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POPE FRANCIS’ REPARATIVE VISION: A 




Various readers of Pope Francis identify in his papal texts a striking openness to uncertainty, 
embodied in a rejection of fear and an embracing of alterity. These themes are united to a 
program of reform touching on doctrinal, ecclesiological, and pastoral matters; as well as 
attendant wider theological, philosophical, and affective issues. However, the general 
unsystematicity of both these readings and Francis’ texts themselves makes it difficult to 
receive those texts in a way that integrates these various themes. 
The critical theorist, Eve Kosovsky Sedgwick distinguishes between paranoid and reparative 
hermeneutics. At the heart of this distinction are their respective attitudes towards 
uncertainty. Paranoid hermeneutics see uncertainty primarily as a source of danger. 
Consequently, they attempt to foreclose uncertainty by deploying totalised, self-confirming 
theories which anticipate and determine their objects so as to construct them as manageable 
threats. In contrast, reparative hermeneutics view uncertainty with hope, looking to it as the 
source of unforeseen joy. Correspondingly, they are less totalising and determining, instead 
allowing the unknown to reveal itself. 
In drawing this typology, Sedgwick integrates affective and epistemological themes in such a 
way as to provide a powerful tool for understanding the cluster of themes identified in 
Francis’ writings. This thesis deploys Sedgwick’s typology in order to produce a 
correspondingly integrated reading of Francis. It constructs a systematic reading of Pope 
Francis’ key papal documents in order to show how he provides theological resources for a 
reparative hermeneutics in Catholic theology, contrasting this with more paranoid impulses 
within the Magisterial tradition as exemplified in John Paul II’s Veritatis Splendor. In doing so, 
it seeks to show how Francis provides the materials for an alternative Catholic imagination, 
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I. INTRODUCTION: FIVE SYMPTOMATIC QUESTIONS 
 
1. THE NEED FOR REPAIR 
1.1. A PROBLEM OF RECEPTION 
Many controversial epithets have been attached to the papacy of Pope Francis, such as 
“revolution”, “change”, “transformation”, “new values” (Panotto, 2018a: xxi). Indeed, 
perhaps the one ubiquitous opinion is that his papacy has been a divisive one. Some of the 
sharpest divisions are around his perceived theological project. 
There are many different analyses of this theological division. One major strand, found in 
commentators such as Hinze, centres the controversy around Francis’ papacy on a conflict 
over the meaning of the Second Vatican Council. For Hinze, Francis is trying to realise the 
“people of God” ecclesiology articulated by the Council, with its decentralising and pastoral 
impulses. Hinze argues that these features of this ecclesiology came under attack during the 
previous two papacies, and that Francis’ papacy represents a somewhat painful turning of 
this tide back to the original vision (2017: Online).  
Kasper warns against reducing Francis to a ‘progressive’ reader of the Council, conceived in 
opposition to ‘conservative’ theologians, on this front (2015: 9). Indeed, Francis has his 
avowedly ‘progressive’ critics such as Cooper (2018) and Carvalhaes (2018), according to 
whom Francis fails to adequately challenge what they see as the Church’s complicity in 
kyriarchy; and Hunt is careful to note that whatever changes Francis seems to be 
inaugurating, they do not amount to a decolonisation of the Church (2018: 98). A more 
nuanced version of this hermeneutic identifies Francis as championing a distinctively 
Argentinian reading of the Council on this front, inspired by the Aparecida document (which 
he helped to write). This includes healing “the wounds of clericalism” (Ivereigh, 2014: 372); 
championing a spirit of “missionary ‘openness’” (Fernández and Rodari, 2016: 22); embracing 
aggiornamento as a given (Faggioli, 2015: 34); a return to a kerygmatic approach to faith 
(Deck, 2016: 3); and a renewed emphasis on inculturation, or the expression of faith in 
diverse cultural forms (Deck, 2016: 72), conceived in Christocentric terms (Luciani, 2017: 
xvii).1 Also along these lines, Tran compares Francis to John XXIII and Paul VI, whom he 
describes as “doctrinally conservative but pastorally sensitive” (2018: 15). Echoing this, 
 
1 Rourke (2016b) and Luciani (2017) give the most complete analysis of Francis along these lines. 
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Carvalhaes contrasts him with Benedict XVI, describing Francis as more closely attuned to 
and concerned with the needs and life of the poor, as opposed to his predecessor’s relatively 
more abstract and Eurocentric focus on doctrine, tradition, and liturgy (2018: 20). 
Not unrelated to Hinze’s analysis is the claim that Francis champions a “change in mentality” 
(Faggioli, 2018: Online). These kinds of narratives tend to focus on an impression that Francis 
seeks a flexible, compassionate ‘pastoral’ orientation in a Church previously dominated by 
an impersonal rigorism. On this point, less favourable commentators identify Francis as 
promulgating laxity, or “uncertainty” around key points of doctrine (Echeverria, 2017: xiv). 
Together, these three narratives show something important about our understanding of 
Francis’ papacy. The first and second indicate that Francis appears to be presenting 
something of a multifaceted theological programme, not in the least because both 
ecclesiology and pastoral theology both impinge on a wide range of theological and practical 
issues. From the third narrative, we should realise that this overall project lacks a clear 
structure. It is difficult to reconcile the individual parts that we encounter with the whole in 
which it ‘makes sense’. This presents a challenge for our reception of those parts, which in 
turn leads to the fragmentation of the Church along these lines of reception – or at least 
enables these lines of reception to reproduce the fragmentations within the Church around 
which these interpretive debates often turn. 
One solution may lie in a systematic account of Francis’ teachings, which indicates their 
mutual relation and thus overall sense and/or force as a unity. Producing this is the task of 
this thesis.2  
A fourth narrative, which is illuminating in this context, is presented by Dionne (2017). 
According to this narrative, Francis champions a rejection of the fear of alterity and 
difference which first arose out of Catholic reactions against modernity, and came to express 
itself in inward-looking and reactionary theology. We can see this narrative at work in 
readings of Francis which highlight a distinctive attitude in his teaching: Francis presents a 
new, “receptive” vision of evangelization, championing an attitude that is “outward looking”, 
with “openness” to the unpredictability that arises from the “uncontainable freedom” of the 
Word (Fernández and Rodari, 2016: 46).  
 
2 In the next chapter, we will address issues associated with reading the texts in this way. 
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This narrative illuminatingly integrates affective and epistemological themes. The 
epistemological theme relates to questions of how the Catholic imagination figures 
difference, alterity, and indeterminacy – things that might appear to Catholicism as 
uncertainty, upsetting its claims to a self-contained, total knowledge. The affective theme 
looks at how our attitudes towards the first theme condition and are conditioned by our 
epistemology. 
This integration serves as the basis for a powerful hermeneutical approach, for two primary 
reasons. Firstly, epistemology has relevance to practically all areas of theology, attending as 
it does to the questions of truth and knowledge which underlie the claims to truth and 
knowledge that constitute our theological positions. Getting a handle on these second-order 
issues is a necessary first step to addressing first-order issues, as answers to these questions 
provide the conditions for assessing how first-order disagreements must be resolved. As 
such, taking epistemology as our hermeneutical locus enables the reader to engage with 
Francis on a higher-order level from which a unified reading of various first-order themes 
and positions can be formed. This in turn facilitates a unified, systematic account of his 
corpus of writings, which is more immediately plural or multivalent. 
Secondly, Francis’ teachings are received in the context of the life of the Church. This includes 
not only our theological thoughts, but also our hopes, fears, loves and desires. Moreover, 
the cognitive, affective, and practical dimensions of our lives are mutually implicating, and 
cannot be separated out from one another (Beck, 1976). A full reception of his theology will 
therefore engage with all of these dimensions. That is, our systematic reading of Francis 
needs to be holistic, in the sense of engaging with the affective and pastoral dimensions of 
his project and its reception. 
1.2. TWO HERMENEUTICS 
In this vein, the reading of Francis constructed in this thesis circulates around these 
integrated concerns. The basic contention of this thesis is that readings such as Dionne’s are 
good. In order to frame this argument, we will employ Sedgwick’s typology of paranoid and 
reparative hermeneutics. 
Sedgwick’s typology articulates a distinction between two broad responses to uncertainty 
which involve both theoretical and affective dimensions. In combining these two dimensions, 
Sedgwick provides a vocabulary to systematically describe in holistic terms the way we as 
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thinking, feeling beings confront the world – that is, a vocabulary which integrates affective 
and epistemological concerns. 
Sedgwick develops her typology in response to the universality of what might broadly be 
described in terms of Ricouer’s “hermeneutics of suspicion” in critical theory (2003: 124). 
Sedgwick associates this ubiquitous hermeneutic with Klein’s paranoid-schizoid position, in 
which the subject takes a stance towards the world characterised by a “terrible alertness” to 
dangers found in threatening objects “that one defensively projects into, carves out of, and 
ingests from the world” (2003: 128). Put broadly, the paranoid position is constantly alert to 
an anticipated threat, which it subsequently reads into, and therefore finds confirmed in, the 
world. Sedgwick identifies five main themes or characteristics of a hermeneutic which arises 
from this process of threat-projection: it is “anticipatory”, “reflexive and mimetic”, “a strong 
theory”, “a theory of negative affects”, and it “places its faith in exposure” (2003: 128). 
Firstly, paranoia is anticipatory insofar as its fundamental imperative is: “There must be no 
bad surprises”. In order to secure this, paranoia seeks to foreclose the possibility of novelty 
as such: the discovery of a ‘bad surprise’ is a ‘bad surprise’ in itself. As such, paranoia posits 
bad news as a given, and as always-already known (Sedgwick, 2003: 130). In other words, we 
might say that a paranoid hermeneutic attempts to determine the scope of possibility, 
foreclosing indeterminacy and uncertainty therein. Moreover, this scope is pessimistic in 
terms of what can arise within it. 
Secondly, paranoia is reflexive and mimetic. Sedgwick writes that it “seems to require being 
imitated to be understood, and it, in turn, seems to understand only by imitation” (2003: 
131). Paranoia only admits accounts of itself within its own terms such that to ‘understand’ 
paranoia is to subscribe to it. It also knows through a process of “knowing and embodying” 
its object (2003: 131), anticipating and reflecting their objects back to themselves in a 
process that continually reproduces and confirms that anticipation (“A paranoid friend, who 
believes I am reading her mind, knows this from reading mine” (2003: 123). 
Sedgwick notes that these mimetic aspects give paranoia an incredible capacity to entrench 
and reproduce itself, foreclosing the possibility of alternative understandings of the world 
through endless self-confirmation as the condition of any inquiry (2003: 132). Consequently, 
a paranoid hermeneutic is a strong theory, with an exhaustive scope to its threat-
anticipations. However, this strength is based upon the constant confirmation of 
anticipations by a totalised method of inquiry that is also founded upon them. Thus paranoia 
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has a “tautological” dynamic: it “can’t help or can’t stop or can’t do anything other than 
prove the very same assumptions with which it began” (2003: 135). In short, paranoid 
hermeneutics are totalising, and therein absolutizing, positing a knowledge that obtains 
exhaustively, and inevitably in all situations, and confirms itself in doing so.  
Through all of this, paranoia is a theory of negative affects. It does not seek pleasure, but 
rather endlessly anticipates and confirms threats in order to forestall pain. Moreover, in 
doing so, it also closes off the possibility of good surprises, in turn reconfirming its affective 
stance (Sedgwick, 2003: 136-8). That is, its absolutizing, determining, and totalising features 
ultimately work in reaction against a world which is anticipated as being hostile, and this 
hostility then serves to justify those features as protective measures.  
Finally, paranoid hermeneutics of suspicion have faith in exposure: it “acts as though its work 
would be accomplished if only it could finally, this time, somehow get its story truly known”, 
seeking constantly to disseminate its findings (Sedgwick, 2003: 138). In this, however, it also 
assumes a context in which the objects of paranoid inquiry are both continuously and 
inevitably present in an obscured manner. On the one hand, this secures the necessity of 
that exposure, but on the other assumes an eternal state of affairs into which they can 
project their anticipated threats (2003: 138-143). Thus their readings become absolutized, 
continuously repeated and projected into eternity. 
Klein’s paranoid-schizoid position is complemented by the depressive position, which 
mitigates anxiety by actively seeking joy. The depressive subject seeks to “repair” the world 
by integrating its threatening parts into a more satisfying whole, which can both “be 
identified with and… offer one nourishment and comfort in return” (Sedgwick, 2003: 128). 
The depressive position is, in a therapeutic context, an “achievement” which involves moving 
away from the hermetic circle of paranoid practices. This new stance allows the other to be 
viewed as something positive, and, where potentially harmful, not merely harmful but as 
“damaged”, eliciting “love and care” rather than rejection (2003: 137). This achievement 
brings with it the possibility for an accompanying reparative hermeneutics (2003: 128). 
Reparative hermeneutics approach indeterminacy hopefully, as a potential source of positive 
affect. Whereas paranoid hermeneutics expect ‘bad surprises’, and seek to avoid them, 
reparative hermeneutics thus allow surprises with a view to the possibility of unforeseen 
pleasure. This gives rise to a hermeneutical distinction: reparative hermeneutics are less 
inclined to posit absolute determinations of the world according to totalised sets of 
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categories or schemas. They do not seek to anticipate their objects, nor foreclose the 
possibility of novelty, instead allowing the objects to challenge the subject and ‘speak for 
themselves’. 
This thesis argues that Francis presents the basis for a reparative stance in Catholic theology, 
specifically towards the unknown and alterity.3 He does this in contrast to a more paranoid 
approach extant in the prior Magisterial tradition (as represented particularly in Veritatis 
splendor), and we will see how this contrast lies at the heart of some of the controversy 
around his papacy. This contrast revolves around a difference in response to the possibility 
of a ‘bad surprise’, particularly in the form of an encounter with something that unsettles 
our certainties, or shows us to be wrong particularly in ways that we cannot anticipate prior 
to the encounter itself. 
Viewed in this context, we can see how Sedgwick’s typology has purchase on our theological 
lives. In particular, she describes the two hermeneutics as interacting in ways that ought to 
be immediately familiar. Firstly, each offers a different kind of assessment of the other. 
Reparative readers view paranoid hermeneutics as a matter of overdetermination and the 
circular restatement of premises. Compare this to the ‘progressive’ Catholic who (perhaps 
crudely) accuses her conservative interlocutor of ‘closed-mindedness’. Against this, the 
paranoid reader may see the application of their strong theory as part of a journey towards 
truth and explanation (Sedgwick, 2003: 135). In this context, reparative hermeneutics, with 
their pursuit of positive affect, are dismissed as ‘mere’ aesthetic pleasure seeking or 
ameliorative reformism that dispenses with truth (2003: 144). Compare this to the 
‘conservative’ interlocutor themselves, who may (perhaps equally crudely) dismiss their 
‘progressive’ counterpart as lacking in ‘rigour’, defecting from the protective, facilitative 
submission to (what they understand to be) the Tradition in their rejection of its 
condemnations. And this is not always entirely unfair: reparative approaches can in practice 
amount to a kind of epistemic mastery, determining their objects to preserve what the 
reader loves and erase what they do not. In contrast, paranoid reading practices can capture 
both the reader’s vulnerability, and the threatening aspects of the text (Tonstad, 2017: 11-
12). 
 
3 Sedgwick herself notes that her typology is not sufficient for diagnosis, but is merely descriptive of 
certain features associated with these approaches. In this vein, when this thesis talks about Francis 
offering a ‘reparative hermeneutic’ (or a text offering a ‘paranoid hermeneutic’), the reader should 
parse this as ‘a hermeneutic with reparative/paranoid features’, rather than a ‘Reparative 
Hermeneutic’ as such.  
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Secondly, N’yong-O notes that while paranoid reading practices are negative-affective, they 
can reflexively serve as sources of positive affect themselves. For example, the paranoid critic 
may employ “recursion”, repeatedly performing paranoid critical readings in the continual 
hope of the possibility of a reparative approach arising (2010: 249). N’yong-O argues that 
societies can form around this practice, finding fulfilment in the activity itself. Likewise, we 
ought to recognise the communities that form around the activity of pre-emptively reading 
familiar theological threats into the world, condemning the latest thing as yet another form 
of ‘Kantianism’, ‘Liberalism’, ‘individualism’, ‘relativism’ and the like, the broad brush of their 
characterisations serving more to facilitate the collective activity of painting in general rather 
than reproducing the fine details – which may otherwise trouble their easy antagonism. 
Likewise, we frequently negotiate these two features in the course of our own reflective 
practice as theologians. With regards to the question of mastery, when we encounter 
something that potentially troubles our certainties, we often find ourselves asking, “am I 
being faithful to the truth, or am I actually trying to master my object – and why?” With 
regards to hermeneutics as practice, we ask, “what role is my theologising playing for me? 
What am I getting out of the activity, and is this appropriate?” Moreover, we often find 
ourselves criticised over our answers.  
One point of contrast between our use of this typology and Sedgwick’s is that Sedgwick seeks 
to reveal the way affect is performed in different reading practices so as to draw our 
attention to it, and thereby enable us to evaluate them on this basis. She is first oriented to 
the problematic by the realisation that having a certain view of the world does not commit 
us to any given response to it. For example, the knowledge that the US government may well 
have engineered the AIDS crisis (even if it in actuality did not) is “separable from the question 
of whether the energies of a given AIDS activist or intellectual group might best be used in 
the tracing and exposure of such a plot” (2003: 124). That is, knowledge has a descriptive 
aspect, but it also has a distinct performative dimension, to which the latter consideration 
belongs. To this end, she actively seeks to disentangle the question of which kind of 
hermeneutic we should employ from the question of the truth of their interpretations (2003: 
130).  
In contrast, the central claim of this thesis is that Francis outlines a theological rationale for 
a Catholic imagination characterised by a reparative stance towards uncertainty. That is, we 
seek to link the content of knowledge as rationale to the performative dimension. 
8 
 
However, our approach is not entirely different from Sedgwick here: Sedgwick’s project is to 
enable us to evaluate the affective component of our interpretive practices, and these 
practices by this component. However, in order to make these assessments we must be 
committed to some account of the world in light of which we can make our decisions about 
our affective responses. For example, her AIDS activist may be able to choose how they react 
to their knowledge of the government’s disregard for queer communities, but they do so on 
the basis of their other cognitively held values, knowledge of strategy, etc. Consequently, 
even for Sedgwick, the performative follows from the descriptive component of their 
knowledge – just not the knowledge for which the performance is being decided. 
The key difference between Francis and Sedgwick lies in the kinds of knowledge from which 
this performance flows. For Francis, these truths are fundamentally theological ones – truths 
which are given over to us by the very hermeneutics about which Sedgwick seeks to enable 
us to decide. This results in a certain circularity: we can only make these decisions ‘from 
within’ a given hermeneutic. Consequently, we cannot so easily disentangle the content of 
knowledge from the question of its performance in this context. 
This also exerts a particular pressure on Francis. It is not merely sufficient for him to show 
the possibility of a reparative alternative to entrenched paranoid tendencies in Catholic 
theology. Rather, he has to ‘show the way out’ of paranoia, accompanying us in a shift from 
paranoia towards a more reparative stance. That is, his theoretical project needs to be 
underpinned by a pastoral one. A common, often dismissive trope is that, whereas Benedict 
XVI was ‘a theologian’, Francis is ‘a pastor’. In drawing this opposition, the trope obscures a 
more subtle interplay between the two roles that we will attempt to bring out in Francis, 
most explicitly in our final chapter. 
2. THE PARANOID PARADIGM 
2.1. SOME PRELIMINARY QUALIFICATIONS 
Because outlining Francis’ reparative vision is itself a thesis-length task, and must be done 
prior to any in-depth discussion of the contentions around it, this thesis does not attempt to 
identify all the controversial aspects of Francis teaching, or to outline these controversies 
themselves. However, it would nevertheless help to have a ‘horizon’ against which we can 
understand the reparative dimensions of Francis’ teachings. 
Moreover, a discussion of theological hermeneutics in themselves is unavoidably both 
abstract and general. This risks obscuring the pressing, concrete issues which arise from 
9 
 
debates in this sphere – which is both unhelpful in the context of our project, and morally 
dubious in the sense of reducing away the concerns that dominate peoples’ lives through 
abstraction. A finer-grained analysis of the controversy around Francis’ teachings in light of 
these issues will provide a more substantive picture of its implications for theology, and 
thereby start to bring this thesis into contact with the day-to-day life of the Church. It will 
also, hopefully, do justice to the concerns in this sphere by engaging positively with the issues 
as they appear within those concerns, as expressed by those who hold them.  
As such, the remainder of this chapter will therefore look to one of the most notorious 
theological controversies of his papacy: that around his pastoral vision, as outlined in his 
apostolic exhortation, Amoris Laetitia. It will show how the reaction against certain features 
of the document can be understood as the operation of a paranoid hermeneutical stance 
within Catholic theology. In doing so, it will equip us to recognise the contrastingly reparative 
orientation of Francis’ own theology. 
Before we begin however, it is worth stating that “paranoid” and “reparative” as Sedgwick 
employs them are not intended to be loaded terms, and each can be more or less appropriate 
in a given context (as mentioned above). 4  Nevertheless, “paranoia” does have a 
pathologizing ring to it. Similar points can be said for my descriptors of determination, 
totalisation, absolutisation. The aim of this thesis is not, however, to assassinate positions 
by portraying them as pathological. Indeed, this is not ultimately possible: as mentioned 
previously, we cannot detach our choice between hermeneutics from the knowledge given 
by those hermeneutics themselves. Consequently,if this thesis has a critical dialectical edge, 
it rather lies in presenting an alternative in the first place,5 and in indicating a way out of 
paranoia and into a reparative approach – something we shall return to in our discussion of 
the pastoral dimension of Francis’ theology in our conclusion. 
In this vein, over the course of writing this thesis, I have become aware that I am a naturally 
paranoid thinker. For example, the first piece of writing I produced for a supervision was a 
 
4 Hence her activist must decide whether their energies might “best be used” in pursuing a paranoid 
approach: an issue about which Sedgwick is ultimately ambivalent: “they might, but then again they 
might not” (2003: 124). 
5 Which would indicate the impossibility of the totalised approaches that these positions embody and 
defend, although someone truly committed to them may dismiss the viability of this alternative 
precisely on this basis, for example by claiming that it breaks with the vision of VS. In chapter seven, 
we will talk about second-order indeterminacy, offering an argument for why we can never be certain 
of possessing totality. Granting this would undermine appeals to paranoid totality, but the argument 
is offered as incidental support for a presupposition that resolves an apparent aporia in Francis’ 
‘alternative’, rather than being made by way of merely presenting Francis’ ‘alternative’ itself. 
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methodological essay which attempted to anticipate every possible issue, spiralling wildly 
out of control in layers of redundant reflexivity. My supervisor, on reading it, described my 
writing as if I’d “seen a nugget of wisdom in a neighbouring field, and then built a tank to go 
and retrieve it”. This feedback has stuck with me throughout the writing process, and I have 
great sympathy and perhaps even affinity for the paranoid impulses Francis critiques. 
Moreover, with regards to my descriptors, we might question where our negative reaction 
comes from: is it because we instinctively reject ideas of determination, totalisation, and 
absolutisation? Why? Indeed, we are about to look at John Paul II’s encyclical, Veritatis 
Splendor (1983), as an example of a ‘paranoid’ hermeneutic in Catholic theology. We ought 
not to read this as undermining the document: what it rather shows is that there is a way of 
understanding Catholicism in light of which these descriptors can take on a positive 
significance – that is, as features of a properly formed approach to the faith. 
As mentioned above, the purpose of this thesis is to show how Francis articulates a 
reparative alternative to Catholic paranoia. What this thesis does not attempt to do is to 
show that this paranoia is in any sense wrong – although it will show where it seems 
wrongheaded from the perspective of a reparative approach. And if our instinctive response 
to the features of paranoid theology is negative, then this may or may not have significance, 
pending further justification. However, it is not the fact of the paranoia itself that is 
significant. 
2.2. VERITATIS SPLENDOR 
A significant basis for much of this contention lies in John Paul II’s encyclical, Veritatis 
Splendor. This contention circulates around specific ethical concepts condemned within the 
encyclical, but also, as we shall see, around challenges which Francis poses to the strongly 
paranoid hermeneutic that it constructs. As such, in order to ‘set our scene’, as well as to 
familiarise ourselves with paranoid hermeneutics in Catholic theology, we shall begin by 
reading VS with an eye to these issues.  This is not to say that VS is in any sense the origin 
point of Catholic paranoia, although the encyclical certainly constitutes a significant moment 
in its history. However, it is specifically referenced as a basis for paranoid hermeneutics in 
the context of the discussion around AL. As such, beginning with VS will equip us to 
understand the controversy around AL, and then the wider hermeneutical orientation of 
Francis’ teachings. We will move from this to present our systematic reading of Francis. 
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VS responds to what it identifies as a “systematic” attack on traditional Church teachings (VS 
§4). It warns that “within the context of the theological debates which followed the Council, 
there have developed certain interpretations of Christian morality which are not consistent 
with "sound teaching" (2 Tim 4:3)” (VS §32). These are, as the encyclical refers to them 
throughout, “proportionalism” and “teleologism”6. However, as Lash points out, the “central 
and overriding aim” of the encyclical is to shore up the authority of the moral principles 
taught by the Magisterium (1994: 23). 
In this vein, the encyclical identifies the origin of this attack as lying in certain philosophical 
developments which have come to influence theology. These are “currents of thought which 
end by detaching human freedom from its essential and constitutive relationship to truth” 
(VS §4). More specifically, the “truth” the absoluteness of which is under threat here is moral 
law. It notes that “some present-day cultural tendencies have given rise to several currents 
of thought in ethics which centre upon an alleged conflict between freedom and law”. These 
tendencies “grant to individuals or social groups the right to determine what is good or evil,” 
which it argues affords to human freedom “a primacy over truth” (VS §35). 
The outworking of this, the encyclical claims, is twofold: Firstly, it results in the collapse of 
the ability of both “the traditional doctrine regarding the natural law”, and the Magisterium 
who promotes it, to determine moral belief. Secondly, it challenges the universalisation and 
“permanent validity” of the precepts associated with that doctrine. In this context, the 
individual is left to “independently make his or her decisions and life choices”, aided but not 
directed by a Magisterium that can only “exhort consciences” and “propose values” (VS §40). 
The encyclical rejects the totalisation of any one meta-ethics as a response to this situation, 
stating that “the Church's Magisterium does not intend to impose upon the faithful any 
particular theological system, still less a philosophical one”. 7  However, in line with the 
teaching function outlined above, it states that the Magisterium nevertheless has the “duty” 
 
6  For an extended discussion of “proportionalism” and the debate around it, see Hoose (1987). 
However, what is significant for our thesis is not how VS treats proportionalism specifically, but what 
the figure of proportionalism represents more generally. We shall discuss this below. 
7 This refers to neo-Thomism: Called for by Pope Leo XIII in his Aeterni patris (1879), neo-Thomism 
built upon a tradition of Neo-Scholasticism spearheaded in the mid 19th Century by Pius IX and the 
German Jesuit theologian, Joseph Kleutgen (Haldane, 1999: 163-4), and was developed and enforced 
over the next hundred years to the point of becoming the dominant paradigm in Catholic theology. 
We should not, however, read this as a total abandonment of many features of this paradigm: firstly, 
as we shall see later, John Paul II (following Paul VI) arguably recovered themes around authority often 
associated with it. Secondly, he continues the 20th Century Thomist revival in Fides et Ratio (1998) – 
although in a manner that differs from the previous tradition by endorsing a specific doctrine within 
20th Century Thomism (actus essendi), rather than Thomism as a whole (Knasas, 2000: 407). 
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to declare that these developments are “incompatible with revealed truth” (VS §29). Against 
these, the encyclical seeks to articulate “the principles necessary for discerning what is 
contrary to "sound doctrine", drawing attention to those elements of the Church's moral 
teaching which today appear particularly exposed to error, ambiguity or neglect” (VS §30). 
With regards to our thesis, as we shall see, this ‘sound doctrine’ is that which safeguards the 
power of the Magisterium to determine moral theology. It does so by treating a number of 
controversial topics in light of a common theme: that the good, human dignity, or human 
freedom (in both the sense of flourishing and autonomy) are functions of obedience to the 
moral law. This law is taught authoritatively by the Church, so this obedience is co-extensive 
with obedience to the Magisterium. As a result the magisterium is placed in an absolute 
position relative to the field of moral theology. Moreover, insofar as it establishes this 
position within a magisterial document, this move has a reflexive dimension which attempts 
to determine moral theology such that it can only indicate this absoluteness and determining 
power; and also to foreclose the moral-theological imagination beyond the magisterium, 
which is thus totalised. 
2.2.1. THE MORAL LIFE AND THE MORAL LAW  
This theme is first developed in relation to a particular construal of the moral life, and its 
relation to the possibility of moral knowledge. VS begins by affirming the necessity of the 
moral law to the moral life. It does so by linking the moral law to revelation, the response to 
which lies at the heart of the whole of Christian life. 
VS locates the basis of moral knowledge in a response to revelation. However, this 
conception of revelation is characteristically post-Vatican II – it is not a set of propositions 
imparted from on high, but the person of God Himself. It begins with an exegesis of the story 
of the young man in Mt 19:16-21, who asks Christ about the nature of the good. Christ 
responds by telling the young man to look towards God’s commandments (VS §6-9). What 
this indicates, according to VS, is that  
To ask about the good, in fact, ultimately means to turn towards God, the fullness of 
goodness. Jesus shows that the young man's question is really a religious question, 
and that the goodness that attracts and at the same time obliges man has its source 




That is, the moral life is a matter of response to revelation. However, the personal nature of 
revelation and the Good does not mean that the moral life itself, which occurs in response 
to it, has a non-propositional form. Rather, “[a]cknowledging the Lord as God is the very core, 
the heart of the Law, from which the particular precepts flow and towards which they are 
ordered” (VS §11). That is, this revelation, and so the moral life itself, is constituted by the 
ten commandments. Consequently, our response to this revelation, and thus the moral life 
itself, lies in obedience to the commandments. 
VS now develops this in order to connect freedom with obedience to this Law. The encyclical 
does this by invoking the idea of the natural law: God creates and orders humanity towards 
its final end by infusing us with “the light of understanding” with regards to morality. This 
infused understanding is “the natural law” (VS §12). VS argues that the precepts evident to 
the natural law are the precepts of the decalogue: because our fulfilment, or our good, lies 
in God, and because it is through obeying the ten commandments that we attain this good, 
the natural law also directs us towards following the commandments. Indeed, the 
commandments themselves are a gift, and therein a sign of the promise of this fulfilment (VS 
§12). Furthermore, VS notes, when the young man asks Jesus as to which commandments 
he ought to follow, Jesus directs him towards those “regarding one’s neighbour”. This 
indicates the ““centrality” of the Decalogue with regard to every other precept”. Moreover, 
VS claims, Christ’s focus on those specifically relating to love of neighbour demonstrates that 
“[t]he different commandments of the Decalogue are really only so many reflections of the 
one commandment about the good of the person, at the level of the many different goods 
which characterize his identity as a spiritual and bodily being”. That is, these 
commandments, in their concern for the good of the person, are “the first necessary step on 
the journey towards freedom, its starting-point” – that is, they outline the basic conditions 
for the fulfilment of our end (VS §13). 
These commandments are “negative precepts”, which “are meant to safeguard the good of 
the person… by protecting his goods”. These goods are “human life, the communion of 
persons in marriage, private property, truthfulness and people's good name” (VS §13). 
However, invoking Augustine, VS notes that they are merely “the beginning of freedom”, in 
which one is “free from crimes... such as murder, adultery, fornication, theft, fraud, sacrilege 
and so forth”. In contrast, we are directed towards “perfect freedom” (Augustine, in VS §13). 
This perfect freedom is attained through the “fulfilment” of the commandments, which lies 
in “interiorizing their demands and by bringing out their fullest meaning”. This means 
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cultivating “love”, which actively “protects and promotes” the goods of the person (VS §15). 
The nature of this love is outlined in the Beatitudes. These “speak of basic attitudes and 
dispositions in life” in which we attain our end, outlining the “horizon of the perfection” to 
which we are oriented by the commandments (VS §16). That is, when we are ‘the poor in 
spirit’, ‘the peacemakers’, ‘the meek’ etc., we will be properly ‘loving’, and therein have 
attained our Good. This love can also be thought of in terms of self-gift, as evidenced in how 
“Jesus himself is the living "fulfilment" of the Law inasmuch as he fulfils its authentic meaning 
by the total gift of himself” (VS §15). 
However, to attain this, we must already have “that maturity in self-giving to which human 
freedom is called” (VS §17). VS uses ‘freedom’ in a second sense here. VS later quotes 
Dignitatis humane to define this freedom as being the capacity of an agent to “decide on 
their actions on grounds of duty and conscience, without external pressure or coercion” 
(Dignitaries humane §1; in VS §31). We might gloss this as autonomy, wherein the agent 
‘gives themselves’ the law by which they act. In this context, to attain ‘freedom’ in the sense 
of our end requires the capacity for self-giving which is a constituent part of that end. This 
enables us to exercise our agency in order to perform this self-giving – that is, to love. 
This places us in a paradoxical position: in order to attain our end, we must possess a 
condition which is constitutive of that end – thereby requiring us to have already attained 
our end. More specifically, this also implies that our end includes unconstrained agency.8 VS 
moves from this to outline the relationship between the commandments and human agency: 
the law directs us towards our end, wherein we find the capacity for love. Moreover, it is 
only in love that we find freedom in both senses of the word. Thus it is only through following 
the law that we achieve autonomy. That is, we “find in God's Law the fundamental and 
necessary way in which to practise love as something freely chosen and freely lived out” (VS 
§18). Without it, we remain constrained insofar as we are unable to exercise our agency in 
this manner. And, conversely, people who have cultivated love no longer find that law a 
constraint upon them. Rather, recognising its true relation to love, they “feel an interior urge 
— a genuine "necessity" and no longer a form of coercion — not to stop at the minimum 
demands of the Law, but to live them in their "fullness"” (VS §18). We noted previously that 
this ‘fullness’ lies precisely in love. As such, to put it another way, we might say that love wills 
itself. 
 
8 At least with regards to the capacity for self-giving. 
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Grace resolves this paradox, granting us our end and the conditions proper to it: VS describes 
the beatitudes first and foremost as “promises”, from which “normative indications” only 
“indirectly flow”. As such, they are not just injunctions to (for example) ‘be meek’ or even to 
love, but are “invitations to discipleship and to communion of life with Christ”, who 
exemplifies them (VS §16). As such, they are not something which must be worked towards 
across the paradox, but are rather something which is given in totality as grace (VS §21). In 
this way, we “become capable of this love only by virtue of a gift received” (VS §22). We are 
made righteous according to the Law by grace, and not through following the Law under our 
own power (which, for this reason, is impossible) (VS §23). In this context, the Law has a 
“pedagogic function”, making us aware of our lack of righteousness and thus of the need to 
turn to Christ for the grace by which we can be righteous (VS §23). 
VS continues to argue that the awareness of having received this gift “generates and sustains 
the free response of a full love for God and the brethren” in us (VS §24). That is, our 
obedience to the Law is an autonomous response, because it arises from the love within us. 
However, God grants the condition for our obedience to His demands in the form of the law 
– that is, it is also (indirectly) received from outside in the form of its condition of possibility 
(love).9  
Moreover, the fact that love is received as a gift “reinforces the moral demands of love”. This 
is because, VS argues, “[o]ne can "abide" in love only by keeping the commandments, as 
Jesus states: "If you keep my commandments, you will abide in my love, just as I have kept 
my Father's commandments and abide in his love" (Jn 15:10)” (VS §24). That is, our reception 
of the gift of love is dependent upon our continuous obedience to the Law. 
2.2.2. THE MORAL LAW AND THE MAGISTERIUM  
Having established that human freedom (in both senses of the word) is contingent upon, and 
realised in, obedience to the Law, the encyclical now moves to associate obedience to the 
Law with obedience to the Magisterium. 
It begins by arguing that the moral life, so construed, is inseparable from the wider faith of 
the Church: “The Church is in fact a communion both of faith and of life; her rule of life is 
"faith working through love" (Gal 5:6)” (VS §26). This is evidenced by how the Letters of the 
apostles provide a “moral catechesis” - they “contain the interpretation… of the Lord's 
 
9 Whether or not this constitutes genuine freedom (in the second sense) is a long-debated issue. 
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precepts as they are to be lived in different cultural circumstances”. VS is careful to note here 
that these interpretations are “made under the guidance of the Holy Spirit” (VS §26). 
The encyclical then makes the leap to claiming that the unity of the Church is disrupted when 
its members neglect the Law.10 It states that “the unity of the Church is damaged not only by 
Christians who… disregard the moral obligations to which they are called by the Gospel (cf. 
1 Cor 5:9-13)” (VS §26). 
This provides the basis for the argument that the Church’s teaching authority includes the 
power to determine moral issues. It claims that “[w]ithin the unity of the Church, promoting 
and preserving the faith and the moral life is the task entrusted by Jesus to the Apostles (cf. 
Mt 28:19-20), a task which continues in the ministry of their successors”. Moreover, guided 
by the Holy Spirit, the Church receives and interprets the Gospel and the Law in an 
“authentic” way (VS §28). It quotes Dei verbum to particularly identify the Magisterium as 
being given “the task of authentically interpreting the word of God, whether in its written 
form or in that of Tradition”, and exercising its authority in doing so “in the name of Jesus 
Christ” (Dei Verbum §10; in VS §27). As such, VS quotes the Code of Canon Law to assert that 
“the Church has the right always and everywhere to proclaim moral principles, even in 
respect of the social order, and to make judgments about any human matter in so far as this 
is required by fundamental human rights or the salvation of souls” (CCL 747; in VS §27). 
The Church also manifests this interpretation in “practice”, which serves as a “sign and fruit 
of a deeper insight into Revelation and of an understanding in the light of faith of new 
historical and cultural situations”. However, VS asserts, this practice is determined by the 
Church’s tradition of interpretation, which stands as absolute in relation to the process of 
interpretation in the present: “it can only confirm the permanent validity of Revelation and 
follow in the line of the interpretation given to it by the great Tradition of the Church's 
teaching and life, as witnessed by the teaching of the Fathers, the lives of the Saints, the 
Church's Liturgy and the teaching of the Magisterium” (VS §28). 
In summary, according to VS, Revelation, in a post-Vatican II personal sense, underpins the 
moral life. However, this life necessarily includes the Law. Moreover, the Magisterium is the 
 
10 This is a leap in the sense that it occludes a hidden premise which claims that a necessary condition 
for the unity of the Church is communion in registers of both faith and moral life. We can see why this 
would be the case: we saw above that, for VS, love is only possible conditional upon our keeping the 
Law. Thus our faith is conditional upon our living the moral life. This also means that the unity of the 
Church is conditional upon our living the moral life: if the communion of faith was sufficient for unity, 
communion in the moral life remains a necessary condition of this communion. 
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prime interpreter of this Law. Thus the moral life ought to be determined by the teaching of 
the Magisterium, in which it performs this interpretative function. 
This determining function is then initially defended against challenges to it based on the 
sense that it infringes the rightful freedom of individual moral agents. Firstly, through the 
argument about the relationship between Law and freedom: following the Law does not 
infringe upon freedom, but rather both grants freedom in the sense of attaining our end, and 
also autonomy through enabling us to freely make a self-gift. Because we follow the Law 
through obeying the teachings of the Magisterium, this means that obeying the teachings of 
the Magisterium does not mean a constraint on our freedom in either sense. Indeed, it is 
actually the condition of that freedom. 
Secondly, through the introduction of a sin narrative, which casts doubt on any intuitions 
that there is nevertheless something oppressive going on here: in summary, the encyclical 
argues that if we have love, we will desire love, and that if we desire love, we will desire 
obedience to the Law. The upshot of this is that if we don’t desire obedience to the law, we 
do not will love, and thus also do not have love. Because obeying the magisterium is co-
extensive with obeying the law, to will obedience to the law is to will obedience to the 
magisterium. Thus if we do not will obedience to the magisterium, we do not have love. 
This mirrors statements made in the opening of the encyclical: VS asserts that we are “made 
holy by “obedience to the truth” (1 Pet 1:22)” (VS: Blessing). However, because of original 
sin, we are tempted to turn away from God and the truth in which we are made holy. As a 
result, our “capacity to know the truth is weakened”. This results in our giving ourselves over 
to “relativism and scepticism”, which leads us to pursue “an illusory freedom apart from 
truth itself” (VS §1). That is, the cause of our seeking ‘freedom’ beyond the determinations 
of the Law (read: the Magisterium) is our sinful nature. 
This narrative, in both its forms, serves to evacuate the force from any arguments against 
this schema by associating that force with the effects of sin (rather than epistemic norms). 
This propadeutic strategy, which seeks to bypass any such arguments themselves, works in 
tandem with arguments later in the encyclical to the effect that moral theologians must 
conform to the teachings of the Magisterium regardless of the strength of arguments against 
them. We will return to this presently.  
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2.2.3. TEACHING AND TOTALITY  
We might note here that this schema is not necessarily as determining as it first appears. It 
leaves undefined both the meaning of “obedience” and “Magisterium”. This leaves open the 
possibility for more subtle indeterminacy, based on notions of dissent which construe 
themselves as in some way being an expression of obedience, or of the Magisterium itself. 
For example, Salzman distinguishes between two approaches to obedience here, each 
turning on a different interpretation of the term “religiosum obsequium”, or the “religious 
respect… of intellect and will” (in distinction from “the assent of faith”) which Canon Law 
stipulates is to be afforded to “the teaching which the Supreme Pontiff or the College of 
bishops enunciate on faith or morals when they exercise the authentic magisterium” such 
that “the Christian faithful… take care to avoid whatever is not in harmony with that 
teaching” (Coriden, CCL 752; in Salzman, 2004: 77). Veritatis splendour defends a reading of 
this term analogous to “assent and submission”. In contrast, the “revisionist” theologies 
which the encyclical addresses would interpret it in a sense more akin to “respect” or 
“submission” (Salzman, 2004: 77). Salzman illustrates this distinction by way of models of 
responsibility: the former invokes “a largely authoritarian and hierarchical parent-child 
model”, in which the magisterium functions like “the parent who teaches a child, and yet, 
when that child resists or questions that teaching, utilizes his or her authority to ensure 
obedience”. In contrast, the latter reading invokes a “responsible-dialogical” relationship 
between conscience and the magisterium, in which the magisterium recognises the need for 
development and refinement of its insights (where not definitively promulgated), and the 
active role of the whole of the Church and the sciences in this process (2004: 78). In this 
context, while conscience must always consult the magisterium, which enjoys a presumption 
of truth, it also serves as a source of corrective insight in this process (2004: 79). Thus a 
believer who “cannot intellectually assent to a particular teaching… can faithfully dissent 
from this teaching, while, at the same time, respecting the authority of the magisterium” 
(2004: 78). 
An example of this would be critiquing an encyclical by reference to an established principle 
of faith, thereby opposing nominally Magisterial teaching from a position of obedience to 
the (prior) Magisterium, or as an expression thereof. This could take a more or less 
controversial form. For example, we might employ the ‘letter’ of a prior document to critique 
a newer one, such as we shall see in the case of the dubia about Amoris Laetitia. 
Alternatively, we might make reference to a less easily defined principle, such as the ‘spirit’ 
of the Second Vatican Council; or “reflection on faith as liberation praxis”, derived from a 
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kerygmatic option for the poor (Gutierrez, 1979: 22). However, VS works to preclude the 
possibility particularly of this kind of dissent. 11  It does so by systematically attacking 
principles upon which freedom in the face of the determinate teachings of the Church as 
actually promulgated might be founded. 
2.2.3.1. CONSCIENCE 
One particularly clear example of this is its teachings on the dignity of conscience, which 
forms the basis for a condemnation of any dissent simpliciter on the part of moral 
theologians. This means that the positive determinations of the Magisterium itself stake out 
limits of thought ‘within’ the Church, thereby totalising them. This is reflexively supported 
by the fact that VS itself is a magisterial document: we know the Magisterium is totalised in 
this way because that is what it authoritatively teaches. Thus, if we accept the Magisterium, 
we must accept its self-totalization. 
VS finds this dangerous opposition of freedom and law in the development of “a "creative" 
understanding of moral conscience, which diverges from the teaching of the Church's 
tradition and her Magisterium” (VS §54). This development is premised on the idea that 
general moral norms “cannot be expected to foresee and to respect all the individual 
concrete acts of the person in all their uniqueness and particularity”. As such, the moral 
agent must ultimately make a decision about moral situations in a way that goes beyond the 
descriptions provided by such norms. In this context, conscience “leads man not so much to 
a meticulous observance of universal norms as to a creative and responsible acceptance of 
the personal tasks entrusted to him by God”. Conscience thus no longer merely makes 
“judgments” (that is, representing situations under universal, morally-weighted categories 
of action), but rather makes “decisions” about the application of these categories themselves 
(VS §55). 
Supposing this, VS claims that certain thinkers then move to claim that “autonomous” 
decision-making is a feature of moral “maturity”. Thus in order to live in a mature way, we 
must have the liberty to choose to discard the moral law (as promulgated by the Church) in 
certain situations. In this context, it notes, “[s]ome even hold that this process of maturing 
is inhibited by the excessively categorical position adopted by the Church's Magisterium in 
 
11 This is an issue with the dubia which its authors do not seem to recognise. Indeed, somewhat 
ironically, many self-identified ‘neo-conservatives’ or ‘traditionalists’ now must learn to occupy 
positions ruled out by the ecclesiology outlined in VS, which they originally championed (Faggioli, 
2016b: Online).  
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many moral questions; for them, the Church's interventions are the cause of 
unnecessary conflicts of conscience” (VS §55). 
VS further claims that, “[i]n order to justify these positions”, particular theologians make 
recourse to “a certain more concrete existential consideration” that has priority over 
abstract and doctrinal considerations. This consideration takes into account situational 
elements in order to indicate “exceptions to the general rule”. In doing so, it can “permit one 
to do in practice and in good conscience what is qualified as intrinsically evil by the moral 
law”. This establishes a “separation, or even an opposition” between general precepts, and 
“the norm of the individual conscience” which can overrule them (VS §56). 
Against this, VS promotes an understanding of conscience as a process of applying the 
universal precepts of the natural law to particular situations in order to formulate moral 
obligation, which it reads in both Romans 2:14-15 and Bonaventure (VS §57-9). It reiterates 
that natural law “discloses the objective and universal demands of the moral good”. In this 
context, conscience “is the application of the law to a particular case”, presenting the 
individual not with an opportunity to accept or reject certain obligations, but with the 
obligation itself that flows from the precepts of the law in the context of a given action. The 
encyclical puts it in Neo-Scholastic terms: “The judgment of conscience states "in an ultimate 
way" whether a certain particular kind of behaviour is in conformity with the law; it 
formulates the proximate norm of the morality of a voluntary act, "applying the objective 
law to a particular case"” (VS §59). That is, it represents the situation under a determinate 
set of terms, with associated norms, constituted by the universal maxims of the natural law. 
Indeed, the encyclical notes, conscience cannot play a creative role: the divine law is the 
“universal and objective norm of morality” from which conscience acquires its dignity and 
force. Thus, if we are to speak in terms of ‘maturity’ of conscience, this can only come from 
attention to the divine law -that is, “an insistent search for truth and by allowing oneself to 
be guided by that truth in one's actions” (VS §61).  
VS construes this in terms of a dialectic between “subjective” and “objective” principles. The 
conscience is a “subjective” principle, which communicates the “objective” truth of the 
divine law. This accounts for the possibility of error in conscience: “In the case of the correct 
conscience, it is a question of the objective truth received by man; in the case of the 
erroneous conscience, it is a question of what man, mistakenly, subjectively considers to be 
true” (VS §63).  
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Moreover, it stipulates, “[i]t is never acceptable to confuse a "subjective" error about moral 
good with the "objective" truth”, nor “to make the moral value of an act performed with a 
true and correct conscience equivalent to the moral value of an act performed by following 
the judgment of an erroneous conscience” (VS §63). That is, an erroneous conscience can 
never redeem objectively immoral behaviour, even if we may not be culpable for it. 
Moreover, we can be culpable for our erroneous conscience where that error arises through 
a failure to cultivate it on our part. Indeed, such an erroneous conscience “compromises” 
the dignity of that conscience (VS §65). 
However, it notes, “Christians have a great help for the formation of conscience in the Church 
and her Magisterium”. Invoking Dignitatis Humanae (§14), it asserts that the role of the 
Church is to inform conscience of the truth. Moreover, we cannot conceive of the Church in 
doing so as infringing upon the freedom or dignity of conscience for two reasons: firstly, 
because it provides the truth from which the rightful dignity and freedom of conscience 
derives; and secondly, because the principles that it provides are principles internal to right 
conscience, thus a conscience which functions in a way determined by them is acting 
autonomously (VS §64). 
In other words, we must obey the Church even where our conscience seems to say otherwise 
– to fail to do so is to indulge in an error in conscience, and culpably so; and also to surrender 
the dignity of that conscience. In short, conscience loses its dignity precisely when it ceases 
to agree with the Magisterium.12 
Porter (1995) frames this in a different way. She notes that VS fails to recognise the ways in 
which the moral concepts that frame universal precepts (such as ‘murder’ or ‘adultery’) 
admit “indeterminacy”. In emphasising the universal truth of the precepts, it inadvertently 
renders them, by omission, more general in scope (i.e. the range of particular historical 
situations in which they obtain) than they might be (1995: 208). As a result, there is less room 
for interpretation with regards to how those norms obtain in our moral lives – for example, 
which situations of killing constitute instances of murder. This indeterminacy allows the 
possibility that “people can share basic moral commitments, and yet disagree deeply and in 
good faith on the practical implications of these commitments”. This is reinforced by the 
encyclical’s identification of apparent indeterminacy in (i.e. disagreement about) moral 
issues with the results of a sinful impulse towards abandonment of the precepts, leading to 
 
12 We might wonder what the implications here are for human dignity and freedom, given the earlier 
argument that they derive from obedience in an analogous way. 
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a “pessimistic view of actual moral communities”. This reduction of possible legitimate 
interpretations within the moral community of the Church, alongside a pessimistic approach 
towards the moral reasoning of its members, leads to a corresponding emphasis on 
“authoritative guidance”. This amounts to the totalization of the interpretations of the 
Magisterium, which emerges as the sole authoritative voice on Catholic moral discourse 
(1995: 212). 
2.2.3.2. MORAL THEOLOGY 
This serves as the basis for a determining program for Catholic moral theology. VS asserts 
that moral theologians “have the grave duty to instruct the faithful — especially future 
Pastors — about all those commandments and practical norms authoritatively declared by 
the Church”. Moreover, it stipulates that  
While recognizing the possible limitations of the human arguments employed by the 
Magisterium, moral theologians are called to develop a deeper understanding of the 
reasons underlying its teachings and to expound the validity and obligatory nature of 
the precepts it proposes, demonstrating their connection with one another and their 
relation with man's ultimate end. 
(VS §110) 
In other words, theologians are charged with articulating and defending the teachings of the 
Magisterium even where the Magisterium itself does not give fully adequate justifications for 
those teachings. On this note, VS demands “loyal assent, both internal and external, to the 
Magisterium's teaching in the areas of both dogma and morality”. That is, its stipulates that 
there can be no dissent, nor disobedience, on the part of moral theologians (VS §110). 
Indeed, it claims, 
Opposition to the teaching of the Church's Pastors cannot be seen as a legitimate 
expression either of Christian freedom or of the diversity of the Spirit's gifts… the right 
of the faithful to receive Catholic doctrine in its purity and integrity must always be 
respected… "Never forgetting that he too is a member of the People of God, the 
theologian must be respectful of them, and be committed to offering them a teaching 
which in no way does harm to the doctrine of the faith". 
(VS §113) 
This passage brings into contact all the themes previously identified: Christian freedom 
cannot be conceived as in opposition to the teaching of the Church. Rather, human freedom 
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consists in being able to (there is a right to) receive this teaching with fidelity. Thus the 
theologian must be committed to teaching in a way that does not challenge it. As a result, 
the teachings of the Magisterium are placed in determining relation to moral theology.  
Moreover, VS accounts for this relationship in such a way that theology becomes unable to 
challenge the Magisterium, absolutizing this determining relationship: even if the teachings 
of the Magisterium seem to fail to meet epistemic standards, its authority holds; and all 
opposition to the Magisterium on the part of theologians is forbidden for the sake of the 
faithful. 
Finally, where there was previously ambiguity around what could be identified as enjoying 
this authority (such that a dissenter could potentially make claim to be speaking for the 
Tradition), this is no longer possible. In discussing “human arguments employed by the 
Magisterium”, VS situates these stipulations in the context of specific, positive teachings – 
what is concretely written down in its documents, such that it could be defended by 
arguments. As such, the precluded “[o]pposition to the teaching of the Church’s Pastors” 
must be read in terms of the specific pastors teaching today (e.g. John Paul II, Cardinal 
Ratzinger, Pope Francis etc.). A theologian can no longer claim to be speaking from the 
position of the ‘true’ teaching of the Church, because this ‘true’ teaching is identified here 
with whatever is being taught in the given moment. As such, that specific body of teaching 
is also totalized – it becomes impossible to ‘think outside’ it. 
This works in tandem with the sin narrative mentioned previously, which accounts for the 
failure of individuals to apprehend supposed truths which are putatively evident to natural 
reason as an effect of sin on the individual. By making recourse to this account, we do not 
have to consider that these ‘truths’ just may neither be true nor so evident. In this context, 
the narrative reinterprets any apparent failure to account for its teachings on the part of the 
Magisterium as a failure on the part of the theologian who detects this failure, caused by 
their sinfulness. As a result, it becomes totalised: it is impossible to ‘think outside’ the scope 
of the teachings of the Magisterium, because any uncertainty in those teachings becomes 
uncertainty in the individual. 
This is further consolidated by the document’s reading of martyrdom as “an affirmation of 
the inviolability of the moral order”, that “bears splendid witness both to the holiness of 
God's law and to the inviolability of the personal dignity of man, created in God's image and 
likeness” (VS §92). According to VS, martyrdom witnesses to the inviolability of the moral 
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law through the willingness to die rather than transgress its precepts. Moreover, in doing so, 
it exalts “a person's perfect ‘humanity’ and of true ‘life’” – which, as we have seen, consists 
precisely in obedience to the law (VS §92). In this regard, it is also an “outstanding sign of the 
holiness of the Church”, which proclaims these things in the martyrdom of its members. 
Furthermore, while the call to full martyrdom is a rare one, VS claims, there is nevertheless 
“a consistent witness which all Christians must daily be ready to make, even at the cost of 
suffering and grave sacrifice” – that is, all Christians are called to be obedient, regardless of 
the cost (VS §93). In other words, it is only when we are obedient that we are proper 
Christians – and it is only when we are obedient that we properly appreciate the dignity of 
others! 
2.2.4. PARANOIA AND VERITATIS SPLENDOR 
In summary, VS establishes an account of freedom, both in the sense of autonomy and 
flourishing, as only finding its fulfilment in obedience to the moral law. Moreover, it totalises 
the interpretation of this law as found in the actual teachings of the magisterium. As a result, 
it establishes the Magisterium as the sole authoritative interpreter of that law. 
As a result, obedience to the moral law becomes a matter of obedience to the Magisterium. 
This is true to the extent that even conscience loses its dignity and authority not only if, but 
then also because, it attempts to go beyond the determinations of the Magisterium. 
Similarly, moral theology must be entirely determined by the Magisterium. As a result, the 
teaching of the Magisterium is absolutized in relation to moral theology and the conscience 
of the individual. This is true even to the extent that, if a given determination seems 
problematic due to the failure of the Magisterium in justifying a particular teaching, moral 
theologians are nevertheless bound to confirm it. Finally, this means that there is no scope 
for ‘thinking outside’ the Magisterium- that is, it is totalized. On this point, the scope of the 
term “Magisterium” becomes strictly determined such that particular teachings become 
totalized, thus foreclosing the possibility of deconstructing this totality ‘from the inside’ by 
contesting the centre of authority designated by the term, “Magisterium”. In short, its effect 
is to “draw a line in the sand”, implicitly declaring that those who cannot adhere to the 
specific formulations promulgated by the Magisterium at a given point in time “ought to 
cease thinking of themselves as Catholics” (Cassin, 2005: 3). 
This lays the ground for paranoid reading practices in Catholic moral theology. The 
absoluteness of the schema’s determinations, combined with its totalisation, leaves 
conceptual space only for interpreting the world in terms of the objects and relationships 
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that it posits – that is, specific (true, good) determinations of the magisterium; and (false, 
sinful) truth claims that deviate from those determinations. As such, it establishes a 
methodological basis for a negative-affective reading of any challenges to the Magisterium, 
which can only be identified and summarily dismissed as an effect of sin. That is, they can 
only be threats - but not of a kind radical enough to overturn the Magisterium itself.  
These features are unsurprising in context. Odozor (1995: xiii) identifies Veritatis Splendor as 
responding to what MacIntyre calls an “epistemological crisis” in Catholic moral theology. 
This is, to put it briefly, a state in which a tradition of inquiry ceases to make progress by its 
own standards (MacIntyre, 1988: 361-2). Such a state arose in the context of uncertainties 
generated around fundamental theological issues to do with the nature of theology and the 
Church by the Second Vatican Council. 
Instituted by Leo XIII in his Aeterni Patris (1879), neo-Thomism was the dominant paradigm 
in Catholic moral theology up until the Second Vatican Council.13 Arising as a response to the 
Church’s loss of temporal power in the latter part of the nineteenth century, neo-Thomism 
was accompanied by the crystallisation of a particular stance towards authority within the 
Church, and the relationship between the Church and the world outside it: firstly, a defensive 
rejection of dialogue with the secular world lead to the stifling imposition of a “monolithic” 
set of texts, authorities, and method. Secondly, a relatively greater emphasis on the Church’s 
“spiritual powers”, including the attribution of even greater authority to the Pope to make 
pronouncements “in all matters”, both fallible and infallible. This in turn eventually 
culminated in Pope Pius XII’s pronouncement in Humani generis of the Pope’s ability      to 
rule out certain topics  for theological discussion (Curran, 1992: 14-15).14 The paradigm was 
thus characterised by a clearly defined, totalised methodology which determined the form 
and the content of the discipline.15 
However, the institution of this paradigm did not mean that it was universally appreciated. 
Writing in 1899, only twenty years after the publication of Aeterni patris, the Belgian moral 
theologian, Thomas Bouquillon laments that “the present condition of Moral Theology is in 
 
13 This tradition is known or associated with a number of names which denote various features, such 
as neo-Thomism, neo-Scholasticism, teleological-deontological “classicism” (Curran, 2002: 54), 
“Catholic moral rationalism” (Langan, 1989), or “manualism” (Keenan, 2010: 11). 
14 “…if the Supreme Pontiffs in their official documents purposely pass judgment on a matter up to 
that time under dispute, it is obvious that that matter, according to the mind and will of the Pontiffs, 
cannot be any longer considered a question open to discussion among theologians” (Humani generis 
§20). 
15 For a good overview of this, see Langan (1989). 
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strange contradiction with its intrinsic character and with the spirit of the day” (1999: 91), 
characterising it as revolving around uncritically parroting authorities, regardless of the 
adequacy of the argument; ignorant of contemporary developments in thought; and failing 
to anticipate new problems, or convince people of the value of its insights with regards to 
them (1999: 92-3). 
These dissatisfactions came to a head in the Second Vatican Council, particularly around the 
inability of Neo-Thomism to engage receptively with thought and issues from outside its 
narrow traditional boundaries. From this dissatisfaction came the impulse towards 
aggiornamento, which motivated the Second Vatican Council to reconfigure the 
philosophical-theological landscape.16 Furthermore, concerns rose within the Council itself 
around the appropriateness of Neo-Thomism as the language for an ecumenical council - in 
general, as a result of the sectarian attitude towards modernity and the world outside the 
Church that had motivated and been reproduced by the school, and in terms of the 
totalisation of the school to the exclusion of other thinkers from the tradition and the 
experiences of non-European cultures. This caused the re-drafting of texts which initially 
would have enshrined Thomism as the primary methodology of the Council in ways which 
placed greater emphasis on other methodologies such as biblical exegesis.17 Finally, the 
ecclesiology of the Council shifted away from the neo-Thomist ‘top-down’ model of spiritual-
juridical relation in a rigid and unilateral hierarchy to a more “concentric” one, with Christ at 
the centre and no difference in ‘vertical’ relation to him corresponding to juridical hierarchy 
between its members (Odozor, 2003: 22). 
However, this development was ambivalent in certain ways. For example, this ‘opening up’ 
was also tempered by a re-affirmation of the authority of the Magisterium. Lumen gentium 
§25 requires a “religious submission of mind” to the Pope and his magisterium – indeed in a 
way privileged over other figures in the Church. Similarly, debate remained around the 
‘horizontalizing’ of authority in the Church – even among some of the theologians who were 
once censured as a result of presenting the very challenges that were now being enshrined 
in the documents of the Council (particularly one Joseph Ratzinger) (Boersma, 2009: 10-11). 
 
16 For an even-handed, critical appraisal of the motivations and task of aggiornamento on this front, 
see Roche (1965).  
17 Komonchak (1998) gives a detailed overview of these dynamics. Routhier (2017) argues that this 
reconfiguration runs even deeper than the renewal of the method of the Council, which reframed not 
only its responses to the questions of the day, but its conception of those questions themselves. 
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Furthermore, Alberigo notes that all councils have been followed by a “complex and 
somewhat lengthy period of tensions caused by readjustments in the life of the Church”, 
with the more influential councils having the longest such periods (1985: 5). In this regard, 
the Second Vatican Council is no exception. Indeed, the Council itself was the product of 
conditions that defy any simple resolution of the issues which it sought to address: for 
example, one of the features of the council was a haphazard alliance of a number of quite 
diverse theological positions in order to overcome the reactionary hegemony that had arisen 
after Vatican I. This was “too heterogeneous a group to have a vision of its own”.18 Moreover, 
the Fathers in attendance from both sides were predominantly from Central Europe, and 
educated prior to WWII. As a result, the council was characterised by “an unresolved 
tension” between the theological themes which arose between the war and the council on 
the one hand, and the themes and issues brought about by the very holding of the council 
itself on the other (1985: 11).19 In this context, the process of reception of the council has 
been a process of interpretation, at the level of both “official” teaching and “unofficial” 
theology on the part of the wider Church (Pottmeyer, 1987: 29). The upshot of this situation 
was a certain amount of confusion as to what the nature of Catholic moral theology properly 
ought to be.  
This was exacerbated by the later controversy over Pope Paul VI’s encyclical, Humanae vitae. 
In 1966, the Commission for the Study of Population, Family and Birth voted “by a heavy 
majority” for a revision of Church teachings with regards to contraception. This was further 
supported by the cardinals and bishops. However, in 1968, Humane Vitae affirmed just the 
opposite. This raised a question with regards to the nature of the Magisterium: against prior 
understandings of a unilateral Magisterium, the Pope had previously expressed a need for 
the commission to establish the degree of certainty required in order to pronounce 
authoritatively on the issue. However, he seemed to have gone on to ignore its findings. This 
not only raised questions about Papal authority and the role of lay expertise, but also came 
 
18 This also means that it would be wrong to read the Council in terms of a clear transition from Neo-
Scholasticism to some other methodology, or to think that this new methodology constituted a single 
unity. Foley and Bergant (2003) identify at least three distinct methodological “flows” which left their 
mark on the Council’s documents, including Neo-Scholasticism. 
19 Schloesser (2006) notes a number of these factors, including the fragmentation of the world into 
disparate political entities, alongside the polarisation of the new political field between two 
superpowers; a new post-colonial consciousness; a post-holocaust awareness of the evils and dangers 
of antisemitism, and the need for a conciliatory theology and politics; a recognition of the choice 
between totalitarianism and democracy, and an accompanying need for a theology that affirms 
freedom of religion; modernity’s revelation of the temporality of human culture; and a post-war 
mentality of existential anxiety and atheism. 
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to be read as “the symbol of a takeback of important things that had happened in Vatican II” 
(McCormick, 1994: 10). This threw issues around authority, dissent, obedience and the role 
of conscience into sharp relief.  
Moreover, the debate around sexual ethics in Humanae vitae also touched on meta-ethical 
questions, including those around proportionalism; and the debate around proportionalism 
fell along similar lines to that about the extent of the powers of the ordinary magisterium, 
with those opposing proportionalism generally advocating a more expansive authority 
(Hoose, 1987: 15). Additionally, Murray notes a consistent theme in John Paul II’s teachings 
of the Church as “the diakonia of truth”20 (or more specifically, objective, universal truth), 
under threat from a secular society with a relativistic culture. VS reads the positions which it 
attacks as particular incarnations of this threat (2006: 171). It is therefore significant that 
Veritatis Splendor presents an integrated front against both proportionalism and magisterial 
minimalism - as well as revisionist sexual ethics, through what Lash identifies as an implicit 
preoccupation with specifically sexual norms (Lash, 1994: 23). In doing so, it fights multiple, 
integrated battles in many registers, against a foe that it reads as at once unified and 
diverse.21 
In this context, Veritatis Splendor can be seen as a unilateral attempt to haul the discipline 
‘back on track’, by re-establishing criteria for such progress, and constraining work in moral 
theology to them. Firstly, VS can be understood in the context of a broader “‘Polish view’ of 
theology” that is characteristic of Karol Wotyla’s (pre-papal) thought, and with which 
continuity is borne out in John Paul II’s teachings (Hebblethwaite, 1980: 123). Post-Conciliar 
Polish theology, and Karol Wotyla more specifically, emphasised a centralising view of the 
Magisterium against (what was identified as) Western trends towards “‘false irenicism’, 
 
20 Fides et Ratio (§2, 6); in Murray (2006: 168) 
21 This contextualisation may shed light on the overextension of the generality of moral precepts 
identified by Porter (see above): the encyclical is not solely concerned with the issue of moral 
universality as such, but also with the cultural issue of the use of (and obedience to) these precepts in 
our ethical deliberation, which is enshrined in Catholic culture, and which is threatened by secular 
culture. Ethical deliberation which admits the universality of these precepts will lead to behaviour in 
obedience to them. Similarly, a more general precept will obtain in more cases, and therefore also 
provide more opportunities for this culturally significant obedience-behaviour. In this cultural context, 
both universalisation and generalisation of the precepts have superficially similar outcomes, and are 
therefore liable to be confused. In a similar vein, Porter notes that casuist theologians who recognised 
this indeterminacy “were accused of being laxists” (1995: 209). However, she points out, this approach 
to moral law is not intrinsically laxist: the difficulty she identifies with more generalising applications 
of norms is not that of following said norms, but of their interpretation (1995: 210). Nevertheless, on 
a behavioural-cultural level, these are superficially similar: both constitute ‘difficulties’, and might 
ultimately lead to behaviours which might run counter to expectations garnered by more naïve 
interpretations of the law. 
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‘humanism’ and even ‘secularism’”, into which the Church had slipped following the Council 
(1980: 107). This gives sense to its negative-affective dimensions: the document is premised 
upon a reading of the trends against which John Paul II writes as a degeneration of the 
Catholic moral tradition. Secondly, John Paul’s response is an echo of Pope Paul VI’s response 
to the controversy around Humanae vitae thirty years before: a “concrete exercise of Papal 
authority”, and in it a decisive statement about the nature of that authority after the Council 
– a statement, moreover, with overtones of a “return” to a more pre-conciliar 
authoritarianism (Gaillardetz, 2015: 14). 
We ought not, however, to take this in an unnuanced way: for example, Mudge notes that 
VS differs from the previous encyclical tradition, which primarily just demanded acceptance 
of its propositions. In contrast, VS argues for its positions, and treats the objects of its 
criticism, in some detail. This opens the possibility for constructive response, “at least in 
principle” (1996: 160), which seems like a gesture towards a multilateral approach.  
However, we should distinguish between merely giving an account of one’s position, and 
also seeking for others to engage in that account. Indeed, we might say that VS makes use of 
the longstanding unilateral character of the genre in order to foreclose this possibility.  
On this point, we should note two things: firstly, Mudge also writes that “it is not clear that 
the Pope expects, or would welcome, any invitation to further discussion” (1996: 160). Here 
we must recognise the significance of the encyclical genre itself. Particularly after the 
controversy around Humane Vitae, a central concern in Catholic moral theology has been 
the question of moral authority itself (Wildes, 1994: 15). As Pius XII stated in Humanae 
generis §20, encyclicals demand the assent (whatever precisely this might mean) of Catholic 
readers, even though they lack infallibility (1994: 16). As Wildes notes, VS, in employing the 
encyclical genre to make its intervention, inscribes issues of ‘proportionalism’ and 
‘teleologism’ within this economy of authority, raising the question of whether moral 
theologians are permitted to explore them any further (1994: 22). To go further than Wildes, 
in reproducing the exercise of power that concerns moral theologians with questions of 
authority, VS raises questions about the proper response to its own intervention – a question 
which it answers in embodying the encyclical form: theologians are required to ‘assent’ to it. 
In other words, although it offers an argument that at least in principle invites a multilateral 
approach, it does so in a way that commands the adoption of a unilateral one; in effect, its 
invitation is an invitation to submit. 
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Moreover, the fact that VS speaks from an authority enshrined within the encyclical form by 
an encyclical itself (Humani generis) further affirms this unilateral dynamic: because VS and 
Humani generis share the same authority as encyclicals, when the former tacitly cites the 
authority of the latter to underpin its own authority, this is effectively a self-citation. As a 
result, the invitation identified by Mudge arises from a reflexive circle of authority which thus 
functions unilaterally. This must be assumed as the condition of any response, which must 
consequently be limited by the unilateral parameters of that condition. This is also repeated 
when the encyclical cites other encyclicals for support of its specific positions, such as its 
rejection of a decision-making capacity in conscience in §60, which invokes Dominum et 
Vivificantem §43. 
Likewise, magisterial documents can be reinterpreted and built upon as time passes.22 VS 
itself illustrates this, for example in its frequent citations of the documents of the Second 
Vatican Council, which recontextualises them as part of a case against ‘teleologism’, as well 
as more generally reading them against certain methodological transformations that arose 
in response to other interpretations. However, the ‘official’ locus of this process lies in 
further magisterial documents – something which is also illustrated by VS in its nominally 
decisive reinterpretative intervention. This involves two further unilateral dynamics. Firstly, 
within this process, the unilateral interpretative authority of the magisterium is ultimately 
privileged over all others – it is only another magisterial document that can decisively 
reinterpret the prior tradition. Secondly, this also reproduces the self-citing dynamic above: 
if this power to reinterpret lies in the magisterial tradition, then this interpretive power lies 
specifically in the document that is doing the reinterpretation at the given moment in time. 
When it was published, this privilege rested upon VS itself. Consequently, its publication 
specifically as a magisterial document is in itself a reflexive assertion of a privileged authority 
which, by virtue of this privilege, ultimately operates unilaterally. 
  
Our second consideration is that, regardless of its nominal appeal to an engageable 
argument,, the upshot of VS is to preclude any discussion of the nature of moral norms 
beyond the determinations of the Magisterium. As such, even if VS can serve as an object for 
 
22 Note that this reinterpretation is not reducible to falsification – there are many familiar words that 
we might use to describe other forms, such as moderation, recontextualizing, deepening, and 
translating. Indeed, the assumption that reinterpretation amounts to falsification may itself embody 
a paranoid anticipation of threat. 
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multilateral engagement, it seeks to set up the ‘tradition crisis’ more      generally for 
unilateral resolution. 
In a similar vein, Laghi notes that, while the encyclical was received in some camps as 
analogous to “a commander intent upon imposing order on his soldiers” (1996: 2), the 
theology presented within the encyclical portrays this ‘order’ as intrinsic to the nature of 
what is being ordered (i.e. moral theology, and by extension the activities of those working 
within the field). “Seen within this perspective”, he writes, “it is difficult to place Veritatis 
Splendor within [this] military imagery”, which portrays order as something imposed from 
without (1996: 6). What Laghi fails to recognise, however, is that this imagery is illuminative 
at a more fundamental level: soldiers, as an intrinsic feature of their role, are subject to the 
authority of their commander. As such, we might say that VS construes moral theology as 
analogous to soldiers awaiting the direction of their superiors. In this context, it is not so 
much an imposition of authority as an induction of moral theology into (or reminder of the 
place of moral theology within) the ranks such that this direction is invited. The term 
‘conscription’, with its roots in the Latin cōnscrībō23 is appropriate here: the Magisterium 
‘writes’ moral theology as a discipline, such that moral theologians find themselves always-
already constrained by conditions inscribed into its very constitution. The authoritarian 
gesture of VS lies in the unilateral nature of its assumption of this kind of authority. And it is 
precisely because this response is a unilateral one that Veritatis Splendor must do this 
through anticipatory determination in reference to a totalised and absolutized set of co-
ordinates. 
3. FIVE PARANOID QUESTIONS 
We can see these paranoid sensibilities exemplified in some of the tensions which Francis 
has faced in the course of his papacy - most notably in the infamous dubia, published in 2016 
by four Cardinals (Cardinal Walter Brandmüller, Cardinal Raymond L. Burke, Cardinal Carlo 
Caffarra, and Cardinal Joachim Meisner), questioning particular aspects of the Apostolic 
Exhortation Amoris Laetitia.24 
Cardinal Burke, in an interview with the National Catholic Register, claims that there “are a 
number of other questions as well, but these five critical points have to do with irreformable 
moral principles” (in Pentin, 2016a: Online). He describes the situation as one of 
“tremendous division” in  the Church, and claims that the focus on these particular questions 
 
23 “To put together in writing, to draw up, compose, write” (Lewis and Short, 1879: Online) 
24 Hereafter, AL 
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is down to the fact that they are “fundamental moral questions which unify us” (in Pentin, 
2016a: Online). 
Whether or not the divisions are as dramatic as Burke would portray them is another 
question. They are certainly heightened. Christopher Lamb, writing for the Tablet, claims 
that, to the contrary, “the vast majority of Catholics are fully behind Francis’ reform 
program” - which in this context refers to the controversial possibility of re-admitting 
divorced and remarried Catholics to communion intimated in note 351 attached to AL §305 
(2017: 6). Either way, these represent very real points of conflict between Francis and certain 
elements within the Church, which have been highlighted by his critics as holding great 
significance with regards to their understanding of the faith. 
3.1. THE DUBIA 
The dubia themselves are: 
1. It is asked whether, following the affirmations of Amoris Laetitia (300-305), it has 
now become possible to grant absolution in the sacrament of penance and thus to 
admit to holy Communion [sic] a person who, while bound by a valid marital bond, 
lives together with a different person more uxorio without fulfilling the conditions 
provided for by Familiaris Consortio, 84, and subsequently reaffirmed by 
Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, 34, and Sacramentum Caritatis, 29. Can the expression 
“in certain cases” found in Note 351 (305) of the exhortation Amoris Laetitia be 
applied to divorced persons who are in a new union and who continue to live more 
uxorio? 
 
2. After the publication of the post-synodal exhortation Amoris Laetitia (304), does 
one still need to regard as valid the teaching of St. John Paul II’s encyclical Veritatis 
Splendor, 79, based on sacred Scripture and on the Tradition of the Church, on the 
existence of absolute moral norms that prohibit intrinsically evil acts and that are 
binding without exceptions? 
 
3. After Amoris Laetitia (301) is it still possible to affirm that a person who habitually 
lives in contradiction to a commandment of God’s law, as for instance the one that 
prohibits adultery (Matthew 19:3-9), finds him or herself in an objective situation of 





4. After the affirmations of Amoris Laetitia (302) on “circumstances which mitigate 
moral responsibility,” does one still need to regard as valid the teaching of St. John 
Paul II’s encyclical Veritatis Splendor, 81, based on sacred Scripture and on the 
Tradition of the Church, according to which “circumstances or intentions can never 
transform an act intrinsically evil by virtue of its  object into an act ‘subjectively’ 
good or defensible as a choice”? 
 
5. After Amoris Laetitia (303) does one still need to regard as valid the teaching of St. 
John Paul II’s encyclical Veritatis Splendor, 56, based on sacred Scripture and on the 
Tradition of the Church, that excludes a creative interpretation of the role of 
conscience and that emphasizes that conscience can never be authorized to 
legitimate exceptions to absolute moral norms that prohibit intrinsically evil acts by 
virtue of their object? 
(Pentin, 2016b: Online) 
Together, these questions touch on a wide range of issues,25 and there is a lot that can be 
said about them on this front. However for the purposes of our analysis, we will firstly look 
to the dubia themselves as an example of paranoid methodology in Catholic theology. In 
doing so, we will come to appreciate how they can be situated in the context of the tradition 
of paranoia established in documents like VS. We will then focus on the fifth dubia, which 
references the discussion around the nature of conscience in VS that we discussed earlier. In 
attending more closely to this dubia, we will see how its authors build upon the groundwork 
for a paranoid methodology that we saw being laid in VS.26 
3.2. DUBIA AS PARANOID WRITING PRACTICE 
A common theme running throughout all five dubia is the anxiety that AL contradicts several 
papal encyclicals written by John Paul II. In this regard, they anticipate and reproduce the 
very readings of Amoris Laetitia that they seek to problematise. Although this is done in the 
hope of correction through ‘clarification’, we might also identify this as paranoid mimesis, 
outlining and thus reproducing the threat in anticipation of its encounter in the case that 
these readings are indeed the intended ones. Moreover, we might ask what this ‘clarification’ 
would amount to. If the cardinals expected a retraction bound up in minimising language, 
 
25 For a more detailed exposition of this, see the Exaplanatory Note (Pentin, 2016b: Online). 
26 Note that identifying this logic says nothing about the validity or force of their arguments – merely 
that they represent a movement to defend paranoid hermeneutics within moral theology, against 
what we will come to understand as a more reparative one. 
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then the text itself is paranoid in itself insofar as it is identifying a range of possible bad 
interpretations without a real view to the possibility of good interpretations. 
This paranoid characterisation gains weight when we recognise that the document is only 
interested in first order concerns – does Amoris Laetitia contradict passage x in document y? 
Dubia form lends itself to this kind of reflection: the demand of a closed answer leaves no 
room to explore second order concerns (such as the nature of ‘continuity’ and ‘tradition’, or 
‘moral value’, and how it inheres in things) in which the issues raised may be dissolved. Thus 
the genre also potentially implies a tacit affirmation of a particular framework for doing 
theology, thereby situating itself as a practice arising out of the context of a strong theory 
which it seeks to maintain.  
In other words, the dubia can be read as an example of paranoid reflexivity, whereby 
paranoia absolutises itself by positing itself as the condition for understanding. In this vein, 
if the dubia themselves are an example of paranoia, we might further identify the paranoid 
reading practices within the dubia themselves as reflexively indicative of the paranoia of the 
system of thought from which they arise. Thus the act of presenting the dubia itself can be 
interpreted as a kind of paranoid praxis. On this point, we noted above that magisterial 
documents embody a citation of their own privileged authority at the moment of their 
publication. In reducing the interpretive question to one of continuity with the first-order 
positions outlined in documents such as VS, the dubia establish these documents as the 
interpretive measure for AL.27 In doing so, they recentre this privileged authority in the prior 
documentary tradition. This undercuts the power of AL to re-read and re-interpret them, 
returning them to unilateral power and bestowing the absoluteness this entails upon the 
theological positions outlined within them, and which the dubia seek to simultaneously 
defend and deploy to interpret the world. Thus, more specifically, the paranoid theorising of 
the dubia cites and return us to the paranoid economy of these original texts. 
This paranoid characterisation is reinforced when we consider the dubia in terms of 
motivation. We noted above how the dubia genre implicitly reinforces particular positions 
which their objects otherwise problematise. To this end, we might say that dubia are both 
 
27 Of course, a hierarchy exists within magisterial documents, and encyclicals such as VS outrank 
apostolic exhortations such as AL within this. My point is not so much that we can account for why 
this hermeneutic may be appropriate, but rather the fact that it is invoked in the first place. Note also 
the exclusive focus on the question of falsification; a framing in which this hierarchy functions 
primarily in terms of a combative ‘trumping’ of one type of document by another, or a heuristic for 
navigating situations which are assumed from the outset to be ones of threat and challenge. 
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reactive and defensive: they presuppose a situation in which a status quo is being 
threatened, and represent a move to defend that status quo. It bears reiterating here (as we 
have throughout) that paranoid hermeneutics such as that implicit in the dubia are neither 
problematic in all cases, nor lacking in their own virtues. Moreover, we are not trying to say 
here that the Cardinals’ motivations are not virtuous or understandable. 
Such a defensive manoeuvre need not be reduced to a reactionary defence of habit. 
However, it equally can have theological meaning beyond merely theoretical concern for 
issues such as continuity of tradition, or the nature of teaching authority. Charles Curran 
illustrates the significance of this point when he recounts the story of a colleague at the 
Catholic University of America. This colleague had spent the better part of his life defending 
conservative positions on various topics in Catholic moral teaching. In this context, the truth 
of these positions took on an eschatological and theodical significance: surely God would not 
have allowed him to become so mislead as to devote his life to inadvertently hurting people 
(1992: 19)?  
What this story illustrates is that adopting a theological position involves making an 
existential commitment not only to the principles affirmed in that position, but also with 
regards to the project of maintaining and promoting that position. This latter commitment 
can only be made on the basis of implicit claims about the nature of the individual’s life of 
faith, and the validity of these claims can be threatened when that commitment is 
challenged. Thus defence of that commitment, which can include by extension the defence 
of the theological positions around which it arises, has a theological significance beyond 
those commitments themselves. 
Reading the dubia in light of Curran’s story brings to our attention a specific pastoral issue 
attached to the clash of hermeneutical stances embodied within them (which may or may 
not be present in the case of the Cardinals, but is a general possibility). For Curran’s 
colleague, the falsity of his ethical positions implies not just his being wrong about ethics, 
but the collapse of his entire theological gestalt, throwing into doubt fundamental issues 
such as God’s goodness, and the security of one’s relationship with God in such a way as to 
necessitate a radical reconfiguration of his entire existential worldview. Indeed, it is 
questionable whether such a reconfiguration would even have been ‘thinkable’ within his 
worldview, presupposing as it did certain truths about these issues which would have been 
problematised in its course. 
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The possibility of one’s life-project being so fundamentally wrong that one cannot even 
account for or anticipate this wrongness within it, gives rise to a fundamental theological 
anxiety that moves quickly into despair: how can we live in light of the possibility of 
condemnation by something that we are not even capable of thinking of, which therefore 
precludes anticipation or any other kind of security?28 We might read this anxiety-inducing 
indeterminacy as the face of the unforeseen ‘bad surprise’ that paranoia seeks to ward off 
through its reflexive operation (which seems very understandable in this context). By 
contrast, a dire mistakenness in a newly authored, supposedly authoritative text is a risk that 
can at least be conceived. 
3.3. CONSCIENCE AGAIN 
Moreover, the texts that they invoke themselves might be understood as paranoid texts. In 
the context of the final dubium, this is VS. More specifically, it is VS on the topic of conscience, 
wherein (as we saw previously) it lays the ground for paranoid theological methodology.  
The explanatory note frames the dubium as responding to the claim in Amoris Laetitia §303 
that “conscience can do more than recognize that a given situation does not correspond 
objectively to the overall demands of the Gospel. It can also recognize with sincerity and 
honesty what for now is the most generous response which can be given to God.” (Pentin, 
2016b: Online). 
The dubium juxtaposes this against the condemnation in Veritatis Splendor §56 of 
understandings of conscience whereby it “could legitimately be the basis of certain 
exceptions to the general rule and thus permit one to do in practice and in good conscience 
what is qualified as intrinsically evil by the moral law”. This juxtaposition is framed by 
questioning the continued authority of Veritatis Splendor itself, thereby rendering this issue 
in part one of continuity, as with the previous dubium (Pentin, 2016b: Online). 
We saw previously that Veritatis Splendor condemns understandings of human freedom as 
in opposition to the divine law. In this context, it condemns models of conscience under 
which it operates as “a creative and responsible acceptance of the personal tasks entrusted 
to [the person] by God”, and thus can permit the rejection of putatively universal moral 
norms (§55). In these cases, human freedom, represented by conscience, would be in conflict 
 
28 The discussion of this par excellence is Kierkegaard (1980). 
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with those norms. In contrast, for VS, the conscience can only work deductively, representing 
particular situations under a limited set of universal norms. 
In line with Veritatis Splendor, the explanatory note for the dubium states that such a 
consideration of conscience 
...would mean to conceive of conscience as a faculty for autonomously deciding about 
good and evil and of God’s law as a burden that is arbitrarily imposed and that could 
at times be opposed to our true happiness. 
However.... The proper act of conscience is to judge and not to decide. It says, “This is 
good.” “This is bad.” This goodness or badness does not depend on it. It acknowledges 
and recognizes the goodness or badness of an action, and for doing so… conscience 
needs criteria; it is inherently dependent on truth. 
(Pentin, 2016b: Online) 
In this context, it seeks reassurance that the passage in question does not legitimate such a 
“creative” conception of conscience, whereby acts can be justified by conscience without 
reference to the objective law. 
We saw previously how the understanding of conscience promoted in VS helps to construct 
a determining, totalising, and absolutizing framework for Catholic theology. Firstly, then, in 
reiterating the teaching of VS on this front, the dubia reinforces this framework. 
However, this takes on an additional significance in the context of the paranoid nature of 
dubia as genre. Precisely in being presented as the unexamined premise of the dubia, the 
teaching is tacitly absolutized, and the passage in AL which potentially problematises it is cast 
as a threat – but, ultimately, not a radical one. To put it another way, the dubia tacitly begs 
the question on the part of VS. And this question-begging finds its justification in the reflexive 
teachings of VS itself – after all, AL cannot possibly present an authentic theological challenge 
to the teaching of VS (let alone a productive one) because VS is already established as a 
teaching, and if anything seems to challenge that teaching it is only because we are fallible 
enough to think so. 
4. CONCLUSION 
Understanding the controversy around Francis’ teachings as a conflict between paranoid and 
reparative hermeneutical stances reveals a significant complication to resolving these 
debates. On the one hand, the reactive camp is epistemologically and existentially 
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committed to the self-enclosed logic of its paranoid hermeneutic. On the other, this self-
confirming logic implies that any challenge must a priori be false, negating the possibility of 
any real disagreement. Thus if the other party does disagree, they must refuse to engage 
with this logic at all, and thus the arguments arising from it. In this vein, at the time of writing, 
Francis has yet to respond to the dubia.  
The upshot of this is that the discussion founders between two positions that are 
fundamentally committed to talking past one another. This is exemplified in the claim 
popular among Catholics who would align themselves with the Cardinals that Francis’ 
teachings in Amoris Laetitia are sowing “confusion”. Richard McCormick would describe this 
as a tactic of “moral evasion”, which is problematic because it implies that the correct 
response to the issue is merely to reiterate the teachings which are in themselves the objects 
of dispute (1994: 124-5) – a reflexively self-confirming, paranoid response. In this vein, with 
regards to the admission of divorced and remarried Catholics to communion, there are a 
number of senior parties within the Church who support the readings of Amoris Laetitia 
which the Cardinals resist.29 As such, to claim that this reading is ‘confused’ is to ignore the 
fact that it is a clearly staked position afforded significant authority in various circles. 
Sedgwick argues that, in recognising the rigid bounds of paranoid readings, we can come to 
glimpse alternative possibilities: recognising the self-confirming logic of paranoid 
hermeneutics, and the way in which they determine our knowledge, opens up a space of 
imagination in which we can come to think beyond them (2003: 146). In this vein, articulating 
the second-order issues upon which the substantive disagreements at hand turn allows us 
to cut through the mutual non-engagement, and thus present the supposedly ‘confused’ 
positions in an intelligible way. In other words, in articulating these issues we can come to 
see the power of Francis’ alternative as an alternative, rather than a source of tension within, 
and therefore ultimately to be negated by the reflexive mechanisms of paranoia. 
However, this does not in itself overcome the existential problem faced by Curran’s 
colleague, and potentially indicated by the dubia. Indeed, we have to admit that the Church, 
 
29  To a greater or lesser extent of permissiveness in interpretation, these include Bishop Robert 
McElroy of Sandiago (2016); Rome’s Vicar, Cardinal Agosto Vallini (2016); the German Bishops’ 
Conference (2017); President of the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts, Cardinal Francesco 
Coccopalmerio (2017); Cardinal Martíne Sistach of Spain (2017); the Archdiocese of Malta and the 
Diocese of Gozo (2017); and the Bishops of Buenos Aires (2017). It is also worth noting that Pope 
Francis himself, in a leaked letter, appeared to endorse this last interpretation (San Martín, 2016: 
Online). For an extensive multi-regional overview of the reception and interpretation of Amoris 
Laetitia, see Keenan (2017). 
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and individuals within it, has supported various evils in its time, and that history might judge 
any of us to be among them. Moreover, the apparent necessity of a paranoid response in the 
face of this threat might indicate that it is one which Francis’ critics struggle to tolerate. In 
this vein, one achievement on the part of Francis’ theology which would both serve to de-
escalate the conflict, and also unproblematically appeal to both camps, would be if it could 
somehow provide a way to cope with this threat. This thesis will argue that Francis indeed 
does this. In doing so, he facilitates the reception of his teachings, and thus engagement with 
the substantive issues upon which the contentions about his theology turn. 
We noted previously that the question of uncertainty constitutes a significant portion of the 
epistemological-affective issue of hermeneutics, which we have argued serves as a powerful 
framework for reading Francis. There is thus an additional significance to focusing on the 
issue of uncertainty in our reading of Francis. It will demonstrate how a reparative 
hermeneutic is more appropriate to the life of faith as presented in this theology than a 
paranoid one. In doing so, it will show how various first-order positions encountered within 
his teachings derive from a sophisticated and (hopefully) compelling navigation of various 
second-order philosophical and theological questions. This will enable the recognition of the 
non-totality of whatever Francis might be seen to challenge, thereby opening the possibility 
of a reception of Francis’ teachings across this divide.  
To summarise, then: the task of this thesis is to provide a systematic and holistic reading of 
Francis’ teachings, in a way that indicates their interrelation and overall sense. In doing so, it 
will facilitate the reception of those teachings, which otherwise appear disparate and 
sometimes individually confusing. Our thesis statement is that Francis presents a reparative 
hermeneutic for Catholic theology. This bears out a tension with existing paranoid 
methodologies, which anticipatorily negate anything outside of their self-totalised scope. In 
articulating Francis’ alternative, we will demonstrate the possibility of this alternative, 
thereby challenging the assumed totality of Catholic paranoia, and facilitating the 
recognition and reception of his reparative vision. This, of course, is not the same thing as an 
acceptance of those teachings, and this apologetic project lies outside the scope of this 
thesis. 
However, in order to do this, there are a number of methodological issues with which we 
must first contend. They all revolve around the prima facie simple task of ‘reading Francis’, 






II. READING FRANCIS 
 
1. THREE METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES, AND ONE MISUNDERSTANDING 
The last chapter indicated how some of the controversy over Francis’ teachings stems from 
a conflict between paranoid tendencies in Catholic theology, and the more reparative 
approach indicated in documents like Amoris Laetitia. This poses a problem with regards to 
reception, which is exacerbated by the plurality of narratives according to which Francis’ 
teachings are significant. The solution, we argued, would be to construct a systematic and 
holistic reading of his teachings in order to indicate their overall sense as well as their 
consistency, such that they can disrupt the totality of existing Catholic paranoia.  
While this should facilitate the reception of his teachings, it is worth noting that this is not 
the same thing as an acceptance of those teachings. At least as I use the term here, we can 
receive something critically, which involves the possibility of rejection. Reception is a process 
of hearing and understanding, or of ‘giving space’ to the other. It is not, however, a process 
of total, uncritical accommodation.30 
This established, there are three primary methodological issues involved in our project: 
firstly, that of specifically reading texts by ‘Pope Francis’, in the context of a disrupted 
authorship; secondly, that of reading a body of texts systematically when they do not present 
themselves as such; and thirdly, selecting sources in the context of unequal authority across 
those sources. Additionally, there is one potential misunderstanding about the nature of this 
project which ought to be anticipated. This chapter will treat each of these in turn. 
1.1. THE QUESTION OF AUTHORSHIP 
The first of these relates to the question of authorship. As we argue below, ‘Francis’ cannot 
be approached simply as an historical figure to whom we have access through the mediation 




30 In fact, we will see this idea at work in Francis’ theology itself later on. 
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1.1.1. DECENTRED AUTHORSHIP 
1.1.1.1. THE PROBLEM OF “POPE FRANCIS” 
Firstly, the nature of Francis’ authorship raises questions about whether fidelity in the sense 
of ‘original intention’ would even be possible. Francis’ thought, as we receive it, is often 
mediated by various disseminators. The clearest example of this are the many books which 
have been published under his name, but are third-party syntheses of extracts from diverse 
sources into longer reflections on particular topics.31 These texts stand in a strange authorial 
limbo: they are not fully primary texts insofar as they are essentially constructed by an editor 
from cut up parts of the primary texts proper, like combining multiple jigsaws to make bigger 
jigsaws of different designs. In this sense, the text is obviously heavily interpreted, but it is 
presented as if it were a primary text, and the interpretation is hidden behind its own 
method: rather than being a standard descriptive interpretation, the interpretation lies in 
the presentation itself. However, equally, they are not fully secondary sources (or even 
anthologies) insofar as they are composed entirely of primary text, without explanation, 
interpretation beyond the constructive process, or analysis (beyond short, superficial 
discursive introductions often by figures in the Church).  
Similarly for media reports: these are often written by individuals with little or no wider 
theological training, who pick up on particular aspects but give no sense of the whole, or how 
those aspects relate to it.32 These kind of reports effectively serve to decontextualize Francis’ 
thought, and situate it in a new context constructed out of their understanding of the 
theological situation. This decontextualisation takes place in the mind of the reporter, who 
may very well be less theologically aware than we might otherwise desire: what they pick up 
on is already decontextualized as they are not equipped to receive it in context, and this 
process is then further repeated as they commit it to paper, often in an abbreviated form.33 
 
31 e.g. Pope Francis (2014), (2015d), (2016g), (2016f) 
32 To further complicate matters, in the words of Vatican Spokesman, Frederico Lombardi, Francis has 
introduced “a genre to which we were not accustomed” to the various forms of Papal communication: 
the “conversational” form, or ‘off-the-cuff remark’ (Rocca, 2013: Online). Given the lack of 
opportunity for revision on Francis’ part, as well as the fact that they are generally given directly to 
the media who are then responsible for their dissemination, they are particularly difficult to interpret 
in terms of the systematic whole. However, to the extent that they are unmediated by the normal 
official regulative structures, we might see them as more strongly aligned with the Pope’s personal 
capacity, and thus inappropriate as sources for this essay. 
33 Beyond newspaper reports, another example of texts to which this applies might be the various 
collections of Francis’ Morning Homilies (Pope Francis, 2015c; 2016c; 2016d; 2016e; 2018b). These 
books are anthologies of reports from L’Osservatorio Romana, which present them to the wider public 
in gloss form.  
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Finally, Francis has given numerous interviews. Perhaps the most famous of these is Spadaro 
(2013: Online). The most infamous is undoubtedly Scalfari (2018: Online), in which Francis 
supposedly denies the existence of hell (Pentin, 2018: Online). Beyond the obvious issues of 
fidelity raised by the latter example, Spadaro has been styled in some camps as a “papal 
puppet master” who directs the Pope’s speech (Gibson, 2016: Online). This extreme claim 
nevertheless reveals the active role of the interviewer in constructing the Papal authorial 
figure through re-presenting the words of the historical person beyond the context of the 
original discussion. 
What we thus receive as “Francis’” theology is actually an array of heavily mediated ideas, 
derived from a variety of sources. This is complicated further by the fact that the figure of 
Francis himself as we receive it is already mediated to us by a complex already-existing 
process of reception, involving factors such as “the expectations of people, followers, and 
the varied opinions regarding the church’s course, and the transformation of different social 
and geopolitical scenes”. Thus in receiving Francis the person, we are also receiving “a 
scaffolding of circumstances, signifiers and developments that greatly exceed him as the 
individual” (Panotto, 2018a: xxii).34 Together, these dynamics disrupt the idea of ‘Francis the 
theologian’ as an individual figure, giving the lie to any naïve claims of objectivity or 
hermeneutical innocence. 
Born out of the endless aggregation, dissemination, writing and re-writing of texts associated 
with the name, we might even go as far as to say that “Francis” is a simulacrum, or a signifier 
the meaning of which proliferates independently of the real. Baudrillard argues that, prior to 
our current historical moment, people conceived of signifiers as ‘exchangeable’ for an 
external or ‘deeper’ reality in which the meaning of the sign could be located. However, he 
argues that, in our late-capitalist society, thought is born of the play of signifiers unmoored 
from any connection to the real; a “hyperreal” exchange of signifiers for other signifiers 
(1994: 2). He locates this economy particularly in the media, which produces, reproduces, 
and trades exclusively in virtual images, delivering this meaning to individuals independently 
of the historical events that they ostensibly portray. Likewise, when we receive ‘Francis’, it is 
always through this kind of virtual exchange, in the media images, advertising, and 
propaganda35 that outstrip the reality of any historical person.  
 
34 For an overview of these dynamics in an Argentinian context, see Panotto (2018b). 
35 Compare Francis’ novel public performance of authentic, approachable personality (for example, by 
touching people, carrying his own suitcase, telling jokes, making references to his native Argentina 
and its culture, and particularly his rejection of ‘impersonal’ and ‘removed’ ceremony) to the image 
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This is not, of course, to say that there is no Francis qua historical individual. Rather, the 
figure whom we receive in the various texts associated with his authorship (and perhaps in 
general) is less this historical person as expressed through them, and more an expression of 
those texts themselves. ‘Francis’ is a product of their multifaceted composition, reception, 
and the meaning-making capacity of the signifiers from which they are both constituted and 
are in themselves. Perhaps the clearest example of this lies in the way in which historicising 
readings must ‘access’ the historical figure to which they attempt to reduce this meaning 
through books and media interviews, or (for the lucky few) ‘personal’ meetings that are in 
actuality carefully managed and heavily propagandised.36 
In the absence of the real for which his texts can be exchanged, we must adopt a different 
approach for interpreting Francis. Rather than the recovery of some ‘true meaning’ as the 
real ‘behind’ the texts, to engage with his theology means entering into this process, 
becoming an active aggregator and creative disseminator.. This undercuts intuitive questions 
about ‘true interpretation’ and ‘fidelity’ to Francis’ intentions: that truth and those intentions 
themselves are the product of the signs that we seek to interpret, rather than a Real that 
they signify. In this context, the question is merely one of whether we enter into the process 
consciously or not.  
These factors problematise naïve hermeneutical approaches that seek to simply identify 
Francis’ texts with a unified historical figure. In this vein,  this thesis attempts to approach 
Francis’ documents at a distance from Francis the historical individual. While this may make 
it a little more methodologically complicated, this also perhaps makes the project more 
exciting. In the absence of a single body of thought, instead we are confronted with a 
disparate movement in the Church and its theology. We have what might broadly be 
described as a ‘Francis Phenomenon’ occurring in the life of the Church which gives rise to a 
‘(Pope) Franciscan School’ of thought, bound by common themes and sources. This arguably 
presents a more authoritative basis for its theology than if it were to come from a single 
figure: the Church is a collective, and it thinks as such. A movement is far more convincingly 
identified as the first stirrings of the Holy Spirit or Sensus Fidei than an individual figure. 
 
of “real” America’, which hides its hyperreality through contradistinction to the self-consciously 
dreamlike “deterrence machine” that is Disneyland (1994: 12). 
36 We will argue that, for Francis, there is something in an interpersonal encounter which transcends 
reduction to images. However, this irreducible interpersonal factor equally resists thematization more 
broadly, and so is not something that can be articulated in an essay – hence the biographer is still 
trapped among the simulacra. 
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Furthermore, as we shall see, Francis emphasises that the Holy Spirit operates through novel 
and creative ways, faithfully leading the Church down a nevertheless unpredictable path. 
This opens up a space in the theological enterprise for properly creative theology: if good 
theology is theology which follows the Spirit, and if the Spirit is creative, then theology will 
have to be similarly creative in its own way in order to keep up. The disruption of a central 
‘author’ figure, to whom fidelity can be owed in such a way that creativity is restricted, gives 
a certain freedom for a self-aware creativity in my interpretation. As someone who will be 
adding to the textual substance of this phenomenon through my (admittedly explicit) 
interpretative work, I cannot help doing so. Moreover, in the absence of an ‘author figure’ 
to cleave to in my interpretation, I cannot help but acknowledge the presence of, and 
inevitability of such creative action. In this context, a theologian who truly wants to 
contribute to the Church in an honest way can only embrace their creative role, abandoning 
any pretension to fidelity beyond that required to approach the sources non-arbitrarily, in 
favour of a self-conscious attempt to assemble something good out of it. As such, I am 
unafraid to ‘fill in’ gaps which I identify in the thought arising from the Francis phenomenon, 
or recast ideas in order to make them better express the broader spirit arising from the texts. 
Finally, it is questionable whether anything is lost in the rejection of historicising approaches. 
Cartagenas draws from Ricoeur to argue that interpretation is always a dialectical relation 
between the configuration of the text by the author, and its reconfiguration by the reader. 
In this context, the fact that Church teaching is disseminated in the form of magisterial texts 
means that it “escapes the finite horizons lived by its respective authors”. Because they are 
received across time, and by a community of readers that exceeds the context of individual 
language use in which it was authored, they have a measure of “semantic autonomy” from 
this moment of authorship. For example, Leo XIII never anticipated the ways in which his call 
for organised labour in Rerum novarum would serve as the basis for wider social criticism – 
and indeed this is the reason why these texts can continue to have relevance even when the 
original events to which they refer have ceased to be (Cartagenas, 2010: 640).  
Indeed, we already know that we are not reading a document ‘properly’ if we reduce its 
meaning to authorial intention. We expect to be able to apply a teaching document in 
contexts other than the specific context in which it was formulated. In this vein, John Paul II 
writes that the Church seeks to provide an “indispensable and ideal orientation” around 
which policy can be formed (Centesimus Annus §43), and, although he qualifies this with the 
claim that it does not seek to provide particular technical solutions and policy 
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recommendations, it nevertheless can only do so based on particular generalisable principles 
and ideas. That is, these documents are always written and read in a general context that 
presupposes the transcendence in their meaning of particular contexts. 
The ultimate justification of this project as I see it thus comes from the nature of the Church 
as revealed by these issues. If we conceive of the Church as a community in which ideas 
circulate, we cannot divorce the creative dynamics of this circulation from our idea of this 
community. As such, in participating in this broad creative process with regards to the Francis 
phenomenon, I am merely participating in this community. That is, at base, what I am doing 
in this thesis is just Catholicism. The only difference between myself and those that assemble 
the texts which I have drawn from, and which are consumed by the community, is that I am 
reflexive with regards to it in the manner laid out above. 
1.1.1.2. WHAT IS IN A NAME? 
Nevertheless, throughout this thesis I refer to “Francis” as the author of the texts and 
originator of the thought. There is an argument to be made that, despite problems of 
authorship, ‘Francis’ has laid claim to these documents in such a way that they represent his 
thought as Pope, even if they are not entirely its product. In his book-length interview with 
Peter Seewald, Benedict XVI discusses Cardinal Joseph Frings’ momentous speech to the 
Second Vatican Council, Das Konzil auf dem Hintergrund der Zeitlage im Unterschied zum 
ersten vatikanische Konzil, which Benedict wrote. He relates a story in which Frings is 
congratulated for his speech by then Pope John XXIII: 
“‘Your eminence,’ John XXIII said, ‘I must thank you… Frings had given voice to 
everything that he meant for the Council, but was not able to express himself. Frings 
answered: ‘Holy Father, I did not write any of the lecture, a young professor wrote it.’ 
Then the Pope said: ‘Mr Cardinal, I did not write my last encyclical myself. It comes 
down to a matter of where one identifies himself.’”  
(Pope Benedict XVI with Peter Seewald, 2016: 121) 
What this indicates is that ‘the Pope’, in some traditionally substantive way, speaks through 
the encyclicals to which his name is attached, even if that encyclical is detached from his 
authorship. 37  Given the necessity of creative reproduction required in approaching 
 
37 Other examples of this decentred authorship are John Paul II’s Fides et ratio, which is “widely held 
to have been penned primarily by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger” (Stollenwerk, 2015: 62); and possibly 
Pius XII’s Humani generis, which shows the likely hand of French Dominican theologian, Garrigou-
Lagrange (c.f. Kerlin, 2007: 111). 
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encyclicals, such a process thus does not mean losing the sense in which the text is ‘the 
Pope’s’. Naturally there is a question about how creative such a reproduction can be before 
it ceases to be identifiable with the voice of the Pope, but equally authorship is not tied 
strictly to his pen. Rather, it requires us to reconceive of what it means to be ‘the Pope’ as 
the figure whose identity is appended to these documents. ‘Francis’, in the way that I use 
the name, is best identified not so much with the figure of Pope Francis himself, but with a 
certain character and quality of authority possessed by texts which is associated with and 
perhaps derives from, but is not identical to, this figure. 
It is worth noting that there is perhaps even an advantage to this decentring of identity with 
regards to the authority of the texts (and my interpretations). The notion of the Magisterium 
refers to both the teaching offices of the Church, and the individuals who inhabit them. This 
creates an ambiguity with regards to the distinction between the juridical and charismatic 
authority of those individuals (Odozor, 2003: 192-3). Some commentators have used this 
distinction to question the authority of certain facets of ostensibly magisterial teaching, 
characterising them as ‘personal’ in distinction to ‘magisterial’. Indeed, Cardinal Burke does 
precisely this when he characterises Amoris Laetitia as “personal, that is, non-magisterial” 
due to its lack of references to prior magisterial teaching (2016: Online). By decentring 
authorship from ‘Francis’ qua historical individual, this disavowed ‘personal’ dimension is 
removed. That is, the nature of papal documents is such that they cannot be attributed solely 
to the ‘person’ of the Pope, in distinction to the magisterial office.38 
Moreover, as mentioned above, this decentring of authorship, and necessitation of 
creativity, short-circuits debates about which interpretations are ‘most true’ to the ‘original’ 
text. If there is no accessible origin, then there is no question about which reading bears out 
the most fidelity with regards to it. To this end, I have avoided engaging at length with 
alternative readings in order to present my own as ‘truer’ than theirs, except where it is 
enlightening with regards to my wider argument. Instead, my readings are explicitly situated 
within the holistic form that I identify, and it is from this that they draw their power. Because 
any ‘rival’ readings will not be so situated, it is difficult to argue for or against them in relation 
 
38 Cardinal Burke refers here to the conversations between Pope Paul VI and the French philosopher 
and theologian Jean Guitton (1967) as an example of the Pope speaking in a ‘personal’ capacity. He 
argues that supposed incompatibilities between Amoris Laetitia and prior magisterial teaching, along 
with the absence of references to prior magisterial documents, mean that it can only be interpreted 
as an exercise of the Pope’s personal capacity – any other interpretation would entail error in the 
magisterium itself at the site of these contradictions. 
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to my own in an illuminating way – the argument that a reading is worse because it does not 
fit this whole says nothing directly about that reading other than that it does not fit my 
project. Conversely, an argument for a reading will only be possible on the basis that it fits 
the whole, which is a narrow condition that may exclude most readings similarly indirectly. 
As such, I do not treat these specific hermeneutical debates at length, and rather focus on 
communicating the holistic vision which, as we have just seen, must be received prior to 
these debates anyway.39 
Finally, if you remain unconvinced by the above arguments, this thesis can still be read as a 
creative extension of Francis’ thought in light of the authorial decentralisation that we 
previously identified in the context of his texts. By re-framing his ideas in a (hopefully) robust 
and systematic way, this thesis will hopefully indicate the robustness of a particular 
(specifically, reparative-hermeneutical) way of doing theology, which is already plotted 
within the co-ordinates of the existing tradition – even if it does not indicate the robustness 
of “his thought” in a more restrictive sense. 
1.1.1.3. A FALSE UNITY? 
Conversely, we might be concerned that our reading fails to fully recognise its own 
implications. This concern lies in our use of the image of a unified ‘authorial figure’ as such, 
decentred or otherwise. If we are constructing both ‘Francis’ and the meaning of his texts in 
the course of our reading, then perhaps this images engenders and embodies a kind of 
hermeneutical false-consciousness, presupposing that unity is readily available in the texts 
prior to our interpretation. Indeed, Foucault (1977) argues that the figure of the author itself 
serves to locate the meaning of a text within fixed boundaries, against the unlimited capacity 
for meaning-making in the reading subject. In this context, to cite the figure of ‘Francis’ 
(however we specifically conceive of him/it) is potentially to cite the possibility of this unity 
and fixity, and thereby militate against our creative interpretive project in the process.40 The 
 
39 To put it another way, the problematisation of authorship necessitates a certain mastery of the texts 
in interpretation. This brings us back into contact with the question of reparative versus paranoid 
hermeneutics. Because of this required mastery, it is difficult to distinguish normatively between 
either of these hermeneutics as an approach to the texts in question. Moreover, we noted that 
although we might associate mastery more with paranoid approaches, either hermeneutic can exhibit 
mastery. As such, although (we shall argue) Francis invokes a reparative vision of theology, this does 
not directly necessitate either hermeneutic with regards to his own texts. That said, as we also noted, 
they do embody certain concerns with regards to mastery and motivation ubiquitous to the practice 
of theology within a tradition more generally. However, in this case these concerns are perhaps best 
addressed apart from Sedgwick’s typology in order to avoid confusing the issue. 
40 We can certainly recognise the way in which these kinds of determining appeals to unity lend 
themselves to distinctly political ends, for example in constructing a basis for proof-texting which in 
turn enables the reader to establish boundaries for thought beyond the texts themselves. 
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image of a ‘corpus’ of texts may be problematic in the same way, referring to a corporeal 
unity that also redoubles the problematic imagery of the ‘authorial figure’ by citing the literal 
bodily unity of an historical individual. 
The first response to these concerns is that these images only function in this way if we forget 
the necessity of creative interpretation as argued for above. If the authorial figure of ‘Francis’ 
is a simulacrum, then its very nature is to generate meaning independently of any such 
‘deeper’ determining principle of identity or textual unity.  
However, we might nevertheless worry that these images in some sense introduce an 
ambivalence towards the possibility for interpretation that cannot be shaken merely by 
appealing to a cognitive account of disunity. Baudrillard himself might share this concern, 
noting that images have a capacity to overwhelm us: their production of meaning exceeds 
its grounding in the real of generative subjectivity; a hyperreal “redoubling of presence that 
effaces the opposition between presence and absence” (2001: 191). In effect, according to 
Baudrillard, subjectivity is redundant before the proliferation of images. Consequently, it is 
not sufficient to appeal to subjectivity itself (such as our recognition of the need for 
constructive interpretation) in order to overcome them. 
Baudrillard’s own response to this problematic is to shift focus to the object/image itself. 
Instead of resisting the image, we must surrender to it and push its powers of meaning-
making to senseless saturation; a “hypertelic” growth in which a system (of 
images/objects/signifiers) outstrips its objectives (representation/utility/signification) and 
thereby comes to inhibit it (2001: 192). Baudrillard gives the example of nuclear warfare, in 
which the destructive capabilities of weaponry far outstrips its purpose, in the end dissuading 
the very war it is created to facilitate (2001: 193-194).  
We can pursue a similar course, invoking the possibilities latent within the image of the body 
itself to render its connotations of fixity meaningless. If Francis’ writings are a ‘body’, and the 
authorial figure itself is a body that generates this written body, writers such as Butler (2006, 
2011) have shown that bodies themselves (perhaps especially in their in/capacity to generate 
other bodies) are semiotically fluid. Rather than representing a material boundary for 
meaning, they are always-already caught up in our processes of meaning-making 
themselves, and can be performatively re-encoded. Moreover, as we shall see, Francis 
himself provides us with the basis for a more fluid conception of what it is to be a body: 
firstly, a continuous theme throughout this thesis is that the Other is encountered as a 
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transcendent reality that destabilises our anticipations and determinations. In this context, 
we might think of the body, as the medium for this encounter, as likewise not so much an 
image of determining unity, but an image of uncertainty, transcendence, and disruption. 
Secondly, in chapter six, we will see how he conceives of creation as involved in an 
eschatological journey towards communion, in which the being-in-relation of creatures, of 
which embodiment is an inextricable part, undergoes a redemptive transformation. Read in 
these ways, images of the body encompass within themselves the very disruption of the unity 
that they otherwise signify. Consequently, the idea of an authorial body, or a ‘corpus’ of 
writings becomes a meaningless descriptor, connoting unity only as much as it also connotes 
its impossibility. 
1.1.2. A ‘READER-CENTERED’ HERMENEUTIC 
This way of reading Francis is somewhat distinctive, and perhaps controversial. The majority 
of the literature on Francis does not engage substantively with the question of how to go 
about reading Francis in the first place, instead tacitly presupposing a variety of 
hermeneutical approaches. Because these hermeneutics remain mostly unarticulated, it is 
difficult to analyse them in a particularly detailed or precise way. However, Yaghjian (2015) 
provides a heuristic typology41  which enables us to make a rough schematisation ofthe 
different approaches extant in the literature that is sufficient for articulating what is 
distinctive about our own approach.  
It distinguishes between three broad hermeneutical types, defined according to where each 
reading ‘locates’ the meaning of the text: 42  “author-centered”, “subject-centered”, and 
 
41 Yaghjian’s book is a guide for undergraduate students starting out particularly in Biblical theology. 
To this end, this typology in no way aspires to be a full-blown theory of meaning. Nor does she even 
attempt to articulate substantive features of each type beyond their basic identifying quality. To this 
end, we are using it descriptively, as short-hand for distinguishing key features of our approach to 
others, rather than prescriptively, as the foundation for a method. 
42 Yaghjian formulates this typology specifically in relation to Biblical interpretation, but it carries over 
to reading the documents of the ordinary Magisterium. To situate my thesis, I have indicated some 
texts which can be read as examples of each in the footnotes below. 
Naturally, the typology is not a rigid one, and various readings of Francis fall within it in mixed 
and/or ambiguous ways. A particularly clear example of this being Toldy (2017): to begin with, Toldy 
adopts what we will come to call a ‘subject-centered’ approach, focusing on what Laudato Si’ says and 
does not say about women. However, she then attempts to “attach women’s faces” to the problems 
identified in the encyclical (2017: 170), finding new meaning in the encyclical through a 
recontextualised reading – that is, she shifts into what we will come to call a ‘reader-centered’ 
approach. Finally, she then uses her recontextualised reading to critically assess Francis’ rejection of 
anthropocentrism – that is, shifting back to a dialogical mode that is characteristic of ‘subject-
centered’ hermeneutics. Where ambiguity arises, I have categorised readings based on which 




“reader-centered”. 43  She gives Hirsch (1967), Gadamer (1997), and Ricoeur (1981) as 
exemplars of each, respectively. 
An ‘author-centered’ hermeneutic “identifies textual meaning with the author’s intended 
meaning and locates that meaning in the original horizon, or context, of the document” 
(Yaghjian, 2015: 201). That is, it is premised on the idea that a text can only be properly 
understood when it is first understood in relation to the historical situation of its authors and 
original audience. As Yaghjian puts it, “writing in this mode begins as a line of works that 
takes us back to its original horizon, before we follow it into other contexts”. This requires 
an informed understanding of that situation. It also “empowers” the interpreter themselves 
to “trust their own construals of meaning and significance”, because their interpretations 
are grounded in concrete historical knowledge. However, this must also be qualified by 
reference to the fact that this knowledge is only “probability”, rather than certitude. To this 
end, it is useful for both the exegesis of texts, and also building upon this exegesis to interpret 
the text in a way that is intelligible in a contemporary context (Yaghjian, 2015: 201).44 
A ‘subject-centered’ hermeneutic, rather than trying to mediate the text to the reader via 
the historical situation of the author, instead conceives of the text as mediating the author 
and reader. It “correlates textual meaning with its subject matter and realizes that meaning 
through subject centered conversation that brings about a fusion of horizons of the author 
and the interpreter” (Yaghjian, 2015: 201). Whereas ‘author-centered’ hermeneutics seek to 
understand by reconstructing the meaning of the author, ‘subject-centered’ hermeneutics 
seek to understand by posing questions to the text, and then writing in response to them. In 
doing so, ‘subject-centered’ hermeneutics facilitate the application of texts to new contexts 
(Yanghjian, 2015: 202). However, this requires “a clearly delineated “original” horizon” to 
which we put our questions. As such, this kind of reading presupposes an ‘author-centered’ 
exegesis (2015: 201).45  
 
43 C.f. Hirsch (1967), Gadamer (1997), and Ricoeur (1981). 
44 For examples of ‘author-centered’ approaches to Francis, see Berryman (2016), Borghesi (2018), 
Curran (2013), Faggioli (2016a), Lemna (2014), McGill (2017), Mudge (2018), O’Collins (2016), 
O’Halloran (2018), Robin Ryan (2015), Rourke (2016a; 2016b), Sadowski (2016), Scannone (2016), 
Sedmak (2017), Whelan (2015), Worthen (2016), Zhang (2016). 
45 For examples of ‘subject-centered’ readings of Francis, see Abeyasingha (2016), Abram (2017), Alva 
(2016), Arasa (2018), Bevans (2015b), Booth (2017), Boyte (2017), Briliute (2016), Butkus and Kolmes 
(2017), Capaldi (2016), Chipalkatti, Rishi and Lobo (2018), Choi (2017), Considine (2015), das Neves 
(2017), Deane-Drummond (2016; 2017), Denis (2016), Gregg (2015), Gruber (2017a), Handley (2016), 
Jamieson (2015), Johnston Largen (2016), Kaboré (2018), Kelly (2016), Kennedy and Santos (2017), 
Kureethadam (2016), Lasida (2017), Lemna (2014), Lennan (2014), Marx (2016), Montgomery (2015), 
Morgan (2018), Muscolino (2016), Northcott (2016), Oltvai (2018), Pittapillil (2016), Principe (Kris), 
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These two hermeneutics are problematised by the de-centered authorship of ‘Francis’ that 
we are seeking to read. An ‘author-centered’ approach is problematic in the context of our 
project precisely because the authorship ‘Francis’ defies reduction to a particular historical 
source. This is not to say that ‘reader-centered’ hermeneutics are problematic in general: 
these documents do have an historical origin, and that origin does lie (in some more or less 
mediated way) in the thought of Pope Francis qua historical individual. However, the focus 
of this kind of reading is ultimately on a different object to ours: as we have argued above, 
the text that we ultimately are tasked with appropriating as Catholics does not have a 
straightforward foundation in an historical author figure. In this contextan ‘author-centered’ 
approach would perhaps tell us less about ‘Francis’ the authorial figure, and more about 
some other phenomenon, and is not the appropriate method here. Following from this, a 
‘subject-centered’ hermeneutic is also problematic because it lacks the clear horizon of 
authorship to which the reader can pose questions. 
This leads us on to the third hermeneutic: the ‘reader-centered’ hermeneutic. A fundamental 
difference between this hermeneutical stance and the previous two is its location of text in 
relation to speech, and thus the person of the author. Whereas Hirsch and Gadamer conceive 
of writing in terms of a mediation of the meaning-making author as encountered more 
directly in speech, Ricoeur understands writing as its own “autonomous mode of 
communication”, and “equal” to speech “as a communicative medium”. For Ricoeur the 
function of writing is not to mediate the meaning-making author to the reader (as in speech). 
Rather, this meaning-making itself becomes a function of the interpretation of the text by a 
reader, who encounters it in a situation of removal from the person of the writer (Yaghjian, 
2015: 203). 
 
Proniewski (2015), Puggioni (2017), Robin (2015), Rowlands (2015), Scherz (2016), Schlag (2017), 
Silecchia (2015; 2018), Spadaro (2018), Thompson (2016), Toldy (2017), van den Heuvel (2018), 
Wrobleski (2016), Zhang (2016).  
In many cases, ‘subject-centered’ approaches only are so ambiguously. This is generally for 
two reasons. Firstly, most of the literature portrays itself as simply looking at ‘what Francis says’ or 
‘what [text x] says’ about a given issue. In both cases, the literature appears to mediate Francis’ 
intention to us. However, it is unclear whether it does so based on an assumed context that makes 
the information readily apparent (i.e. an ‘author-centered’ approach) or whether it is the navigation 
of the issues themselves (and the mediation between the subjectivities of author and reader around 
them – i.e. a ‘subject-centered’ approach) that undergirds the reading of the text. 
Secondly, Francis writes out of a tradition which serves as both the context for, and the object 
of, his theological reflection. Where a reading identifies Francis as deploying certain elements of this 
prior tradition (as virtually all readings do), it is thus unclear whether this constitutes a locating of 
meaning in relation to the context provided by this tradition (i.e. an ‘author-centered’ approach), or 
an investigation of how Francis writes ‘about’ the tradition such that it serves to mediate Francis and 
the reader (i.e. a ‘subject-centered’ approach). 
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This hermeneutical approach requires the reader to engage with the text specifically as 
writing; something that is encountered in its own autonomy. Interpretation is a struggle not 
to uncover a hidden meaning in the text as such, but to appropriate the alien meaning 
presented by the text such that it becomes one’s own. In this context, in writing about a text, 
our task is to invite others to engage in this process themselves (Yaghjian, 2015: 204).46 
 
46 For examples of ‘reader-centered’ approaches to Francis, see Bevans (2015b; 2016); Byrne (2016); 
Campos (2017); Carter (2014); Ceballos (2016); Chaput (2017); Choi (2015); Choi (2017); Clarkson 
(2017); Clifford (2017); Considine (2015); Cooreman-Guittin (2016); Cremers (2016); Cuddeback 
(2016); Dettloff (2017); Gaudelli (2017); Gilchrist (2017); Goleń (2018); Granados (2017); Gruber 
(2017b); Hanby (2015); Hrynkow (2016; 2018); Iheanacho (2016); Imanaka (2018); Knoetze (2015);  
Lemna (2014); López (2016); Lunney (2016); Magesa (2017); Messinger (2017); Michaluk (2017); 
Moccia (2017); Pavić and Šundalić (2016); Peppard (2016); Porras (2015); Pramuk (2018); Reginald 
(2017); Sachs (2017); Scherz (2018); Seifert (2016); Thompson (2016); Toldy (2017); Torevell (2018); 
Turkson (2015); Urick, Hisker and Godwin (2017); and Wahlberg (2017). 
It is sometimes unclear whether the literature on Francis is ‘subject-’ or ‘reader-centered’. 
Because most writers do not explicitly identify a locus of meaning for the text, it can be ambiguous 
whether the literature locates meaning in the figure of the author, or whether it ultimately represents 
the author of that literature’s own appropriation (as reader) of the text as an autonomous locus of 
meaning - for example, Campos (2017), who notes in the title that he is giving “an Indian Perspective” 
on Laudato Si’, but which manifests primarily in the selection of the contents of the encyclical, rather 
than explicit reflexivity.  
Similarly, attempts to read Francis’ texts according to the tradition, such as Michaluk (2017), 
Goleń (2017), or Chaput (2017), blur the boundaries between ‘reader-centered’ and both ‘author-
centered’ or ‘subject-centered’ approaches: on the one hand, they bring an interpretive framework 
to bear on the text (that is, a particular reading of the tradition). However, on the other, they 
understand this framework in terms of the historical context of that text – namely, the historical 
tradition out of which it nominally speaks.  
Michaluk’s paper is also interesting in that his ‘reader-centered’ approach is particularly 
subtle, to the point that it only becomes plausibly visible if we are attuned to the cultural weight of 
his methodology. We have to pay attention to instances such as when, in the course of a discussion 
about approaches to technological development, he claims that “[w]hen analyzing Laudato Si’… it is 
worth considering that his teaching continues the thoughts of his predecessors, but is more up to date 
and concrete” (2017: 379). Here, his analysis of these predecessors on this topic, and his comparison 
with Laudato Si’, is too superficial to truly indicate either continuity or discontinuity. A charitable 
reading of his argument thus prompts us to a different interpretation of this claim. One option for this 
would be to read the statement as an apologetic move: as we saw in the previous chapter, and as we 
probably know from experience, apparent discontinuities between Francis’ papacy and those of his 
predecessors carry weight for both ‘conservative’ and ‘progressive’ partisans within the Church - 
‘conservative’ critics of Francis often pin their criticism on what they identify as discontinuities 
between him and his predecessors, and ‘progressive’ readers use these discontinuities to detract from 
the positions which Francis has ostensibly abandoned. In adopting this premise, Michaluk pushes a 
hermeneutic of continuity which undercuts both these readings. In other words, Michaluk actually 
offers a ‘reader-centered’ approach, circulating around the appropriation of a particular 
understanding of Francis’ theology. This is plausible inasmuch as there is a clear motive for doing so: 
presenting this reading constitutes an intervention into a broader cultural conflict within the Church. 
This is an action of value for an individual invested in that conflict - as Michaluk, like all Catholics, 
surely is. 
Finally, readings which attempt to put Francis’ texts ‘in dialogue’ with other texts (such as 
Bevans (2016)) appear to be subject centred approaches, particularly given their explicit focus on 
dialogue. However, behind these readings lies a ‘reader-centered’ interpretative decision for both 
dialogue partners. In short, they select both Francis’ texts and the interlocutor texts as hermeneutical 
frameworks through which to engage the other. They thereby mediate both texts specifically as in 
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The similarities between the presuppositions of a ‘reader-centered’ hermeneutic and the 
conditions of our own project are fairly clear: our Baudrillardian reading of Francis’ 
authorship leads to a decentred account of its meaning, this emerging from the texts 
themselves, and the processes of their production, dissemination, reception and 
interpretation. Moreover, we can identify our project with this process of appropriation – 
we have to receive these texts in a way that enables us to implement them in the life of the 
Church. In this vein, in writing about the texts, we also seek to enable others to engage with 
them in the same manner. 
Likewise, as we mentioned previously, what this means for our project is that our reading of 
Francis cannot be understood to be a simple read reception that aspires to uncover some 
‘true meaning’ lying behind the texts, apart from the process of reading or interpretation 
itself. By extension, we cannot aspire to passively ‘receive’ any meaning that exists prior to 
this reception. At all points, we are always-already involved with the text. The process of 
interpretation and reception are all determinative of the meaning of the texts themselves, 
and we must be both aware and unafraid of the active role that we play in this dynamic. 
This requires us to adjust our expectations for what this project can entail, and it is in this 
readjustment that we might find our concerns to lie. One way of framing this is in terms of 
the Catechism’s teaching that the faithful are to “receive with docility the teachings and 
directives that their pastors give them in different forms” (CCC §87). In this context, we must 
accept a sense of ‘docility’ that recognises the active role we play not just in the 
acknowledgement and implementation of teachings, but in the construction of the meaning 
of those teachings themselves. As such, we cannot aspire to work from a position that 
dispenses with this role It is worth noting that the issue at stake here is not, ultimately, about 
whether we are to be ‘docile’ or not. Rather, it turns on what it means to be ‘docile’ in the 
first place, and encourages us to reflect critically on this. This issue, together with differences 
around the issue that underpins it – namely how we ought to conceive of ‘Francis’ as 
authorial figure – may lie at the root of the main methodological distinctions between this 
 
dialogue through the reading practice that places them in this dialogical relation to one another. In 
this context, Ceballos (2017) is particularly interesting: this paper weaves a rich tapestry out of a 
variety of sources, structured by an extended reflection on Laudato Si’. On the one hand, this paper 
could be read as juxtaposing a ‘subject-centered’ reading of the encyclical alongside ‘subject-
centered’ readings of other texts. However, by deploying it in this structuring role, Ceballos integrates 
the text into a wider intertextual field that in turn expands the meaning of the encyclical itself. In 
short, by functionally recontextualising Laudato Si’, thereby rendering it a meaning-bearing unit in a 
larger hybrid text, Ceballos produces a ‘reader-centered’ reading of the encyclical itself in which its 
intratextual meaning is also enriched. 
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thesis and other readings and appropriations of Francis, both in terms of choice of 
hermeneutical type, and perhaps the willingness to synthesise his writings in a self-
consciously creative manner. 
The uncertainty of this critical reflection around docility itself, alongside the potential for 
creative activity that it potentially enables, may be the root source of our concern – especially 
when contrasted with the security and passivity of the uncritical response normally 
associated with ‘docile reception’. 47  However, we must recognise that, insofar as the 
challenge is to reconceive of docility as such, the question our approach raises is whether 
the proper reception of texts is not inextricably bound up in a measure of freedom to 
approach them in a way that facilitates their appropriation in the context of one’s project. If 
a ‘reader centered’ approach is truly necessary, then, far from such a reading distorting the 
texts, it is only in light of such a project that the texts themselves attain meaning. 
Consequently, a more self-consciously creative approach cannot merely be dismissed out of 
hand.  
1.2. A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH 
Another concern might arise around our attempt to read Francis’ writings as parts of a 
systematic whole which exceeds each individual document. It is the contention of this thesis 
that such a reading brings to light this systematic whole, even if this whole is not immediately 
apparent. In order to do this, moreover, it will ask questions of these texts which are not 
explicitly treated within them. As we shall see, a close reading of the texts in dialogue 
provides answers to these questions. However, this reading is admittedly somewhat ‘against 
the grain’ of the texts as they present themselves. 
These questions will be with regards to various philosophical issues, and one of the tricky 
aspects about approaching Pope Francis as a theologian is that he does not produce texts for 
reading with an eye to these issues. What we have is a galimorphry of media reports, 
encyclicals, transcribed addresses, and homilies, many of which are only accessible in some 
edited and translated form. Thus his corpus lacks an explicit systematic form. Moreover, each 
such source does not attempt to lay out a systematic treatise or unpack an idea: what they 
constitute are quick, popular explorations of or meditations on ideas, an understanding of 
which is presupposed and never defined. Rather, they lend themselves to reflection without 
attending to the fine grain of an idea, and in this vein most readers will quite rightly look to 
 




them for nothing more than a spark of inspiration or general orientation in the course of 
daily life. As such, they provide difficult material for close, systematic reading. 
Indeed, Francis himself privileges this kind of ‘everyday’ focus in theology. One of the key 
principles of his thought is that “realities are greater than ideas” (EG §231): we must attend 
to the complexities and intransigencies of ‘real life’ rather than focusing on comparatively 
neat ideas and theories which, despite lending themselves well to analysis in an academic 
context, are often reductive or insensitive to the particularities of a situation. As such, a critic 
might be tempted to say that it is inappropriate or somehow abusive of the sources to 
attempt to present a philosophically-oriented, systematic approach to Francis’ theology. We 
will also see, in chapter four in particular, that Francis affords a significance to the local and 
particular (indeed, to local and particular uses of language), and warns against reducing it 
away to the global or universal – something which might in itself give us pause before 
establishing a ‘universal’ system around the ‘local’ interventions of particular texts. 
The first response to this concern is that this thesis ultimately shows that Francis’ writings do 
in fact have a systematic, and philosophically sophisticated dimension. On this front, the 
above criticism merely begs the question. Indeed, in light of the genre distinctions between 
Francis’ teaching documents and the academic kind of writing in this thesis, I would argue 
that the transformations which take place in the act of translating from one form to another 
are primarily genre-based. A superficial piece of theological writing makes use of concepts 
with the same potential for nuanced and complex meaning as academic theology - and 
indeed we assume there is some continuity between them to the extent that academic 
theology can speak about the faith in which an encyclical instructs us at all. The difference 
between the two is not that the meaning of the latter is more complicated than the former, 
but that the former obscures this complexity in its expression. To this end, reading a more 
superficial document like an encyclical in an academic way is primarily a matter of changing 
the genre so as to bring the originally obscured meaning into sharper relief. 
In a similar vein, our argument for his affording significance to the local arises out of this 
systematic perspective. To this end, we might question the rationale behind privileging the 
local over the particular in our reading of Francis. At the very least, what this reveals is that 
the very question of whether to emphasise the particularity of texts or the universality of a 
systemic reading in the first place is contingent upon prior hermeneutical decisions – 
decisions which themselves need to be justified. This means that we must do more than 
merely appeal to the supposed ‘variety’ and ‘particularity’ of texts, as if the meaning and 
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significance of this variety were simply evident. Moreover, if we refer to our reading of 
Francis in order to do this, then this argument itself would presuppose a systematic outlook 
as its own basis. Likewise, as we shall also see in chapter four, Francis’ recognition of the 
particular is not an indifference towards particulars in general. More specifically, in chapter 
seven, we will argue that he can sustain first-order commitments in such a way as to 
recognise universal truth claims. In other words, his recognition of the local and the 
particular admits the possibility of universality, and there is no reason why this should not 
apply to our hermeneutic of his documents themselves, rather than reducing their meaning 
purely to particular instances of language use local to their contexts. 
Another consideration might be that, although Francis does not present his theology to us 
‘already assembled’, respecting this by not attempting to assemble anything from it denies 
us the kinds of resources which come from systematisation and ‘academic’ kinds of reading. 
These include a richer and more sophisticated understanding of the meaning and significance 
of the texts than is enabled by the more superficial expression of the original documents 
prior to this re-contextualisation and re-reading. Furthermore, this in turn can allow us to 
appropriate the texts in a broader and more rigorous way: by recognising the wider 
systematicity of those texts, we can refer between them in order to explain the questions 
and lacunae which necessarily arise in the context of their more narrow focus; by reading 
them in relation to a more sophisticated understanding of their objects allows us in turn to 
derive more sophisticated answers to the questions they seek to help us to solve; and 
figuring out the conceptual underpinnings of their practical recommendations allows us to 
approach those recommendations in a more critically informed, reflective (and so perhaps 
less authoritarian) way, and to apply them more precisely in different contexts , enabling a 
more sophisticated praxis. To put it succinctly, the texts are better when read in this way. In 
this vein, we might also say that our mode of reading, while perhaps a little counter-intuitive, 
is also the more charitable one.48 Correspondingly, academic theology itself is also enriched 
by engaging in these kinds of text, insofar as it comes to be informed by insights expressed 
in voices otherwise excluded from the academy.49 
 
48 And one might hope that presenting them in this more robust way will go some way to assuaging 
worries about perceived inadequacies. 
49 As we will see, this attention to difference and the Other is a prominent theme in Francis’ theology 
as we read it. To this end, we might say that academic theology also starts to be conducted in a way 
more in tune with Francis’ teachings themselves; an integration into the life of the Church and a way 
of embodying teaching negotiated on a basis other than that of the fraught relationship between 




Moreover, if such a creative approach enables us to articulate Francis’ thought more robustly 
than would otherwise be possible, then this too speaks in its favour at least insofar as the 
Church has to receive Francis’ thought in at least some form. Along these lines, the texts 
themselves are directed towards the good of the Church. Reading them creatively can help 
them further pursue this good where a more conventional reading would not, as it can allow 
them to transcend their original presentation. 
The ‘reader-centered’ hermeneutic necessitated by Francis’ de-centred authorship enables 
this reading. Even if a systematising approach ‘goes against the grain’ of the texts as they 
superficially present themselves, it constitutes an important part of the meaning-making 
process in the context of the appropriation of Francis’ theology in this project. 
1.3.  ABSTRACTION 
This also relates to another potential worry with regards to our project: the relative 
abstraction of our reading from the ‘historical context’ of its composition. Many analyses of 
Francis focus on demonstrating the historical pedigree of his theology, for example by 
explaining its Argentinian roots, and its relationship to particular traditions of interpreting 
the Second Vatican Council. This kind of approach is helpful insofar as these historical links 
can help us to navigate the ideas in the text in a broadly systematic way. It also helps assuage 
concerns around fitting Francis’ teachings into the wider Magisterial tradition, at least 
conceived in a certain way. Finally, as mentioned earlier, we will also see that Francis affords 
a significance to the local and historical, and this might also lead us to attend to the historical 
particularities of his authorship. However, this thesis does not take this approach, and this 
may be of concern to more historically-minded readers.50 To assuage this worry, I offer the 
following arguments:  
Firstly, the texts we are reading intrinsically resist identification with the object of this kind 
of genealogical study. The de-centred authorship that is the ‘Francis’ with which we are 
concerned cannot be identified with the figure of ‘Francis’ the individual. This means that 
any reading which interprets a text in terms of that individual is always-already engaging with 
a fundamentally different text to the one with which we are engaging – even if they are 
nominally the same (e.g. they are both called “Amoris Laetitia”).  
 
50 Although we will touch on certain historical figures and moments in order to guide our reading 
(particularly the Argentine Theology of the People in chapter four, Aquinas in chapter six, and general 
pre-modern trends in Eucharistic theology in chapter seven), this is not done with the specific 
intention of situating Francis within the tradition. 
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Secondly, the texts themselves are disseminated in order that they are appropriated in ways 
other than contextualisation. When we read a papal encyclical, we do not immediately run 
to the history books to figure out where the ideas within come from. This is because, 
although they may have been written in response to particular contexts (as John Paul II told 
us above), these texts nevertheless purport to speak  in general or even universal ways. 
Similarly to the above, this general outlook also requires us to read in more explicitly abstract 
terms. 
Following on from this, as we noted previously, part of the process of reading these 
documents is a creative appropriation. They must speak to situations beyond the limited 
contexts of their compositions, and what enables this is their creative appropriation by the 
wider reading community (of which we are part). On this front, a historical genealogy of 
Francis’ thought only goes so far: it tells us where it comes from, and helps us to relate 
otherwise disparate elements around issues specific to the context of that origin. However,  
genealogy does not necessarily help us look at it in our expanded context, particularly where 
that context is quite different to the ‘original’ one. We are interested in abstract issues about 
hermeneutics of alterity, approached in terms borrowed from an American cultural critic 
from 2002. This demands a different reading – one that is oriented towards teasing out the 
concepts and relationships relevant in this context, rather than attempting to ‘read back’ 
into it Argentine theology from the 1960s, or the outlook of CELAM in the 1980s. In this vein, 
our focus also necessitates a level of abstraction. General philosophical issues apply, and can 
be important, even where they are not anticipated by specific texts. Because they are to an 
extent detached from the immediate context of the texts themselves, these issues can only 
be treated with a degree of abstraction. 
Focusing on this reflection and accounting for its historical roots are two different projects, 
and while the latter would certainly be valuable, there is too much to the former to fully do 
justice to it while also attempting to do the latter. To the extent that I, as a PhD student, can 
be said to have any ‘background’ at all, my background is primarily philosophical. As such, I 
have elected in this study to focus on the philosophical issues which arise in the context of 
Francis’ writings, and allow myself to be guided in my interpretation by how they navigate 
these issues (specifically in a systematic way), rather than attempt to trace the particular 
historical genesis of each move ‘he’ makes.51 
 
51 Note that by not treating more contextual issues, I am not arguing that more contextual readings 
can be ignored. My project is perhaps best read alongside these other kinds of projects, as 
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Finally, with regards to the issue of situating Francis in the tradition: the assumption that we 
need to do this implies that Francis’ teachings might not be in continuity with the tradition 
(whatever we take this to mean). However, these texts, as papal texts, are at least nominally 
authoritative components of the tradition. In this vein, the impetus towards this kind of 
reading often lies in the sense that Francis’ teachings need to be defended as properly 
‘traditional’ in this way. However, this is not an issue with which this thesis is concerned - 
our project is not this kind of apologetic project. Furthermore, at least to the extent that this 
kind of argument amounts to a kind of ‘proof texting’ (which we have already argued 
embodies a paranoid hermeneutic), the upshot of this thesis is that Francis’ theology enables 
us to avoid this way of reading - thereby undercutting the force of these claims, at least when 
presented without engagement with Francis’ theology on its own terms. 
This does not entirely settle the issue, however. One further argument for an historicising 
approach is that a-historical hermeneutics themselves fail on a theological level. For example, 
Granados (2017) argues against readings of Amoris Laetitia that do not (and thus proposing 
a reading that does) interpret its teachings on divorce in a way consonant with a particular 
strand of sacramental theology, identified specifically with Irenaeus. On the one hand, he 
thereby identifies the meaning of Amoris Laetitia with a particular understanding of the 
historical tradition from which Francis putatively writes. On the other, he presents this 
reading explicitly as a reading from ‘the Tradition’ (which is to say, a particular, if perhaps 
rightfully privileged, interpretive standpoint), and argues that alternatives are illegitimate 
precisely because they do not read it from this standpoint. We might thus understand 
Granados as presenting a ‘reader-centered’ approach that entails an ‘author-centered’ 
hermeneutics, albeit a restricted one.  
Granados is clearly influenced in this by his ecclesiology, which also serves as the content of 
the contextualising information that guides the ‘author-centered’ reading. Indeed, he notes 
that the reading of Amoris Laetitia against which he argues “undermines… the Petrine 
ministry itself, depriving it of the sacramental basis on which it was founded” (2017: 665-
666). This demonstrates that the hermeneutical question is not a theologically neutral one – 
deciding our hermeneutics involves taking stances more or less directly on wider theological 
topics, such as ecclesiology. By extension, there is a danger in making hermeneutical 
 
complementary to them. Moreover, synthesising the two approaches would undoubtedly be fruitful. 
I just do not have the space or expertise for it here. 
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decisions without reflecting on the more specific theological issues on which those decisions 
might impinge. 
This is a risk that we are just going to have to run. Firstly, it would be a mistake to assume 
from this that a given theology ought to or (even could) function as some kind of ‘first 
philosophy’. It is trivial to say that theological truth claims always involve implicit 
commitments beyond those strictly ‘internal to theology’. This includes hermeneutical 
commitments: in the case of Granados, his reading of the Tradition is premised upon a 
particular selection and reading of historical sources. In a complementary way, the choice 
for these readings similarly involves other theological commitments.  
These commitments, however, are not a given. As will become apparent in this thesis, 
Francis’ texts themselves actually articulate the possibility of receiving from the Other, which 
renders these kinds of disciplinary boundaries more porous than is suggested by Granados’ 
hermeneutic. Likewise, the tradition itself problematises these kinds of disciplinary 
boundaries, at least under certain readings. Pound notes that Thomas Aquinas himself, 
whose theology is closer to being identified with the Tradition than any other, looked beyond 
the boundaries of recognised ‘theological’ thought to Aristotle. Consequently, the 
methodological model with which he (and by extension, the Tradition as embodied in him) 
presents us is one that endorses “repeating his gesture” and finding a contemporary voice 
for rearticulating theology. These possibilities reveal that Granados’ hermeneutic is founded 
upon a decision to prioritise certain figures in his reading of Francis, and therefore also the 
possibility of reading Francis outside of the parameters set by his decision. 
The issue of arguing for one decision on this matter over another is a complex one, which 
lies beyond the scope of our project here.52 However, the above arguments ought to indicate 
that our approach is at least reasonable; I leave its ultimate appraisal to the reader. 
1.4. REDUCTION 
Before we continue, we should make sure to clear up a potential misunderstanding around 
our project which relates to the above issues. A ‘reader-centered’ hermeneutic involves 
meaning making in the process of reading itself. One way in which this can be accomplished 
is through a fourth type of hermeneutic, which Yaghjian calls a “writer-centered 
hermeneutic”. This kind of hermeneutic is different from the others insofar as, rather than 
 
52 This being to outline how Francis can be read as presenting a reparative alternative to Catholic 
paranoia, without decisively ruling for or against this alternative. 
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constituting a distinctive stance towards texts as such, it serves as a tool for approaching 
specific texts within a ‘reader-centered’ reading. 
‘Writer-centered’ hermeneutics employ an “interpretive method chosen by the writer for 
the purpose of explicating a… text in a particular way toward a particular end” (2015: 204-
5). Moreover, ‘writer-centered’ approaches are “[a]uthorized by the semantic autonomy” 
presupposed in texts by a ‘reader-centered’ hermeneutic. Yaghjian notes that this 
hermeneutic “privileges the writer-interpreter’s claims on the text rather than the text’s 
claims on the writer-interpreter”. That is, in exercising this authority, the interpreter sets “an 
interpretive agenda (e.g., a feminist hermeneutic; a social science hermeneutic)”, which to 
an extent determines what one finds in the text (2015: 204). This, however, risks a certain 
reductiveness – and perhaps even an inappropriate or distorting mastery of the text.  
Our project involves such a hermeneutic: we are employing Sedgwick’s typology of paranoid 
and reparative hermeneutical stances in order to explicate Francis’ texts in such a way that 
a certain treatment of issues of knowledge and alterity on his part become apparent. 
Moreover, Catholic theology is no stranger to fraught questions of mastery around 
hermeneutics: for example, when John Paul II warns against reducing ecclesial communion 
purely to a “sociological or a psychological reality”, he is warning against adopting a kind of 
‘writer-centered’ hermeneutic, where that hermeneutic is one of purely secular human 
sciences (Christefideles Laici §19). In this context, we might worry that our reading of Francis 
(and his critics) through Sedgwick constitutes a kind of psychoanalytic reduction of theology 
to a mere product of affect, thereby eliminating its cognitive basis. 
As such, it is important to understand that Sedwick’s typology serves to describe certain 
features of theological stances – namely their approach to the apparent uncertainty of 
alterity and indeterminacy. We are not claiming that these theologies are entirely motivated 
or constituted by an affective reaction, as if the cognitive aspects are a mere side-effect. 
Similarly, we are not seeking to dismiss certain theologies on the basis of their relation to a 
paranoid hermeneutical stance. 
For example, although our treatment of it was brief, we noted in our reading of Veritatis 
Splendor that John Paul II roots his understanding of conscience and obedience in an exegesis 
of scripture, and also philosophical ideas of the natural law and its relation to divine law. 
These constitute a cognitive basis for the paranoid dimensions of the text, and will 
themselves have cognitive reasons for being maintained. Similarly, by providing a systematic 
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account of his teachings, our project will identify the cognitive reasons Francis has for his 
more reparative stance. 
One helpful way of framing our project might be as follows: Milbank traces the origins of 
social theory, including psychoanalysis, in the distinctly theological debates of early 
modernity. He argues from this that ‘the social’ itself, as the object constructed by and 
determining the methodologies of social theory, is itself a “quasi-theological category” 
(2006: xii). Likewise, then, theology itself is a social theory, able to speak of this category. 
Pound notes that it “is not difficult to extend Milbank’s project to psychoanalysis” (2007: 4), 
and seeks to “encourage theology to think of itself as already psychology, and liturgy as 
psychoanalysis” (2007: 5). This thesis responds to Pound’s encouragement: far from 
psychoanalysing theologies, we are instead showing how Francis’ theology can work 
therapeutically, helping us to achieve a reparative stance in light of the difficulties that come 
with being a Catholic theologian. 
2. SELECTING TEXTS 
This thesis aims to specifically address the writings within the ambiguous authorship of ‘Pope 
Francis’. In order to do so, it limits itself to his major texts published up until 2018.53 These 
include the encyclical letters Lumen Fidei (2013b) and Laudato Si’ (2015a); the apostolic 
exhortations Evangelii Gaudium (2013a), Amoris Laetitia (2016a) and Gaudete et Exsultate 
(2018); the Papal Bull Misericordiae Vultus (2015d); and the apostolic letters Misericordia et 
Misera (2016b) and Magnum Principium (2017). 
2.1. WHY THESE TEXTS? 
The first reason for this is practical: in the course of his teaching, Francis has produced (and 
continues to produce) an overwhelmingly vast number of texts in the form of speeches, 
homilies, and interviews. It would be impossible to integrate all of these into our analysis, so 
we have to limit ourselves to a subset. 
Moreover, this subset ought to be as informative of Francis’ theology as possible. In this vein, 
the second reason is that the documents I have selected reflect on their topics in a 
distinctively extended way. As such, they are informative for the purposes of my project in a 
way that his other texts `are not. 
 
53 Francis continuously produced documents over the course of the time in which this thesis was 




Thirdly, these texts are the most widely read, and are the texts that will be referenced by 
future teaching documents. This gives them a de facto qualitatively different kind of 
historical significance, or perhaps even authority, to the other texts: these are the texts to 
which the Church really has to, and will continue to have to, respond. Focusing on these texts 
means focusing on the Francis that will be received by the Church in a determinate form in 
the long term. This is not to say that his other texts are ephemeral, but in terms of our project 
there is a clear difference in significance here. 
A final reason why these texts in particular are suited to our project is that they intrinsically 
lend themselves to ‘reader-centered’ hermeneutical approaches. The texts take their place 
within a tradition of epideictic panegyric writing, recovered from Patristic authors by the 
Second Vatican Council (O’Malley, 2008: 74). Key to this genre is a project of “persuasion” 
and “reconciliation”: they “establish an identity between themselves and their audience” in 
terms of shared ideals, to which the reader is exhorted (2008: 77). In service of this, the genre 
also rejects the top-down, legalistic stipulation associated with pre-Conciliar magisterial 
texts. Instead, it focuses on elaborating these shared values, and inspiring the reader to 
realise them (2008: 76).54 We see a similar genre at work throughout these texts, which 
consistently work to exhort and inspire. 
Texts written in this genre presuppose an active role on the part of the reader in interpreting 
them, laying out responsibilities “not as a code of conduct to be enforced, but as an ideal to 
be striven for, with the understanding that they are to be adapted to changing times and 
circumstances” (O’Malley 2008: 76). That is, they are oriented towards appropriation by the 
reader. Because of this, they invite ‘reader-centered’ hermeneutical approaches. 
Secondly, epeidictic as found in Francis’ texts identifies the figure of the speaker with 
expertise in a way that decenters the historical authorial figure. In traditional Christian usage, 
epidictic invokes the authority of the speaker as part of an appeal to recognise the speaker 
as representing and upholding the shared values promulgated in the text (Perelman and 
Olbrects-Tyteca, 1969: 52). Lynch notes that Francis’ use of epideictic in Laudato Si’ assumes 
an authority grounded not in personal qualifications (e.g. as a scientist), but in the “speech 
of love” that embodies the religious dimension of the text itself (2017: 474). This has the 
effect of decentering Francis the historical individual, locating this authoritative voice in the 
 
54 Which is not to say that elements of the older genre ceased to be employed, or to carry cultural 
weight. Jamieson notes how Paul VI in Humane vitae employs the “static, absolutist vocabulary” and 
tendency to “assert rather than argue” characteristic of the traditional encyclical genre in order to 
indicate the authority of the prohibition of birth control (1973: 165-6). 
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text itself. In doing so, the reader who interprets this authoritative text comes to occupy this 
central position instead. 
Finally, we should note that, in limiting itself thus, this thesis excludes from primary focus 
the texts written by Francis as Bishop of Buenos Aires. There are two principle reasons for 
this: firstly, I am concerned with Francis in his capacity as Pope, with the authority that comes 
with this position, rather than his capacities prior to this. Our motivating problematic arises 
precisely because he is Pope. Conversely, his teachings as a regional Bishop do not present 
the same problems, because they do not have to be received in the same way. In a similar 
vein, to the extent that Papal authority extends over the universal Church whereas the 
bishops are concerned with the local church, there is a potential issue of compatibility in 
taking a bishop’s pronouncements and applying them in a context the scope of which 
exceeds that in which they were originally formulated. Finally, a number of these texts have 
been written in a personal capacity (that is, distanced from the authorship about which we 
are concerned), and thus are ruled out on this count. 
Related to the issue of selecting texts is the question of translation. Francis’ texts have been 
translated into multiple languages, and each translation inescapably renders the meaning of 
the various documents in a subtly different way from the others. In selecting particular 
translations to work from, I inevitably exclude certain other interpretations made possible 
by alternative translations. However, for the reasons outlined above, my interpretation does 
not pretend to be in any sense a total or final interpretation. As such, I have elected to focus 
exclusively on the English translation, for two reasons.  
Firstly, it is impossible to read and compare every translation, requiring us to attend to a 
smaller subset. Secondly, the purpose of the various translations is to facilitate the 
documents being read in native languages. The purpose of this is to enable the documents 
to be appropriated within the various local contexts of the Church, and this process of 
appropriation is generally not treated as one that necessarily involves translation from other 
versions unless an explicit problem is identified in one’s native language.55 Consequently, the 
documents are published with the assumption that, except in rare cases, they will be 
interpreted specifically as rendered by translation into the native language of the reader. 
English is my native language, and so it makes sense to read the documents in English.  
 
55 We will treat one potential such problem with the translation of LF in chapter three. 
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This is further supported by two factors. Firstly, the affirmation of vernacular translations 
both in the way that recent synods have been conducted in the vernacular rather than Latin. 
Secondly, the significance afforded to the local by Francis’ own teaching documents – 
particularly Magnum principium (2017). Similarly, appeals to Francis’ native Italian or Spanish 
as the ‘original’ language locate meaning in Francis the historical person in a way that is 
problematised by the very nature of the documents themselves, as argued above. 
2.2.  AUTHORITY 
These documents are not equal in authority. Nor are all the various statements within them 
equal to one another. Nor are they equal in authority relative to the documents of the prior 
tradition, or all the statements in one the same in comparison to all the statements in 
another. These questions of relative authority take on particular weight in an apologetic or 
legal context: insofar as it is a principle whereby conflict can be resolved, learning to balance 
these disparate levels of authority is a necessary part of navigating the literary component 
of the doctrine of the Church. This thesis does not address these issues for a number of 
reasons. 
Firstly, it does not undertake an apologetic project of the above sort, limiting the relevance 
of these issues. Distinctions in authority pertain to the acceptance of a given teaching, not 
the content of the teaching itself. As such, they are somewhat extrinsic to my interpretive 
project, which focuses on the latter issue. 
Secondly, the nature of ‘authority’ itself in this context is ambiguous. Richard McCormick 
understands the authority of the ordinary magisterium as being a matter of its enjoying a 
“presumption of truth”, which elicits “a type of respect that most often translates factually 
into assent or acceptance” (1994: 72). However, as he also notes, presumptions are “not 
carved in granite”, and “can be and have been undermined by further consideration, 
changed facts, the presence of human folly and other factors”. Similarly, this presumption is 
contingent upon the proper operation of the magisterium. McCormick writes: “When they 
short-circuit these processes… the presumption is correspondingly weakened” (1994: 73). 
The point here is that there are conditions to our assent to the statements of the ordinary 
magisterium. Hence, although a text may putatively command greater authority than 
another, if that inferior text brings into question the conditions for that authority then we 
can no longer merely invoke the difference of authority in order to resolve the conflict (at 
least without begging the question). 
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3. AN OUTLINE OF THE PROJECT 
We construct our reading of Francis over the next four chapters. Chapter three looks to the 
account of ‘faith-knowledge’ in Lumen Fidei. Central to this is the concept of ‘encounter’ with 
God, which establishes conditions for faith-knowledge that preclude claims to totality, 
determination, and absoluteness in that knowledge. The chapter illustrates this in the 
context of a response to the fifth dubium, which we saw in chapter one. It concludes with a 
discussion of Francis’ ethics of ‘unselfing’ obedience in knowledge, and how this contrasts 
with the ethics of knowing in VS.  
Chapter four addresses the ecclesiological dimension of the encyclical, reading it in dialogue 
with Evangelii Gaudium. It argues that the historical embeddedness of faith-knowledge 
enables an indeterminate unity of form within the life of the Church, conceived as the 
community that shares in faith-knowledge. This enables a ‘plurivocal’ model of ecclesial unity 
that serves as the basis for a reparative stance towards difference in credere in Deum. 
Chapter five then reads this ecclesiology through the epistemology of chapter three in order 
to produce a model of ‘metaxological’ ecclesial unity. This serves as the basis for a critique 
of more ‘paranoid’ ecclesiologies, focusing specifically on that implicit in Veritatis Splendor.  
Chapter six looks to Laudato Si’ as the basis for a broadly Thomist analogical metaphysics 
that also incorporates the themes of encounter from chapter three. It argues that this 
metaphysics gives rise to an ontology of relation that extends the conditions of faith-
knowledge established in chapter three to knowledge of creation in general. This enables 
plurivocity not just in credere in Deum, but in credere Deum. In doing so, it also responds to 
two concerns: firstly, with regards to the potential totalitarian associations of the 
metaxological model of unity in chapter five. It argues that Francis’ ontology of relation 
presents an important development from the neoplatonic hierarchies of being that are 
normally associated with appeals to metaxis. Unlike these hierarchical ontologies, Francis’ 
ontology of relation actively resists totalitarian readings of metaxological unity. Secondly, it 
addresses concerns around Francis’ apparent social Trinitarianism, arguing that he in fact 
presents a Trinitarian apophaticism. 
Chapter seven seeks to alleviate fears around danger and disagreement which might 
otherwise prevent our adopting a reparative stance towards the indeterminacy presented in 
this thesis. It does so by arguing that Francis’ ontology of relation enables us to read 
difference in credere Deum as more easily accepted difference in credere in Deum. It then 
argues that Laudato Si’ presents us with an eschatological vision which, when read in 
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dialogue with Evangelii Gaudium, gives rise to a comic narrative of conflict that enables us 
to face these differences in a hopeful, rather than fearful, way. It concludes with a short 
reflection on theological style in the context of this hope. 
This thesis then concludes with a brief reflection on themes of uncertainty, ambivalence, and 
transformative potential. It begins by summarising and consolidating the argument of the 
previous chapters, as well as discussing its limitations. It then positions Francis’ theology in 
relation to what Komonchak (1994) calls the “Augustinian” and “Thomist” sensibilities, 
arguing that he deploys a model of “Franciscan knowledge” (Stump, 2010) in order to 
mediate these poles. Finally, it moves from this to discuss Francis’ redemption of negativity 
in the name of an indeterminate hope.  
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III. KNOWLEDGE AND TOTALITY IN LUMEN FIDEI 
 
Francis’ first encyclical,56 Lumen Fidei,57 investigates the nature of faith as knowledge – or, as 
the encyclical puts it, “faith-knowledge” (§28)58 The next two chapters of this thesis reads 
 
56 Readers such as Stollenwerk see Lumen Fidei as having been “written mostly by pope Benedict XVI”, 
and interpret it in light of Benedict’s wider writings (2018: 55). While it is not their focus, this chapter 
and the next show that LF can also be read as fundamentally integrated into Francis’ Magisterium. 
57 Hereafter, LF 
58 Readers particularly of a Thomist bent may be given pause here, for two reasons. Firstly, the English 
rendering of cognitio as “faith-knowledge” is theologically problematic in itself because it effaces the 
distinction between scientia and cognitio, two concepts which might fall under “knowledge”, but for 
Aquinas are distinct in crucial ways. This distinction, moreover, is present in the vocabulary of the 
Latin version, which renders this as “cognitio fidei”. Secondly, in conflating the two as “knowledge”, it 
effaces a significant aspect of this distinction – namely that, for Aquinas at least, faith is a form of 
cognitio, but not scientia. Consequently, if we take “knowledge” without distinguishing it from 
scientia, we end up with an oxymoron. 
This is not necessarily an issue, at least for one understanding of the nature of this distinction, 
as given by Thomas Aquinas, as interpreted by MacDonald (1993). MacDonald argues that, at least as 
rendered in Aquinas, neither cognitio nor scientia perfectly correspond to knowledge: cognitio is much 
broader, referring to the “cognition” of an object through assimilation to the mind, and therefore 
capable of being false (1993: 162). In contrast, scientia is a reflective form of knowledge, referring to 
“complete and certain cognition” of the truth of a proposition, specifically by way of a demonstrative 
syllogism (1993: 164). Moreover, Aquinas claims that scientia can only be held on the basis of premises 
whose justification in being held is non-inferential. Instead, these truths are justified in light of their 
being “necessarily true propositions whose falsity is inconceivable to us” (MacDonald, 1993: 173). 
MacDonald notes that the only kinds of truths which enjoy this status could be “a priori truths of 
axiomatic systems” (2003: 174), and in this regard scientia is significantly narrower than “knowledge” 
as used in English. To this end, any translation of either to “knowledge” is imperfect. Consequently, 
this imperfection may just be inescapable when writing in English (as I do) - although perhaps 
“cognition” is a better word for cognitio, as MacDonald himself translates it. 
However, there are two reasons why this is less problematic than we might think. Firstly, it is 
not entirely true that faith cannot be designated as “scientia”: MacDonald reads Aquinas to argue that 
he recognises the narrowness of scientia and expands it analogously by admitting “secondary scientia” 
of which true scientia is the paradigm, but which only holds “degrees culminating in completeness 
and certainty” (2003: 174). One example of secondary scientia is that which pertains to the truths 
about God, where we base our propositions in observations of God’s logically and metaphysically 
contingent effects in creatures, rather than the logically and metaphysically necessary properties of 
God in Godself 1993: 176). To this end, the translation may not be as problematic as we might 
originally think with regards to scientia and faith. 
Secondly, although the Latin employs these terms, there is no reason to think that this 
vocabulary is the most faithful rendering of the concepts themselves employed in LF. Indeed, we have 
good reason to think that a catch-all “knowledge” may be a more helpful rendering. Our reading of LF 
identifies elements within it drawn from the phenomenology of Martin Buber. For Buber, as we shall 
see, “knowledge” refers to the intentional ‘grasp’ by the mind of its object – something which 
corresponds more to Aquinas’ more general concept of cognitio rather than propositional scientia. 
Insofar as, for Buber, thematicity (including propositional attitudes) emerges reflexively from the 
unthematic, it perhaps makes sense to render the distinction between the two in terms of an internal 
distinction within an overarching category – something which is achieved by conceiving of them both 
under the aegis of “knowledge”. In this context, even the phrase “faith-knowledge” is less 
problematic, insofar as “knowledge” admits distinctions between both thematicity and unthematicity, 
and the kinds of justifications which obtain for each. 
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the encyclical in dialogue with Francis’ later papal texts in order to construct an epistemology 
from LF, and then translate it into an ecclesiology that provides the basis for a reparative way 
of being Church as outlined in those wider texts.59 
As a way of ‘getting into’ this reading, we will begin by looking to the issue raised with regards 
to Amoris Laetitia by the fifth dubium, which we saw in our introductory chapter. Through 
our analysis of this issue, we will identify three concepts. The first two of these concepts, 
fullness and limitation, brings us into contact with Evangelii Gaudium.60  These concepts 
introduce an eschatological theme, which is more fully worked out in EG, and which touches 
on issues of totality and the anticipatory or ‘strong-theoretical’ dimensions of paranoid 
hermeneutics. This eschatological theme will serve as the basis for our treatment of our third 
concept, divine requirement, which we will argue serves as an example of a particular kind 
of logical structure implicit in Francis’ theology. These thematic elements will serve as the 
basis for our reading of the epistemology given in LF, which emerges as necessitating a 
certain logical structure to theological knowledge. We will then apply this logic to Francis’ 
discussion of mercy in his Papal Bull, Misericordiae Vultus, 61  and the Apostolic Letter 
Misericordia et Misera62 as a ‘worked example’. In doing so, we will also provide a response 
to the dubium itself. 
1. FULLNESS, LIMITATION, AND THE ‘LOGIC’ OF LUMEN FIDEI 
To begin with, let us recall the fifth dubium, seen in chapter one. This problematises the 
following passage in AL: 
 
On a similar note, for Buber, “knowledge” is founded upon an immediate experience of an 
Other. Buber affords this immediate, inceptual encounter an irreducibility that Aquinas would not. In 
other words, Buber rejects the exclusive epistemic privilege Aquinas affords to true scientia on the 
basis of its foundation in necessary propositional truths. To this end, it is questionable whether 
Aquinas’ concept of scientia is even applicable here – which in turn throws into question the very 
distinction that is elided by the English “knowledge”. 
On this point, where the Latin translation of LF does use “scientia”, it is always in relation to 
metaphors of sight or thematic knowledge (in particular, the ‘sciences’) (§14, 25, 34, 36, 37, 38). In 
contrast, “cognitio” is used in the context of both illumination metaphors/sight (e.g. §28) as well as in 
the context of other kinds of knowing – including the interpersonal encounter with God which we will 
associate with Buber’s pre-thematic encounter with the Other (“Ille subiectus est qui se praebet 
cognoscendum ac manifestandum, videlicet e persona ad personam”; “He is a subject who makes 
himself known and perceived in an interpersonal relationship” (§36)). In this context, as for Buber’s 
intentional knowledge, the “cognitio fidei” outlined in LF pertains to both thematic and unthematic 
knowledge. 
59 Our reading will deploy a ‘reader-centered’ hermeneutic, as discussed in chapter two. 
60 Hereafter, EG 
61 Hereafter, MV 
62 Hereafter, MM 
71 
 
“...conscience can do more than recognize that a given situation does not correspond 
objectively to the overall demands of the Gospel. It can also recognize with sincerity 
and honesty what for now is the most generous response which can be given to God 
and come to see with a certain moral security that it is what God himself is asking 
amid the concrete complexity of one’s limits, while yet not fully the objective ideal.” 
(AL §303) 
The key concepts here are as follows: the “concrete complexity of one’s limits”, in light of 
which conscience discerns right action; the notion of an “objective ideal” which an action can 
succeed or fail to meet; that of “God himself” as “asking”, or divine requirement. The idea of 
“moral security” as a quality of the discernment of conscience is also significant, but more 
specifically in terms of Francis’ approach to ethics, which we shall look at in more detail later. 
The term ‘limits’ is resonant of a passage in EG. In this text, Francis identifies four principles 
corresponding to “constant tensions present in every social reality”. He asserts that these 
derive from “the pillars of the Church’s social doctrine, which serve as ‘primary and 
fundamental parameters of reference for interpreting and evaluating social phenomena’”, 
and that observing them will guide society down “a genuine path to peace within each nation 
and the entire world” (EG §221).63 
The first of these is “Time is greater than space”. Francis identifies this principle as 
negotiating a tension between “fullness” and (here being the resonance) “limitation”. 
‘Fullness’ amounts to the complete “possession” of some object, or the attainment of a goal 
or end. ‘Limitation’ describes our inability to attain fullness. We exist between these two 
poles: we occupy a position of limitation in the current ‘moment’, but we are always living 
‘towards’ fullness, which discloses itself in the negative figure of the “horizon” of this 
limitation. ‘Time’ is the dynamic relationship between these two poles, as the horizon of 
limitation opens itself into fullness. Francis writes: “People live poised between each 
 
63 Flipper notes that Francis’ four principles do not correspond entirely to the four core principles of 
CST – “the dignity of the human person”, “the common good”, “subsidiarity”, and “solidarity” 
(Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church §160; in Flipper, 2018: 202). These seek to mediate 
the relationship between individuals and specific institutions, whereas Francis’ principles “concern the 
way in which we, as individuals and communities, engage processes” (2018: 202, footnote 3). Taking 
an ‘author-centered’ approach, Borghesi argues that they actually derive from Romano Guardini, who 
characterised life as occurring within the tension between a set of polar opposites. However, he notes 
that the second of these principles, “realities are greater than ideas” (EG §231) serves more as a realist 
qualification of Guardini’s polar philosophy rather than coming directly from them (2018: 116-117). 
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individual moment, and the greater, brighter horizon of the Utopian future as the final cause 
which draws us to itself” (EG §222).  
In this context, we can adopt one of two attitudes: one which wisely prioritises time, and one 
which prioritises space. The distinction between these two attitudes tracks a corresponding 
dialect between “spaces” and “processes”: prioritising space “means madly attempting to 
keep everything together in the present, trying to possess all the spaces of power and of self-
assertion”, attempting to achieve totality instead of allowing processes to occur. In contrast, 
prioritising time means “initiating processes rather than possessing spaces”. That is, it means 
accepting the tension between the limitation of the present, and totality, and orienting one’s 
life to working within this tension, rather than attempting to grant presence to totality (EG 
§223). 
The idea of evaluating action in light of ‘one’s limits’ in AL can be read in light of this principle: 
we can associate ‘the concrete complexity of one’s limits’ with the context of limitation in 
which we live. This is supported by Francis’ characterisation of fullness as “the final cause 
which draws us to itself”. It is in fullness that the Good subsists. As such, we might say, “the 
objective ideal” corresponds to the action in which fullness is realised, as the other pole in 
the schema. 
This distinction has to be understood in the context of our third key concept, divine 
requirement. What does it mean to distinguish between an ‘objective ideal’, corresponding 
to fullness, on the one hand; and some other class of actions which do not conform to this, 
but are nevertheless required by God in the context of limitation on the other?  
We saw previously that the objection to the passage raised by the dubium references 
Veritatis Splendor (§55) in order to frame this distinction in the context of the universality of 
the norms of divine law. In this context, it would seem that the distinction situates universal 
norms on the side of fullness, while implying that these norms do not obtain in certain 
situations of limitation. What we seem to have here is the intimation of a conceptual space 
that stands in excess of the scope (that is, the determinations) of the particular set of 
universal principles that constitute the moral law. 
It is this dialectic more generally - between particular sets of universal determining principles 
on the one hand, and the excess of situations over these principles on the other - that lies at 
the core of the epistemology laid out in LF. In chapter one, we saw how VS constructs the 
basis for a paranoid hermeneutics by totalising the precepts of the moral law as interpreted 
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in the historical teachings of the magisterium. This chapter ultimately argues that, in contrast 
to VS, LF outlines an approach to knowledge which rejects such totalisation.  
We also noted in our first chapter, as identified by Porter (1995), that one of the ways in 
which VS does this is through confusing universality and generality. By reference to our 
worked example of Pope Francis’ theology of mercy in MV, we will show how the 
epistemology laid out in LF defies this confusion, facilitating a commitment to universal 
moral precepts alongside a restricted sense of their scope. 
2. FAITH-KNOWLEDGE 
The epistemology of LF emerges out of a phenomenological analysis of faith-knowledge, 
which Francis describes in terms of three metaphors: hearing, sight, and touch. Each of these 
metaphors expresses some aspect of faith-knowledge in terms of a relation to totality. 
2.1. HEARING 
Francis’ first metaphor is that of hearing. This metaphor is used to express two limiting 
conditions of our capacity for total knowledge. 
The first chapter of the encyclical presents a discussion of biblical models of faith, starting 
with Abraham. Francis notes that, for Abraham, faith is a matter of “hearing” – quite literally. 
He notes that this establishes faith as something personal: it is a response to “a word which 
engages us personally, to a “Thou” which calls us by name”. In it, God reveals Himself as the 
“God of a person... capable of interacting with man and establishing a covenant with him” 
(LF §8). Firstly, then, faith is a matter of being engaged in an interpersonal relationship with 
God, and it is this interpersonal dimension that is identified with the metaphor of hearing. 
In this vein, Francis writes, faith knowledge is presented in the Bible as a form of hearing 
because it is “linked to the covenant with a faithful God who enters into a relationship of 
love with man and speaks his word to him” (LF §29). The ‘hearing’ aspect of faith imparts 
two qualities to it as knowledge. Firstly, it is “personal knowledge”, of a person, whom we, 
as people, know as such. We know God as a person in and through His revelation. Indeed, 
for Francis, it is this interpersonal dimension which gives faith-knowledge its force: it is 
because of this knowledge of who God is as a person that we respond accordingly. Francis 
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writes that faith “recognises the voice of the one speaking, opens up to that person in 
freedom and follows him or her in obedience” (LF §29).64 
Francis, in invoking the image of “a “Thou” which calls us by name”, seems to be alluding 
here to Martin Buber (and indeed, as we shall see, he references Buber explicitly later on).65 
For Buber, God can only be addressed on this interpersonal basis – indeed, as the 
paradigmatic interpersonal relation, “the eternal Thou” (Buber, 2013: 53). As we shall see, 
Buber’s thought plays a significant influence on the development of this theme in LF.66 
Secondly, this knowledge is “bound to the passage of time, for words take time to be 
pronounced, and it is knowledge assimilated only along a journey of discipleship” (LF §29). 
The acquisition of faith-knowledge is not an instantaneous process, nor does it take place in 
some eternal realm. Rather, faith-knowledge is a matter of continuous communication with 
God, responding to a revelation that continues to unfold throughout history.  
This is exemplified by the model of faith presented in the story of Israel. He writes: “Israel 
trusts in God, who promises to set his people free from their misery”. In this context, the 
journey of faith takes on a literal meaning: “Faith becomes a summons to a lengthy journey 
leading to worship of the Lord on Sinai and in the inheritance of the promised land”. The 
witness of Israel is to God’s guidance along this journey in terms of His concrete deeds in 
 
64 It is worth noting here that Lumen Fidei does not frame this knowledge specifically in terms of moral 
knowledge. Thus, while we have been prompted to this reading by its specific realisation in terms of 
morality, the logic presented in Lumen Fidei is presented in generic terms. That is, the model of 
theology presented by Francis is not purely a model of moral theology, but is rather a logic of faith 
knowledge in general.  
65 Buber invokes the concept of “I-Thou”, which he describes as a “primary word”, with a “combined” 
nature. The function of this word is to “intimate relations”. He describes it as being “spoken from 
being”, and, in doing so, “bring[ing] about existence”. That is, the pair “I-Thou” constitutes a 
transcendental condition of subjectivity. Its companion ‘primary word’ is “I-It” (2013: 3). Each primary 
word brings about a certain mode of subjectivity: Buber distinguishes between “experience” and 
“relation”: experience is a mode of subjectivity brought about by I-It. In experience, subjectivity is 
thematic – Buber describes it as the “sphere of transitive verbs”, constituted in activity directed at an 
object (“some thing for their object”). Buber contrasts this with relation, in which the Thou is 
encountered, but unthematically (“When Thou is spoken, the speaker has no thing for his object... But 
he takes his stand in relation”) (2013: 4). We will return to this later. 
66 The historically-minded reader should note that Francis has a notable ongoing relationship with 
Judaism and its thinkers, particularly throughout his career as archbishop (c.f. Skorka (2018)), and in 
his friendship with the Argentine Rabbi, Abraham Skorka (c.f. Bergoglio and Skorka (2013)). He was 
also presented with an inscribed copy of Buber’s I and Thou at the Vatican celebration of Nostra Aetate 
in 2015 (Kessler, 2018: 87). However, these details are extraneous to our ‘reader-centered’ 
hermeneutic. More directly relevant, Young-Somers recognises a theme of what might be described 
as a “personalism”, which he associates with Buber, in Francis’ wider thought. However, he notes that 
Francis “has not publicly laid claim” to a personalist theological approach (2018: 105). Perhaps Lumen 




history. In this context, “the light of faith is linked to concrete life-stories”; the faith-
knowledge of the believer is formed in the context of, and in response to, specifically 





Francis also employs metaphors of sight. The “call” which faith hears is also a “promise” (LF 
§9). This promise is our redemption in Christ, and it is in terms of this promise that faith-
knowledge becomes knowledge in the sense of sight: “a light for our way, guiding our journey 
through time” (LF §4). Sight, for Francis, is thus the knowledge to which we aspire in the 
temporal, interpersonal process of development expressed previously in terms of hearing. 
Francis contrasts this with a ‘visual’ conception of knowledge that he associates with the 
figure of the ‘ancient Greek knower’. He writes that “it has been claimed that an emphasis 
on sight was characteristic of Greek culture”. The ‘sight’ of knowledge attributed to this 
figure aimed at “contemplation of the whole”. It was conceived as being a wholly unilateral 
movement of thought “down from heaven directly to the eye”, without “calling for a 
response” from the knower. Moreover, because of its unilateral nature, nor is the knower 
required to engage in the world and history – they are instead elevated to a point of “static 
contemplation” removed from rather than immersed in history, to which the world is 
disclosed in its totality (LF §29). 
Knowledge as sight superficially appears similar to this ‘Greek’ conception, playing a 
circumscribing, totalising role. Similarly to the ‘Greek’ understanding, Francis writes, faith 
knowledge as sight “provides a vision of the entire journey and allows it to be situated within 
God’s overall plan” (LF §29). 
He also continues to develop an account of just what this knowledge amounts to. Francis 
writes: “without this vision, we would be left only with unconnected parts of an unknown 
whole” (LF §29). This introduces an important theme: knowledge as sight refers to thematic 
knowledge, in which the subject comes to encounter objects as expressible within (i.e. 
circumscribed by or unified within the language of) subject-object relations.67 In the context 
of faith-knowledge, this situation is specifically an eschatological one: he writes that this light 
comes both from the past, in the “foundational memory” of God’s self-revelation in Christ, 
and also from the future which is opened up to us by Christ (LF §4). That is, faith-knowledge 
 
67  This emphasis on thematicity (subjects and objects in action), as opposed to propositional 
(universals and particulars in representation) in his account of knowledge is something else that 
Francis shares with Buber, for whom thematic subjectivity or “experience” (2013: 4) is brought about 
by the transcendental conditions of subjectivity (the “primary word”, “I-It”) and not representational 
or propositional cognition (2013: 3). 
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as sight discloses the world in terms of divine thematicity, which is to say, their eschatological 
nature.68 
This thematic nature of sight is also the basis for similarity with the ‘Greek’ notion. Buber 
characterises thematicity (which he calls “experience” (2013: 4)) as a feature of an “I-It” 
subjectivity stance (2013: 3). The objects of thematicity (the It) can be circumscribed by the 
subject (the I) in a variety of reductive ways – Buber gives the example of a tree, which can 
be looked upon “as a picture”, “as movement”, classified “as a species” with a specific 
“structure and mode of life”, reduced to “an expression of [physical] law”, or abstracted into 
“pure numerical relation” (2013: 6). In this vein, he writes, “the I of the... I-It... has no present, 
only the past”. By this, he means that they exist in a world characterised by “cessation, 
suspension, a breaking off and cutting clear and hardening”, in which the world is determined 
before the knowledge of the subject. Moreover, this subjectivity, like the ‘Greek’ subjectivity, 
is also removed from its object. Buber writes: “The man who experiences has not part in the 
world” [sic]. The experience does not link the experiencing subject to the world such that the 
world can transform him: rather, the experience is “‘in him’”, and he is transcendent of it 
(2013: 5). 
However, the Biblical understanding of knowledge as sight is subject to the conditions of 
hearing such that it resists a totalising understanding. Francis writes: “hearing God’s word is 
accompanied by a desire to see God’s face” (LF §29). That is, knowledge as sight is acquired 
after an initial kindling of desire to attain it, which is prompted by God’s word. Sight is a 
response to this hearing relationship. In this context, the ‘sight’ of faith is tied to the historical 
process of hearing. Francis writes: “faith ‘sees’ to the extent that it journeys, to the extent 
that it chooses to enter into the horizons opened up by God’s word” (LF §9). We might 
describe this image of faith as ‘exploratory’: God’s word reveals to us a ‘space’ of novelty and 
transcendence. Faith is a matter of investigating these horizons, and coming to apprehend 
the world as it exists within them. Moreover, insofar as faith-knowledge as hearing is a 
matter of interpersonality, the systematising knowledge of sight is a function of this 
 
68 Indeed, for Francis, it is this ultimate thematicity which serves as the transcendental guarantee of 
thematicity as such: without this ordering, the subject “breaks down into the multiplicity of his 
desires”, and “his life story disintegrates into a myriad of unconnected instants”. In other words, 
unconditioned by any overarching thematicity, their subjectivity dissolves into a myriad of equivocal 




relationship. As such, it also resists the image of the subject as removed or objective of the 
situation. 
In this vein, Francis turns to St Augustine to temper this metaphor. He notes that Augustine 
uses “light” as a metaphor for faith, thereby invoking the metaphor of sight.69 However, he 
writes, for Augustine 
 
[j]ust as the word calls for a free response, so the light finds a response in the image 
which reflects it. Augustine can therefore associate hearing and seeing, and speak of 
"the word which shines forth within".70 The light becomes, so to speak, the light of a 
word, because it is the light of a personal countenance, a light which… calls us and 
seeks to be reflected on our faces and to shine from within us. 
(LF §33) 
 
In short, Augustine used metaphors of ‘light’, and thus sight, in a way that integrated the 
conditions of hearing. Francis too, unlike the figure of ‘the Greeks’ he invokes, seeks to avoid 
totalising accounts of thematic knowledge. 
3. TOTALITY AND ‘SIGHT’ 
The understanding of faith presented above effectively repeats the schema presented by 
Francis’ principle of time is greater than space. We noted how our acquisition of sight is 
limited by the conditions of hearing, interpersonality and temporality. These two conditions 
present what might be described as two ‘horizons’ of sight: a qualitative horizon, designating 
an intrinsic limitation of thematic faith-knowledge due to the nature of its object (God, as 
Other); and a quantitative horizon, designating limitation in time (that is, we will only acquire 
‘more’ as we progress into the future). These horizons require us to acknowledge the 
partiality of our thematic faith knowledge. 
  
 
69 Francis himself frequently makes reference throughout the document to the “light of faith” (LF §1, 
2, 4, 6, 12, 30, 32, 34, 35, 46, 51, 57, 60), which “illumines” (e.g LF §1, 20, 32, 35, 55) the world for the 
believer. The use of this metaphor is closely associated with his metaphor of sight as pertaining to 
thematic knowledge: the metaphor of ‘light’ is always used in reference to some object which must 
be understood or navigated – for example, “our human relationships” (LF §32), “the material world” 
(LF §34), or “the path of all those who seek God” (LF §35). However, it is also worth noting that Francis 
is not particularly discriminating in his use of the image of light, and it sometimes reads as if it applies 
to all of faith, thereby reducing all faith-knowledge to ‘sight’. Such a universalised reading is not 
consistent with his wider understanding of faith, particularly when we come to faith-knowledge in the 
mode of touch, which is categorically different from sight. 
70 C.f. De Sancta Virginitate, 48, 48: PL 40, 424-425. 
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3.1. INTERPERSONALITY: THE QUALITATIVE HORIZON 
Buber contrasts thematic “I-It” subjectivity with an interpersonal “I-Thou” subjectivity. 
Whereas I-It subjectivity assumes a stance of experience in the face of which the world is 
circumscribed and reduced away, the stance of the I-Thou is one of relation71 (2013: 4). 
Rather than being relative to some mediating or reductive schema, in relation, the I 
encounters the Thou immediately: “No system of ideas, no foreknowledge, and no fancy 
intervene between I and Thou” (2013: 9). Defying mediation, and thus reduction, the world 
is encountered “in a single whole” (2013: 6).  
Moreover, this whole is not a whole in the sense of a unity circumscribed as such by some 
external principle. Buber describes relation with God as Thou as one of “unconditional 
exclusiveness”: there is no other principle to which this relation stands in relation. In this 
regard, we do not relate to God as an object “in the world” – in such a relation, the world 
would serve as a third relatant (2013: 56). This does not mean negating the world, but rather 
a relativisation of the world to the Thou. Thus he writes, “But with no neighbour, and whole 
in himself, he is Thou and fills the heavens... all else lives in his light” (2013: 7). 
In this way, for Buber, relation cannot be expressed thematically. True relation requires the 
absence of any condition whereby it can be expressed in terms of subject and object. Indeed, 
Buber himself recognises the impossibility of writing about relation in this regard. Although 
the word “I-Thou” itself implies a thematic relation, in an apophatic turn he writes: “When 
Thou is spoken, the speaker has no thing; he has indeed nothing” (2013: 4). Similarly, he 
writes, when the subject “abhors the name, and believes himself to be godless... he 
addresses God” (2013: 54). To put it briefly, the unthematicity of relation means that the 
Thou is paradoxically encountered as absolutely singular and Other, beyond all 
determinations (including this sentence). Thus relation is intentional in an apophatic sense, 
being truly unthematic. This establishes a qualitative distinction between the I-Thou and the 
I-It: the Thou cannot be reduced to an It without losing its status as Thou. 
Just as there is a qualitative limit to the I-It, arising from the nature of relation, Francis 
invokes a qualitative limit to sight, arising from the nature of interpersonality. Francis notes 
that all faith-knowledge is ultimately grounded in interpersonality, writing that  
 
71 For clarity’s sake, we will use the italicised relation when using the term in Buber’s technical sense. 
Unitalicised “relation” invokes a broader sense, which can encompass the former. We will also use 
“encounter” to describe instances of relation. 
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theology is more than simply an effort of human reason to analyze and understand... 
God... is a subject who makes himself known and perceived in an interpersonal 
relationship... [T]heology… is not just our discourse about God, but first and foremost 
the acceptance and the pursuit of a deeper understanding of the word which God 
speaks to us… about himself, for he is an eternal dialogue of communion, and he 
allows us to enter into this dialogue. 
(LF §36) 
Francis links this to a qualitative horizon of sight in his reflection on idolatry: God, addressing 
us as a person, presents himself as an Other. Others constitute a reality beyond ourselves, 
hence faith confronts us with the horizon of our knowledge and control. Idolatry, for Francis, 
attempts to assert totality against this alterity. Francis explicitly references Martin Buber 
here to define idolatry as “when a face addresses a face that is not a face”.72 In other words, 
idolatry treats a non-Other as if it were Other. Whereas an authentic Other defies totalising 
knowledge and control, Francis writes: “Before an idol, there is no risk that we will be called 
to abandon our security, for idols “have mouths but they cannot speak” (Ps. 15: 5)”. Rather, 
“[i]dols exist... as a pretext for setting ourselves at the centre of reality and worshipping the 
work of our own hands” (LF §13). They present something that is grounded within us as the 
object to which we have to respond, setting up a hermetically sealed subjectivism, with no 
basis for novelty or transcendence. 
In this vein, Francis describes idolatry as “the opposite of faith”. He writes, Faith “is an 
invitation to turn to the source of the light, while respecting the mystery of [its] 
countenance” (LF §13). That is, faith seeks apprehension of God, but does not demand it, or 
pretend to possess it completely. Rather, it acknowledges and respects the conditions of 
‘hearing’ as limits of sight. Idolatry is the opposite of faith in that it replaces this mysterious 
Other with something “into whose face we can look directly and whose origin we know” (LF 
§13). 
In short, God is encountered as Other, interpersonally. The intrinsic nature of God as Other 
defies totalised knowledge. Because our sight is predicated upon this encounter, it is similarly 
limited. Thus sight has a qualitative horizon, whereby it is limited by the qualitative nature 
of its object. 
  
 
72 C.f. Die Erzählungen der Chassidim, 793 
81 
 
3.2. THE QUANTITATIVE HORIZON 
However, as we have seen, Francis also invokes the possibility of thematic knowledge of God. 
The qualitative horizon is not all-exclusive. Indeed, even though the objects that Francis talks 
about the ‘light’ of faith illumining are not God Himself, but rather aspects of creation and 
our lives within it,73 these illumined objects are, for Francis, illumined in relation to the divine 
reality. As such, knowledge of them and knowledge of God cannot be entirely separated, and 
Francis seems to acknowledge this when he writes that faith as a light invites us to “explore 
ever more fully the horizon which it illumines, all the better to know the object of our love” 
(i.e. God) (LF §36).  
This might seem confusing: if our knowledge of God is, at root, interpersonal, and this 
interpersonality involves the alterity of unconditionally exclusive relation, then it seems 
impossible for thematic knowledge to follow from it. Surely the qualitative distinction 
between I-Thou and I-It invoked by Buber precludes any pass between relation on the one 
hand, and thematicity on the other? 
Buber himself approaches this issue when he reflects back upon the possibility of expressing 
his mysticism at all. He writes: “The description of God as a Person is indispensable for 
everyone who like myself means by ‘God’... him who... enters into a direct relation with us 
men”. The reason he gives for this is as follows: talk of God as Person refers, in the language 
of Spinoza,74 to a divine attribute – “personal being” - which is known to us directly “in its 
quality as an attribute”, even if God in His “essential being” can only be encountered and 
known unthematically (2013: Postscript §6). That is, talk of God as ‘Person’ refers precisely 
to what is intelligible to thematic knowledge in relation to His Personhood. ‘Personal being’, 
as the object of thematic knowledge, is no more than what that knowledge attributes to the 
occasion of relation, plus further thematic reflection on this. As such, when we talk about 
God as Person, we are (by definition) not talking about anything inaccessible by the 
unthematic nature of relation. 
 
73 “all reality” (LF §1); “the future” (LF §3); “every aspect of human existence” (LF §4); “our human 
experience” (LF §6); “our passage through time” (LF §12); “the gloom of death” (LF §17); “the origin 
and end of life” (LF §20); “our steps” (LF §26); “all reality”, and “all our human relationships” (LF §30); 
“the questions of our own time about truth”, and “the material world” (LF §34); “the path of all those 
who seek God” (LF §35); any “human experience” or “journey of man” (LF §35); “the entire cosmos 
and all of history” (LF §48); “our life” (LF §51); “all our relationships in society” (LF §54); and “death” 
(LF §56) 
74 “...that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance” (Ethics I.IV). Buber 
and Francis part company on this point – as we shall see in chapter 6, Francis’ metaphysics is one of 
Thomist analogical participation. 
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For Buber, then, the pass from the unthematic relation of I-Thou to the thematic knowledge 
of I-It is ultimately not so much a pass as a qualitative leap: the I-Thou encounters, and then 
through some correspondence this encountering itself inscribes itself within the subjectivity 
of the I-It. In illustration of this, Buber invokes the image of the “‘primitive’ man”, who relates 
to the moon, and then recalls the relation: initially, “he has in him only the dynamic, stirring 
image of the moon’s effect, streaming through his body”. This effect eventually becomes 
associated with less intimate features of the sensory landscape: “Out of this the image of the 
moon personally achieving the effect only gradually emerges. Only now, that is to say, does 
the memory of the unknown that is nightly taken into his being begin to kindle and take 
shape as the doer and bringer of the effect” (Buber, 2013: 9). That is, even when our thematic 
knowledge purports to be about the Thou, it is only ever truly about the intuitions which we 
come to associate with relation – even when we purportedly ‘identify’ the Thou (here, the 
moon), all we do is learn to associate a given set of intuitions (roundness, shininess, distance 
etc) with relation. 
This does not lead Buber to discard experience entirely: for Buber, form is a “mixture of Thou 
and It”. He asserts that when we relate to God, this serves as the occasion for communication 
in a “mixture of divine and human power”. Buber writes: “He who is sent out in the strength 
of revelation takes with him, in his eyes, an image of God; however far this exceeds the 
senses, yet he takes it with him in the eye of the spirit, in that visual power of his spirit which 
is not metaphorical but wholly real”. This look shapes the world as we encounter it: an 
“essential quality” of relation persists in form such that it becomes a site of “theophany”, or 
relation to the divine (Buber, 2013: 81). Nevertheless, form is precisely a mixture of Thou and 
It, each aspect retaining an ultimate distinction rather than being mediated together. Thus 
form loses its theophanic potential when “objectification” (i.e. the It aspect) grows too great 
(Buber, 2013: 82). The qualitative distinction stands. 
However, despite this distinction, there is a pass between them. For Buber, we are 
nevertheless able to associate particular intuitions with the event of relation. We are, more 
significantly, nevertheless able to identify the theophanic potential of particular forms. On 
the one hand, this knowledge ultimately remains to do with the extrinsic features of relation 
– it tells us about its attributes, or its effects on wider reality. On the other, this does provide 
an (admittedly thin) ontology of relation itself: it is the kind of thing which bears out these 
effects. To put it simply, we cannot speak directly of relation in itself. However, we can talk 
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of the forms in which it occurs, as forms, which in turn involves speaking of relation indirectly 
as ‘that by virtue of which they are forms’. 
This seems to be reflected in Francis’ portrayal of thematic theological knowledge. We noted 
how the objects illumined to sight are objects of thematicity. However, these objects are 
nevertheless known in relation to the divine as it effects them: when Francis talks about God 
directly in the encyclical, he invariably does so in terms of God’s historical action in 
providence, covenants, or fulfilment of promises – that is, in terms of God’s bearing out of 
effects upon the world.75 In this vein, as we previously noted, the light of faith discloses 
objects to sight in terms of their eschatology, and this ‘light’ itself stems from God’s self-
revelation in Christ, and the future promises which this opens up (LF §4). 
In this vein, for Francis, there is the possibility for thematic faith knowledge, albeit with a 
strict qualitative horizon. This knowledge is ultimately dependent upon associated intuitions 
arising from interactions between God and history, bringing us to our second condition of 
faith construed in terms of hearing: learning is a process in time. Thus there is a second, 
quantitative horizon, designating the progress of the process of acquisition of this 
knowledge. However, insofar as this horizon is conditioned by the interpersonal self-
revelation of God in history (which serves as the condition for the intuitions from which sight 
is derived) the movement of the quantitative horizon is ultimately governed by the mystery 
that lies behind the qualitative horizon of divine alterity. 
In this vein, Francis writes, the countenance of the divine mystery “will unveil itself in its own 
good time”. However, “[f]aith by its very nature demands renouncing the immediate 
possession that sight would appear to offer” (LF §13). That is, although it is theoretically 
possible to attain thematic knowledge of God, we do not automatically possess this 
knowledge. Rather, we acquire it in time, in a process ultimately mediated by God, whose 
sovereignty over this process (and thus the unpredictability of the process) lies precisely in 
the alterity of the divine Person. As such, Francis associates idolatry not just with a disregard 
for divine alterity, but also with impatience: he notes that Israel turns to idolatry specifically 
while waiting for Moses on Sinai (LF §13). Thus the interpersonality of hearing ultimately 
grounds its historicity, and thereby also limits sight. 
This brings together themes of self-assertion and time in a manner that leads neatly back to 
Francis’ principle in EG §222-3, to which we were introduced at the beginning of this chapter. 
 
75 C.f. e.g. LF §12, 15, 17, 23, 24, 28 
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This principle calls on us to accept the limitations of our current situation, which involves 
allowing  time for tensions to be resolved, rather than attempting to achieve totality in the 
present. Moreover, Francis associates the failure to do this with “trying to possess all the 
spaces of power and of self-assertion”: the imperative to ignore limitation is, at base, an 
attempt to assert the self. The connection with the twin horizons of sight is fairly clear here: 
the principle of ‘time is greater than space’ invites us to accept the quantitative horizon. 
Moreover, we can see from Francis’ identification of the failure to do this with the drive to 
self-assertion how this principle also invites us to accept the qualitative horizon, and refrain 
from idolatry. 
To briefly summarise the above: Buber identifies our thematic knowledge of the world as 
arising from an interpersonal mode of knowledge, or relation. This gives our thematic 
knowledge a qualitative horizon, arising from the unthematicity of the other (the Thou). 
Francis, following Buber, identifies our thematic theological knowledge (which he refers to 
metaphorically as sight) as being predicated upon interpersonality, which involves the 
irreducible alterity of the Other to thematic knowledge. Thus for both, thematic knowledge 
of the Other/God has a qualitative horizon. However, both nevertheless affirm the possibility 
of thematic knowledge of the Other/God in the form of reflection upon the thematic 
elements of relation itself, if not the other to whom the subject relates. For Francis, we 
identified this with God’s action in history. However, Francis explicitly notes, the historical 
process of relation is governed by God who, as Other, possesses a freedom which places this 
process out of our control. Thus there is also an inescapable quantitative horizon to our 
thematic knowledge, governed by the temporal structure of God’s actions in history. Francis 
figures knowledge specifically in terms of the conditions presented by these qualitative and 
quantitative horizons via the metaphor of knowledge as hearing. 
4. TOUCH 
But what exactly is this relation? Francis answers this question via the metaphor of touch, 
which emerges from his discussion of the relationship between love and “Christian faith”. 
4.1. LOVE 
Francis writes that “Christian faith is centred on Christ” (LF §15). However, this faith “does 
not merely gaze at Jesus, but sees things as Jesus himself sees them, with his own eyes: it is 
a participation in his way of seeing” (LF §18). In other words, Christian faith ‘sees’ through 
participation in Christ’s sight; it is a matter of participating in Christ’s subjectivity, 
apprehending his thematic knowledge. 
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So how do we attain this subjectivity? The answer is through “love”. Francis describes love 
as “a kind of knowledge”, which he further describes as “a relational way of viewing the 
world”, and “a form of shared knowledge, vision through the eyes of another”. It is “an 
experience of truth... it opens our eyes to see reality in a new way, in union with the beloved” 
(LF §27). In other words, love is a matter of relation which transforms us such that our sight 
operates in a particular way. 
In this context, faith originates in an encounter with God in His love: “Faith is born of an 
encounter with the living God who calls us and reveals his love, a love which precedes us...” 
(LF §4). Francis writes:  
Transformed by this love, we gain fresh vision, new eyes to see; we realize that it 
contains a great promise of fulfilment, and that a vision of the future opens up before 
us. Faith, received from God as a supernatural gift, becomes a light for our way, 
guiding our journey through time.  
(LF §4)  
This reference to faith, here understood in terms of sight, as “supernatural gift”, as well as 
the precedence of God’s love over our existence, indicates that sight arises out of this 
encounter, which happens prior to it. 
This transformation occurs at a primordial and holistic level. Francis quotes Romans 10:10, 
stating that “[o]ne believes with the heart”. He associates the heart as the nexus of all the 
various aspects of human being with its being “where we become open to truth and love”, 
writing: “In the Bible, the heart is the core of the human person, where all his or her different 
dimensions intersect: body and spirit, interiority and openness to the world and to others, 
intellect, will and affectivity” (LF §26). 
This primordiality is what is expressed when we talk about the fatherly nature of God’s love. 
Abraham recognises in God’s voice “a profound call which was always present at the core of 
his being”. Moreover, God’s promise is one of children, or new life. In this way, God reveals 
himself to be “the source of all life”, the creator. From these combined elements, faith thus 
reveals God’s relationship of “Fatherhood” to us, and creation as a whole: we relate to him 
at a fundamental level – that of our very being, which God reveals to us is an expression of 
our origins in Him (LF §11). The transformation elicited in the faithful is equally primordial. 
This is expressed by St. Paul, also in terms of God’s fatherhood, who Francis quotes as 
86 
 
teaching that, in accepting the life of faith, “believers become a new creation; they receive a 
new being” as “God’s children” (cf. Rom 8: 15) (LF §19). 
This new being consists in “the acknowledgement of a primordial and radical gift which 
upholds our lives” – that is, that God created and sustains us, and is the author of all goods. 
However, for Francis, this acknowledgment is more than intellectual recognition of fact: 
rather, it is “openness” to this “primordial gift” (LF §19). In other words, our response to love 
involves a transformation of our selves. 
In this way, the idea of ‘belief with the heart’ also invokes the idea of faith not just as being 
loved, but as loving back on our part. Francis notes that belief can be associated with “falling 
in love”. Love is more than an affect. Rather, it is a kind of existential stance that “aims at 
union with the beloved” (LF §27). We might associate this with the transformation elicited 
by God’s love: Francis writes that true love “unifies all the elements of our person and 
becomes a new light pointing the way to a great and fulfilled life” (LF §27). This returns us to 
the theme of the heart as the ‘core’ of the person, in which all its elements coincide. God’s 
self-revelation leads to belief, which kindles love in the person. This in turn leads to the 
fundamental reorientation of the person towards God. 
We can understand this seeking unity as lying at the heart of the transformation in which we 
come to adopt Christ’s subjectivity. Francis writes, 
...In faith, Christ is not simply the one in whom we believe, the supreme manifestation 
of God’s love; he is also the one with whom we are united precisely in order to believe. 
Faith does not merely gaze at Jesus, but sees things… with his own eyes: it is a 
participation in his way of seeing. In many areas in our lives we trust others who know 
more than we do... Jesus, the Son of God, is the one who makes God known to us (cf. 
Jn 1:18). Christ’s life, his way of knowing the Father and living in complete and 
constant relationship with him, opens up new and inviting vistas for human 
experience. Saint John… [uses] various forms of the verb "to believe". In addition to 
"believing that" what Jesus tells us is true, John also speaks of "believing" Jesus and 
"believing in" Jesus. We "believe" Jesus when we accept his word... We "believe in" 
Jesus when we personally welcome him into our lives and journey towards him, 
clinging to him in love and following in his footsteps along the way. 
(LF §18) 
The key to understanding this complex passage is Francis statement that Christ is “the 
supreme manifestation of God’s love”. Francis means multiple things by this: firstly, Christ 
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provides us with thematic knowledge, telling us ‘that’ certain things about this love are true. 
That is, the historical life of Christ exhibits God’s love to sight. However, we also “believe in” 
Christ himself, as this supreme manifestation. Francis identifies this “believing in” with 
entering into a personal relationship; to “believe in” is to “trust”, and to relate to personally 
therein. That is, we relate to Christ as the love to which we are open, and to which we thus 
respond in love, which is directed at God. In other words, we encounter God’s love in Christ, 
and seek union with God in love in union with Christ. This ‘believing in’ involves ‘believing 
that’ what Christ witnesses to is true, but is also prior to this. 
Our participation in Christ’s sight, then, is not exhaustive of our relationship with God the 
Father – or even Christ. Rather, it is an expression of a more primordial relationship with 
Christ, which mediates our response to God’s ‘fatherly’ love. We encounter God’s love in 
Christ, which enkindles love in ourselves that leads us to seek unity with God. In turn, this 
love enables us to achieve the unity with Christ in which we can share in his sight: Francis 
writes that “[t]he Christian can see with the eyes of Jesus and share in his mind… because he 
or she shares in his love, which is the Spirit. In the love of Jesus, we receive in a certain way 
his vision” (LF §21). That is, we adopt Christ’s subjectivity because Christ Himself loves God 
in the manner that is elicited as response from us by God’s love, which we encounter in Christ 
Himself. 
Finally, this point about participating in Christ’s sight in order to recognise His divinity brings 
us back to the question of the pass from unthematic relation in encounter to thematic 
knowledge about that relation on the other. We noted that, for Buber, this pass is made 
through reflection upon the intuitions arising around the relation. In a similar vein, Francis 
asserts that recognising the divinity of Christ is only possible given one’s prior transformation 
by and in love: “Without being conformed to [Christ] in love... it is impossible to confess him 
as Lord” (LF §21). That is, we can only recognise the relation in Christ as relation through 
participating in His own thematic knowledge – that is, we might say, through reflecting in the 
same way as He does. Thus our relation to God in love is not just the condition for thematic 
knowledge of God, but is also the condition for thematic knowledge which recognises the 
encounter as such. 
To summarise, then: we encounter God’s love in Christ. This encounter elicits a fundamental 
transformation in us, in which we we enter into a primordial (that is, prior to thematic 
knowledge) economy of love. This economy involves a loving response on our part wherein 
we seek unity with God. In seeking unity with God in this way, we are conformed to Christ, 
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who loves God in the manner elicited from us. This results in our participating in Christ’s 
subjectivity, or sight. Moreover, doing so enables to recognise that this process has taken 
place. 
4.2. THE THIRD METAPHOR: TOUCH 
Francis indicates the distinction between this primordial ‘encounter’ in love and its 
expression in the thematic knowledge which emerges from it by way of a third metaphor: 
that of “touch”. Francis writes, “the light of love is born when our hearts are touched and we 
open ourselves to the interior presence of the beloved, who enables us to recognize his 
mystery” (LF §31). That is, God’s self-communication in love precedes and enkindles our own 
love. 
The word itself ought to be read in both a metaphorical and a literal sense. The metaphorical 
sense is of ‘touching hearts’; of the fundamental reorientation of the person by love, towards 
the beloved. We might think that this understanding of faith is better expressed as ‘being 
touched’. However, we must recall that love, for Francis, is not merely passive – it seeks unity 
with the beloved, and thus has an active component. In short, love ‘touches back’. To this 
end, he also writes, “In faith, we can touch [Christ] and receive the power of his grace” (LF 
§31). In short, ‘love’ is a dialogical economy of relation between two persons, wherein we 
are fundamentally reoriented as subjects. Touch refers to this fundamental and primordial 
reorientation, and our equally primordial response. 
Secondly, there is the literal sense: “through the sacraments [Jesus] continues to touch us 
today” (LF §31). In the sacraments (specifically the Eucharist), we literally touch, and are 
touched by, Christ. Although this does not establish an essential relationship between the 
two different senses of touching, by juxtaposing them Francis begins to associate faith not 
only with ‘supernatural’ realities, but with the physical, natural objects and practices by 
which it is structured. This is further developed when, in the context of a discussion about 
the relationship between faith and reason (specifically with regards to faith’s ability to tell us 
about the material world) he notes that “love is always lived out in the body and spirit” (LF 
§34; emphasis mine). In short, touch here refers to the material condition of this knowledge.  
This theme of the significance of materiality is a frequent one in LF, specifically in relation to 
hope. This connection is exemplified when Francis writes: “Our culture has lost its sense of 
God’s tangible presence and activity in our world”. He notes that the historicity of Christ 
speaks against this, offering an historical hope by demonstrating that God acts in history: 
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“Christians, on the contrary, profess their faith in God’s tangible and powerful love which 
really does act in history and determines its final destiny”. He then continues to describe this 
love as “a love that can be encountered… fully revealed in Christ’s passion, death and 
resurrection” (LF §17). This emphasis on encounter here intimates the theme of touch: it is 
not just that we can see the outworkings of divine love in history; we can also encounter that 
love itself. Our historical hope comes not just from a removed apprehension of God’s activity, 
but in relating to God Himself. In this vein also, Francis invokes the ‘trustworthiness’ of God’s 
love, either specifically nominated as ‘God’s’76 or Christ,77 as well as the theme of divine 
‘reliability’, which might also be interpreted along these lines.78 We saw previously that 
Francis conceives of ‘trust’ as a mode of interpersonal relation. As such, we might say that 
for Francis, the very historicity of touch facilitates the relation that instantiates it. 
Touch, then, inscribes relation to God into historical existence. We might recall Buber’s 
concept of form here: for Buber, we find occasion to relate to God in particular worldly 
objects. The materiality of touch could be understood as a parallel notion: it is encounter 
occasioned by particular historical objects. 
4.3. KNOWLEDGE AS TOUCH VS KNOWLEDGE AS SIGHT 
In a discussion on other religions, Francis writes: “The light of faith in Jesus also illumines the 
path of all those who seek God, and makes a specifically Christian contribution to dialogue 
with the followers of the different religions... God is light and he can be found also by those 
who seek him with a sincere heart”. That is, all who seek God can attain a measure of faith-
knowledge as sight. This includes those who are not Christian. He writes: “Because faith is a 
way, it also has to do with the lives of those men and women who, though not believers, 
nonetheless desire to believe and continue to seek. To the extent that they are sincerely 
open to love and set out with whatever light they can find, they are already… on the path 
leading to faith.” What is significant here is that Francis takes up the theme of sight as a 
process of gradual development. Importantly, however, he does so in the context of the 
concepts of love and fullness, writing: “Any-one who sets off on the path of doing good to 
others is already drawing near to God… for it is characteristic of the divine light to brighten 
our eyes whenever we walk towards the fullness of love” (LF §35). 
 
76 C.f. LF §4, 23, 51 
77 C.f. LF §4, 42, 53 
78 C.f. LF §15, 16, 17, 42, 50, 
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We saw previously how Francis conceives of ‘fullness’ as an eschatological term: ‘fullness’ 
represents the fulfilment of the present. However, we also saw that, for Francis, we exist 
within ‘limitation’, unable to lay claim to this fullness because our sight is bounded by 
qualitative and quantitative horizons. Moreover, we saw that the qualitative horizon is a 
function of God’s alterity, and that this horizon governs the quantitative one. 
Here, Francis seems to associate love with fullness. In this vein, in the course of his discussion 
of the role of theology, Francis writes: “Since faith is a light, it draws us into itself, inviting us 
to explore ever more fully the horizon which it illumines, all the better to know the object of 
our love” (LF §36). Here, Francis identifies faith-knowledge as sight, pushing forwards at its 
horizons in pursuit of that which we love. Note that Francis is not using the word “object” in 
a sense that implies thematicity to love: in the same paragraph, Francis declares that “God 
cannot be reduced to an object”, and affirms the interpersonal dimension of this 
irreducibility when he declares that this is because “God is a subject who makes himself 
known and perceived in interpersonal relationship”. In this vein, God here is an “object” in 
an apophatic sense, the use of the term being necessitated by the nature of language rather 
than selected for its adequacy, much as Buber is forced to talk about relation in a way more 
proper to the I-It.  
The fulfilment of this process, for Francis, lies in the achievement of love itself. He asserts 
that “[a]ny-one who sets off on the path of doing good to others is already drawing near to 
God, is already sustained by his help, for it is characteristic of the divine light to brighten our 
eyes whenever we walk towards the fullness of love” (LF §36). That is, what sight seeks is 
attained in love. Similarly, in his discussion of the Decalogue, he writes that by following the 
commandments, faith “professes the love of God…. and lets itself be guided by this love in 
order to journey towards the fullness of communion with God” (LF §46). In other words, it is 
through the economy of love that we attain fullness in the communion of that love. 
Moreover, in a discussion of ethics, Francis writes that “our life is illumined to the extent that 
it enters into the space opened by... love, to the extent that it becomes, in other words, a 
path and praxis leading to the fullness of love” (LF §51). Here, love is not just identified with 
fullness, but attainment of that fullness is explicitly presented as the principle which governs 
the progressive attainment of sight. Similarly, he describes Christ as bringing “a new light”, 
which he identifies as “the fullness of God’s faithful love” (LF §59). 
Similarly, Francis writes, if love is not directed at an Other, it merely circulates within 
ourselves and “falls prey to fickle emotions and cannot stand the test of time” (LF §27). This 
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can be read in the sense of the breakdown of the subject in idolatry when we contrast it with 
Francis’ vision of true love, which, in being directed at an other, “unifies all the elements of 
our person and becomes a new light pointing the way to a great and fulfilled life” (LF §27). 
That is, the orientation of the subject to God in love provides the field in which value 
becomes intelligible as something inherent in objects and not merely the product of the 
subject’s will. Love is thus a kind of ‘light’ in which the objects of knowledge are disclosed to 
the subject as knowable in specifically moral circumstances – that is, as the foundation for 
moral sight. 
These examples serve to re-present the qualitative horizon in positive terms. This horizon 
does not merely designate the limit(ation) of sight: it also designates the excess of touch. 
What we encounter through interpersonal relation is the fullness that provides the horizon 
into which our thematic knowledge expands. Thematic knowledge attempts to (partially) 
express what is present primordially in the economy of love that is touch. 
5. THE ‘LOGIC’ 
This schema provides a particular structure to theological knowledge. We might say that, for 
Francis, faith-knowledge occurs in two registers. The first is a register which he refers to as 
touch. This knowledge is acquired through the inhabiting of a relationship of love with God 
as Other, and is prior to, and the condition of, thematic faith knowledge - which Francis refers 
to as sight. Being prior to thematic faith knowledge, we might describe it as unthematic: in 
line with its ‘object’ (this term being used ironically or apophatically), it cannot be 
circumscribed by thematic knowledge. We might say that it stands in excess of sight, which 
thus has a qualitative horizon. 
Sight emerges through reflection upon the experience of this encounter in time. Thus the 
object of sight is more properly the effect of God’s action in the world upon worldly 
phenomena. Following Buber, we might say that the knowledge of God therein is knowledge 
in attribution: what we know of God is what we attribute to God via the sensory components 
of His action in history, as disclosed to us thematically. Sight is thematic, and antecedent to 
touch, thematising our existence in relation to this unthematic encounter. This process is 
bounded by a quantitative horizon, which refers to the range of possible knowledge as 
limited by the provision in history of its object. 
Both of these horizons indicate a partiality of our thematic theological knowledge: on the 
one hand, the quantitative horizon indicates the continual possibility of more which can be 
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said. On the other, the qualitative horizon indicates the necessity of more which cannot be 
said – that there is a hard limit to our thematic knowledge, beyond this possibility.  
This partiality provides a natural limit to what we can express in thematic terms – for 
example, in terms of precepts (universal types quantifying over particular objects in 
situations), and, modus ponens, of particular sets of precepts. This excess implies a certain 
plurality with regards to how we can articulate the life of faith: at the risk of cliché, there is 
more to faith than can be summed up in any given set of descriptions or rules. 
6. WORKED EXAMPLE: MERCY AND THE MORAL LAW 
This is illustrated most clearly in Francis’ conception of mercy. In analysing this, we can also 
present the basis for a response to the concerns of the fifth dubium, with which we began 
this section. 
We noted previously that AL §303 intimates a conceptual space beyond the determination 
of particular actions according to the particular set of universal principles posited by the 
moral law. Moreover, we noted that this conceptual space is in some sense value-laden, but 
not morally value-laden – that is, there are divine requirements attached to it, other than 
moral maxims. 
6.1. THE NATURE OF MERCY 
One criticism that may be raised is that, although we have shown the thematically expressed 
range of faith knowledge to be distinct from morality, it may still be coextensive. What is to 
say that it is not exhausted by this? What is to say that the ‘range’ of thematised faith 
knowledge extends beyond the range of its realisation in morality? 
We can find an example of an element of thematic faith-knowledge which is not coextensive 
with morality in Francis’ understanding of mercy, as articulated in the Papal Bull 
Misericordiae Vultus (2015). Francis understands mercy by way of its relation to justice. 
Justice, as Francis refers to it here, pertains to the objective demands which arise in the 
context of law: he describes it as “a fundamental concept for civil society, which is meant to 
be governed by the rule of law”, and as “that which is rightly due to each individual” (MV 
§20). In this vein, where the Bible makes reference to divine justice, it is “understood as full 
observance of the Law and the behaviour of every good Israelite in conformity with God’s 
commandments”. However, he notes that this ought not to be interpreted in a “legalistic” 
way, writing that “in Sacred Scripture, justice is conceived essentially as the faithful 
abandonment of oneself to God’s will” (MV §20).  
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Justice, as Francis conceives of it then, has two components, which are inseparable: the 
requirements of the law, and a corresponding apportioning of dessert. That is, it involves two 
epistemic judgments: firstly, in the sense of representing particular acts under universal laws. 
Secondly, the agent of the acts in question is represented in their status as the particular 
agent of those actions in terms of universal categories of guilt, which is entailed by the nature 
of those laws. To put it another way, judgment in the juridical sense is a matter of judgment 
in the epistemological sense.  
In relating particulars to universals, epistemological judgment is thematic: it represents 
particulars under universals, thereby determining them as tokens of types. In other words, 
the world is given over to the subject by it in terms of objects, which it represents in terms 
of other objects. Because the discourse of justice is one of judgment, it too is thematic by 
implication. As such, it is to be identified in the context of faith-knowledge with sight.  
However, the judgments of justice are not merely that of relation to a formal law in light of 
which various particulars are represented under formal legal categories. Rather, it is also in 
terms of a relationship to God (more specifically, His will) which is expressed in these terms. 
That is, justice is a thematization of our relationship to God, specifically in relation to His will. 
Following on from our previous reflections on the twin horizons of thematic knowledge, we 
would thus expect this conception of justice to manifest limitations. Firstly, there would be 
some dimension of our relationship to God which resists expression in the thematic language 
of justice, specifically because of its thematicity. Francis does not reflect on this. However, 
he does illustrate the existence of a quantitative horizon, whereby there is some element of 
our relationship to God ‘beyond’ expression in terms of justice. We might say, there is a 
complement to our ethical or justice-based discourse in terms of our relationship to God. 
This second horizon is intimated in Francis’ conception of mercy, which he articulates in 
terms of the relationship between justice and its foundation in our loving relationship to 
God. He writes: “Jesus speaks several times of the importance of faith over and above the 
observance of the law”. Francis highlights in particular Christ’s response to the Pharisees in 
Matt. 9:13: “Faced with a vision of justice as the mere observance of the law that judges 
people simply by dividing them into two groups – the just and the sinners – Jesus is bent on 
revealing the great gift of mercy that searches out sinners and offers them pardon and 
salvation”. Consequently, we cannot “draw the line at a formal respect for the law”. Rather, 
“Jesus... goes beyond the law” (MV §20).  
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This ‘going beyond’ the law is a movement in which judgment becomes relativized to the 
divine love which structures the history in which that judgment takes place. Francis finds this 
relativization exemplified in Hosea (6:6): in this, Israel had strayed from the law such that it 
“deserved just punishment” as an “unfaithful people”. However, God put aside anger, 
showing that “God’s anger lasts but a moment, his mercy forever”. In doing so, God ‘goes 
beyond’ the law, setting aside judgment according to its determinations (specifically, of 
“unfaithful people”) in “an even greater event in which we experience love as the foundation 
of true justice” (MV §21).  In short, love mediates the judgments of justice, ‘going beyond 
them’. This mediation inaugurates a new mode of relating to God, in which “one begins to 
feel the tenderness and mercy of God” (MV §21). That is, mercy is that which is ‘beyond’ 
these judgments. 
We see the correspondence between this economy and Francis’ epistemology in his gnomic 
statement that “God’s justice is his mercy” (MV §20). We noted previously that Francis 
identifies the essence of justice as lying in submission to the will of God. We can now see 
how God’s mercy can be seen as his justice: this setting aside is God’s will. To embrace this 
setting aside is to submit to God’s will – which is to say that God’s justice paradoxically fulfils 
itself in the overturning of its judgments over us in our disobedience. 
This enables us to understand the relationship between mercy and love as Francis 
understands it in relation to knowledge. Just as faith-knowledge as touch, which subsists 
within the economy of God’s love, provides the horizon for knowledge as sight (which 
involves judgment in the epistemic sense), so love also mediates the universal law and the 
agents over which it determines. In this context, ‘mercy’ denotes the range of thematic 
knowledge within the overarching quantitative horizon of thematic knowledge that 
“envelopes and surpasses” the range of justice (MV §21). 
We find confirmation of this in Misericordia et Misera (2016). In this document, Francis 
describes mercy in terms that are analogous to the function of sight in relation to love and 
touch. Firstly, just as the loving gaze embodies love, and thereby serves as the medium for 
the primordial encounter in touch,79 mercy “renews and redeems because it is the meeting 
of two hearts: the heart of God who comes to meet the human heart” (MM §16). Mercy is 
further portrayed as the medium for touch when Francis describes it as initiating 
 
79 Moving beyond our selection of documents, Todd notes that Francis talks about the encounter with 
mercy in a variety of literal gazes, as well as various other modes of interaction (2018: 24-28). We 
should be reminded by this that, just as the word ‘sight’ is used metaphorically, by extension ‘the gaze’ 
need not be a literal matter of the eyes falling upon some object of attention. 
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transformation on the level of “creation”, which, as we saw previously, Francis associates 
with the primordial encounter of touch through metaphors of fatherhood: “I come to realize 
that I am truly a “new creation” (Gal 6:15): I am loved, therefore I exist… I have been shown 
mercy, therefore I have become a vessel of mercy” (MM §16). 
Finally, just as we feel the touch of God’s love in the loving gaze of others, so too are we 
touched by the mercy of others. Repeating the haptic metaphor in terms of images of 
proximity, Francis notes that “mercy becomes visible and tangible in specific and powerful 
acts” - specifically those in which we “draw near to our brothers and sisters” (MM §16). This 
encounter is not merely with one another however: in doing so, we also attain “closeness to 
Christ” (MM §16). 
6.2. GOODNESS AND RIGHTNESS 
In short, we might say that mercy is the complement of judgment, the two being mediated 
by love. This provides us with the means to understand our next key concept: that of being 
‘right by’ God. A person can be measured according to this thematic expression of love, apart 
from their measure according to the moral law; God’s exercise of mercy indicates the 
existence of this excess. 
But what does it mean to be ‘measured’ by this excess? What is it to be ‘right by’ mercy, as 
opposed to merely good? 
Francis seems to present mercy as a knowledge,80 analogous to moral knowledge. Firstly, 
they are both acquired from the same source, and in relation to one another. According to 
Francis, Christ’s passion is the definitive instance of justice, and its overtaking by mercy. 
Francis writes, “God’s justice is his mercy given to everyone as a grace that flows from the 
death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Thus the Cross of Christ is God’s judgment on all of us 
and on the whole world, because through it he offers us the certitude of love and new life” 
(MV §21).81 That is, in Christ’s passion, we encounter mercy in its fullness, in the overcoming 
of judgment in its fullness: we gain vision of mercy in its fullness through transcending the 
horizon of judgment in its fullness, of which it is the complement. 
 
80 By ‘a knowledge’, I mean a system of concepts which can be brought to bear upon the world in 
order to navigate it. 
81  We should read this equation of mercy and justice here as above, in terms of justice’s self-
overturning in God’s will (to which justice demands obedience) for mercy. 
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In this vein, just as more conventional fields of thematic theological knowledge (i.e. sight) 
arise from touch, Francis argues that this historical mediation makes mercy illustrative of the 
primordial nature of God’s love, which in turn reveals its subsistence within this love: Francis 
writes, “the mercy of God is not an abstract idea, but a concrete reality with which he reveals 
his love as of that of a father or a mother, moved to the very depths out of love for their 
child. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that this is a “visceral” love”” (MV §6). We saw 
previously how God’s fatherhood relates to the primordiality of His love, which we engage 
with on the level of our very being. By revealing his mercy in history - in material, bodily 
realities – we are led to apprehend the primordial nature of God’s love as embodied in this 
mercy. In this way, mercy makes knowledge as touch visible to knowledge as sight as the 
ground of this sight, thereby confirming its subsistence in love. 
Moreover, as with other sight, this revelation in its fullness occurs in a manner that precludes  
total thematisation. Firstly, Francis describes Christ as “the face of the father’s mercy” (MV 
§1). The use of the term ‘face’ here is redolent of Francis’ reflections on otherness and 
idolatry: true others defy our attempts to circumscribe them in thought and power, 
appearing as a ‘face’ that is free of our control. This is further intimated when Francis writes 
that Christ reveals mercy in “his entire person” (MV §1, emphasis mine). In other words, 
there is a qualitative horizon to our apprehension of mercy, corresponding to the qualitative 
difference between touch and sight. 
Furthermore, Francis writes that the incarnation occurred in “the ‘fullness of time’ (Gal 4:4), 
when everything had been arranged according to [God’s] plan of salvation” (MV §1). That is, 
God’s mediation of mercy in its fullness is mediated by history, being actualised only at a 
certain point in time and not before. 
This is developed further in EG and AL, which recapitulate and expand upon the 
phenomenological imagery of LS. Oltvai reads in EG and AL that, for Francis, the encounter 
of grace is the experience of “being phenomenalized in a certain way” by the gaze of Christ 
as Other (Oltvai, 2018: 318).82 Moreover, this gives it an experiential dimension, tied to this 
being-intended: “The aesthetic experience of love is expressed in that ‘gaze’ which 
contemplates other persons as ends in themselves” (AL §128, in Oltvai, 2018: 318). In other 
words, the love in which the law is mediated appears as the being-subject-to a certain 
configuration of sight. 
 
82 C.f. EG §120; §141; AL §291. 
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This contemplation of the Other (that is, of the subject by Christ) “as ends in themselves” 
refers to the way this gaze “suspends the general in favour of the particular”. Oltvai 
associates this with the pastoral ideal of “accompaniment”, which “makes present the 
fragrance of Christ’s closeness and his personal gaze”, and “teaches us us to remove our 
sandals before the sacred ground of the other [la terre sacré de l’autre]” (EG §169; in Oltvai, 
2018: 319). 
Francis elaborates that “[o]ne who accompanies others has to realize that the person’s [di 
soggeto – the subject’s] situation before God and their life in grace are mysteries which no 
one can know fully from without” (EG §172; in Oltvai, 2018: 319). That is, as Oltvai puts it, 
the suspension of the general expressed in accompaniment amounts to a recognition of “the 
other’s inability to fully become an object of knowledge… as her ownmost reality or 
characteristic… as a phenomenon that pre- or exceeds the norm” (2018: 319). 
In short, for Francis, being loved is a matter of being viewed in one’s own transcendence. 
Love is embodied in a gaze that recognises the absolute horizon of its knowledge about the 
person upon which it falls. Thus Francis associates this mysterious (here perhaps best read 
in both senses of the term) dimension of the subject with the mystery of God: when we gaze 
in such a manner on others, we are moved to a “certain dread” (AL §127; in Oltvai, 2018: 
319). That is, we recognise in their alterity the alterity of God, and its corresponding 
sacredness. Thus, as Oltvai puts it, seeing the Other “incites a ‘fear of God,’ a ‘fear and 
trembling’ – or, in post-conciliar vocabulary, ‘wonder and awe’” (2018: 319). In this vein, EG 
§88 renders this in language reminiscent of Buber, describing the Gospel and its call to 
evangelism through the loving encounter with the Other as telling us to “run the risk of a 
face-to-face encounter with others” (in Oltvai, 2018: 319). Oltvai notes that the French 
translation displays this Buberian theme even more explicitly, speaking of ““le risque de la 
rencontre avec le visage de l’autre,” “the risk of the encounter with the face of the other”” 
(Oltvai, 2018: 319-20). 
We noted above that, for Francis, we only attain faith-knowledge as sight after being 
touched. This has implications for our knowledge of moral responsibility (i.e. of what justice 
demands from us): for Francis, responsibility becomes apparent to us only after first being 
gazed upon (2018: 322). Moreover, we saw how the alterity of the Other is the alterity of the 
divine. It is thus in recognising their gazing upon the subject that our responsibility to them 
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appears. Christian life is at heart a response to the gaze of “the Father’s face as glimpsed in 
the face of Christ, and Christ’s as glimpsed in the face of the Other” (2018: 323).83 
This necessitates a particular approach to the application of moral norms in a pastoral 
context: a loving gaze recognises the absolute horizon that arises as a function of the 
transcendence of the Other. As a result, sight cannot reduce the Other to a single set of 
determinate judgments. Consequently there are no moral generic situations, because 
pastoral discernment always takes place in the context of an encounter with the face of the 
Other - in all its irreducible, holy particularity (2018: 321). Hence Francis chastises those who 
apply rules as if they were totalizable: they are guilty of a “self-absorbed promethean 
neopelaganism”, and “trust only in their own powers”. That is, they assert themselves as 
wielders of the rules over the Other, negating the transcendence of the individual to whom 
those rules are applied (EG §94; in Oltvai, 2018: 321). 
This goes some way to indicating just in what the knowledge of mercy consists: love 
recognises that law is always mediated by the relationship in the course of which it is applied 
– and that this relationship, by virtue of the transcendent nature of its relatants, exceeds any 
specific determinations.  
It is the awareness of the irreducible particularity of the individual, that stands in excess of 
the general determinations of totalised schemas. More importantly, however, is what this 
does not indicate. It does not give us specific determinations such that we can say that an 
individual has ‘mercifying property x’ or ‘mercifying property y’.84 This is because, as we have 
seen, the scope of mercy lies beyond this kind of determinations. In short, mercy is 
mysterious, known only in terms of the context in which is arises – as that which pertains to 
Others. Mercy, as a knowledge, might thus be summarised as sight’s loving perception of its 
absolute horizon as it gazes upon the Other in a moral context. To recognise someone as 
‘right by’ mercy is not to recognise some determinate thing about them, but to recognise the 
limitation of the determinations of justice themselves. 
 
83 It is probably significant here that Francis emphasizes being evangelized over doing evangelization 
here. Although we can play this gazing role in evangelizing others, on focusing on our role as recipients 
of evangelism, he leads us away from thinking of this gaze as something that we possess. This 
reinforces our sense of divine alterity. 
84  My use of the gerund, “mercifying” here is deliberately evocative of Francis’ Papal motto, 
“miserando atque eligendo”. Although some commentators translate it as “by mercifully choosing” or 
“by God’s merciful choice” (Mercier, 2016: Online), Francis himself translates it as “mercifying” in 
order to express the way “the vision of Jesus… gives the gift of mercy” (Francis, 2016b: 12). 
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In this vein, the closest MV comes to intimating a definition of mercy is in four statements 
found in MV (§2): firstly, it is “the very mystery” of the Trinity – that is, the logic of mercy is 
the logic of the inner life of the Trinity. Secondly, it is “the ultimate and supreme act by 
which God comes to meet us” – that is, we encounter God through His establishing a 
relationship with us according to the register of mercy. Thirdly, it is “the fundamental law” 
of interpersonality – that is, it is the basic mode of relating to others. Fourthly, it 
“connects” God and humanity, kindling hope for divine love in spite of our sinfulness – that 
is, it is the mode in which we can remain within the economy of divine love despite our 
fallen nature. There are two salient themes here: firstly, that mercy is the logic of the 
economic Trinity, which is an extension of the relations of the imminent Trinity. This 
amounts to an explicit statement of mercy as mystery. The second is merely a restatement 
of the interpersonal nature of mercy, with a stubborn refusal to go ‘beyond’ this. 
6.3. THE ‘MORAL SECURITY’ OF RIGHTNESS 
We should pause here to anticipate an objection. Our response to this objection will set us 
up to respond to the challenge presented by the Cardinals.  
If mercy and ethics can be seen as analogous and parallel knowledges, does this make them 
alternative knowledges? That is, does God’s mercy amount to a negation or suspension of 
justice? If so, this amounts to antinomianism, which we might want to reject for a number 
of obvious reasons. 
This is not the case. Francis notes that mercy does not mean that the judgments of justice 
are negated, writing that “anyone who makes a mistake must pay the price”. Rather, it is 
more that judgment is not absolute, but rather is contextualised in terms of a process in time 
in which that judgment does not obtain throughout: it “is just the beginning of conversion, 
not its end” (MV §21). In short, judgment obtains at a given time. In forgiveness, the 
judgment of justice is not cancelled out in the present, but remains in the past as the present 
transcends itself into the future. 
We saw previously how thematic sight has a quantitative horizon, mediated by time. This 
expands into fullness, attained in non-thematic touch. We might understand this temporal 
particularity of the range of justice in terms of the movement of this horizon. This limitation 
in time is a function of touch’s excess over sight, wherein thematic knowledge is relative to 
the encounter in love within time. Love is thus revealed here as actively limiting judgment. 
Law is subordinate to God’s love, having only a relative force.  
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This is not to say that love and law are in any sense opposed: Francis states explicitly that 
mercy and justice “are not two contradictory realities, but two dimensions of a single reality 
that unfolds progressively until it culminates in the fullness of love” (MV §20). That is, the 
exercise of both mercy and justice are both subsidiary to the exercise of God’s love, and each 
has its own proper place within it. Rather, the limiting of law (and thus the operation of 
mercy, which is its complement in love) is intrinsic to the nature of law as subsidiary to love. 
In short, then, mercy does not represent the negation of law as such - the demands of law 
remain in place.  
Another resource for understanding how the exercise of mercy is not love’s acting over and 
against law is Francis’ reflection on the relationship between mercy and divine sovereignty: 
Francis quotes Thomas Aquinas in saying that ““It is proper to God to exercise mercy, and he 
manifests his omnipotence particularly this way””. He remarks that Aquinas’ words “show 
that God’s mercy, rather than a sign of weakness, is the mark of his omnipotence” (MV §6; 
See Summa Theologica,85 I, q. 30, a. 2). If mercy acted over and against law, then Francis 
would presumably link mercy and divine sovereignty in an antinomian sense. However, he 
does not: Thomas’ point here is that, in exercising mercy, God occupies a position of 
superiority to the subject of his mercy.  The limitation of law by love provides God with a 
resource to occupy this position, relating to us in a way that does not involve the judgments 
of law which condemn us. In this vein, we should not think of the excess of love over law in 
terms of power, but of abundance: Law has its proper place, but this is not everywhere. 
Mercy is the self-provision of God’s love where it does not provide itself as law.86 
 
85 Hereafter, ST 
86 It is worth noting that “mercy” in the sense Francis uses it ultimately differs from Aquinas’. For both 
Aquinas and Francis, mercy is an outworking of God’s love: for Francis, mercy is God’s love as exercised 
in a register other than that of moral judgment. For Aquinas, mercy stems from pity, and God’s pity 
derives from His love - God “loves us as belonging to Him”, so that he appropriates our loss as His own 
(ST II-II, q. 30, a. 2). However, Aquinas describes mercy as a passion (II-II, q. 30, a. 3), whereas Francis 
discusses it primarily in terms of action – forgiving, and we have outlined it in terms of (epistemic) 
judgment. Moreover, Aquinas identifies pity, which grieves unjust harms, with nemesis, which grieves 
unjust goods, and opposes them both to envy, which grieves just goods and harms (II-II, q. 36, a. 3). 
In this way, for Aquinas, mercy, when properly ordered, is ordered to securing the demands of justice 
in the distribution of goods. As we have seen, for Francis, mercy its own order distinct from, and thus 
not ordered to justice – if anything, justice is ordered towards mercy, or at least mercy is only ordered 
towards justice to the extent that it represents the fulfilment of justice in its self-transcendence. For 
these reasons, the sense of “mercy” as Francis uses it might also be conveyed by “forgiveness” or 




In this vein, Oltvai notes that moral laws, for Francis, have a quasi-sacramental character: 
they are an “analogia fidei”, pointing towards the love that they embody. Thus they are an 
expression, or a site of encounter, of God’s love. And it is in their nature, as signs that conceal 
even as they reveal, that they must be subordinated to the transmission of that love. Because 
of the phenomenological nature of this process, Francis is lead to prioritise lived experience 
over abstract, generalised judgments. This means, in practice, that they must be approached 
in an “ever-contextual” way, requiring “(re)interpretation” in their application at the service 
of the reception of the gaze (2018: 323).87 
In summary, for Francis, even though one may supersede the other, the relationship 
between mercy and justice is not one of conflict. Rather, it belongs to the nature of justice 
to be mediated by love in its relation to, and superseded by, mercy in this manner. Thus, 
when Francis highlights the story of Jesus and the adulteress (John 8:9-11) as illustrating the 
nature of mercy, he writes that, in this story, “God’s love takes primacy over all else”. In 
recognising this primacy, Francis writes, Christ “returned the Mosaic Law to its true and 
original intent” (MM §1). 
However, a question remains: if justice remains intact, why do the judgments of justice cease 
to obtain between the two times? The answer is that the range of this knowledge changes. 
As we saw previously, for Francis, God’s justice can sometimes indicate its own negation. 
God wills the foregoing of judgment of humanity according to His justice. Because justice 
entails conformity to His will, His justice thus ‘judges itself’ and pronounces its own foregoing 
with regards to humanity, thereby readjusting its range and opening up its complement in 
mercy as the fulfilment of its own internal logic. 
This leads us on to the remaining key concept: the idea of “moral security” as a quality of the 
discernment of conscience, which attends to rightness. We have just argued that, for Francis, 
the judgments of mercy and the judgments of the moral law are in a sense parallel. 
Moreover, conscience is more generally associated with the moral law. Indeed, as we have 
seen, Veritatis Splendor conceives of conscience specifically as the faculty by which 
judgments are made in light of the moral law. As such, how is it that conscience can be said 
to discern mercy? And how can conscience be said to discern mercy with ‘moral security’? 
 
87 This also shows how Francis’ particularist approach to moral norms is not a nominalist one: these 
norms have a transcendent dimension. 
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Perhaps what Francis is intimating in this passage is that conscience can play a role in 
identifying the ranges over which ‘justice’ and ‘mercy’ obtain in a given situation. We might 
say that this is a kind of moral cognition, to the extent that the relative ranges of each emerge 
from justice’s own self-limitation. That is, we become aware of the range of mercy in relation 
to justice when justice appraises itself as the knowledge which may or may not obtain over 
a given object in a given situation. As an operation of justice, conscience can repeat this 
appraisal and thus identify this self-limitation. To put it simply, conscience can judge when 
justice demands a less totalising application of law.88 
6.4. MYSTICISM AS A GUIDE TO MORALS 
This raises another question: how does conscience judge when justice demands a less 
totalising application of law? This is an important question: after all, pastors have to be able 
to navigate the dialectic of justice and mercy in practice, and we have not come to any 
determinate principles by which they can do this. Three things ought to be noted here.  
Firstly, there are cases where the limits of law are indicated by its failure to secure other 
goods. An example of this can be found in Evangelii Gaudium’s “kerygmatic hermeneutic” 
(Oltvai, 2018: 321). We noted above how sight is engendered by touch, which is experienced 
as becoming subject to a gaze that recognises one’s own transcendence. This means that 
pastoral care must prioritise the communication of the kerygma, by which individuals come 
to experience God’s loving, transforming gaze itself. To evangelise another is thus first and 
foremost a matter of “transmitting” this gaze, by allowing our sight (which, as we saw 
previously, is Christ’s sight) to fall upon them in a loving manner (2018: 323). This is 
expressed in Francis’ recognition of John Paul II’s ‘law of gradualness’ in AL §295: because 
our capacity to follow the law is a function of our recognition of God’s love as embodied in 
 
88 Part of the controversy over AL §303 relates to its application to Catholics living in ‘irregular’ 
situations - for example second marriages. This arises in the context of footnote 351, which potentially 
implies that they can be admitted to the Eucharist on the basis of pastoral discernment. It goes beyond 
the scope of this chapter to respond to this question of application, although it is worth noting that 
the general possibility for ‘going beyond’ the judgments of justice does not mean that this possibility 
can be actualised in all cases - and a reading of this passage as “blanket permission” is a poor one 
(Tom Ryan, 2017: 143). Moreover, much of the debate around this issue focuses on whether there are 
contexts in which (at least something framed broadly analogous to) this might be appropriate 
(Wahlberg, 2017: Online). This debate, however, can also take into account principles extrinsic to the 
relationship between justice and mercy, including the nature of the eucharist (for example, Granados 
(2017)), as well as the place of previous teachings about the role of merely grave rather than mortal 
sin as a condition for exclusion (for a debate about the place of these teachings as discipline versus 
metaethics, see Buttiglioni (2016), Hitchens (2016) reply, and Crosby’s (2016) reply to Hitchens). It 
goes beyond the scope of this project to negotiate these extrinsic issues. For a more detailed 
discussion of the place of the wider tradition in our hermeneutic, see chapter two. 
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it, an individual must first come to recognise that love before they can follow the law (Oltvai, 
2018: 321). These kinds of considerations can guide us in practice, even though they are not 
apprehensions of mercifying properties in themselves. This could very well be the kind of 
case that Francis imagines when he talks about moral security. 
Secondly, however, we must remember that although touch is embodied in and experienced 
as the being-subject-to a certain kind of gaze, what is revealed in the course of the gazing is 
not reducible to the information revealed by the gaze itself. In this vein, Francis seems to 
open up the possibility for a different kind of apprehension of moral situations – one that is 
more primordial and mystical, going beyond the determinations of sight just as its 
(non)object exceeds them. To exhaustively account for mercy in these terms would amount 
to a determination of all the ways in which a person is indeterminate. Any attempt to 
formulate such an account would therefore be predicated on a failure to understand what it 
is to be mysterious in this way.  
Francis articulates a suitably apophatic method of knowing in terms of “discernment”, 
offering an extensive meditation on this topic in Gaudete et Exsultate.89 In this, discernment 
manifests indeterminacy in two ways. 
Firstly, discernment is “a grace” that seeks “to know the Father… and the one whom he has 
sent, Jesus Christ” (GE §170). As we have seen, it is precisely this mystical orientation that 
precludes reduction of the knowledge of discernment to purely thematic knowledge. Thus 
while it includes “existential, psychological, sociological or moral insights drawn from the 
human sciences”, as well as “reason and prudence”, and “the Church’s sound norms”, it 
nevertheless “transcends them” (GE §170). Indeed, Francis is careful to note that while 
discernment takes the Gospel as its “ultimate standard”, and thus necessarily involves 
“obedience… to the Magisterium” that guards it, he qualifies this by noting that, in practice, 
discernment can lead us beyond merely repeating norms: it is “not a matter of applying rules 
or repeating what was done in the past, since the same solutions are not valid in all 
circumstances and what was useful in one context may not prove so in another” (GE §173). 
Thus it does not reduce to them. 
Secondly, discernment seeks “a glimpse of that unique and mysterious plan that God has for 
each of us”, which Francis notes “takes shape amid so many varied situations and 
limitations”. Here Francis also identifies an historical indeterminacy and incompleteness to 
 
89 Hereafter, GE 
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discernment. Similarly, as a grace, it also “requires no special abilities, nor is it only for the 
more intelligent or better educated”. This further disrupts the link between ‘expert’ 
theorising (as a form of thematicity) and the knowledge of discernment. We might find a 
parallel here with the idea of “affective connaturality” – a kind of untheoretical knowledge 
of the divine which Francis associates with the praxis of everyday believers (see EG §125; 
Deck, 2015: 54-5), which we shall see in the next chapter bears up the possibility for 
indeterminacy embodied in a pluralism corresponding to the historical variations between 
communities of believers (GE §170). 
Abram reads AL to produce an understanding of pastoral discernment which mirrors this: it 
involves the refusal to employ “rigid classifications” or categorisations (AL §298; in Abram, 
2017: 148); a contextualising application of norms that takes into account wider 
considerations about the individual’s relationship to God; and a recognition that our analyses 
of a pastoral situation admit complexity and ambiguity, rather than cleaving to a model of 
knowing which “leaves no room for confusion” or promotes “black and white” 
understandings (AL §308; in Abram, 2017: 149). Abram notes that imagination plays an 
important role in this process, and that Francis himself employs ekphrasis and a rich range 
of metaphors in order to express the pastoral role of the Church (see 2017: 152-158). In doing 
so, he seeks to communicate a multivalent understanding of the relationship between the 
Church and those within its care, which necessitates a similarly indeterminate, multivalent, 
and most of all imaginative process of discernment (2017: 158). In short, Abram notes in a 
less systematic way how, for Francis, discernment is a matter of negotiating the excess of 
pastoral situations over any particular set of determinations. This kind of reading will be 
familiar to anyone who has engaged in popular discourse around Francis. We will also know 
the popular response that, on its own, this idea seems somewhat obscure. Our ‘mystical’ 
reading provides a more  substantive account of what it means to talk about this excess, and 
to exercise discernment with regards to it. In short, while it is not entirely explanatory (and 
cannot be), it at least goes some way to say what it is that can’t be fully articulated, and why. 
Finally, from a practical point of view, we already know how to navigate mystery. Indeed, the 
themes the four statements of MV §2 are present throughout the life of the Church, in its 
prayers and liturgies, its social teaching, and in the less formalised theological culture of its 
members. If there is anything unsettling or unsatisfactory about this, it is because of the 
frustrating nature of mystery itself. Time is greater than space, and this is a hard lesson to 
learn. But equally, this opens the possibility of life that is not governed by the determining 
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logic of space. For all its difficulty, it is also a liberating lesson – a hopeful lesson, and one 
that should assuage our anxieties around its refusal to console our (therefore) misplaced 
fears. 
6.5. UNSELFING AND OBEDIENCE 
This mystical moral knowledge represents a key contrast between Francis’ and more 
paranoid theologies. In our analysis of Veritatis Splendor in chapter one, we explored how 
the encyclical ‘conscripts’ moral theology into the ranks: just as it belongs to the nature of 
the soldier to be subject to the commands of the general, for VS, the discipline is always-
already given over to the conditions set by the magisterium. We also saw how, for John Paul 
II, martyrdom represents the acme of the moral life, as the total giving oneself over to the 
demands of the moral law. In VS, themes of obedience undergird the determining capacity 
of its paranoid hermeneutic, absolutizing its determining features in all their putative 
totality. It is in obedience that we recognise as absolute the total range of the moral law, and 
thus its capacity to determine situations in general.  
One of the factors that makes VS so compelling is that, as Catholics, we perhaps expect to 
have to be obedient, and to be answerable to something greater than ourselves. VS clearly 
articulates what this something is: the moral law, mediated through the teachings of the 
magisterium. Moreover, for VS there is rigidity to the demands of moral life, which translates 
into a practical difficulty in living up to them – the moral law is total and absolute, and thus 
we run the risk of failing before it in all situations.  
Correspondingly, Francis’ appeal to a mystical dimension of ethics might appear less 
convincing. Indeed, from the standpoint of VS, Francis’ appeal to mystical knowledge seems 
like an excuse for an anti-martyrdom that pits the subject against the determinations of the 
law by reference to a ‘transcendence’ that is merely a cipher for standing over and against 
it. This reveals what might be described as a contested ‘aesthetics of obedience’ as one 
dimension of contrast between Francis and VS. VS embodies this aesthetic in a way that 
Francis’ metaethics does not. 
However, it would be wrong to think that Francis does not also offer an obediential approach 
to the moral life. Moreover, the difference between Francis’ required obedience and that of 
VS exhibits a key distinction that serves to make Francis’ account difficult to accept for those 
with more paranoid sensibilities. This distinction lies in the additional, in some sense even 
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more difficult, requirements of a moral life that does not reduce to following a given specific 
set of maxims. 
Abram, without giving it the more systematic connotations that we have above, picks up on 
Francis’ use of metaphors of the “loving gaze” to describe a certain way of comporting 
oneself in relation to others in a pastoral context. She associates this with Iris Murdoch’s 
concept of “unselfing”, in which the subject, enraptured by an encounter with the divine, 
can “move beyond” its selfish, world-distorting drives to recognise moral reality (2017: 156; 
see Murdoch, 1997b: 369).  
A key point about unselfing, for Murdoch, is that it is difficult to properly identify. This 
epistemic uncertainty is rooted in two conditions.  
Firstly, an anthropological one: drawing from psychoanalysis, she notes that our moral 
decisions arise out of an “obscure” system of internal processes (1997a: 344). Thus it is 
difficult to discern the quality of our moral subjectivity through introspection.  
Secondly, an ontological one: in order to achieve a properly unselfish gaze, we need to 
maintain what Murdoch refers to as “attention” to the Good (which in this context she 
identifies with talk about God) (1997a: 344).90 This concept, which Murdoch borrows from 
Simone Weil,91 refers to a kind of ‘orientation’ towards the Good which does not falsely 
reduce it to a determinate object. However, it is difficult to identify this attention from its 
object, precisely because doing so risks this reductive determination. This is because the 
Good is, for Murdoch, ultimately indeterminate. For Murdoch, we have access to “intuitions” 
of the Good in its determinate instantiations, through which we can ascend to ever more 
truthful apprehensions of the Good in itself. However, precisely because they are 
instantiations, these never quite bring us to the concept of Good itself (1997b: 378). This lack 
of determination results in a lack of totality with regards to the moral life: we are ultimately 
left in a world that “remains disparate and complex, beyond the hopes of any system”, 
possessing only the “shadowy, unachieved unity” that comes from its pointing beyond itself 
(1997b: 380).92 In this context, any particular intuition which purports to be of the Good in 
 
90 Note here the parallels with Francis’ exhortation to “serene attentiveness” to creation and God 
(Laudato Si’ §226). This reveals the mystical nature of creation, and thereby “opens one to 
transformed relationships with God, oneself, others, and the natural world” (Ehrman, 2018: 105). We 
will return to this, and the implied parallel between the mystical encounter with the Other and the 
apprehension of the created world in our sixth chapter. 
91 C.f. Weil (2002: 116-122) 
92 For a more complete discussion of this, see Murdoch (1992: 391-430). 
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itself/God is a false reduction from unpossessable transcendent principle to immanent (and 
therefore possessable) intuition, which Murdoch calls “fantasy” (1997a: 354). This in turn 
means that we cannot identify attention from the supposed ‘presence’ of its object: the 
moment we say “my attention is on the Good”, we give the lie to our own statement, 
reducing the Good by determination to whatever intuition is intended by the sentence. 
These two conditions mean that, if unselfing is the necessary condition for a certain kind of 
ethical knowledge in situ, this knowledge lacks easily identifiable conditions. Furthermore, 
Murdoch is keenly aware of the difficulty of unselfishness. She notes how experience teaches 
us that the attempt to “pierce the veil of selfish consciousness” “cannot be entirely 
successful” (1997b: 377). This leads her to an Augustinian awareness of the ease with which 
we slip into concupiscent fantasy,93 which she illustrates dramatically in her novels.94 
Francis’ faith in the capacity of the Church for pastoral discernment implies a mitigated 
suspicion on this front. Indeed, in the next chapter, we will see how Francis explicitly 
approves of non-theorised theologies in the form of popular piety, and employs an 
epistemology of affective connaturality to provide an account of the sensus fidei which 
enables him to approach discernment hopefully. Our sixth chapter will show how this 
optimism can be accounted for in light of his eschatological convictions. 
Nevertheless, there are elements of Murdoch’s vision which remain: it is hard to totally deny 
Murdoch’s anthropological condition. Moreover, while we might not wish to subscribe to 
the model of Platonism offered by Murdoch, the ontological condition is reproduced by 
virtue of the fact that, for Francis, mystical ethical knowledge is similarly rooted in an 
apprehension of that which by its very nature defies determination (the transcendence of 
the Other). Finally, Augustinian concerns about concupiscence are hardly alien to 
Catholicism!95 
Combined with the fact that this mystical knowledge can qualify our determinate knowledge, 
Francis’ ethical mysticism requires us to adopt a certain hesitancy in making ethical claims. 
We ought not to confuse this with Vattimo’s ethic of ‘weak thought’ – this is not the hesitancy 
that comes with secular, ‘post-metaphysical’ discourse (and as we shall see in chapter six, 
 
93 Insole reads this awareness as pessimistic to the extent that it is better described as “neo-Lutheran” 
(2006: 125). 
94 See The Black Prince (1973) in particular (Insole, 2006: 134). 
95 We will return to this in our conclusion. 
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there is a strong metaphysical strand to Francis’ thought).96 Rather, it is an awareness that 
ethics involves a difficult discipline, which, despite its difficulty, can nevertheless always 
challenge and surprise us. Francis’ ethical mysticism both baptises the possibility for a 
challenge to totality rooted in discernment, and with the same stroke casts doubt on any 
particular such challenge. 
This entails a model of an ‘obediential’ moral life, albeit different to that of VS. For VS, the 
acme of the moral life is martyrdom, conceived as the radical surrender of oneself to the 
prescriptions of the moral law, and a refusal to set one’s power as an agent over against it. 
For Francis, in contrast, the acme of the moral life is the radical surrender of oneself to the 
transcendence of both divine and human Others, and a refusal to set one’s power as a knower 
over and against it. That is to say, for Francis, we must respect the absolute horizon of our 
knowledge. In this vein, Francis condemns the “self-absorbed promethean neopelagianism” 
of those who reduce salvation to a function of following a set of worldly rules, and occupying 
certain worldly categories (EG 94). In doing so, they forget the role of mercy in salvation. In 
the context of the understanding of mercy developed above, we can recognise this as a 
condemnation of those who neglect the transcendence of Others, and the functions thereof 
in the moral life. The term “promethean” rings with particular significance here: it is literally 
a defiance of the transcendent (in the form of the indeterminate Other), giving to ourselves 
a power (to determine) that does not belong to us. The refusal of neopelagianism is a refusal 
of self-aggrandizement in the form of the illusion of self-sufficient totality; of the fantasy of 
a moral life reduced to the function of a determinate set of rules. 
This principle is powerfully illustrated in MM: Francis notes that Jesus’ response to the 
adulteress’ accusers in John 8:10-11 is silence; silence to “let God’s voice be heard in the 
consciences [sic] not only of the woman, but also in those of her accusers” (MM §1). This 
reading of the story links themes of unselfing with mystical knowledge of God: when we 
cease to impose ourselves and our knowledge upon the situation (in speaking, particularly 
to condemn), God’s voice comes through. However, God’s voice here does not break the 
silence. We might interpret this image of a ‘silent voice’ as reflecting the apophatic 
dimension of Francis’ ethical mysticism: the knowledge gained through the encounter with 
this voice (with God as a person) is not just another articulation of the law by which the 
 
96 For a treatment of this issue in relation to Francis, see Lemna (2014). 
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crowd had condemned the woman. Rather, it lies in excess of the determinations of that law, 
and thus appears as ‘nothing’ where those determinations are totalised. 
This is unacceptable to the paranoid sensibility. Paranoia, as a theory of negative affect, is 
perfectly content with ethics being hard in the sense of being hard to live up to, and often 
failed. What it cannot abide is ethics being hard in the sense of that we might be wrong in 
ways we cannot anticipate – that is, of an indeterminacy that opens the possibility of bad 
surprises. But this also touches a nerve theologically: a challenge to authority is a challenge 
to the eschatological claim that underpins that claim to authority, as well as perhaps a claim 
to unity beneath that authority (that is, in obedience). We noted earlier that VS seeks to 
preserve these elements: as to the first, it seeks to secure a determinate account of the 
fulfilment to come by providing the Church with a sign of this in its possession of moral 
knowledge in the present. In contrast, as Hauerwas (1996) notes, Murdoch’s model of the 
moral life, comprised by a consistent refusal of totality, and without the promise of a 
resolution, leads to a hopeless eschatology. As to the second, VS links Christian identity to a 
clear form of life, embodied in the moral law. 
We will deal with the first of these in chapter seven, which will show that Francis, in contrast 
to Murdoch, proceeds from the basis of an eschatology which transforms the failure of 
indeterminacy into a sacrament of hope. This in turn allows him to transform the negativity 
which is so intolerable to paranoia into a source of positive affect, thereby motivating a 
reparative approach. As for the moment, we will deal with the second in the next chapter, 
which shows how Francis provides an account of the Church as an authentic unity that is 
nevertheless an indeterminate one. 
7. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we read LF as outlining a phenomenology of faith-knowledge. We also saw 
how an epistemology that permits a reparative stance towards indeterminacy in faith-
knowledge emerges from this:  
Faith-knowledge arises in both a thematic and an unthematic, or pre-thematic way. We enter 
into this knowledge through a primordial encounter with God, experienced as the touch of 
divine love in the loving gaze. In being touched, we touch back - and this instils in us an 
unthematic knowledge of the Other whom we touch, which in turn is the condition for our 
own adoption of a subjectivity characterised by this loving gaze – Christ’s. This gaze gives 
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over to us thematically what has already encountered primordially. However, it is also the 
means of lovingly touching Others, and God’s lovingly touching those Others through us. 
Because of this dependence, the thematic component of faith-knowledge is characterised by 
two horizons. Firstly, a qualitative horizon that figures the transcendence of both divine and 
human Others, conceived as an excess over the possible content of thematic knowledge. This 
means that our faith-knowledge is characterised by both non-totality, corresponding to the 
inexhaustibility of the transcendent Other: we will never fully circumscribe through 
description what it is to be touched by the Other, or their love. This excess also means that 
the content of our faith knowledge will always exceed the determinations of any particular 
set of thematised principles, which themselves are always mediated by their unthematized 
ground. Secondly, as we persist in the loving embrace of the divine gaze, our knowledge of 
the world revealed in love expands, pushing back the quantitative horizons of our faith-
knowledge. This means that our faith-knowledge is characterised by indeterminacy, 
corresponding to the indeterminacy of the plenitude that lies within that transcendence, and 
which flows out before us in the course of history. 
We also saw how the qualitative horizon of our thematic knowledge is illustrated particularly 
clearly in the case of our moral knowledge, where we realise that a truly loving gaze is one 
that recognises the existence of this excess, and in pastoral practice, which is necessarily 
flexible, particular, and unsystematic. In this context, we must develop a mystical 
attunement to this excess, and its mediation of thematicity. This involves an ascetic 
‘unselfing’, wherein we learn not to assert our own capacity as knowers over and against the 
transcendence of the Other.97  
However, this relation of thematicity to mediating unthematic mystical knowledge is not 
restricted in Francis’ theology to ethics. The next chapter will look to how Francis builds from 
this to an ecclesiology – that is, how faith-knowledge serves as the material for a collective 
Christian subjectivity, out of which practice, culture, and identity emerge. We noted how VS 
links Catholic identity in faith to the actualisation of the determinations of the moral law, as 
mediated by the specific historical teachings of the Magisterium, in a form of life. This 
establishes a notion of unity as the criterion for Catholic identity – a notion of unity beneath 
the determinations of that law, with the boundaries of that unity indicated by the totalisation 
 
97 Illuminating parallels can be found in Wallenfang’s engagement with texts outside our selection in 
order to produce a phenomenological reading of Francis that mirrors a number of features of ours. 
Note in particular his identification of mercy with an “unpredictable encounter” to which those 
involved must “yield” (2018: 66). 
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of those determinations. In contrast, as we shall see, Francis’ more reparative vision of faith-
knowledge leads to a correspondingly less determined understanding of what it means to 
come together in a unity of faith. 
In the mean-time, and pending a more in-depth discussion in the next chapters, we might 
conclude with a comment on the affective dimension of Francis’ understanding of faith-
knowledge. We have talked a lot about the ‘limits’ of knowledge, and the difficulties involved 
in navigating these limits. From this, we might think that Francis’ epistemology in LF 
ultimately sets us up for a negative-affective stance – that we, as knowers, are ultimately 
destined to disappointment. However, we can subtly shift the emphasis.  
Instead of fixating on the limits of thematicity, we might note the possibility for knowledge 
beyond those limits, in touch. We might also note that, beyond these limits, lies fullness – 
that we stand before a God who so exceeds description, and yet who touches us lovingly. 
Similarly, we live in a world alongside countless Others, each recognisable as unfathomably 
deep wellsprings of newness – Others whom we can love, and who can love us. Others with 
whom an encounter is the very touch of grace, and for whom we ourselves are (you are!) a 
blessing.  
Orienting ourselves in this way allows us to grasp the sensibility underlying Francis’ theology. 
These realisations cast a light upon the world in which it appears mysterious, but wonderful 
therein. A light which searches out the shadows of uncertainty, and recasts their threatening 




IV. MYSTICAL ECCLESIOLOGY AND HISTORICAL PLURALISM 
 
In our introduction, we noted that Veritatis Splendor reproduces a paranoid paradigm in 
Catholic theology. For VS, the unity of Christian life is a function of the totality of Magisterial 
determinations. In short, it is a determinate unity. This in turn invites the negation of alterity: 
what exists beyond the bounds of these determinations becomes ‘un-Christian’ (or at least, 
un-Catholic). In the previous chapter, we read Francis as rooting faith in a mystical encounter 
with God. In this chapter, we will read Francis’ ecclesiology as prioritising mystical encounter 
over juridical structures.98 We will argue that this leads him to prioritise the possibility of 
encounter over the inclusion or exclusion of particular forms within the Church. This in turn 
enables him to incorporate variations in form into the unity of the Church. 
The chapter begins with a discussion of the nature of the Church in Lumen Fidei read in 
dialogue with Evangelii Gaudium. We will show how, for Francis, the Church is a collective 
subject founded on the shared encounter with the divine identified in the previous chapter. 
This leads Francis to an ecclesial ‘Marian priority’, wherein the institutional ‘Petrine’ 
structures of the Church are ordered to this encounter, and consequently can only function 
antecedent to it.99  
Next, we will look at how this leads to pluralism within the Church. We will begin by looking 
to how historical pluralism leads to pluralism of encounter. We will argue, following Francis’ 
theology of language as outlined in the Apostolic Letter, Magnum Principium,100 that the 
forms within the Church (including doctrinal formulations) must be ordered towards 
facilitating this encounter, and thus admit this pluralism. This establishes a “plurivocal” 
understanding of Church unity, admitting difference within itself. We will conclude by looking 
to how Francis’ ecclesiology encourages a positive-affective response to difference within 
the Church, and the indeterminacy that this represents. 
1. THE MARIAN CHURCH 
In the last chapter, we saw how Francis’ mysticism gives priority to the unthematic 
knowledge of touch over the thematic knowledge of sight. This model relativizes thematic 
 
98 For a discussion of our ‘reader-centered’ hermeneutic, see chapter two. 
99 Note that I am deploying these terms in order to track a distinction in ecclesiology to which they 
have already been attached, rather than to make any substantive points about topics such as 
Mariology – or the worrying gender politics latent within these associations. 
100 Hereafter, MP 
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knowledge to an unthematic knowledge that exceeds its determinations. This excess 
establishes two ‘horizons’ to sight, expressed via the metaphor of hearing, which in turn 
represent the indeterminacy and non-totality of thematic knowledge. Francis performs 
something similar with his ecclesiology. We shall argue below that he builds from this 
epistemology to order the ‘Petrine’ juridical structures of the Church towards the mystical 
‘Marian’ encounter with the divine, subjecting them to the indeterminacy, non-totality, and 
non-absoluteness that conditions any expression of this encounter. 
1.1. A COMMUNAL SUBJECTIVITY 
We saw in our last chapter how, for Francis, Christian subjectivity is the communal 
participation in that of Christ. We also saw how Christian subjectivity cannot be reduced 
solely to a set of thematic beliefs, which themselves arise reflectively from a process of 
negotiating an interpersonal encounter with God. This includes both an unthematic way of 
‘knowing’ in touch, but also the concrete act of ‘touching’ itself. Finally, we saw that, for its 
human participants, this relationship is ultimately a response to revelation.  
In this vein, Francis understands the communal dimension of Christian subjectivity as 
revolving around the sharing of revelation. Francis describes revelation as a “gift”, which, 
once accepted, moves naturally on to its sharing: “The word, once accepted, becomes a 
response… which spreads to others and invites them to believe”. We see through the 
transmission of that knowledge by others, and those who do not have knowledge acquire it 
from those who do, “just as one candle is lighted from another” (LF §37). 
The Church is the community in which this transmission occurs. This makes the continuity of 
the Church’s tradition through history the condition for the possibility of faith-knowledge at 
times other than that of the initial revelation: Francis writes that it is “through an unbroken 
chain of witnesses that we come to see the face of Jesus”. Moreover, we saw previously how 
Christian subjectivity is ultimately a matter of participating in that of Christ. This makes the 
community in which this subjectivity is reproduced coextensive with the subjectivity itself. 
Hence he describes the community of witnesses that is the Church as “that one remembering 
subject” (LF §38). 
1.2. INSTITUTIONS AND MYSTERY 
In short, the Church, as collective subject, arises as such antecedent to the encounter with 
God identified in the last chapter. This means that, for Francis, the various institutions which 
serve the Church are ultimately ordered towards this mystical dimension. This is illustrated 
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most clearly in his vision for a “missionary option” for the Church, his conception of ecclesial 
memory, and his mystical ontology of Church unity. 
1.2.1. MISSIONARY OPTION 
In EG, Francis outlines his vision for a “missionary option”, or “a missionary impulse capable 
of transforming everything”, so that every aspect of the Church’s institutional and cultural 
life “can be suitably channelled for the evangelization of today’s world”. This includes a 
“renewal of structures” (EG §27), which are thus placed at the service of evangelization.  
Worthen notes that “evangelization” has a specific meaning not reducible to “evangelism” 
(2018: 81). Whereas the latter means “Christians telling other people about the Gospel”, 
“evangelizing means bringing the Good News into all the strata of humanity, and through its 
influence transforming humanity from within and making it new” (Evangelii nuntiandi, §18; 
in Worthen, 2016: 81). This transformative focus links Francis’ “missionary option” closely 
with the transformative ‘touching of hearts’ identified in the previous chapter specifically as 
part of the encounter with God. In other words, central to Francis’ “missionary option” is a 
recognition that the institutions of the Church exist (or ought to exist) at the service of the 
encounter with God. 
1.2.2. MEMORY 
In a similar vein, Francis conceives of institutions within the Church in terms of reproducing 
Christian subjectivity. Central to this is what Francis calls memory. He writes: 
...what is communicated in the Church, what is handed down in her living Tradition, 
is the new light born of an encounter with the true God… which touches us at the core 
of our being and engages our minds, wills and emotions, opening us to relationships 
lived in communion. 
(LF §40) 
Francis distinguishes memory from “a purely doctrinal content”, which could be adequately 
transmitted in “an idea... or perhaps a book, or the repetition of a spoken message” (LF §40). 
That is, ‘remembrance’ in the sense of the Church’s memory is not the mere re-presentation 
of facts or propositions. Rather, it is the repetition in the present of the encounter with God 
from which faith-knowledge arises. Francis notes that “[b]ecause faith is born of an 
encounter which takes place in history and lights up our journey through time, it must be 
passed on in every age. It is through an unbroken chain of witnesses that we come to see the 
face of Jesus” (LF §38). Here Francis unites three themes: firstly, of the foundation of faith in 
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an encounter with God, which we saw earlier. Secondly, the idea that faith is passed on 
through ‘witness’. Thirdly, that what witness passes on more specifically is not merely faith, 
but the occasion for the encounter itself from which faith arises. This occasion, more 
specifically, is Christ’s Passion: “Faith’s past, that act of Jesus’ love which brought new life to 
the world, comes down to us through the memory of others — witnesses — and is kept alive 
in that one remembering subject which is the Church” (LF §38).  
Note here that Francis explicitly reminds us of the relationship between the Passion and 
God’s love. We saw in our last chapter how the encounter that lies at the heart of faith 
revolves around an economy of love, in which we are touched by divine love, and touch back 
in our own way. In other words, in ‘remembering’ Christ’s passion, we are touched by God’s 
love.  Hence it serves as an occasion for the encounter from which faith springs. Thus Francis 
strongly affirms the importance of the Church, as a community of witnesses to faith: it is 
precisely through receiving this memory through the witness of others that we come to faith. 
In this vein, he writes that “[t]he love which is the Holy Spirit and which dwells in the Church 
unites every age and makes us contemporaries of Jesus” (LF §38). We encounter Jesus as 
members of the Church, drawn in by the love that unites it as a communion in which memory 
is shared. 
The institutions of the Church preserve this memory. Francis illustrates this function in his 
analysis of “four elements which comprise the storehouse of memory which the Church 
hands down: the profession of faith, the celebration of the sacraments, the path of the ten 
commandments, and prayer” (LF §46). 
The sacraments are the first ‘storehouse’ identified by Francis. He focuses here on baptism 
and the Eucharist. For Francis, Baptism transmits to us “both a teaching to be professed and 
a specific way of life which demands the engagement of the whole person and sets us on a 
path to goodness”. In this way, the baptised are “set in a new context” (LF §41). This ‘teaching 
to be professed’ recalls the process of thematising knowledge bounded by the conditions 
expressed as hearing, and the ‘way of life’ recalls the transmission of knowledge as seeing: 
the first witnesses by ‘profession’, or speech; the other by visible action and ordering of the 
world and activity within it. In this way, the baptised adopt a subjectivity that finds itself in 
the “new environment” (LF §41) of a world oriented thematically in relationship to God. 
However, as we saw previously, the condition for the possibility of thematic faith-knowledge 
is touch. In line with this, Francis, also writes that, in baptism, “we become a new creation 
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and God’s adopted children” (LF §41). We saw previously how the theme of God’s 
fatherhood, here invoked in the sense of our childhood, relates to His relation to us on a 
primordial level. We might thus read this as referring to our acquiring a new primordial 
relationship to God in ‘touch’, which serves as the condition for thematic knowledge. 
Similarly, we also noted the possibility of reading our ‘being’ as relating to our subjectivity. 
In this way, if we read our becoming a ‘new creation’ in the sense of having a ‘change of 
being’, we might again understand this in terms of the fundamental transformation of our 
subjectivity elicited by touch.101 
What is particularly significant about baptism is that it “is something which must be received 
by entering into the ecclesial communion which transmits God’s gift” (LF §41). That is, it is 
inseparable from initiation into the Church as an historical community, and thus the process 
by which that community is sustained in history. The ritual aspects of the ceremony thus 
embody the essential life of the community. Insofar as this community is formed around a 
theophanic encounter that fundamentally reconfigures our subjectivity, the imagery of the 
sacrament in which this first occurs reflects this reconfiguration. For example, the immersion 
in water simultaneously signifies both death and life, thereby inviting us to “pass through 
self-conversion to a new and greater identity” and to be “reborn by following Christ in his 
new life”, and communicating “the incarnational structure of faith” by both referring to 
fundamental and radical transformation, as well as the bodily nature of the process (LF §42).   
With regards to the Eucharist, Francis writes that this sacrament is that in which “[t]he 
sacramental character of faith finds its highest expression”. As we saw previously, Christian 
subjectivity is a matter of encounter and sharing in the subjectivity of Christ. In this vein, 
Francis writes, the Eucharist constitutes “an encounter with Christ truly present in the 
supreme act of his love”. In this encounter, we receive God’s revelation in both its forms, as 
both call and promise, future and memory (LF §44).  
This is received in two dimensions: “history”, and that “which leads from the visible world to 
the invisible”. In the dimension of history, “the Eucharist is an act of remembrance, a making 
present of the mystery in which the past... demonstrates its ability to open up a future, to 
foreshadow ultimate fulfilment” (LF §44). That is, we sacramentally encounter Christ’s 
incarnation and passion, which, as we saw earlier, Francis describes as God’s “eternal” word, 
the “definitive yes” to his promises, and the “supreme manifestation of His love for us” (love 
 
101 As we noted previously, this does not mean that we cannot have ‘touch’ without Baptism – merely 
that it transmits a memory of ‘touch’ that provides us with privileged knowledge in this register. 
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being identified with revelation) (LF §12). In the dimension relating the visible and invisible 
worlds, we encounter and are entered into the economy of grace: “The bread and wine are 
changed into the body and blood of Christ, who becomes present in his Passover to the 
Father: this movement draws us, body and soul, into the movement of all creation toward 
its fulfilment in God” (LF §44). That is, we encounter Christ, whose subjectivity we adopt, and 
move towards God in the love that constitutes that subjectivity. 
The second ‘storehouse’ is the Apostle’s Creed. The Creed, for Francis, is not merely a 
dogmatic formula. Francis writes that “[t]he creed does not only involve giving one’s assent 
to a body of abstract truths; rather, when it is recited the whole of life is drawn into a journey 
towards full communion with the living God”. That is, its recitation serves as a site of 
encounter with God. This in turn gives rise to thematic knowledge, within the economy of 
love: when we recite the creed, we are “invited to enter into the mystery” it professes. This 
involves “becoming part of that history of life which embraces us and expands our being, 
making it part of... the ultimate subject which recites the creed, namely, the Church” (LF 
§45). In effect, we might say, recitation of the Creeds constitutes a microcosm of the 
essential elements of the Christian life. 
The third ‘storehouse’ is the Lord’s Prayer. Francis writes that, in the Lord’s Prayer, 
“Christians learn to share in Christ’s own spiritual experience and to see all things through 
his eyes” (LF §46). That is, in reciting the Lord’s prayer, we are able to participate in Christ’s 
‘sight’. What is significant here is Francis’ description of the result as ‘participation’ in Christ’s 
sight, ‘through his eyes’. In the context of his understanding of Christian subjectivity, we must 
understand this in terms of the encounter from which this knowledge is possible – that is, 
the Lord’s Prayer is a way of touching God, or a site of encounter. 
The fourth ‘storehouse’ is the Decalogue. Francis describes the Decalogue as a set of 
“concrete directions for emerging from the desert of the selfish and self-enclosed ego in 
order to enter into dialogue with God”. In this way, the Decalogue describes “the response 
of love” to God’s call, by which we return to him (LF §46). This is redolent of Buber when he 
asserts that, in order to enter into relation with God, we must surrender “that false self-
asserting instinct that makes a man flee to the possessing of things” (2013: 3.3). We might 
say that, for Francis, the decalogue outlines how to enter into the economy of love with God. 
The Decalogue is thus not so much a site of encounter, but a technique – to put it simply, the 
decalogue indicates ‘how to’ touch. 
118 
 
We might understand Francis’ concept of a ‘storehouse’ of memory as analogous to Buber’s 
concept of form.102 As we saw in the last chapter, for Buber, form is an It which serves as a 
site of ‘theophany’, or encounter with Thou. For Francis, the ‘memory’ of the church is the 
forms which it preserves throughout history that serve as the forms (in Buber’s sense) 
through which its members can encounter God;103 material elements through which we can 
enter into the economy of love in touch.104  
1.2.3. UNITY  
Thirdly, Francis roots the unity of the Church in a mystical reality. For Francis, “[t]he unity of 
the Church in time and space is linked to the unity of the faith” (LF §40) – that is, of its 
subjectivity. The unity of the Church as a collective subject consists in two functions of two 
ontological relationships.  
Firstly, of the unity of its object – the Church is united “because of the oneness of the God 
who is known and confessed”. That is, the faith-knowledge of all Christians arises from and 
pertains to the same object (LF §47). Availing ourselves of Scholastic terminology, we might 
say that it has the same efficient and final cause: it arises from the same relation, and is 
directed towards knowing the same object. 
Secondly, although the faith of the Church may manifest different forms within it, all of these 
forms are unified under a single type: all faith “is directed to the one Lord”, and arises from 
and is ordered to “the life of Jesus... the concrete history which he shares with us”. Francis 
contrasts this with Gnosticism, which maintains that there are two faiths – a perfect one, 
which can transcend Christ’s historicity “toward the mysteries of unknown divinity”; and an 
imperfect one, which cannot. In other words, Christianity is a single vocation and a single 
knowledge (LF §47) - we might say that it has a shared formal cause, or that it is the same 
‘material’. 
In short, the unity of the Christian subject derives from its efficient, formal, and final unity. 
In this vein, the unity of the faith itself subsists as a function of the unity of the subject in 
 
102 We will identify this more specific use of the term via italicisation. 
103 Note that we ought not to conflate ‘storehouse’ with ‘only point of reception’: although they have 
a unique institutional role, the faith is also transmitted by believers outside of these specific contexts. 
Likewise, chapter six will show how, according to Laudato Si’, all of creation can serve as a site of 
theophany – although the sacraments remain a “privileged” occasion for this (§235). 
104  This point also serves to reinforce the historical dimension of the metaphor of ‘touch’. The 
sacraments serve as the site of this encounter through their empirical dimensions; we ‘touch’ God 
when we touch the oil, hear the words, smell the incense, see the candles etc. 
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which it is realised: “faith is one because it is shared by the whole Church, which is one body 
and one Spirit”. That is, faith is unified because it belongs to a single subject (LF §47). 
1.3. MARIAN PRIORITY 
What is significant here is that Francis’ conception of ecclesial unity in LF is ultimately not a 
juridical one. Rather, the unity of the Church is a function of the fundamentally mystical unity 
of its faith. This in turn means that the structures and forms which make this unity visible 
and demarcate its boundaries only do so antecedent to a fundamentally mystical dimension. 
This prioritisation of the mystical over the institutional forms of the Church has implications 
for the way in which we construe the role of those institutions. These implications were 
explored by Vatican II. 
Lumen Gentium105 describes the Church as a sacrament, through which humanity communes 
with God. In this, it is structured and guided by the Holy Spirit (LG §4). Its constitution thus 
derives from the people who belong to it through the Holy Spirit: it is “the people of God” 
(LG §9). Curran argues that, in this, “Vatican II... sees the hierarchy within its fundamental 
understanding of the church as mystery and as the people of God”. In this vein, LG attends 
first to the Church as mystery, then as the people of God, and only then to the hierarchy. 
Similarly, chapter four of part one of Gaudium et Spes emphasises the nature of the Church 
as the people of God, and this emphasis is continued in “subsequent documents” (Curran, 
2002: 103).  
Odozor notes that this departs from pre-Vatican II understandings of the Church, which 
tended to represent it in terms reminiscent of a neo-Platonic hierarchy, with the Church 
being ‘more properly’ the Church as one ascended up the institutional hierarchy. In contrast, 
the Church presented in Lumen Gentium is more “concentric” than hierarchical, with Christ 
at the centre and no difference in ‘vertical’ relation to him corresponding to juridical 
hierarchy between its members (2003: 22). We might say, following von Balthasar (1986), 
that the Council prioritised the Marian principals within the Church over the Petrine, its 
hierarchical (Petrine) elements being grounded in and oriented towards the (Marian) 
reception of the mystical and sacramental.106 
 
105 Hereafter, LG 
106 Of course, von Balthasar affirmed a more authoritarian vision of the relationship between these 
principles than we do here, which construes authority in the Church along the model of a hierarchical 
patriarchal marriage. Beattie critiques this gendered dimension as “rigid masculine authoritarianism” 
(2006: 135), the imagery of which turns on the negation of women’s personhood and correspondingly 
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Paralleling Gaudium et Spes’ identification of the Church with ‘the people of God’, we noted 
that, for Francis, the Church is founded upon a sacramental encounter with God. The Church 
is the community which participates in this encounter, and preserves the forms which serve 
as its means within history. As a corollary, he writes that 
it can also be said that faith itself possesses a sacramental structure. The awakening 
of faith is linked to the dawning of a new sacramental sense in our lives… in which 
visible and material realities are seen to point beyond themselves to the mystery of 
the eternal. 
(LF §40) 
That is, just as the sacraments are the sites of the encounter which engenders faith, faith 
itself can be understood as sacramental in the sense of its alerting us to the presence of God 
in these sites. In Buber’s terms, it is faith which enables us to apprehend form as form. This 
renders faith itself a form, as the visible outworking of encounter in history. This repeats a 
core theme of Lumen Gentium, wherein the Church is affirmed as the “universal sacrament 
of salvation” (LG §48). 
Likewise, Francis makes frequent use of the term “people of God”. For example, LF associates 
the memory and continuity of witness of the Church with this identity when he quotes Dei 
verbum §8 to write that “[w]hat was handed down by the apostles… "comprises everything 
that serves to make the people of God live their lives in holiness and increase their faith. In 
this way the Church… perpetuates and transmits to every generation all that she herself is, 
all that she believes"” (LF §40). In this vein, EG liberally uses this term, as well as making this 
identity a prominent theme in its own right. Here, Francis associates it with the Church’s 
fundamental nature and mission, writing that “[b]eing Church means being God’s people, in 
accordance with the great plan of his fatherly love. This means that we are to be God’s leaven 
in the midst of humanity” (EG §114). He gives this an explicitly mystical connotation when 
he continues to write that it is the Holy Spirit which “builds up the communion and harmony 
of the people of God” (EG §117), and through its “constant inner working” ensures that “the 
people of God… is constantly evangelizing itself” (EG §139). He also identifies the 
sacramental basis of the Church as people of God in baptism, by virtue of which “[t]he people 
of God is holy” (EG §119); and “all the members of the People of God have become 
 
invites “uncritical fidelity” to its Petrine teaching bodies (2006: 138). However, as noted previously, 
our purpose here is not to interrogate or critique the gendered dimension of these images, although 
this is not to say that it is not worth doing in general. Nor is it to interpret von Balthasar. 
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missionary disciples” (EG §120). Commentators such as Kasper also identify wider themes 
associated with the People of God theology in Francis’ wider teachings – for example, his 
emphasis on the role of the sensus fidei as articulated in Lumen Gentium (§12), in Evangelii 
Gaudium (§119, 139, 198) (2015: 39). We might thus say that, for Francis as for the Council, 
the essential principle upon which the identity of the Church is founded is both its 
constitution by, and provision of, sacramental economy. 
The Council’s shift towards Marian priority was accompanied by a shift in the Church’s 
understanding of its juridical structures, particularly with regards to authority. Curran argues 
that although Lumen Gentium “strongly upholds the authoritative teaching office of the 
hierarchical magisterium”, it also affirms that all baptised people are able to play a prophetic 
and teaching role. He associates this identification with an ethos visible in the other 
documents of the Council: Dignitatis Humanae grounds itself in the “spiritual aspirations” 
arising out of an increased consciousness of “the dignity of the human person” on the part 
of the laity (§1). Perhaps most strikingly indicative of the wider implications of this 
understanding, Curran notes that this is a clear, revolutionary admission that the Church “has 
learned from the experience of human beings” (Curran, 2002: 105).  That is, the juridical 
authority of the Magisterium is not impervious to challenge from other voices within the 
Church. Nor, according to Curran, is it impervious to voices from the outside: Gaudium et 
Spes “describes the teaching function of the church with regards to the social world in terms 
of dialogue” (Curran, 2002: 105). This means that the Church does not merely present 
teachings, but also “receives help” and has actually “learned moral truth” from the modern 
world. Curran quotes §44 of the document in support of this, which states that “[t]hanks to 
the experience of past ages, the progress of the sciences, and the treasures hidden in the 
various forms of human culture, the nature of human beings is more clearly revealed and 
new roads to truth are opened” (in Curran, 2002: 105-6). Finally, he claims that Justice in the 
World, the 1971 document produced by the World Synod of Catholic Bishops, similarly 
endorses dialogical notions of the hierarchical function, insofar as it “insists on the need for 
dialogue to bring about true peace and justice in the world” (Curran, 2002: 106).  
As we shall see, Francis’ Marian priority enables him to similarly adopt a less totalising and 
determining approach to the formal elements of Church life. This enables him to permit 
plurivocal, decentred authority, and plurality of forms within the life of faith, which in turn 
provides the means to articulate diversity within the unified subjectivity of the Church, and 




2.1. HISTORICAL PLURALISM  
Francis’ Marian prioritisation of encounter situates the reproduction of Christian subjectivity 
within the life of the community as it lives out this encounter. Following the development 
highlighted by Odozor, this means that we cannot conceive of the process as a unilateral, 
top-down affair mediated by the figure of a juridical superior. Rather, it takes place ‘on the 
ground’, at the level of the individual who encounters God for themselves. This lays the 
ground for diversity within that unity. 
Francis writes that, although Christian subjectivity is a matter of participating in the 
subjectivity of Christ, the love that constitutes Christian subjectivity is “not only a relationship 
between the Father and the Son”. If it was, Christian subjectivity would solely be a matter of 
participating in Christ’s subjectivity as a unity, which would make this subjectivity a matter 
of relation between God and a single unified, homogenous subject. However, the fact is that 
there are multiple individuals as local operators of this collective subjectivity, which 
circulates between them. As such, there is also a relationship “in the Spirit, a “We,” a 
communion of persons” (LF §39). In other words, individuals can subsist as individuals in the 
collective subjectivity of the Church because of the economy of the Spirit. 107  In short, 
Christianity may be a collective subjectivity, but it has individual operators in local contexts. 
This tension between the unified collective subjectivity, on the one hand, and individual local 
operators on the other, bears out an analogy with the tension between speaking 
communities and individual linguistic operators. Francis draws this analogy with regards to 
the reproduction of each kind of subject. He writes: 
Language itself… by which we make sense of our lives and the world around us, comes 
to us from others, preserved in the living memory of others. Self-knowledge is only 
possible when we share in a greater memory. The same thing holds true for faith, 
which brings human understanding to its fullness.... The Church is a Mother who 
teaches us to speak the language of faith. 
(LF §38) 
In other words, our identity arises as a function of a language. This identity is only intelligible 
to us if we speak the language – that is, if we participate in the life of the linguistic 
 




community. Thus it is only by participating in the life of the linguistic community that we can 
make this identity intelligible to ourselves. Whereas linguistic communities are formed 
around speaking practices, the Church is formed around a sustained encounter with God. 
Similarly, just as the knowledge of linguistic communities is a function of those speaking 
practices, the knowledge of the Church – that is, faith-knowledge – is a function of this 
encounter. It is by participating in the life of the Church that we can come to possess this 
knowledge, and the world becomes intelligible to us in its light. In this way, Christian 
subjectivity becomes a function of the historical life of a community. 
This historicisation of the relationship between the collective subject and the individual 
operator connects the diversity of individual operators within the collective subjectivity with 
the diversity of individuals within historical communities. That is, one way in which we can 
conceive of pluralism within the Christian subject is in terms of the local variations within 
historical subjectivities, arising as a function of the various historical distinctions that give 
rise to these variations. Francis himself reflects upon this, suitably specifically in the context 
of linguistic differences, in his Apostolic Letter, Magnum Principium (2017). 
2.2. MAGNUM PRINCIPIUM 
2.2.1. LITURGICAL LANGUAGE AS THEOPHANIC  
Magnum Principium makes an amendment to Canon 838, affording the power to prepare 
vernacular translations of liturgical texts to local Episcopal Conferences. A close reading of 
the document reveals a theology of liturgical language that articulates the relationship 
between theophany and possible variation in the forms via which this encounter occurs. In 
doing so, it establishes the possibility for variation in the thematic content of faith-
knowledge arising from the unified encounter in which Christian subjectivity is constituted. 
At the heart of the theology of Magnum Principium is the assertion that  
Because the liturgical text is a ritual sign it is a means of oral communication. 
However, for the believers who celebrate the sacred rites the word is also a mystery. 
Francis here identifies two dimensions to liturgical language. The first is the immanent 
dimension of “oral communication”. This is then juxtaposed against a transcendent second 
dimension – liturgical language as a “mystery”.108 This second dimension also implies a quasi-
 
108 Perhaps questionably, MP fails to indicate a semiotics that would explain what is happening in this 
‘communication’, although Francis’ use of intensional over representational language in LF might lead 
us to suppose the former. Either way, the key distinction for our project is between the transcendent 
and immanent aspects of mystery and communication respectively, and this is not a semiotic issue. 
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sacramental economy involved in liturgical language use, wherein the speaking itself serves 
to present the mystery. 
Francis then continues: 
when words are uttered, in particular when the Sacred Scriptures are read, God 
speaks to us. In the Gospel Christ himself speaks to his people who respond either 
themselves or through the celebrant by prayer to the Lord in the Holy Spirit. 
This explicitly identifies this quasi-sacramental economy as a theophanic one: the priest, in 
his speaking the words of the liturgy, serves as the medium for divine self-communication; 
the mystery is God as person. The theology of liturgical language which comes into view here 
is further brought into contact with the model of theological knowledge presented in Lumen 
Fidei when we remember that the various ‘storehouses’ of the memory of the Church are 
accessed in and through the liturgy. For example, the Liturgy of the Word contains the 
recitation of the Creed (see LF §40). We might say that, for Francis, liturgical language 
constitutes another ‘storehouse’ in itself, serving as the form via which theophany occurs, 
and encounter is made. 
Furthermore, Francis describes “the word” itself as “a mystery”. This claim implies that the 
liturgical word itself constitutes the kind of divine reality encountered in the sacramental 
self-communication of theophany. This also implies that there is more to the words 
themselves than just forms in which theophany occurs. 
This motivates the document’s concern for fidelity in translation, understood in terms of 
successful ‘communication’. MP identifies a tension between, on the one hand, the necessity 
of translation of the liturgy into the local vernacular; and the necessity to preserve a common 
content, particularly with regards to doctrine, on the other. Francis writes: 
The goal of the translation of liturgical texts and of biblical texts for the Liturgy of the 
Word is to announce the word of salvation to the faithful… and to express the prayer 
of the Church to the Lord. For this purpose it is necessary to communicate to a given 
people using its own language all that the Church intended to communicate to other 
people through the Latin language. 
However, he also notes: 
While fidelity cannot always be judged by individual words but must be sought in the 
context of the whole communicative act… some particular terms must also be 
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considered in the context of the entire Catholic faith because each translation of texts 
must be congruent with sound doctrine. 
That is, the Church needs to ‘communicate’ a certain propositional content to its 
congregations, and facilitate the ‘communicative’ expression of a certain content on the part 
of its congregations. Francis acknowledges that this is not merely a case of substituting words 
in one language for words in another, but requires a more holistic view to the text with 
regards to genre and presentation. However, he also notes that some specific elements of 
the text need to be preserved within those varying holistic structures. The implication here 
is that, even in the face of the theophanic dimension of liturgical language, the 
‘communicative’ dimension is nevertheless highly significant. 
This significance can be brought out when we attend closely to the language in which this 
‘communicative’ role is framed. Firstly, the document references “[t]he great principle, 
established by the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, according to which liturgical prayer 
be accommodated to the comprehension of the people so that it might be understood”. This 
principle, which is not specifically cited, might be identified with the assertion in 
Sacrosanctum Concillium109 that 
...in order that the liturgy may be able to produce its full effects, it is necessary that 
the faithful come to it with proper dispositions, that their minds should be attuned to 
their voices, and that they should cooperate with divine grace lest they receive it in 
vain. Pastors of souls must therefore realize that, when the liturgy is celebrated… it is 
their duty also to ensure that the faithful take part fully aware of what they are doing, 
actively engaged in the rite, and enriched by its effects. 
(SC: §11) 
In a similar vein, the document stipulates that 
…all the faithful should be led to that fully conscious, and active participation in 
liturgical celebrations which is demanded by the very nature of the liturgy… In the 
restoration and promotion of the sacred liturgy, this full and active participation by 
all the people is the aim to be considered before all else; for it is the primary and 
indispensable source from which the faithful are to derive the true Christian spirit... 
(SC: §14) 
 
109 Hereafter, SC 
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In order to facilitate this, the document stipulates a number of reforms, including that, 
because use of first languages “frequently may be of great advantage to the people”, Latin 
need not be used in all situations (SC: §36). In other words, the good at stake in attempting 
to translate the liturgy, as invoked by reference to Sacrosanctum Concillium in Magnum 
Principium, is the capacity for the congregation to participate in the Liturgy in a specific 
manner - this being enabled by an understanding of the text. 
So what is this manner of participation? The above passages mention an attunement of mind 
to voice, or an intending of what one says rather than speaking by rote; a co-operation with 
divine grace; an awareness of what one is doing when one celebrates the rite; and (perhaps 
redundant in the context of awareness and intention, as well as co-operation with grace 
which again might imply these features), activity. In short, we might say that Sacrosanctum 
Concillium (and thereby Magnum Principium) envisions proper participation in the Liturgy 
through the cultivation of specific thematic relations, whereby the thinking subject 
comprehends the activity for themselves, and then chooses to actively apply themselves to 
it. ‘Communicative’ language takes on a particular significance here, inasmuch as it is in the 
operation of this language in which the congregation can participate in this manner.110 
The significance of this notion of proper participation becomes apparent when we attend to 
the effects by which participants are ‘enriched’. The document lists the following effects: 
...[it] moves the faithful, filled with "the paschal sacraments," to be "one in holiness"; 
it prays that "they may hold fast in their lives to what they have grasped by their 
faith"; the renewal in the Eucharist of the covenant between the Lord and man draws 
the faithful into the compelling love of Christ and sets them on fire. From the liturgy… 
grace is poured forth upon us; and the sanctification of men in Christ and the 
glorification of God, to which all other activities of the Church are directed as toward 
their end, is achieved in the most efficacious possible way. 
(SC §10) 
Read in dialogue with Francis’ analysis of faith given in Lumen Fidei, we can identify two key 
themes here which are repeated in Magnum Principium: firstly, we might associate ‘oneness 
in holiness’ with the unity of the Christian subjectivity in Christ. Similarly, praying for the 
congregation to ‘hold fast in their lives’ to the faith seems to invoke themes of sight, 
 




structuring and schematising life. In this vein also, the document describes the liturgy as “an 
action of Christ the priest and of His Body which is the Church... a sacred action surpassing 
all others” (Sacrosanctum Concillium: §7). In other words, it is an activity performed by the 
Church as a collective subject, which is to say, as participating in Christ’s subjectivity. 
Secondly, however, there is the theme of the faithful being drawn into ‘the compelling love 
of Christ’. We saw earlier how participation in Christ’s subjectivity is a matter of participating 
in His love, which derives from the amorous economy of touch. Similarly, the mentioning of 
grace being ‘poured forth’, as well as sanctification and the ‘ends’ of the activities of the 
Church also invoke themes of touch in the sense of God’s self-communication in love, and 
the ‘fulness’ represented by this encounter in love.  Thus we might say that, for 
Sacrosanctum Concillium (read back through Francis), the liturgy unites faith as both sight 
and touch. We participate in the liturgy in the mode of sight, and this in turn enables us to 
maintain the sight that characterise Christian subjectivity. However, the effect of doing so 
(and plausibly the reason why participation in the liturgy enables us to maintain this sight) is 
the entering into the amorous economy of touch in the course of that participation. 
In short, adequate understanding of the ‘communicative’ language of the liturgy is a crucial 
condition for the liturgy to enable the congregation to enter into touch: it enables the 
congregation to adopt the thematic stance whereby operating the language becomes the 
means of touching. This allows us to understand the significance afforded to ‘communicative’ 
language in Magnum Principium. In this vein, Francis writes that the goal of translating the 
liturgy is to “announce the word of salvation to the faithful in obedience to the faith”, and to 
“express the prayer of the Church to the Lord”. In other words, this ‘communicative’ 
language serves as the medium via which the Church participates within the dialogical 
encounter with God that constitutes the economy of love. This goal is served by vernacular 
translations of the mass precisely because it enables vernacular languages to play this role 
in the process. Thus, Francis writes that the liturgical reforms of Sacrosanctum Concillium 
“willingly opened the door so that these [vernacular] versions, as part of the rites 
themselves, might become the voice of the Church celebrating the divine mysteries along 
with the Latin language”. That is, the Church can employ immanent ‘communicative’ 
language as theophanic forms through which it enacts the dialogical relationship that is 
touch.  
This connects Francis’ claim that the words of the liturgy are mysteries and his somewhat 
gnomic claim that “when [liturgical] words are uttered… God speaks to us. In the Gospel 
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Christ himself speaks to his people who respond… by prayer to the Lord in the Holy Spirit.” 
The speaking of those words by Christ is a divine action, and the response of the congregation 
is an entering into the economy of the divine. In doing so, the words are transfigured, 
becoming expressions of the love that constitutes and circulates within this economy. 
In this sense, these words can properly be described as a mystery: they are the material of 
an act (their speaking), which is a mystery itself. To participate in the Liturgy is to encounter 
God, quite literally, in conversation. In this vein, Francis quotes John Paul II in EG to remind 
us that the liturgical context goes beyond mere catechesis, or the repetition of thematic 
truths to be meditated upon. Rather, “the liturgical proclamation of the word of God, 
especially in the eucharistic assembly, is… a dialogue between God and his people, a dialogue 
in which the great deeds of salvation are proclaimed and the demands of the covenant are 
continually restated” (Dies Domini, §41; in EG §137). 
2.2.2. DEVOLUTION AND DIVERSITY 
This dimension to ‘communicative’ liturgical language necessitates pluralism in liturgical 
translation. Francis writes that although it is necessary to preserve some terms between 
translations, it is also the fact that “fidelity cannot always be judged by individual words but 
must be sought in the context of the whole communicative act and according to its literary 
genre”. That is, contextual variations (i.e. the conditions of the ‘whole communicative act’) 
render certain forms more or less capable of ‘communicating’ what they ought, and this 
contextual sensitivity must be reflected in the way in which liturgy is translated. Verbal forms 
are used differently by different groups in different contexts, and an in-depth knowledge of 
these contexts is required in order to adequately deploy those forms within them. Without 
such knowledge, they may be incapable of being understood in a way that enables their 
operators to adopt a thematic stance such that they can become the means for touch.  
As a basic example, in a non-Latin speaking context the forms constituting ‘Latin words’ will 
have no ‘communicative’ meaning. In contrast, forms constituting ‘native words’ will bear 
‘communicative’ meaning. Thus different forms have to be employed in order to play the 
same ‘communicative’ role. 
In this vein, the document itself is concerned with applying subsidiarity to the translation of 
the Liturgy, stipulating that it “is for the Apostolic See to... recognise adaptations [to the 
liturgical text] approved by the Episcopal Conference according to the norm of law”, and 
that “[i]t pertains to the Episcopal Conferences to faithfully prepare versions of the liturgical 
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books in vernacular languages... and to approve and publish the liturgical books for the 
regions for which they are responsible after the confirmation of the Apostolic See.” While, 
as Condon notes, such approval requires unanimity on the part of Episcopal Conferences, 
which will serve as a practical check to developments (see Condon, 2017: Online), this 
nevertheless indicates an awareness that the regulation of the ‘communicative’ language 
employed is best done at a devolved level. This might be read as an indicator of a new 
sensitivity to the local variations in the ‘communicative’ roles played by particular forms – 
that is, to variations in the forms which can be deployed locally in order to touch.  
This devolution of translation implies that there can (within limits) be legitimate diversity in 
the forms employed in order to play a given ‘communicative’ role. Following our example, in 
some contexts, utterances associated with Latin will be deployed; in others, Spanish, or 
Hindi. While this pluralism may seem superficial at first glance, it actually provides the basis 
for a much more substantive pluralism within the unified subjectivity that is the Church (that 
is, beyond differences between those who talk about “the Eucharist”, and those who talk 
about “l’Eucharistie”). The significance here is that Francis does not thereby reify specific 
forms with regards to particular actions whereby touch is enacted. For some Christians, God 
will be encountered via an economy involving one set of forms; for others, another. We 
might say that the formal unity of “the Church” is a “plurivocal” one (Desmond, 2005: 164), 
intending a diversity of distinct but real interrelating forms.  
2.3. LITURGICAL LANGUAGE AND DOCTRINAL LANGUAGE 
We talk commonly about the “forms of the faith”, including not only forms within the liturgy 
(specific words, gestures, symbols etc. that are deployed in a liturgical context), but wider 
elements of the Catholic life including culture, practices, and beliefs. Indeed, we describe 
Catholicism itself as a “form of life”. The question then is, does the possibility for plurivocity 
within the formal unity of the faith outlined above extend beyond liturgical forms?  
The formulations that institute certain truth claims, imperatives, and prohibitions as doctrine 
can be included among these forms. Thus we might ask more specifically, does this possibility 
for plurivocity extend to doctrinal forms? That is, can we conceive along these lines of some 
element of the Church for which certain doctrines do not make up part of the landscape of 
their belief and practice? We will argue below that, for Francis, doctrinal formulations are 
ultimately oriented towards playing the same theophanic function as liturgical forms. As with 
liturgical forms, to the extent that their variation enables them to fulfil this role, the answer 
is therefore yes.  
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2.3.1. THE HIERARCHY OF TRUTHS 
Central to understanding how Francis can permit this variation is his relativization of the 
various weights of doctrines. Francis strongly affirms the indispensability of dogma. 
However, he contrasts dogma with less ‘essential’ points of doctrine, and the reasons for this 
move illuminate the theology of doctrine which allows us to make our argument. 
In LF, Francis notes that because the articles of the faith express the nature of a single object, 
and what they reveal is a unity, they themselves comprise a unity. That is, the articles of the 
faith have a holistic structure in which faith-knowledge is thematised. This holism is 
important: “because all the articles of faith are interconnected, to deny one of them, even 
of those that seem least important, is tantamount to distorting the whole”. As we have seen, 
Christian subjectivity involves thematic knowledge. Moreover, insofar as the identity of the 
Christian collective subject is grounded in the formal unity of its subjectivity, to remove 
elements of that thematic whole is “to subtract something from the veracity of the 
communion”. Finally, because the subjectivity itself subsists in the unity of the subject in 
which it is realised, disrupting this unity means damaging it. Thus, Francis writes, “harming 
the faith means harming communion with the Lord” (LF §48). Its integrity is a component of 
the integrity of the subjectivity itself. In this vein also, Francis writes that the articles of faith 
must be understood as possessing a kind of totality: “its light expands in order to illumine 
the entire cosmos and all of history”. This expresses itself in a determining “power to 
assimilate everything that it meets… purifying all things and bringing them to their finest 
expression”, which Francis additionally identifies with the faith’s being “universal and 
catholic” (LF §48). 
Roberts reads this kind of emphatic dogmatic commitment as a defensive reaction against 
hermeneutical indeterminacy of the Church’s identity (2018: 135). However, there is nuance: 
Firstly, in EG §237, Francis associates the “totality or integrity of the Gospel” with a 
universality that refuses to homogenise the particulars integrated within it; a universality, 
moreover, which we shall see in the next chapter defies association with any particular 
determining idea of its form, instead functioning as an indetermining principle.  
Secondly, his statements above refer explicitly to the articles of faith, and although perhaps 
we might be able to make arguments towards the absoluteness of wider doctrine, Lumen 
Fidei does not pursue any such lines of argumentation here. Thus, additionally, we might 
take this statement about the absoluteness of the articles of faith as the exception that 
proves the rule, intimating an inabsoluteness to thematic knowledge beyond them.  
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This is not to say that the wider thematic elements of faith are ephemeral - rather, we must 
just appreciate that they are not essential to faith for Francis in the way that the articles are. 
This is also not to say that further arguments cannot be made towards the absoluteness of 
specific elements of thematic knowledge apart from those contained in the articles.111 Nor 
does this mean that we are not obliged to afford a given measure of authority to a particular 
doctrinal statement merely because it is not in the Creeds (nor ought this to be read as the 
extreme version of such a claim, as an endorsement of ‘theological positivism’).112 The point 
is that we ought not to read Francis here as implying that every doctrinal position is asserted 
by faith as equally absolute; not even its revealed truths. Hence Francis writes: 
All revealed truths derive from the same divine source and are to be believed with the 
same faith, yet some of them are more important for giving direct expression to the 
heart of the Gospel. In this basic core, what shines forth is the beauty of the saving 
love of God made manifest in Jesus Christ… In this sense, the Second Vatican Council 
explained, “in Catholic doctrine there exists an order or a ‘hierarchy’ of truths, since 
they vary in their relation to the foundation of the Christian faith”. This holds true as 
much for the dogmas of faith as for the whole corpus of the Church’s teaching, 
including her moral teaching. 
(EG §36)113 
In the above passage, Francis begins by identifying a hierarchy within the revealed truths of 
the faith. This hierarchy does not mean that there is necessarily a difference in authority 
between them. What the hierarchy refers to is the relative “centrality” of truths to the 
Gospel, which Francis illustrates in terms of a priest who preaches more on temperance than 
charity or justice. In such cases, “an imbalance occurs”. The same goes for if we speak “more 
about law than about grace, more about the Church than about Christ, more about the Pope 
than about God’s word” (EG §38). He then continues to state that this relationship holds 
across the whole of the Church’s teaching, notably distinguishing between dogma and wider 
doctrine in the course of their inclusion within this totality. 
One way of reading this would be in terms of a crude quantification of time given to themes 
– e.g. as the claim that Christians ought to think and talk about mercy proportionally more 
 
111 C.f. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (1989: §6-11), which outlines an expansive vision of 
doctrinal authority. 
112 C.f. Donum Veritatis §33 
113 Francis is quoting Unitatis redintegratio §11 here. 
132 
 
than they ought to think and talk about temperance. However, Francis indicates a more 
sophisticated hermeneutic when he writes that 
…each truth is better understood when related to the harmonious totality of the 
Christian message; in this context all of the truths are important and illumine one 
another. When preaching is faithful to the Gospel, the centrality of certain truths is 
evident and it becomes clear that Christian morality is not a form of stoicism, or self-
denial, or merely a practical philosophy or a catalogue of sins and faults.  
(EG §39) 
What Francis seems to be getting at here is that this relationship of relative centrality is a 
relationship of hermeneutical primacy. There is a “harmonious totality” in which each 
individual truth is to be understood. Certain truths, as more ‘central’ within this totality, are 
the truths in light of which the other truths ought to be read. Hence we realise that ‘Christian 
morality’ cannot be reduced to (for example) stoicism – even if it has certain elements which 
are superficially stoic. 
At the heart of this hierarchy is the encounter with God which is the condition and essence 
of Christian life. He writes that the Gospel fundamentally “invites us to respond to the God 
of love who saves us”. If this invitation becomes obscured, the moral teaching of the Church 
risks “becoming a house of cards” – “certain doctrinal or moral points based on specific 
ideological options”, rather than the Gospel itself (EG §39). 
That is, all of the truths of the Church are oriented towards the possibility of this encounter, 
which serves as their hermeneutical key, without which they lose the foundation of their 
meaning. This orientation ultimately grants a relative inabsoluteness to those teachings. 
Without necessarily implying that they are untrue, or lacking in authority, they are 
nevertheless antecedent to that encounter. Hence Francis admits the possibility of revision, 
in a number of ways. 
Firstly, there is a ‘pragmatic’ one, aimed towards cultivating the encounter with God rather 
than expressing truth as such, which Francis frames in terms of ‘communication’. Prefiguring 
the controversy around AL, this includes the precepts and maxims for practice, which might 
inhibit this encounter: 
In her ongoing discernment, the Church can also come to see that certain customs not 
directly connected to the heart of the Gospel… are no longer properly understood and 
appreciated. Some of these customs… no longer serve as means of communicating the 
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Gospel. We should not be afraid to re-examine them. At the same time, the Church 
has rules or precepts which… no longer have the same usefulness for directing and 
shaping people’s lives. 
(EG §43) 
Secondly, 
The Church… needs to grow in her interpretation of the revealed word and in her 
understanding of truth. It is the task of exegetes and theologians to help “the 
judgment of the Church to mature”. The other sciences also help to accomplish this… 
Differing currents of thought… if open to being reconciled by the Spirit… can enable 
the Church to grow, since all of them help to express more clearly the immense riches 
of God’s word. For those who long for a monolithic body of doctrine… this might 
appear as undesirable and leading to confusion. But in fact such variety serves to bring 
out and develop different facets of the inexhaustible riches of the Gospel. 
(EG §40)114 
Here, Francis describes the Gospel as having “inexhaustible riches” of which there are 
“different facets”. In order to fully “bring out and develop” these, the Church must “grow in 
her interpretation” of revelation, and also “her understanding of truth”. This means that 
doctrine cannot be understood as a “monolithic body”. Instead it admits development and 
variation (“variety”) – that is, change. Moreover, this process of change is not a unilateral 
one. Rather, the Church’s teachings can be informed and developed with input from 
practitioners within the various sciences, including (contra Veritatis Splendor) theologians, 
who by implication are not bound solely by the state of development constituted by the 
determinations of the historical Magisterium as it exists at a given moment in time. This 
indicates the dynamic of knowledge indicated in the previous chapter: thematic theological 
knowledge develops in history from, and expresses in its own way, the mysterious knowledge 
of the encounter. In other words, it is not absolute, but relative to this encounter, admitting 
indeterminacy and non-totality. 
Thirdly, there is a more superficial issue of translation. Francis writes that 
…today’s vast and rapid cultural changes demand that we constantly seek ways of 
expressing unchanging truths in a language which brings out their abiding newness. 
“The deposit of the faith is one thing... the way it is expressed is another”. There are 
 
114 Francis is quoting Dei verbum §12 here. 
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times when the faithful, in listening to completely orthodox language, take away 
something alien to the authentic Gospel of Jesus Christ, because that language is alien 
to their own way of speaking to and understanding one another. With the holy intent 
of communicating the truth about God and humanity, we sometimes… hold fast to a 
formulation while failing to convey its substance. This is the greatest danger. Let us 
never forget that “the expression of truth can take different forms. The renewal of 
these forms of expression becomes necessary for the sake of transmitting to the 
people of today the Gospel message in its unchanging meaning”. 
(EG §41)115 
Because languages are historically relative, they can vary by context in their capacity to 
‘communicate’ adequately. In other words, they can vary in their capacity to effectively 
thematise truth, potentially disordering the intension of their users, preventing them from 
‘thinking’ truth. 
In summary, for Francis, doctrine is ordered towards the encounter that lies at the heart of 
Christian subjectivity. In doing so, it admits relativity to that encounter in three registers: a 
pragmatic one, based around its capacity to facilitate that encounter; an epistemic one, 
based around its capacity to express the truth of that encounter; and a linguistic one, based 
around its capacity to reproduce thematic knowledge across linguistic contexts. The first two 
registers directly presuppose this encounter as their condition, and the third indirectly as the 
condition of the translated formulae. 
2.3.2. DOCTRINE AND THEOPHANY  
The principle by which this variation is made possible or appropriate, according to Francis, is 
pastoral. Francis reminds us instead that “missionary outreach is paradigmatic for all the 
Church’s activity” (EG §15). To this end, he proposes a re-evaluation of the institutions and 
practices of the Church; Francis’ “missionary option (EG §27), which we saw earlier. 
This includes the way we negotiate doctrine. We have just seen that, for Francis, some truths 
are more ‘central’ to the faith than others, where this ‘centrality’ corresponds to 
hermeneutical priority. This priority is defined by their service to the encounter which lies at 
the heart of the Christian life. This prioritization obtains particularly when reading these 
truths in a “missionary key” (EG §34) – that is, with an evangelical hermeneutic which Francis 
further characterises in terms of “a pastoral goal and a missionary style which would actually 
 
115 Francis quotes John XXIII (1962) and then John Paul II’s Ut unum sint §19. 
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reach everyone without exception or exclusion” (EG §35). This hermeneutic recognises that 
“the message has to concentrate on the essentials, on what is most beautiful, most grand, 
most appealing and at the same time most necessary”. It deploys the hierarchy in service of 
this, ensuring that “the message is simplified, while losing none of its depth and truth”, so as 
to become “all the more forceful and convincing” (EG §35). 
In this context, the purpose of doctrine is ultimately pastoral. In this vein, Barret describes 
Francis as directing us towards “a practical use of doctrine rather than a conceptual use of 
doctrine”, wherein doctrines are deployed in order to orient us properly to a situation (2018: 
125). Thinking of the controversy over Amoris Laetitia, Barrett notes that this method lacks 
“conceptual precision regarding which doctrines ought to illuminate which situations”, which 
in turn could “lead to different moral evaluations of the same case” (2018: 126). However, 
once we recognise that this orientation is fundamentally an evangelizing one, the picture 
becomes a little clearer: the doctrines which one ought to employ are the ones which 
facilitate the divine encounter that lies at the centre of Christian life. 
In short, for Francis, the purpose of doctrine is fundamentally as a tool for evangelization. 
This opens up the possibility for a theophanic understanding of doctrine itself: one of the 
ways in which it can (perhaps best) serve evangelization is to serve as the medium for 
theophany. We are prompted towards this theophanic understanding by several factors. 
Firstly, we have already seen that Francis affords a sacramental dimension to the bodies of 
doctrine that are the Decalogue and the Apostle’s Creed, which he conceives of as 
“storehouses” of the Church’s memory. The Decalogue has a theophanic aspect in the 
specific sense of directing us towards forms of life in which we can encounter God, rather 
than the words themselves serving as those forms. Francis’ theology of the Creeds goes 
further: Francis identifies reciting the Creed as an occasion for theophany because, in doing 
so, we enter into the life and history of the Church as the subject which responds to God. 
This does not seem altogether different from the activity of ‘thinking with’ doctrine: we 
noted how faith-knowledge has a thematic component or sight, and that part of the 
subjectivity of the Church is this shared sight. Understood as part of this sight, allowing 
doctrine to disclose the world to us can be understood in terms of operating this subjectivity. 
In this way, to deploy doctrinal language is to take our place within the Church – which is to 
say, to enter into its life and history. Thus Francis’ understanding of the Creed enables an 
understanding of doctrine as also playing a more direct theophanic role. 
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Secondly, Francis talks about doctrine in poetic terms that can be read as connoting a 
theophanic dimension. He writes that “instead of seeming to impose new obligations, 
[evangelizers] should appear as people who wish to share their joy, who point to a horizon 
of beauty and who invite others to a delicious banquet” (EG §15). Evangelization necessarily 
involves imparting doctrine. However, in this context, this doctrine is conveyed in such a way 
as to reveal a transcendent dimension (“horizon”, “beauty”), and to invite the hearer to join 
the evangelizer in their orientation towards it. Here, doctrine can be understood as playing 
a similar role to (beautiful) liturgical forms. Similarly, he talks of the Gospel’s “freshness”, 
and “the fragrance of the Gospel” as a quality of proper teaching (EG §39). This image 
portrays proper teaching as having something more than just propositional content – 
particularly when we take into account his association of this “freshness” with the “[e]ternal 
newness” of Christ, which can “renew our lives and our communities”, and by which he 
“constantly amazes us by his divine creativity” (EG §11). These images of sanctification and 
transcendence give a quasi-sacramental resonance to this “freshness” and “fragrance” which 
could easily be read in a theophanic sense. 
Thirdly, there is the theology of encounter that lies at the heart of Francis’ understanding of 
evangelization. As we saw in the previous chapter, for Francis, we are evangelized when we 
are touched by God’s loving ‘gaze’ – which, in some cases, can be instantiated in the loving 
‘gaze’ of a human Other (see Oltvai, 2018: 323). This tells us more substantively what this 
sacramental dimension constitutes: doctrine, as that which the Other communicates to us, 
can serve as the form in which this love touches the recipient. 
Finally, Francis weaves themes of beauty, liturgy and doctrine in such a way as to identify the 
sacramental function of doctrinal language and the sacramental function of liturgical 
language. He notes that the Church “evangelizes and is herself evangelized through the 
beauty of the liturgy, which is both a celebration of the task of evangelization and the source 
of her renewed self-giving” (EG §24). In other words, Francis associates liturgical form and 
evangelization in two ways: firstly, the beauty of liturgical forms is in some sense associated 
with the work of evangelization in the course of celebration. This can be read as blurring the 
conceptual distinctions between liturgical form and the forms present in or constituting 
evangelization. Secondly, he establishes that evangelization can take place through the 
forms of the liturgy, by virtue of their beauty. Given that in a liturgical context we know that 
these forms (or more specifically, the linguistic forms) can serve as a site of encounter with 
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the divine, this indicates that an encounter specifically as it occurs in the liturgy is at least 
one mode of evangelization. 
This is developed in EG §34 when he writes that it is “the very heart of the Gospel” which 
gives Church teachings their “meaning, beauty and attractiveness”. This formula is redolent 
of the three transcendentals – Truth, Beauty, and the Good. Here we have a poetic intimation 
that those teachings communicate the divine itself within them. Later, in EG §36, he notes 
that “[i]n this basic core, what shines forth is the beauty of the saving love of God made 
manifest in Jesus Christ”. This establishes a parallel between doctrine and liturgy in the 
context of evangelization: doctrine manifests a beauty in which the love of God touches us. 
This explicitly associates this beauty not just with transcendence, but with the encounter by 
which we are evangelized - the same encounter that occurs in the liturgy. In other words, 
doctrinal language in evangelization evangelizes in the same way as the beautiful forms 
(including the linguistic forms) of the liturgy. The economy of liturgical language is not just 
one mode of evangelization, but the mode. Consequently, doctrinal language, ordered 
towards evangelization, is ordered towards the economy of liturgical language. Thus, for 
Francis, theophanic liturgical language serves as the model for doctrinal language in this 
respect. 
In short, doctrinal forms can play a theophanic role comparable to liturgical forms - both 
indirectly (as Francis identifies with the Decalogue), but also directly. The upshot of this is 
that the relativity of liturgical form to encounter is reproduced in a specifically doctrinal 
register. In turn, the plurivocal indeterminacy and non-totality necessitated by the 
sacramental economy of liturgical language is also necessitated in a doctrinal context. 
Hence Francis writes that “Jesus wants evangelizers who proclaim the good news not only 
with words, but above all by a life transfigured by God’s presence” (EG §259). Sinicalchi reads 
this as an appeal to “supra-rational encounters with believers, which go above mere 
evidential approaches” (2018: 135). These encounters with believers, as we have seen, are 
media for an encounter with God. Leaving aside the question of whether this mystical 
dimension is truly supra-rational, or whether we conceive of the knowledge touch as a non-
thematic form of reason, what Sinicalchi identifies is an ultimate deprioritising of thematicity 
in favour of encounter. To indulge in a pun (or two), Francis recognises that form is not to be 
valued over substance, but to be recognised as able to present that substance itself in ways 
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that go beyond mere verbal expression; evangelizing incarnation is more primary than 
‘communicative’ evangelism.116 
This in turn permits the ‘plurivocity’ appropriate to liturgical forms in a doctrinal context. The 
theophanic understanding of liturgical language in MP shows how the issue of translation is 
at once also tied to the ‘pragmatic’ issue of sustaining the encounter that lies at the heart of 
the Christian life. We might say that there is thus a ‘functionalist’ principle governing 
translation within the Church in the context of liturgical language: the end of theological 
language in this context is ultimately to serve as the means for touch. Translation is therefore 
governed by the priority of encounter both in the sense of preserving thematic knowledge 
about this encounter, but also (and more fundamentally) a teleological priority: our 
theological-liturgical formulations are relativized to this end. To this end, doctrinal variation 
along the lines of liturgical variation is permitted by Francis’ first and third modes of doctrinal 
relativization (pragmatic and linguistic), which are integrated in this ‘functionalist’ 
prioritization of theophany.117 
2.4. PLURALISM AS A GOOD 
In summary, Francis’ Marian prioritisation of encounter over Petrine institutional form 
means that variation in form is permissible when at the service of cultivating the encounter 
with God towards which the Christian life is ultimately directed. This even extends to 
doctrinal formulae. This enables a positive-affective approach to difference. We can think 
about variation in terms of inclusive and exclusive variation. Inclusive variation is when forms 
which are not universally included in the faith-life of the Church are included in the faith-
lives of a subset of the Church. An example of this might be a popular devotion specific to a 
region. Exclusive variation is when certain forms are omitted from the faith-life of some 
subset of the Church. An example of this might be a couple who have a committed, sexual 
relationship outside of marriage.118 We will begin by looking at inclusive variation, as this 
 
116 In this vein, Bevans (2015a) reads EG itself as embodying an attempt to elicit an encounter with the 
reader beyond the activity of merely passing on information. 
117 Connolly notes that the institutional shift of the Church towards the global south means that 
Francis’ missional faith, in rooting the hermeneutics of the faith in the experience and activities of 
previously excluded groups, will inevitably be shaped by “different priorities” and questions to those 
of Western-centric evangelization (2015: 401). What Connolly identifies is that Francis’ evangelical 
paradigm offers not just a change in style, but opens up the possibility for substantive developments 
in the faith itself. This is particularly true by our reading, which, in recognising a contextually-bound 
sacramental dimension to doctrine, argues that this shift is not only possible, but necessary. 




illustrates this possibility the most clearly. We will then see how this also holds for exclusive 
variation, as exemplified by Francis’ pastoral approach in AL. 
2.4.1. BASISMO, AND THE NECESSITY OF PLURALISM  
An example of inclusive variation undergirding pluralism might be found in what Lehmann 
describes as basismo: “an outlook on social, religious and political issues which starts from 
the viewpoint that the people are possessed with special, albeit often hidden, insights and 
untainted beliefs” (1996: ix). This approach claims “that political and religious salvation 
necessarily involve listening to the people and gaining empathy, even a mystical communion, 
with their culture”. In its South American context, basismo found expression in Ecclesial Base 
Communities, Catholic workers’ associations, liberation theology, and grassroots pastoral 
initiatives (1996: 13). 
Boff identifies a key characteristic of churches in Ecclesial Base Communities, which captures 
the aspect of basismo pertinent here: “a re-sacramentalisation of the life of the community, 
rather than just seven sacraments, in which it “learns to discover God in its own life, 
struggles, and happenings”” (1982: 138). This can be seen in the practice of biblical 
interpretation within these communities, in which members of the community would come 
together as a community, and “inject concrete reality and their own situation” into their 
interpretations (1982: 199). Mesters analyses three factors at play in this process: 
“Community”, or “the con-text”; “Reality”, or “the pre-text”, and “the Bible”, or the “text” 
simpliciter (1982: 200). The word of God is to be discovered in each of these ‘texts’, and they 
play complementary roles in discerning His word. The interpretative principle here is the 
community, as the subject which reflects upon the other two texts. The question of how 
much these other two texts truly ‘exist’ in their own right, apart from their interpretation, is 
somewhat moot here – what is important is that this process involves reflecting on particular 
situations in light of the community’s own understanding of their faith and its content, and 
without determining mediation by an often absent hierarchy (Bruneau, 1980: 226). 
In short, what basismo affirms is that believers can identify forms in the context of their own 
lives via which they can relate to God. In learning to ‘discover God’ in the course of its life, 
the community can construct a hermeneutic which reads the images and events of that life 
in relation to the narratives found within Bible study. Through this encoding, these forms 
become ‘sacramentalised’, serving as sites and means for encounter with God. In this way, 
involvement with the culture of the people enables the deployment of a new set of forms 
via which the life of faith can be lived out. 
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Significantly, basismo affirms that this process of encoding can be done autonomously, in a 
subsidiary way by the very people whose lives are being encoded. Lehmann notes that this 
outlook is founded on a notion of “the people” (1996: 8). Implicit in basismo is the idea that 
this ‘people’ is capable, through its culture and situation, to successfully operate as an 
interpretative authority with relative autonomy. That is, basismo fundamentally affirms the 
authority of local groups to operate this hermeneutic. In other words, it affirms the 
possibility and legitimacy of pluralism in sight within the collective subjectivity of the Church.  
The Argentine Theology of the People expresses this principle in a mystical, historicising 
mode that is paralleled by Francis’ ecclesiology. This was a movement associated particularly 
with the theologians Lucio Gera (1924-2012) and Rafael Tello (1917-2002), who worked as 
part of the Argentine Episcopal Commission for Pastoral Practice (COEPAL). COEPAL was 
established with the aim of renewing pastoral practice in the wake of Vatican II’s vision for a 
more active laity (Scannone, 2016: 119-120). Drawing from Gaudium et Spes’ language of 
“the people of God” and its recovery of culture as a theological locus, as well as the option 
for the poor championed by the Episcopal Conference of Latin America (CELAM), at the 
Medellin and Puebla conferences, the Theology of the People identified the people of God 
with the poor, and sought to resource the theological insight embodied in their culture 
(2016: 121). While Scannone identifies it as a current within the broader field of Liberation 
Theology (1979: 221), its methodology was guided by a rejection of the terms of Marxist class 
analysis as ultimately alien to the lives of those it studied.119 Instead, the Theology of the 
People looked to an analysis informed by the popular culture that structured their lives and 
preserved their communal memory, thereby incarnating or inculturating their faith (Rourke, 
2016b: 73). 
Popular piety was identified as a significant mode of this cultural incarnation. This was 
understood as integrating the wider life and struggles of the people into the life of faith, 
thereby rendering them sites for encounter with the divine. In the experience of this popular 
faith, the specific spirit of the people becomes apparent, and this served as the “hermeneutic 
locus” in the Theology of the People’s reading of popular culture (Luciani, 2017: 24). 
The challenge of the Theology of the People is that of a conversion within the Church itself 
so that it can come to recognise the location of the people and enter into “their own ethos” 
 
119 This is not to say that the Theology of the People rejected the idea of class struggle; it merely 
recognised it as a historical reality to be understood by reference to the life of the people, rather than 
a fundamental hermeneutical principle (Scannone, 2016: 122). 
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(Luciani, 2017: 12). This involves the recognition that disparate cultural forms of popular 
piety are an expression of a cultural theological knowledge, and thus a precondition of faith 
and a source of values upon the basis of which a people can continue to be evangelized 
(Scannone, 1979: 219). This means detaching our conception of the faith from the ‘central’ 
(that is, totalised) form of European Catholicism. Rather, this centre gains its meaning from 
the “periphery” that is the lives of the poor (Luciani, 2017: 7). Intrinsic to this is the idea of 
pluralism. Because culture is the vehicle for faith and subjectivity therein, individuals have a 
right to their culture - and because there are many cultures, recognising this right involves 
recognising the necessity of pluralism (2017: 32-34). 
Borghesi reads Francis as making a similar move, linking the plurality of historical forms to 
pluralism in the Church, via an affirmation of popular piety.120 We have seen above how the 
life of faith, for Francis, is centred around mystical encounter with both divine and human 
Others. Borghesi reads Francis’ second ‘principle’ in EG, “realities are greater than ideas” as 
prioritising the ‘reality’ of the Other, and the encounter with them, over abstract “ideologies” 
which centre their analysis of the world in ideal schemas. This leads Francis in EG §90 to 
praise popular piety, as a form of faith which centres interpersonality and encounter (2018: 
283-4). Thus the prioritisation of encounter in the life of faith enables pluralism in the forms 
in which faith is embodied. 
Furthering the similarity, Francis also outlines the stance that pluralism is not only permitted, 
but necessary. Francis affirms inculturation as a way that the Church can evangelize, as well 
as to assimilate and sanctify diverse cultures, both enriching and being enriched by their 
values (EG §116). He also recognises that inculturation is a way in which faith can be 
preserved, and a people can continue to evangelize themselves (EG §112). In this context, he 
writes that “[t]he history of the Church shows that Christianity… will also reflect the different 
faces of the cultures and peoples in which it is received and takes root”. This “diversity of 
peoples who experience the gift of God, each in accordance with its own culture” is an 
expression of “genuine catholicity” (EG §116). We can associate this plural, catholic vision 
with Francis’ vision for a ‘polyhedral’ universalism that embraces and sustains the 
 
120 Borghesi is not alone in identifying commonalities between Francis’ theology and the Theology of 
the People, particularly as expressed in EG. For more in-depth analyses of these commonalities, see 
Scannone (2016), Rourke (2016a; 2016b), Deck (2016), and Luciani (2017). All of these commentators 
convincingly trace the influence of the movement on Francis the historical individual. Although our 
project is not to construct a biographical, ‘author-centered’ reading, these parallels serve as useful, 




particularity of the local (EG §234-6). Francis sees in this model “the totality or integrity of 
the Gospel”, which embraces “everyone” (EG §237). This unity through the universal 
embrace of the Gospel mirrors Francis’ understanding of the unity of the Church in LF §47: 
the unity of the Church derives from the unity of its faith, both in the sense of the truth 
towards which it is oriented, and also the shared nature of that faith as an orientation 
towards Christ’s history with us. Read in this context, the catholicity of the Church, in all its 
cultural (that is, formal) plurality, must be understood in terms of this universalism. Thus the 
Church cannot impose a single set of forms such that these cultural distinctions are negated: 
this would amount to a homogenising totalisation of that set. 
The result of this is a loosening of the link between any one specific set of forms, and the 
theophanic function which they can play. Firstly, the possibility of plurality implies the 
possibility of multiple forms adequately playing similar roles in the life of faith. Secondly, 
rejecting false universalism involves the rejection of attempts to totalise a determinate set 
of forms so as to negate those external to it. Beyond this, however, what the possibility of 
basismo reveals is that pluralism is not only permissible, but is in fact inescapable – precisely 
because faith is lived out (that is, we are touched, and grow in sight) in a variety of contexts, 
the form of the Church must admit a plurality that corresponds to the historical plurality of 
these contexts.  
Moreover, this necessity makes a good of pluralism. In order to navigate this required 
plurality, we must attend to formal variations in context, as well as the experiences of the 
believers who employ these various forms in those contexts, in order to evaluate them. This 
in turn, however, presupposes a more hopeful outlook: in attending to these factors, we are 
ultimately looking for an encounter with God. As such, our hermeneutic of difference 
becomes more positive-affective: variation poses a problem, but it also holds a solution, and 
an opportunity for faith. 
In a broader sense, the recognition of pluralism as not only necessary, but potentially 
enriching, disposes us to view alterity in general in a less distrustful, and more hopeful way. 
Hence Francis writes of a Church that truly inculturates its faith: “In this way, the Church 
takes up the values of different cultures and becomes sponsa ornata monilibus suis, “the 
bride bedecked with her jewels” (cf. Is 61:10)” (EG §116). When confronted with an 
Otherness that defies our attempts to totalise particular institutional forms, and the 
indeterminacy that it thus embodies, we do not have to turn inwards and negate it in fear. 
Rather, we can look to it joyfully, as a new expression of the plenitudinous transcendence 
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that those institutions must ultimately follow and serve. In short, we are equipped to take a 
positive affective stance. Thus Francis lays the ground for a fundamentally reparative 
ecclesiology. 
2.4.2. EXCLUSIVE VARIATION 
The challenging aspect to this is that it applies as much to exclusive as inclusive variation, as 
both flow from the same principle. We saw in the last chapter how our relationship to God 
is not exhausted by the demands of justice, but rather, the determinations of justice are 
relative to this relationship. Thus mercy may permit this variation where justice alone would 
not: in Amoris Laetitia, Francis invokes John Paul II’s “law of gradualness” to recognise 
“gradualness in the prudential exercise of free acts on the part of subjects who are not in a 
position to understand, appreciate, or fully carry out the objective demands of the law” (AL 
§295; see FC §34). We can also make a parallel argument here: the obligation to include 
certain forms in our lives is relative to their theophanic capacity in our particular case.  
Furthermore, graduality in the obligation to include certain forms does not amount to a 
“gradualness of law, as if there were different degrees or forms of precept in God's law for 
different individuals and situations” (FC §35): as we noted in the previous chapter, it is 
intrinsic to the nature of justice that it can be superseded by mercy. We can read Francis’ 
permission of variation in doctrinal forms in a similar way: because doctrine is ultimately 
pastorally oriented, it is intrinsically appropriate for its inclusion to be relative to the pastoral 
situation. Because of this intrinsic orientation, we are not proposing the recognition of 
precepts by different ‘degree’ or ‘form’. Rather, because this variation is a function of the 
nature of law itself, the law is fully realised in that variation. 
Against this, Eccheverria reads Francis’ appeal to the hierarchy of truths as an “inclusive 
hermeneutical principle” which seeks to illustrate the interconnectedness, and thus 
indispensability, of all doctrine (2015: 132). Likewise, under our reading, Francis does invoke 
a holistic approach to doctrine. Similarly, our understanding of the hierarchy does not mean 
that we can approach certain truths with indifference. Nevertheless, we have seen that it 
can also serve as an exclusive principle. The reason for this is because it discriminates 
between doctrines not in terms of truth, but on a functional basis.  
The possibility of this turns on the distinction between claiming that something is true, and 
claiming that we should respond to this truth in a certain way. In this vein, Francis writes of 
locally variable popular piety, which we took as a model of the principle of variation within 
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the Church, that “it discovers and expresses that content more by way of symbols than by 
discursive reasoning, and in the act of faith greater accent is placed on credere in Deum than 
on credere Deum” (EG §124). This distinction between credere Deum, or belief ‘about’ God, 
and credere in Deum, or a relational, trusting belief ‘in’ God, reflects this distinction: the 
latter indicates what is true about God; the former, what ought to be done in response to 
God. Superficially, this distinction dissociates the affective knowledge of popular piety from 
doctrinal matters. However, as we have seen, Francis’ ‘pastoral option’, with its 
‘functionalist’ approach to variation in form and corresponding emphasis on discernment, 
establishes this kind of relational approach as the primary critical principle by which doctrinal 
variation is to be negotiated. In short, we might say that, for Francis, issues of credere Deum 
are secondary to the issue of credere in Deum – and this priority enables Francis to 
discriminate between forms without making distinctions in truth. 
Eccheveria recognises this distinction: in reading Francis, he seeks to respond to Catholics 
who are concerned by Francis’ invocation of the hierarchy of truths, alongside his (qua 
historical individual) criticism of an alleged overemphasis on relatively peripheral issues such 
as “abortion, contraception, and homosexuality” (2015: 126), which they read as 
encouraging “indifference” towards these issues (2015: 131). Here the issue is ultimately not 
so much one of truth as practice, or response to truth, in which specific responses to various 
truths can take more or less prominent a place. In this vein, Eccheverria reads Francis through 
John Paul II’s Evangelium vitae, to argue that this integrative approach requires us to 
culturally embody Catholic life, specifically in the moral dimensions related to these issues, 
as part of an effort to evangelize non-Catholic culture (2015: 138-9). The difference between 
Eccheverria’s reading and our own, is that we read Francis as recognising that this kind of 
project takes place within contexts that render various forms more, but also less, effective in 
evangelization. Thus, for Francis, exclusive variation is not only possible but necessary. 
We do agree with Eccheverria on one point, however: Francis does not endorse 
indifferentism. Where this need for variation means the neglect of certain forms that might 
otherwise be necessary parts of the faith, Francis’ holism entails that this should be 
temporary, and with an eye to their eventual integration. To put it differently, we ought not 
to read Francis’ deployment of the hierarchy as meaning that doctrines can be chosen or 
transformed at will.  
Rather, what our reading of Francis offers is a more systematic account of how variation in 
the faith of particular individuals and groups within the Church can be reflected in variation 
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in practice so as to lead them to greater faith. Francis’ insight is that faith can exist on a 
continuum, and even a truncated and distorted faith is better than no faith at all. Because of 
this, our reading enables a more flexible pastoral approach to discipline, undergirded by the 
same positive affective stance we previously associated with inclusive variation: when we 
look at someone who doesn’t seem to be ‘doing faith properly’, we are encouraged to view 
this variation first and foremost as a case of faith in a difficult context.  
This way of viewing means (without losing sight of the ideal) focusing on what has been 
achieved, or what is included in a given situation, rather than centring our hermeneutic 
around identifying deficiencies. Francis’ pastoral approach in AL can be read as reflective of 
this hermeneutic. He writes that “a pastor cannot feel that it is enough simply to apply moral 
laws to those living in “irregular” situations, as if they were stones to throw at people’s lives”. 
Rather, instead of taking an antagonistic stance, pastors must exercise discernment in order 
to “find possible ways of responding to God and growing in the midst of limits”, opening “the 
way of grace and of growth, and… paths of sanctification which give glory to God” (AL §305). 
In other words, a pastor’s focus should ultimately be towards cultivating faith, rather than 
deploying doctrine as the basis for a negative hermeneutics of peoples’ lives.  
At the heart of this is the recognition that what is achieved in difficulty is particularly 
valuable: “a small step, in the midst of great human limitations, can be more pleasing to God 
than a life which appears outwardly in order, but moves through the day without confronting 
great difficulties” (EG §44; in AL §305). This undergirds a positive affective stance towards 
faith lives that fall short of the ideal. Hence, for example, he recognises that although non-
marital unions are not the ideal, and that marriage should ultimately be pursued, he writes 
that in such cases “respect also can be shown for those signs of love which in some way 
reflect God’s own love” (AL §294). 
2.4.3. DISCERNMENT AGAIN 
However, if Francis rejects indifferentism, we must be able to make discriminations. How can 
we tell whether a given instance of variation is legitimate or not?  
Approaching variation in this pastoral context brings our reflections on pluralism back into 
contact with the issue of discernment: as we saw in our last chapter, Francis encourages us 
to employ the mystical knowledge that discernment provides in these situations, orienting 
ourselves in light the individual’s relationship with God, in awareness of the excess of this 
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relationship (and thus the situation) over determining principles. In short, it is discernment 
which can allow us to make these discriminations. 
This does not entirely solve the issue. Discernment involves a significant measure of 
indeterminacy: as we saw in our last chapter, attends to our relationship with God in excess 
of over any specific set of determinations. In this way, the potential for variation cannot be 
determined a priori. Rather, it must be approached from a stance of ‘unselfing’, which refuses 
to assert one’s capacity as knower over the transcendence of God as Other in which this 
excess lies. 
However, Francis reassures us about the process of discernment in this context.121 We noted 
above that basismo provides a model for the pluralism that Francis champions. We also 
noted that it affords the local community a kind of interpretive authority by which it can 
identify what variation is required in its own faith-life, particularly in terms of biblical 
hermeneutics and popular piety. Francis identifies this interpretive capacity in the context of 
popular piety with “affective connaturality born of love” (EG §125). ‘Affective connaturality’, 
invokes a Thomist concept of “affective knowledge”, which pertains to wisdom in the form 
of “affective tendencies and moral and religious habits which put that person in contact with 
whatever it is about which one exercises judgment” (Rafael Tello, Fundamentos de una 
Nueva Evangelización (unpublished), trans. in Deck, 2015: 54).122 Francis writes: 
I think of the steadfast faith of those mothers tending their sick children who, though 
perhaps barely familiar with the articles of the creed, cling to a rosary; or of all the 
hope poured into a candle lighted in a humble home with a prayer for help from Mary, 
or in the gaze of tender love directed to Christ crucified… these actions… are the 
manifestation of a theological life nourished by the working of the Holy Spirit who has 
been poured into our hearts (cf. Rom 5:5). 
(EG §125) 
Affective connaturality, for Francis, represents a working of grace which enables the faithful 
to make discernments about the forms of their faith-life. This is expressed in the “sensus 
fidei”, or the “instinct of faith… which helps [the faithful] discern what is truly of God”: Francis 
describes this as being given to the people of God by virtue of their baptism, and describes 
it as a working of the Spirit that “gives Christians a certain connaturality with divine realities, 
 
121 And perhaps these assurances can be carried over to our reflections on discernment in the previous 
chapter. 
122 C.f. ST I-II q. 64 a.1; q. 162 a. 3 ad 1m 
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and a wisdom which enables them to grasp those realities intuitively, even when they lack 
the wherewithal to give them precise expression” (EG §119). 123  In short, for Francis, 
recognising the Church as people of God means recognising its capacity for affective 
knowledge, and the reliability of its discernments. That is, even though discernment itself 
might be an indeterminate process, Francis invites us to trust in the subject which makes 
those discernments. In other words we must also approach this indeterminacy with hope – 
that is, in a positive affective manner. 
3. CONCLUSION  
In this chapter, we have shown how Francis’ mysticism leads to an ecclesiology which 
prioritises the ‘Marian’ aspects of the Church over the Petrine. The Church is the collective 
Christian subject, arising from a transformative encounter with God as Other; its institutional 
forms must thus follow this encounter, wherever and however it arises. This leads him to 
what we described as a “plurivocal” model of Church unity, admitting difference within itself 
corresponding to the historical variations in the contexts in which that mystery unveils itself. 
This can include not only variation in liturgical forms, but in doctrinal forms. The measure by 
which we must approach this plurivocity is one of discernment, which is inherently 
indeterminate. However, Francis also recognizes a capacity in the faithful to make reliable 
discernments – an affective connaturality with God, expressed in the sensus fidei. This 
encourages us to approach discernment in hope. 
 
123 The precise nature of this recognition is contentious. Without specifying the exact relationship 
between the two, Francis associates the sensus fidei here with the infallibility of the people of God in 
credendo. Eccheverria reads this association as implying that this infallibility belongs to the sensus 
fidei. He also notes that this infallibility applies to the “entire body of the faithful” (LF §12; in 2015: 
195) or the universal Church in its entirety. In this context, Eccheverria reads Francis as construing the 
sensus fidei in terms of what he calls the sensus fidelium, or the exercise of the sensus fidei on the part 
of the Church in its entirety (2015: 196-197).  
In conflating the sensus fidei in this passage and the sensus fidelium, Eccheverria conflates 
Francis’ recognition of the sensus fidei’s powers to discern with the infallibility of the sensus fidelium. 
In this context, its capacity to reliably make discernments is contingent upon the conditions for the 
authentic exercise of the sensus fidelium, including  “universal agreement [universuum consensum] in 
matters of faith and morals”, “from the bishops to the least of the lay faithful” (LF §112; in 2015: 195); 
something that implies alignment with the determinations of the teachings of the Magisterium (2015: 
195). 
This reading challenges our ability to interpret this passage as affirming the sensus fidei as a 
principle of local variation and particular discernment. However, Francis does not specify that this 
association is a relationship of belonging. Moreover, as we have seen, Francis describes the sensus 
fidei in terms of affective connaturality, which he illustrates through examples of the faith of elements 
within and distinct from the Church as a whole (“mothers” and “Christians”). In this context, we ought 
to read the document as referring to the sensus fidei specifically, as it belongs to individual Christians. 
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Although we will treat this in more detail in the next chapter, we can see how our reading of 
Francis lays the ground for an ecclesiology motivated by a reparative hermeneutics. Firstly, 
it challenges us to think of the unity of the Church as incorporating difference or variation. 
Variation, both inclusive and exclusive, is both permitted and required – so long as it is 
ultimately at the service of evangelization, or facilitating the transformative encounter with 
God that lies at the heart of the faith. This means that the forms of the Church, including its 
doctrinal forms, are relative to the encounter from which they arise, and to which they are 
oriented. That is, they are non-absolute. This also means that we seek to determine the form 
of the Church by totalising models of unity or forms of faith so as to negate variation in their 
inclusion. Rather, we must embrace the non-totality and corresponding indeterminacy 
presented by alterity, so long as that alterity is ultimately born of difference in the conditions 
of an encounter that ultimately expresses itself in the collective subject that is the faithful 
Church. Moreover, this understanding of variation enables us to conceive of particular 
examples in terms of achieving faith. This in turn enables us to take a positive-affective stance 
towards it. Finally, we must approach questions of variation via an indeterminate process of 
discernment, which we are encouraged to view hopefully, or with positive affect. The upshot 
of this is the possibility for incorporating real plurivocity, and the indeterminacy that it 
embodies, within the unity of the Church. 
In our next chapter, we will argue that Francis’ plurivocity is enabled by a metaxological 
metaphysics of unity. In doing so, we will read his ecclesiology through his epistemology, 
arguing that his plurivocal ecclesiology is made intelligible via a relativization of ideas of unity 
which might preclude it. This allows us to re-express the indeterminacy posed by alterity in 
terms of the indeterminacy of knowledge outlined in the last chapter. The upshot of this is 
that Francis’ ecclesial Marian priority makes talk of the unity of the Church obey the priority 
of non-thematic mystical knowledge as outlined in our third chapter. We will then move from 
this to show the ecclesiological implications of Francis’ ‘unselfing’ mysticism in this context, 
and outline the challenge posed by Francis’ ecclesiology to paranoid Catholicism as 




V. THE CRITICAL CHALLENGE OF MARIAN PRIORITY 
 
In chapter three, we saw how Lumen Fidei presents an epistemology which resists paranoid 
determination via totalisation. All (determinate) thematic knowledge, which Francis refers to 
as sight, arises out of an intrinsically indeterminate un-thematic knowledge, or touch. The 
indeterminacy of touch is a function of the ultimately mysterious nature of its object - God 
as the transcendent Other. Because sight arises from this ground, it is limited by two 
horizons: a qualitative horizon, delineating the intrinsic excess of touch over sight as such; 
and a quantitative horizon, which delineates the bounds of what has been given over to sight 
at a given moment in history. In short, for Francis, our thematic knowledge can neither claim 
to be total, nor absolute. Consequently, there can be no absolute or total determinations by 
that knowledge. We also saw how this provides us with a model of virtuous knowing 
revolving around an aesthetics of ‘unselfing’ obedience, wherein the subject does not seek 
to impose their capacity as knower over and against transcendence. We contrasted this with 
the aesthetic of ‘unquestioning’ in VS, wherein the subject does not seek to impose their will 
over and against transcendence (specifically in the form of the moral law). 
In chapter four, we saw how Francis’ ecclesiology resists the absolutization, totalisation and 
determination of the forms which can be incorporated within the unity of the Church. We 
argued that Francis’ mysticism establishes a ‘Marian priority’, wherein the ‘Petrine’ 
institutional structures or forms of the Church (including doctrinal forms or formulations) 
arise from, and must always be ordered towards facilitating, the encounter that lies at the 
heart of faith. This means that they admit a certain inabsoluteness, being relative to the 
conditions which enable this encounter. We then argued that historical pluralism requires a 
concomitant ‘plurivocity’ in the forms of the Church, precluding the totalisation of any 
particular set of forms. This includes doctrinal formulations, although we also noted that the 
variation in their inclusion which Francis champions does not imply a variation in truth. 
Finally, we argued that this leads to a positive affective stance towards pluralism, and the 
indeterminacy that it represents. 
This chapter will read this ecclesiology through the epistemology of chapter three in order 
to critique ecclesiologies which embody a more paranoid approach. We will begin by 
responding to the worry that the model of ecclesial unity emerging from this is not true 
‘unity’. We will argue that it is grounded in a mystical metaphysics of unity. This reproduces 
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the relationship between mystical and thematic knowledge identified in chapter three. We 
will argue from this that ecclesial unity, for Francis, cannot be reduced to any particular 
totalised idea of unity, but rather possesses a transcendent dimension which resists this 
reduction. Consequently, when we ‘think’ the unity of the Church, we can only do so in an 
indeterminate and non-absolute way. The chapter will conclude by exploring the challenge 
of this ecclesiology to paranoid Catholicism as embodied in the ecclesiology of VS, through 
Francis’ discussion of contemporary Gnosticism to articulate a critique of the paranoid 
ecclesiology of Veritatis Splendor. 
1. PLURIVOCITY AND METAXIS 
One suspicion we might have about this plurivocal ‘unity’ is that it is not intelligible as such. 
This is because ideas of unity and totality are closely, if perhaps superficially, linked: to 
‘apprehend the unity’ of a thing can also be parsed as ‘to circumscribe it in thought, in its 
totality’. In short, to unify, at least intuitively, is to totalize a determinate conception of it. As 
a result, we might wonder whether we really can ‘think’ this plurivocal unity. This is 
illustrated when Roberts notes that the spiritual life of ‘the people’, to which Francis’ 
ecclesiology affords priority over our ideas of ecclesial unity, is often syncretistic, and 
motivated by pragmatic concerns in the face of precarity, in ways that trouble the very notion 
of a determinate ecclesial identity itself (2018: 136-137). 
1.1. EQUIVOCITY AND HOMOGENEITY 
We can restate this in a more sophisticated way. Desmond distinguishes between “four basic 
senses of being”: “the univocal, the equivocal, the dialectical, and the metaxological” (2005: 
158).124 He writes,  
 
124  This typology is neither total nor exclusive: Rubenstein (2005) identifies a post-Heideggerian 
impetus to escape immanentizing univocal ontologies which reduce Being to beings. However, she 
also recognises Hannah Arendt’s critique of Heidegger himself, whose apophaticism about Being 
(according to Arendt) requires the philosopher to ignore ontic ethical relationships (that is, 
relationships between the beings that Being transcends). Consequently, Rubenstein turns to Jean-Luc 
Nancy, who she reads as outlining an ontology that rejects univocity while retaining an ontic focus. 
Kotsko (2009: 121) notes that Rubenstein’s appeal to Nancy thus illustrates the capacity of his 
ontology to disrupt typologies which would simply oppose immanentizing (ultimately) univocal 
ontologies to transcendently oriented (metaxological) metaphysics. 
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While the univocal sense tends to emphasize determinate sameness and identity, the 
equivocal tends to stress difference that escapes univocal sameness, sometimes even 
to the point of the loss of any mediation between sameness and difference… By 
contrast, the dialectical sense seeks to mediate differences… by transition to a more 
inclusive unity or whole, which… contains and even reconciles the differences. Finally, 
the metaxological deals with the interplay of sameness and difference… not by 
mediating a more inclusive whole but by recurrence to the rich ambiguities of the 
middle… 
(2005: 158) 
Framed in these terms, we might wonder whether the model of ‘unity’ proposed by Francis 
is less plurivocal than equivocal, losing sight of unity as such in pursuit of an indiscriminate 
recognition of difference. What is left is a field of differentiated others, with no intelligible 
unity. The reason for this is that, as Desmond indicates, in losing sight of unity, the equivocal 
loses the ability to articulate the opposition of unity-difference that enables difference to 
appear as different. Both terms rendered meaningless, we are then free to throw them about 
as it suits us. This enables us to make what is ultimately an incoherent claim that things which 
lie outside the proper unity of the Church are nevertheless ‘the same’ in this regard, despite 
their ‘difference’.  
We can push this potential critique: Ratzinger describes the process of inculturation as one 
where “a faith stripped of culture is transplanted into a religiously indifferent culture”. In 
short, according to Ratzinger, the idea of inculturation treats cultures and religions as 
effectively generic or indifferent. He further argues that this is impossible: cultures and 
religions are “particular”, not generic, in such a way as to preclude this transplantation. 
Consequently, where inculturation appears to have been successful, what has really 
happened is a process of “inter-culturation”, in which one culture has assimilated aspects of 
the other. This is enabled by each culture sharing features, but the receptive culture 
nevertheless unavoidably changes in the process (1993: Online). In short, inculturation 
(according to Ratzinger) presupposes that cultures are effectively indifferent. We can frame 
this in Desmond’s terms by reference to Benedict XVI’s critique of “cultural levelling”, 
wherein “indiscriminate acceptance” of various cultures erases the “profound significance” 
found in the elements of those cultures that make them distinct (Caritas in Veritate: §26). In 
short, an equivocal understanding of culture leads to the loss of the distinctions between 
those cultures, and a false reduction of their differences to a generic sameness. 
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This association of Desmond and Ratzinger’s critiques is particularly pertinent given, as we 
saw in the last chapter, that inculturation serves as one of the concepts via which Francis 
articulates his pluralism. Moreover, this critique is sharpened by an apparent tension with 
Francis’ own rejection of ‘spherical’ universalism that leads to the levelling of culture (EG 
§236). 
Furthermore, Desmond argues that politics of equivocity ultimately degenerate into a kind 
of voluntaristic totalitarianism: when we lose sight of the determination of transcendent 
unity, what replaces it as mediating principle is the will of the individual, before which the 
world is reduced to indifferent objects of desire  (2005: 162). This bears up a further tension 
with Francis’ critique of “idolatry” in LF §13, where an object of the will is substituted for the 
properly transcendent other, thereby negating the lack of control that transcendence 
represents. In this context, our reading of Francis’ ecclesiology seems to erase its very 
foundation in this alterity. 
1.2. A METAXOLOGICAL UNITY 
However, this equivocal reading is wrong. As Francis writes in EG §131:  
Differences between persons and communities can sometimes prove 
uncomfortable... Diversity must always be reconciled by the help of the Holy Spirit; he 
alone can raise up diversity, plurality and multiplicity while at the same time bringing 
about unity. 
In this passage, he recognises the presence of (discomforting social) tensions within a 
plurivocal Church. He also identifies the impossibility of immanent resolutions, mirroring the 
critique of equivocity above, as well as more obvious concerns about univocal 
totalitarianism. Instead, he grounds the unity of the Church in transcendence (the work of 
the Holy Spirit). This provides the basic outline of his solution, which we will now explore in 
more substantive terms. 
1.2.1. DIALECTICS OR METAXIS? 
One reading of this transcendent unity is a dialectical one. We might be led to this by a 
superficial reading of Francis’ “four principles” in EG. From their introduction, these 
principles seem to suggest a dialectical synthesis: Francis presents them as able to “guide the 
development of life in society and the building of a people where differences are harmonized 
within a shared pursuit” (EG §221). This ‘harmonization’ could be read as indicating the 
mediation in which differences are ‘contained’ or ‘reconciled’, as is characteristic of dialectic 
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thought as portrayed by Desmond. More specifically, Francis’ two principles which deal 
specifically with difference – the second, “Unity prevails over conflict” (EG §226); and the 
fourth, “The whole is greater than the part” (EG §234) also seem to read in this way. With 
regards to the former, this seeks “resolution which takes place on a higher plane and 
preserves what is valid and useful on both sides” (EG §228). Similarly, with regards to the 
latter, Francis navigates the tension between the global and the local by reference to a 
“polyhedral” model, in which distinct locales are incorporated like faces into a multifaceted 
global polyhedron. The polyhedron, for Francis, exhibits a “convergence of all its parts, each 
of which preserves its distinctiveness”, in which the whole both sustains but also exceeds the 
sum of its components (EG §236). 
However, this is an over-simplification. It is true that Francis is a ‘dialectical’ theologian in a 
sense. Borghesi, via an ‘author-centered’ reading, reads in Francis the influence of 
“dialectical” theologians such as Pryzwara, de Lubac, Fessard, Ferré, and Guardini. In line 
with the above reading of his fourth principle, he notes that the dialectics they present – and 
thus the dialectics Francis presents – refuse to resolve their ‘tensions’, instead maintaining 
each pole simultaneously. This is particularly the case with Guardini, who conceives of 
human psychology as operating in the tensions between a set of cognitive “polar pairs”, 
which he finds Francis “reduces to” three of the four ‘principles’ of EG (2018: 108; see EG 
§221-237).  
However, Borghesi also notes that Francis’ third principle, “realities are greater than ideas” 
(see EG §231-233), does not derive from Guardini’s polar pairs. This principle also represents 
a dialectical tension for Francis – between the determining and totalising ‘ideal’, through 
which we engage with reality; and reality itself, which transcends the ideal. This serves to 
introduce a realist dimension to his dialectics (2018: 117). 
In a similar vein, we might say that this principle underlines a distinction between Francis’ 
‘Guardinian’ dialectics and his metaphysics. Francis’ principles are presented as a kind of 
analytic framework: they “derive from the pillars of the Church’s social doctrine”, which 
Francis describes as “primary and fundamental parameters of reference for interpreting and 
evaluating social phenomena” (EG §221; see Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the 
Church §161). That is, they are cognitive, and perhaps (depending on our interpretation of 
“derive”) transcendental. Consequently, the unresolvable tensions of unity and conflict, 




In this context, we must also read the images of the ‘higher plane’ and the ‘polyhedron’ as 
ideal figures. These images point beyond the unresolved polarity of their respective 
dialectics, to their (non-reductive, tensioned) unity. That is, they are transcendental figures 
representing the (tensioned) unity of poles that serves as the condition of their respective 
dialectics, and orients the thought of their respective principles. Being transcendental, these 
figures must themselves be understood as belonging to the ideal pole of the ideas-reality 
dialectic, oriented towards, and derivative of, a reality which nevertheless is wholly 
transcendent of them, and thus cannot be reduced to (or determined by) them.  
In short, the unity of Francis’ “higher plane”, or the universality of his “polyhedron” is not a 
function of the relationship between their components, but rather is a reflection of a 
transcendent unity or universality that stands in excess of immanent determinations, 
including all unities together but without reducing difference away. The “higher plane” of 
resolution only is a resolution because real (transcendent) unity transcends and reconciles 
our ideas of unity and conflict, unifying all distinct ‘sides’ specifically as distinct ‘sides’. The 
“polyhedron” is universal because real universality includes what is both local and global, 
including all localities in a global context specifically as localities.125 
Francis’ metaphysics of unity is thus what Desmond would describe as “metaxological”. For 
Desmond, a metaxological picture of the world arises from its situation in the “middle”, 
between immanent plurality and transcendent unity. Without ever fully transcending 
immanence (and thus reducing away plurality to unity), it recognises the grounding of 
immanent plurality in a unity that nevertheless “exceeds determination in terms of 
immanence alone”. This transcendent unity provides an “ontological robustness” to 
immanent alterity, while in itself being properly transcendent of that alterity, manifesting an 
 
125 In chapter three, we associated the ‘fullness’ of touch with the absolute horizon of thematic 
knowledge. However, here we have associated the poles of this dialectic with the ideal – which is to 
say, sight. This tension resolves itself when we read it in light of Francis’ third principle itself: this 
dialectic bears within itself the tension between the ‘ideal’ and the ‘real’. Because it is ultimately a 
thematised dialectic (“some object [time] is some relation [greater] than some object [space]”), the 
poles it establishes are ultimately poles that present themselves to sight. What this dialectic thus 
illustrates is that there is always a tension of which sight is aware between what it has achieved, and 
what lies beyond its horizons. This by itself says nothing about the way those horizons intersect with 
the distinction between ‘ideality’ and ‘reality’. 
In fact, the relationship between sight and ‘reality’ (as we have read it) is only established via 
Francis’ description of touch and his association of it with ‘fullness’, along with his further association 
of ‘fullness’ with ‘reality’. But this is not, strictly speaking, part of the formulation of the dialectic itself 
- even if it can be read (as we have) in terms of that dialectic. 
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“even more radical otherness” that prevents its reduction to immanent determinations 
(2005: 160).  
Put more simply, a metaxological metaphysics affirms the reality of difference by affirming 
both difference and unity.  It is able to do so because it locates the relationship between (the 
unity of) the two principles in a transcendence that lies beyond either, and thus is reducible 
to neither. Because the relationship (the unity) between the two principles is transcendent, 
it cannot be reduced to an immanent unity. This means that we cannot determine it by 
totalising an immanent model of unity, reducing away difference beneath this 
determination. This enables plurivocity within immanent unities; real difference between 
distinct particulars that are nevertheless unified. 
1.2.2. METAXIS, MYSTICISM AND ECCLESIOLOGY  
This metaxological metaphysics enables us to read the ecclesiology of the last chapter 
through the epistemology of chapter three. Analogously to how our thematic knowledge of 
God is conditioned by horizons that preclude its totalization, so too are our notions of 
ecclesial unity. Firstly, we noted in chapter three that God’s transcendence precludes 
reduction to immanent (thematic) determinations. Similarly, the unity of the Church also 
precludes such reductive determination. Secondly, just as our thematic knowledge is 
conditioned by a quantitative horizon, there is no absolute idea of unity to which the unity 
of the Church necessarily conforms, or which cannot be unsettled by the real unity that 
unveils itself over time in the life of the Church. Thus our notion of Church unity must be 
ever-expanding, always seeking to incorporate the novel expressions of the reality of this 
unity. Francis expresses this succinctly when he writes: “She is certainly a mystery rooted in 
the Trinity, yet she exists concretely in history as a people of pilgrims and evangelizers, 
transcending any institutional expression, however necessary” (EG §111). 
So what, then, is this transcendent reality from which the unity of the Church derives? We 
saw how LF answers these questions in the previous chapter: Francis writes that “[t]he unity 
of the Church in time and space is linked to the unity of the faith” (LF §40). That is, it derives 
from its unity as the collective Christian subject; specifically its formal, efficient, and final 
unity, which lies in its relation to the mystical object of its faith. It is from the efficient and 
final unity of this subjectivity that its transcendence derives: “Faith is ‘one’… because of the 
oneness of the God who is known and confessed. All the articles of faith speak of God; they 
are ways to know him and his works”. Francis develops this  along the lines that we have 
been following above when he continues to write that “[c]onsequently, their unity is far 
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superior to any possible construct of human reason” (LF §40). In short, the knowledge 
disclosed by this subjectivity is that of a reality which transcends our ideas of that reality. 
Here we return to the epistemology of LF: because our thematic knowledge (sight) of God is 
subject to the horizons of hearing, so to is our sight of Christian subjectivity as the disclosure 
of God.  
To put it more simply, Christian subjectivity is a matter of knowledge of the transcendent.126 
Proportional to its object, the scope of that knowledge has the capacity for similar 
transcendence, meaning that what can fall within the scope of that subjectivity cannot be 
determined from the outset. Consequently, the nature of that subjectivity itself, conceived 
in terms of what it encompasses, resists determination. Put more concretely (for example), 
even though the articles of faith have the capacity to encompass and assimilate everything 
the faith encounters (LF §48), this assimilation is to a transcendent unity which thus has the 
capacity to upset our determinations of what that assimilation will look like. In turn, this 
means that our understanding of those articles themselves, as that-which-assimilates (i.e. in 
terms of what they can mean with regards to the world), is similarly indeterminate. 
This then leads to the indeterminacy of its formal unity – that is, that it is ultimately 
constituted by the same vocation or intensionality, or a being “directed to the one Lord, to 
the life of Jesus, to the concrete history which he shares with us” (LF §40). Because this 
knowledge is disclosed in the amorous economy of touch, which is to say, encounter, it is 
bound to the media for this touch. In other words, it is bound to the elements of the context 
for the encounter, in which the encounter takes place. This means that this unity of 
intensionality must encompass within it all the various forms through which this intension is 
sustained. This too is potentially a site of transcendence, and certainly a site of 
indeterminacy, corresponding to the range of possibilities for this encounter. Thus our 
recognition of this unity (which we discussed in the previous chapter in terms of our 
expression of it in ‘Petrine’ forms and structures) must follow the mystical reality of that life. 
1.2.3. INCONSISTENCY AND PARADOX 
In summary, Francis’ epistemology in chapter three establishes a model of faith-knowledge 
which is fundamentally indeterminate. His Marian priority, read through a metaxological 
metaphysics, enables Francis to construe the unity of the Church in these terms. This enables 
him to authentically ‘think’ difference within unity, thereby incorporating the possible 
 
126 Over the determinations of sight 
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variation in form argued for in the last chapter within a Church that is nevertheless still 
meaningfully ‘unified’. 
Nevertheless, there is a qualification to our capacity to ‘think’ unity here: because there is 
no ideal unity under which immanent unities can be consistently determined, the unity that 
we must think is an inconsistent one. This inconsistency manifests as paradox. Milbank 
illustrates this with the analogy of a misty riverbank, as seen from a car travelling along it. 
On the one hand, distinct objects stand out all the more starkly as objects against the 
background of the mist – the equivocal, emerging from a transcendental univocity. On the 
other, the uniform blanket of the mist impresses itself all the more firmly upon the viewer in 
the way it contrasts with the objects framed within it – the univocal, emerging from a 
transcendental equivocity (2009: 160-1). 
The term “paradox” is useful here insofar as paradoxes need not be vicious, even though 
they do not accommodate themselves to thought. As with the misty vista, where the 
paradoxical interplay of univocal cloud and equivocal bodies requires us to recognise both 
the real and irreducible unity of the scene while also recognising the reality and irreducibility 
of the objects within it, so the paradoxical interplay of identity and diversity in Francis’ 
ecclesiology requires us to recognise both the real and irreducible difference of groups within 
the Church, while also recognising the real and irreducible unity between them. 
Furthermore, to extend the analogy, there is a unity to both the mist and the objects within 
it: ‘the riverbank’. However, from our vantage point travelling through it, there is nothing 
within our sight that would tell us this: surrounded on all sides by mist and trees, we might 
think it extends endlessly beyond us.  This unity transcends what we can see from our 
window. Similarly, the distinction between worldly and transcendent unity is a distinction 
between the ideal and the real; here shown to be what is conceived, and what is ultimately 
inconceivable. 
Moreover, as we progress into this unforeseen transcendence by rounding the next corner, 
we may be surprised by some object wholly unheralded by previous encounters, (yet still) 
irrupting from the mist. Similarly, the transcendence of the unity of unity and difference 
means that it possesses the capacity to rupture ideas and preconceptions of unity: we might 
find that unity and difference are related in such a way as to allow unforeseen and 




Indeed, just as any complete description of the riverbank must include the capacity of the 
mist to surprise us, our ideas of unity, if properly directed towards reality, must always 
indicate their inabsoluteness and non-totality. As a result, for Francis, when we talk about 
unity, we can only do so in awareness that true unity cannot be reduced to any particular 
idea of unity that we may have. 
We can restate this explicitly in the language of the two horizons. The tension between the 
ideal and the real can be read as a reflection of the tension between our thematic knowledge, 
in which the world is ‘conceptualised’, and the transcendent reality of the divine on the 
other. Just as the absolute horizon of thematic knowledge in general means that there is 
both a qualitative horizon to that knowledge, and also a quantitative incompleteness to it, 
there is a limit to our ability to thematise the unity of the Church specifically. In this context, 
the ‘tension’ of the paradox can be understood as a ‘running up against’ those horizons.127 
1.2.4. PARADOX AND INDIFFERENCE 
This also enables us to tie up the loose thread that is the question of indifference, and the 
related issue of inculturation. In Milbank’s valley, the figures which emerge from the mist 
have unity, even as they differ. Similarly, while Francis’ notion of unity is indeterminate, he 
nevertheless has a notion of unity. He does not endorse an equivocal model of the Church. 
This in turn means that he does not necessarily treat the various cultures in which the faith 
is inculturated as generic. For Francis, as we have seen, faith is ultimately a response to an 
encounter. Moreover, the encounter from which faith is born can occur within an 
indeterminate range of forms. This means that a culture’s capacity to acquire faith is not 
contingent upon its acquisition of a determinate set of forms. Of course, Francis identifies 
four ‘storehouses’ of the Church’s memory, but we also noted that he does not restrict 
memory to these four forms. This in turn means that a culture does not need to receive a 
particular set of forms in order to acquire faith. It could also (hypothetically) encounter God 
within its own set of forms. In such a case, there is no transplanting of forms such that the 
cultures must be treated as generic. But nor is there a transplanting of faith: the new faith of 
the culture is linked inseparably to its particular theophanic forms. Faith and culture maintain 
their “particularity”, and faith cannot be considered as an “abstraction” (Ratzinger, 1993: 
Online). If there is anything generic or abstract, it is the idea of ‘an encounter’ (that is, not 
 




the encounters themselves), by which faith and form are united in their particular unities. 
But all this is to say that there is some overarching descriptive category which obtains here.128 
This descriptive genericity is enabled by the indeterminacy of Christian unity. What it 
expresses is that the real unity of the Church falls across apparent or ideal distinctions. This, 
however, does not negate these distinctions – as Francis’ third principle reminds us, our 
relationship to reality is a tensioned one, where reality is one pole of an ideal dialectic that 
also incorporates the ideal register itself in which these distinctions manifest. In other words, 
we cannot help but ‘think’ them. 
2. THE CRITICAL CHALLENGE OF MARIAN PRIORITY 
To summarise: for Francis, the unity of the Church is a function of a shared encounter with 
God. This encounter takes place through a range of distinct cultural forms, giving a 
paradoxical plurivocity to the unity of the Church. These forms, while different, can 
nevertheless be read as meaningfully unified. This is because the relationship between (that 
is, the unity between) unity and difference as such is a function of a transcendent reality, and 
thus does not reduce to (immanent) ideas of unity by which differences might be excluded 
in thought. To put it differently, there is no idea of unity which can be adequately totalised 
such that it can determine the unity of the Church.  
We can restate this in terms of Francis’ Marian priority in order to frame it in a more 
concrete, ecclesial sense. There is a Marian dynamic at the heart of our conceptions of 
 
128 Of course, the question of whether such inculturation, as opposed to inter-culturality, has ever 
happened is an entirely different one. This question must be approached carefully in light of the 
violent colonialism that has facilitated the globalisation of Christianity, not in the least because 
narratives of inculturation, which emphasise the integrity of evangelised cultures, can obscure 
histories of violent transformation. For example, (the historical individual) Francis’ emphasis on 
inculturation can be read as part of an apologetic against the damning ‘black legend’ of Spanish 
colonialism in South America. Against this, Francis venerates the Jesuit reducciones as an example of 
inculturating evangelism; an ethical origin for Catholic identity in Argentina, which in turn grants an 
inherited value to that identity (Rourke, 2016b: 38-40). However, Crocitti recognises that the 
reducciones involved the imposition of an alien regime involving economic exploitation and 
disciplinary violence (2002: 11-12). This indicates a more troubling legacy, which is obscured by 
narratives of inculturation. 
That said, perhaps even more worrying is the ease with which Ratzinger talks about the 
“healing pass-over of a culture” in which “[o]nly appearing to die, the culture actually rises, coming 
fully into its own for the first time”. This image is premised upon the idea that all cultures arise from 
a “universal human disposition for the truth”, and are therefore fulfilled when they are shaped by 
Christian truth, which he uses to dispute the idea that cultural evangelism is violence at all, instead 
characterising it as an exchange that “leads [the colonised culture] to its own center” and 
“redemption” (1993: Online). A critical reader would claim here that he merely tries to excuse colonial 
violence by portraying it as sanctifying. In this vein, although a theory of inter-culturality can help us 
to recognise violent transformations of culture, it also has the potential to baptize it. 
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ecclesial unity, which must thus follow the continued expression of that mystery in diverse 
and novel historical contexts. We must therefore recognise the transcendence of that 
mystical unity over our (immanent) ideas of unity, and its capacity to unsettle them. 
Von Balthasar, from whom we drew our Marian-Petrine terminology, links the Marian to 
martyrdom. For von Balthasar, the Marian Church is defined by its openness to revelation, 
and obedience to it. Its paradigmatic action is the Marian fiat, with its “truly unlimited 
availability” that freely consents to the infinite mystery and demand of the divine. Just as 
Mary’s fiat allowed her to give birth to Christ, the Marian Church by its fiat anticipates the 
redemption offered by God, opening the present to in “infiniti capax” to respond to grace 
(von Balthasar, 1986: 206-7). This is most fully realised in “the Ernstfall [decisive moment]”, 
in which the total sacrifice of one’s being in a response to God’s love is made (Balthasar, 
1969: 37). 
In chapter three, we identified a key distinction between Francis’ vision and that of Veritatis 
Splendor: each operates under what might be described as aesthetics of obedience, 
expressed most fully in terms of a kind of ‘martyrdom’. As we saw, for Francis, martyrdom 
might be conceived in terms of a surrender of one’s capacity over the transcendence of the 
divine. Thus the acme of the moral life is an ‘unselfing’ refusal to assert oneself as knower 
over what is properly transcendent. 
Just as for von Balthasar, Francis’ Marian priority thus demands an obedience, which is 
expressed in the ‘martyrdom’ of ‘unselfing’ before transcendence. Read in the context of his 
ecclesiology, as mediated by his epistemology, one instance of this transcendence is the true 
unity of the Church. This provides the basis for a critical response to the paranoid ecclesiology 
in VS. As we saw, for VS, martyrdom expresses the ultimate surrender of one’s will before 
the demands of the law, which is unilaterally mediated by the historical teachings of the 
Magisterium. Thus acme of the moral life is found in an ‘unquestioning’ obedience to those 
teachings. This obedience involves staying within the bounds of the unity of the Christian life 
as laid out by those teachings. Hence it also involves a recognition of an absolute, total, 




Francis makes something like this critique in his analysis of modern “gnosticism” 129  in 
Gaudete et Exsultate. Gnosticism offers the false consolation of a model of faith that “can 
appear to possess a certain harmony or order that encompasses everything” (GE §38). It 
invokes the illusion that we possess “explanations [that] can make the entirety of the faith 
and the Gospel perfectly comprehensible”. This belief leads gnostics to “absolutize their own 
theories and force others to submit to their way of thinking” (GE §39).  
Francis condemns this as “an anthropocentric immanentism disguised as Catholic truth”. At 
its heart is the attempt to supplant “mystery and grace” with human “power” (GE §48); a 
“false holiness” (GE §35) that refuses the ‘unselfing’ necessary to the Christian life. Instead, 
it seeks to totalise our (thematic) knowledge, enabling the determination of the 
transcendent according to that knowledge, thereby subverting the Marian priority proper to 
the Church. 
Ultimately, VS is not a gnostic document, because it lacks the fundamental motivation of 
contemporary gnosticism to measure holiness by our capacity to “understand the complexity 
of certain doctrines” (GE §37). In contrast, as we saw previously, for VS, holiness is a matter 
of obedience to the pronouncements of the Magisterium. Similarly, the immanentism of 
gnosticism is “inherently anthropocentric”, substituting God and the Other for a 
fundamentally subjective consolation of a false certainty (Barrett, 2018: 120). In contrast, 
while we might argue that VS provides this sense of certainty, it nevertheless does so through 
adopting a transcendent orientation that cannot simply be dismissed as subjectivism. 
However, for VS, this orientation is nevertheless one wholly determined according to a 
totalised set of particular historical (i.e. immanent) mediations. As such, there is a parallel 
between gnostic determination by totalisation, and the paranoid hermeneutics of VS. In this 
vein, Francis recognises in gnosticism the reflexive totality that we have identified with 
paranoid hermeneutics: because it “considers its own vision of reality to be perfect”, it “feeds 
on itself and becomes even more myopic” (GE §40).  
Against this, Francis’ Marian priority reminds us that the transcendence of the divine stands 
over our capacity as knowers, rupturing this totality and thereby manifesting indeterminacy. 
Thus Francis opposes gnostic totalisation to the non-totality and indeterminacy which is 
associated with true transcendence: the gnostic “wants everything to be clear and sure 
 
129 We ought to read this as ‘gnosticism’ in the sense of its having “general common features” with 
the ancient heresy, rather in terms of direct equivalence (CDF, 2018: §3). 
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presumes to control God’s transcendence”. However, “God infinitely transcends us; he is full 
of surprises”. As a result, “[w]e are not the ones to determine when and how we will 
encounter him” (GE §41). This criticism thus obtains with regards to paranoid hermeneutics 
in theology, even if they are not strictly gnostic.  
The danger of VS, then, is that it establishes the same kind of dangerous totalization and 
determination with regards to the unity of the Church. Moreover, there is a further crucial 
parallel between VS and contemporary gnosticism. Whereas gnosticism asserts the self as 
knower over the transcendence of the divine, VS might be described as invoking a kind of 
‘institutional gnosticism’, asserting the historical Magisterium as the operator of thematic 
knowledge. Although this institutional focus means that the individual is no longer central to 
this relationship, this still disrupts the proper ordering of thematic and mystical knowledge, 
and thus asserts the immanent over and against the transcendent. It is just that, rather than 
asserting individual knowers over and against mystery, it asserts the Petrine over and against 
the Marian.  
2.2. ALTERITY AND TOTALIZATION 
This contrast is played out with regards to alterity. Francis places alterity at the heart of his 
ecclesiology. He does so in four ways, which we saw in the previous chapter: firstly, 
evangelism takes place in the encounter with others. As such, alterity is a condition of the 
Church. Secondly, because of this, the Church’s mission is ultimately one directed towards 
alterity. In other words, alterity is the end of the Church. Thirdly, Francis recognises the 
dependence of the Church on the world for the forms in which people encounter God. 
Because the cultures which supply these forms are plural, the Church itself is plurivocal. In 
other words, alterity is an inescapable feature of the Church. Finally alterity within the 
Church can be conceived of as an expression of plenitudinous divinity, and an opportunity 
for faith. As such, alterity becomes associated with the good of the Church. 
Furthermore, this openness to alterity is itself a mode of the ‘unselfing’ which Francis 
recognises as the acme of Christian life. Gruber argues that EG’s focus on outreach in 
evangelization and pastoral practices situates the Church within the world, thereby 
identifying the world as its theological locus. In doing so, Francis enacts a kind of “kenosis”, 
wherein the Church surrenders any false claims to docetic ahistoricity, and instead comes to 
embody the message of Christ in its original incarnational medium. In doing so, it recognises 
that revelation “can never be safely contained in the teachings of the church”, and that 
“[o]nly by getting lost in the world can the Church get a grasp on revelation” (Gruber, 2017b: 
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69). Thus Francis is lead to a model of the Church which “does not allow for clear-cut 
definitions of church and world, but makes for blurred, leaking, and shifting borders between 
them” (2017b: 70). Even as the Church professes revelation, it does so from within history. 
For Francis, to embrace alterity as the condition of this profession is to embrace the 
immanence of the Church, and the transcendence of the divine over it. Thus, as Francis puts 
it in GE, we cannot “claim to say where God is not, because God is mysteriously present in 
the life of every person, in a way that he himself chooses, and we cannot exclude this by our 
presumed certainties”. This means that true discernment, which is “guided by the Spirit” and 
not pretensions to a total knowledge, “can and must try to find the Lord in every human life” 
(GE §21). 
In contrast, VS was written as part of a defensive reaction against an epistemological crisis in 
moral theology. Its purpose was to reaffirm the boundaries of the discipline, and to criticise 
violations of those boundaries. We might describe this by way of an image: circling the 
wagons. This manoeuvre establishes a defensive perimeter. In doing so, it reconfigures the 
unity of the group around an ‘internal space’ that must be defended from threat; a process 
which itself creates the ‘internality’ of the defended space, and the ‘externality’ of the threat. 
Likewise, VS responds to the threat of tradition crisis with a paranoid movement that 
determines moral theology according to a model of total obedience to the Magisterium and 
its metaethics, negating anything which does not fall within the bounds of this determination 
as ‘outside’ the Church.  
In other words, VS identifies indeterminacy with alterity, and its foreclosure of the former is 
performed by way of rejection of its embodiment in the latter. Firstly, it rejects the theologies 
that transgress the boundaries it sets out – the known threats anticipated and identified as 
such by the paranoid hermeneutic. Secondly, and more radically, it rejects the alterity 
represented by the negativity at the heart of the tradition crisis itself; the bad surprise of a 
threat that overturns the hermeneutic. 
This denial of historicity and plurivocity further aligns VS with contemporary gnosticism, and 
opens it up to critiques of the latter. Francis contrasts gnostic ‘virtue’ with the true seat of 
holiness in charity, which is oriented towards the historical encounter with others. Gnostics 
“think of the intellect as separate from the flesh, and thus become incapable of touching 
Christ’s suffering flesh in others”, instead being concerned with “abstractions” (GE §37).  
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This enables gnosticism to negate historicity and its plurality – a negation which Francis 
juxtaposes against the “concrete simplicity” of the Gospel. He associates this concreteness 
with pluralism, and opposes both to gnostic unity, writing that “some currents of Gnosticism 
scorned the concrete simplicity of the Gospel and attempted to replace the trinitarian and 
incarnate God with a superior Unity” (GE §43). This association is elucidated further in the 
next passage, which notes that  
In effect, doctrine, or better, our understanding and expression of it, “is not a closed 
system… The questions of our people, their suffering, their struggles, their dreams, 
their trials and their worries, all possess an interpretational value that we cannot 
ignore if we want to take the principle of the incarnation seriously…” 
(GE §44)130 
In this context, the concreteness of the gospel refers to the role historical context plays in its 
interpretation. The historical pluralism of the Church implies multiple sites of interpretation. 
In contrast, Gnosticism rejects the historical in favour of the ideal, simultaneously negating 
this pluralism. 
We noted previously that VS is not, ultimately, a gnostic document. Nevertheless, there is a 
parallel here between the negation of history as a site of indeterminacy in gnosticism, and 
the paranoid totalization of an idea of unity in VS, which precludes the historical irruption of 
difference within the unity of the Church as conceived by Francis. Francis recognises history 
as a site of indeterminacy which can disrupt the totality of our ideas of unity, indicating the 
transcendence of the reality of the unity of the Church over them. In contrast, both VS and 
gnosticism totalise an ideal unity, and negate history as a site of this indeterminacy.  
Thus Francis challenges both gnosticism and paranoia when he writes that “in the Church 
there legitimately coexist different ways of interpreting many aspects of doctrine and 
Christian life” (GE §43). Similarly to how we saw previously, he contextualises this in terms 
of mystery, writing that it “is not easy to grasp the truth that we have received from the Lord. 
And it is even more difficult to express it. So we cannot claim that our way of understanding 
this truth authorizes us to exercise a strict supervision over others’ lives” (GE §43) That is, 
recognising the legitimate plurivocity of the Church is part of recognising the transcendence 
 
130 Francis quotes his Video Message to Participants in an International Theological Congress held at 
the Pontifical Catholic University of Argentina (1-3 September 2015) (2015e: Online) here. In this 
context, we are reading “interpretation” in terms of “understanding and expression”. Following our 
last chapter, we are reading these in terms of credere in Deum, rather than credere Deum. 
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of the truth that it seeks to express over the particular forms within it. Gnosticism, in seeking 
to totalize an ideal notion of unity in order to create a monolithic vision of the Church, asserts 
the ideal over a mystery that transcends it. The same can be said for paranoia. 
3. CONCLUSION: THE CHALLENGE OF UNSELFING 
In short, both LF and VS are ultimately concerned with living before the truth. They share the 
fundamental premise that the Christian life is one of obedience before the transcendence of 
the truth. However, LF recognises that this transcendence is not only over the will, such that 
this recognition expresses itself in an unquestioning obedience to a unilateral authority, but 
is also over knowledge. Consequently, it has a capacity to unsettle us, to the point that this 
obedience requires a surrendering of determination and totality in knowledge. In this 
chapter, we have argued that the unity of the Church enjoys this transcendence, and this 
indeterminacy can be embodied in alterity. Because we cannot occupy a position whereby 
the limits of this unity can be determined, there is always the possibility of an alterity arising 
within it that subverts our conceptions of that unity. Thus we must surrender claims to 
determination, totality, and absoluteness in our conceptions of the unity of the Church. 
However, as we have argued in the previous chapter, we can nevertheless embrace these 
limitations with hope – that is, with positive affect. In this way, Francis lays the ground for 
an ecclesiology which approaches difference reparatively. 
This critique is doubtless controversial, not least because it is a critique of a document that 
has been afforded authority within the recent tradition. The issue of how to approach it 
alongside our commitments to paranoid documents such as VS as part of the tradition is an 
important one. If apt, it requires us to reconsider how we view VS. Alternatively, perhaps 
their possibility indicates a dangerous trajectory in Francis’ teachings which needs to be 
corrected. On this point, there is much discussion about the continuity of Francis’ teachings 
and the tradition immediately prior to him, and the topic lies beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However, it is worth noting how this critique adds to this debate.  
Firstly, it is worth reiterating that both Francis as we have read him and VS agree in 
fundamental ways. Although we have identified fundamental differences, they share a 
common insight into the primacy of truth in theology, and a common ‘obediential’ sensibility 
– even if they disagree on what precisely constitutes this obedience. As such, we are not 
faced wholly with an ‘either-or’ decision between the two. 
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Secondly, part of this critique has been the argument that VS (as we have read it) pushes the 
Magisterium beyond its proper bounds so as to reverse the proper relationship between the 
Marian and the Petrine. This raises further questions about the position of VS in the tradition 
as such, which destabilizes the ‘easy’ resolution of accepting or rejecting Francis based on 
perceived continuity or discontinuity with those documents.  
Thirdly, at the heart of our critique is the issue of the proper relationship between the Church 
and mystery, and the capacities of its institutions to ‘know’ that mystery in certain senses. 
The past two chapters have shown how Francis frames this issue epistemologically and 
ecclesiologically, and in doing so have integrated our critique into this wider field of 
systematic considerations. As such, it cannot be addressed in a purely doctrinal register. 
We ought to also recognise the corresponding challenge that VS, and indeed the wider 
paranoid tradition, presents to Francis. As we saw previously, VS was written in response to 
a tradition crisis in moral theology, in which the canons of rationality which previously 
determined the discipline were disrupted. The result of this was the gradual fragmentation 
of the discipline, with no universal measure of success available to reorient inquiry. In this 
context, the encyclical’s rejection of alterity and the indeterminacy it embodies is one rooted 
in a recognition of very real dangers, including radical danger. In this context, we ought to 
ask: does Francis’ stance towards alterity and indeterminacy include the radical alterity and 
indeterminacy that VS ultimately seeks to foreclose? And if so, how does he contend with 
the very real danger involved, as embodied in the tradition crisis that ultimately motivated 
VS? 
On this point, something conspicuously absent in this thesis so far is a treatment of doctrinal 
issues in truth. In the last chapter, we saw how the unity of the Church can incorporate 
variations in doctrinal form. However, we explicitly treated this variation as an issue of 
credere in Deum, rather than credere Deum. Moreover, in our third chapter, we discussed 
how Francis’ epistemology places conditions of indeterminacy, non-totality and 
inabsoluteness upon our thematic knowledge. This would seem to apply to doctrine. 
Furthermore, in this chapter, we have resurrected this theme, but only in the limited context 
of conceptions of ecclesial unity. This omission skates over a tension in our reading of Francis, 
between his critique of paranoid determination and totalization, and his dogmatic 
commitments. Near the beginning of the chapter, we noted a fundamental contrast between 
Francis and Buber in that the latter refuses dogma as an immanentizing reduction of God 
from Thou to it (see Buber, 2013: 78). Along these lines, we might ask: how does Francis 
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maintain his commitment to both (indeterminate) transcendence and (determinate) dogma? 
Can he do so within the terms of this critique? Our next chapter will answer these questions. 
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VI. THE REPARATIVE COSMOLOGY OF LAUDATO SI’ 
 
In our third chapter, we read LF as outlining an epistemology which serves as the basis for a 
reparative hermeneutics in Catholic theology. We developed this in order to produce an 
account of ecclesial unity which opens up the possibility for a reparative hermeneutics of 
alterity within the Church. 
This epistemology understands knowledge as arising from an encounter with God as Other. 
This encounter gives rise to knowledge in a primordial, unthematic register, which Francis 
refers to as touch. This then provides the basis for reflective, thematic knowledge which 
Francis refers to as sight. In this encounter, God’s alterity manifests as a transcendence over 
thematic knowledge. As a result, sight is bounded by two horizons: firstly, a qualitative 
horizon, which denotes the limits of thematicity as such before the reality of this encounter. 
Secondly, a quantitative horizon, denotes the expansion of sight into the field of touch. 
Francis illustrates this boundedness of knowledge by way of the metaphor of hearing. 
The condition of hearing provides the basis for a reparative hermeneutics by thwarting the 
totalisation and absolutisation of, and the determination of the world by, thematic 
knowledge. Firstly, the presence of horizons indicates that thematic knowledge is never 
total. Similarly, because it is a function of unthematic touch, it can never be absolute, but 
rather is always relative to the encounter. This opens up the possibility of its being unsettled. 
Finally, because sight is neither total nor absolute, there is always the possibility of 
indeterminacy before it. 
To illustrate this dynamic, chapter three looked to the example of mercy in Amoris Laetitia. 
We argued that mercy, for Francis, is the complement of justice in the field of sight. Touch, 
which transcends sight, and therefore any specific set of determinations by it, mediates the 
relationship between the two, enabling the determinations of justice to be superseded by 
those of mercy. In chapters four and five, we looked to how the unity of the Church 
transcends the determinations of any specific ideas of unity. 
Chapter four moved from this to explore Francis’ ecclesiology in light of his emphasis on 
evangelization. We argued that, for Francis, the form and structures of the Church properly 
conceived are relative goods to that of this encounter. This enables pluralism in matters of 
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credere in Deum,131 corresponding to the amount of authentic variation in the conditions in 
which this encounter takes place.  
In chapter five, we then looked to how Francis conceives of unity in this context, returning 
to the epistemology of chapter three in order to articulate an analogous conception of 
ecclesial unity, which incorporates and sustains the difference and alterity made possible by 
his ecclesiology. In short, chapter five argued that Francis conceives of the unity of the 
Church as a function of a transcendent unity which cannot be reduced away through 
determination by any specific idea of unity. This is because it is directed towards the 
transcendent reality of God, and thus possesses within itself the capacity to disclose 
transcendence in knowledge, first, as unthematic, primordial touch; and then partially as 
reflective, thematic sight. That is, the scope of this subjectivity corresponds to the 
transcendence of its object. The upshot of this is that, just as the reality of God transcends 
our ideas of God, the reality of this scope transcends our ideas of it. As a result, just as the 
transcendence of God means that our thematic knowledge of God is always conditioned by 
the horizons of hearing, and therefore subject to indeterminacy, non-totality, and relativity, 
so too are our ideas of ecclesial unity. 
Throughout these chapters, our discussion of this subjectivity has been limited to its 
knowledge of our own relationship to God. Chapter three spoke about it in abstract terms, 
but then illustrated it in relation to the logic of mercy; chapter four then set it aside to focus 
on the relationship between encounter and ecclesial structures; and chapter five only 
returned to it in order to talk about the role of that knowledge in relation to the form of 
Christian subjectivity. This means that a major question has been left hanging: to what extent 
does Francis’ epistemology hold in the context of knowledge of things beyond one’s personal 
encounter with God? This leads to the further question: to what extent does our thematic 
knowledge in general manifest the accompanying indeterminacy, non-totality, and relativity?  
This chapter seeks to answer this question. It does so by looking to Laudato Si’.132 LS presents 
a vision of the cosmos in which the relationship between humans, other creatures, and God 
are central organising features. Francis states that the creation accounts in the book of 
Genesis “suggest that human life is grounded in three fundamental and closely intertwined 
relationships: with God, with our neighbour and with the earth itself”. In this context, sin is 
 
131 Relational, trusting belief ‘in’ God. 
132 Hereafter, LS 
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the “rupture” of these relationships, which arose through our “presuming to take the place 
of God and refusing to acknowledge our creaturely limitations” (LS §66). 
This establishes a basic relational context for understanding creation, which Francis 
elaborates upon throughout the encyclical. These relationships are understood to be 
interrelated: Francis cites the story of Cain and Abel, wherein Cain is “cursed from the 
ground” for murdering his brother, as showing how “[d]isregard for the duty to cultivate and 
maintain a proper relationship with my neighbour, for whose care and custody I am 
responsible, ruins my relationship with my own self, with others, with God, and with the 
earth” (LS §66).133 Pertinent to our thesis are two broad dynamics of relation: firstly, ontic 
relations between creatures; and secondly, metaphysical ones between creatures and God, 
into which other creatures are incorporated. Both of these have implications for extending 
the epistemology of LF to cover wider knowledge. 
We will start with ontic relations (i.e. relations between creatures). In section 1, we will argue 
that LS establishes a ‘relational ontology’ that construes our knowledge of other creatures 
primarily in terms of encounter, as seen in chapter three. We will continue to argue that this 
can be read as being underpinned by a Thomist134 metaphysics of analogy, in which the 
nature of the world is analogous to the divine nature: for Francis, the life of the Trinity shows 
God’s nature to be one of encounter, and creation resembles God in this specific form of 
relationality. We will then anticipate the charge that Francis offers a ‘social Trinitarianism’, 
problematised by Kilby (2000) and Tonstad (2016). We will argue that he actually presents a 
 
133 In this vein, Biviano (2017) identifies “social love” as a key virtue for ecological responsibility in LS. 
Similarly, Dávila (2017) argues that the concern for the environment in LS cannot be separated out 
from, but rather must be read through (without reducing it to), its concern for the poor. 
134  It is worth saying something about our appropriation of Aquinas here. This thesis employs a 
‘reader-centered’ hermeneutic which aims to construct the meaning of Francis’ texts through the 
process of appropriation, rather than ‘uncovering’ some original authorial intention, or using it as a 
proxy to pose questions to the author. The strength of Thomas in this context is that, under certain 
readings, he presents a metaphysics that is both illuminative of Francis in this instance, and also 
already integrated into the tradition in a broad fashion. My use of “broad” is deliberate: as Kerr notes, 
contemporary readings of Aquinas “are so conflicting, and even incommensurable, that integrating 
them into a single interpretation seems impossible” (2002: 15-16). Thus it is hard to claim that any 
one reading of Aquinas is to be identified with the tradition specifically. Nevertheless, the fact that 
the (multivocal, ambiguous) figure of Thomas is one that is incorporated within ‘the Tradition’ means 
that the illumination he provides is broadly intelligible, and therefore receivable, in a more-or-less 
uncontroversially Catholic context. This facilitates the appropriation of Francis’ texts in our reading.  
To this end, our reading of Thomas is at the service of our reading of Francis, rather than the 
other way round. We are not, therefore, trying to claim that Francis possesses an authoritative 
‘Thomist’ identity. In this context, we will take our reading of Aquinas from Oliver (2017), the strength 
of Oliver’s reading here being that it foregrounds these illuminative features. For a more in-depth 
discussion of the rationale behind these hermeneutical decisions, see chapter two. We will also return 
to the question of situating Francis in the tradition in our concluding chapter. 
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‘Trinitarian apophaticism’ that actively resists the perils that Kilby associates withattempts 
at ‘Trinitarian’ ontologies, as well as one from Surin with regards to analogical metaphysics. 
We will then move to metaphysical relations (i.e. relations between creatures and God). In 
section 2, we will argue that LS also portrays creation as a site of encounter with God. We 
will argue that it does so in a way that renders our knowledge of creation as inextricable from 
our knowledge of God in this encounter. This in turn means that this knowledge of creation 
is conditioned by hearing as it manifests in that knowledge of God. 
Together, these two arguments show how our knowledge of creation in general is bound by 
the conditions of hearing. In doing so, it expands the scope of these conditions to all 
knowledge, including credere Deum,135 and not merely credere in Deum. 
1. A RELATIONAL ONTOLOGY 
Francis construes relationships between creatures in terms which seem to mirror the 
interpersonal mysticism of LF. We will argue that these relationships can be understood as 
ones of ‘encounter’ along these lines. This is even the case for relationships with non-person 
creatures, which analogically resemble encounters with the Other. We can explain this in 
reference to themes within LS that bear out parallels with Aquinas’ metaphysics of analogy, 
which enable us to conceive of this resemblance in terms of an analogical metaphysics 
wherein the origin of creation in the relational inner life of the Trinity is born out in a 
resemblance in creatures. 
1.1. RELATING TO CREATURES 
Francis construes ontic relations in interpersonal terms. Early in the encyclical, Francis 
identifies a need for an “integral ecology”, which goes beyond the “language” of natural 
science and “takes us to the heart of what it is to be human” (LS §11). He sees the life of St 
Francis of Assisi as exemplifying this approach:  
  
 
135 Doctrinal belief ‘about’ God 
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Just as happens when we fall in love with someone, whenever he would gaze at the 
sun, the moon or the smallest of animals, he burst into song, drawing all other 
creatures into his praise. He communed with all creation, even preaching to the 
flowers, inviting them “to praise the Lord, just as if they were endowed with reason”… 
to him each and every creature was a sister united to him by bonds of affection. 
(LS §11) 
This passage integrates two significant themes: firstly, that of communion; St. Francis 
“communed with all creation”. Secondly, that of interpersonality, attributed to this 
communion by the analogy between St. Francis’ gaze upon other creatures and that of the 
lover upon the beloved; as well as specifying that St. Francis directly addressed flowers, and 
considered creatures as siblings. 
In a similar vein, Francis notes that “the laws found in the Bible dwell on relationships, not 
only among individuals but also with other living beings” (LS §69). Likewise, Francis sees in 
human nature the presupposition of the possibility of encounter with creation. He writes 
that humans possess among all creation “their own personal identity” and capacity to enter 
“into dialogue” not only “with God himself”, but also “with others” (LS §81). 
Francis sees even our basic physical existence as one of relation to creatures. He writes that 
embodiment as inextricable from encounter and relation with Others and the natural world, 
as it “establishes us in a direct relationship with the environment and with other living 
beings”. This is, at least in part, because our bodily existence is one constitutive dimension 
of our identity in relation - as Francis implies when he writes that “valuing one’s own body 
in its femininity or masculinity is necessary if I am going to be able to recognize myself in an 
encounter with someone who is different” (LS §155).  
Finally, Francis calls for an “ecological conversion”, in which the changes involved lead to “a 
spirit of generous care, full of tenderness” (LS §220). The term, “tenderness” has 
interpersonal connotations. In Amoris Laetitia, Francis praises tenderness as a virtue which 
exhibits the law of love (AL §27). He illustrates this virtue by way of the image of “a babe 
sleeping in his mother’s arms after being nursed”, in “a closeness that is conscious and not 
simply biological” (AL §28). He develops this when he writes: 
Tenderness… is a sign of a love free of selfish possessiveness. It makes us approach a 
person with immense respect and a certain dread of causing them harm or taking 
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away their freedom. Loving another person involves the joy of contemplating and 
appreciating their innate beauty and sacredness, which is greater than my needs. 
(AL §127) 
In our third chapter, we followed Abrams in noting that Francis’ ethic of obedience is one of 
“unselfing” before the Other (2017: 156). Tenderness expresses this ethic of unselfing, hence 
Francis’ next line is the one which Oltvai (2018: 318) uses to define the loving economy of 
encounter: “The aesthetic experience of love is expressed in that “gaze” which contemplates 
other persons as ends in themselves” (AL §128). In describing the spirit fostered by the 
attitudes engendered by an ecological conversion as ‘tender’, Francis thus portrays it as 
intrinsically interpersonal. Thus the attitude to creation to which Francis exhorts us is a 
fundamentally interpersonal one, defined by a dynamic of love towards creation as an 
Other.136 
1.2. DO WE “ENCOUNTER” NON-PERSON CREATURES? 
This raises a question: many aspects of creation are not persons. Consequently, it seems odd 
for them to be able to occupy the position of Other, which, at least as far as we have seen it 
so far, seems intrinsically bound up in conditions of personality. In this vein, Francis explicitly 
states that humans possess a “uniqueness” in respect of their “personal identity” and 
“capacity to enter into dialogue with others and with God himself” (LS §81). This seems to 
cut against Francis’ identification of non-human creation as something that we can relate to 
in the sense of the I-Thou. However, equally, the consistency of this imagery raises questions 
about whether it can be dismissed as mere metaphor. A more careful reading of LS provides 
us with the material for a broadly Thomist metaphysics of analogy in which this imagery can 
be taken literally. In doing so, it provides the basis for a metaphysics that coheres with the 
themes of indeterminacy, non-totality, and inabsoluteness that we have been following 
throughout this thesis. 
One illuminating statement by Francis is his careful specification that we must not identify 
creation with God, writing that “there is an infinite distance between God and the things of 
this world, which do not possess his fullness” (LS §88). In parsing the distinction in this way, 
he reveals something of what is going on here. We noted in chapter two that this language 
 
136 In LS, this theme of ‘unselfing’ also takes on a more straightforwardly ascetic sense: Francis calls 
for “modesty, humility, and simplicity” which refuses desires for destructive practices and instant 
gratification, as well as appreciating and being satisfied with what we have (Christie, 2017: 123-124; 
c.f. LS §222). 
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of “fullness” evokes Francis’ first principle in EG §222-225. In this, Francis writes that ““time” 
has to do with fullness as an expression of the horizon which constantly opens before us, 
while each individual moment has to do with limitation as an expression of enclosure” (EG 
§222). In short, then, the distinction between creatures and God is an eschatological one.  
Francis repeats this language in his earlier statement that the purpose of all creatures can be 
found in “a common point of arrival, which is God, in that transcendent fullness where the 
risen Christ embraces and illumines all things” (EG §83). While this, in itself, is relatively 
unclear, it nevertheless clarifies the above distinction further: the eschatological destiny of 
creatures, which God possesses and the possession of which lies at the heart of the 
distinction between God and creatures, is found in God. In other words, what sets God aside 
from creation is precisely that God is God. 
In short, for Francis, the distinction between creatures and God in this instance lies not in 
some third term in relation to which they are both mediated, but in the divine Being itself. 
We find a similar idea in Aquinas’ understanding of divine and created existence. For 
Aquinas, God’s perfection entails impassibility. Aquinas conceives of change in terms of 
difference in the context of continuous identity. In order to articulate this, Aquinas 
distinguishes between a being’s substance (its unchanging essential identity), and its 
accidents (the different properties it may or may not possess in existence). These concepts 
enable him to articulate change in terms of an immutable substance manifesting different 
combinations of accidents. In this context, in order for God to be impassable, God must lack 
accidents in which change occurs. Aquinas parses this in terms of an identity between the 
divine substance and the divine existence; what God is is fully and entirely expressed in how 
God is (see Summa Theologica I, q. 3, a. 4). This also means that God exists necessarily, by 
virtue of God’s identity or essence, rather than by virtue of accidental conditions 
(contingently). To put it differently, God’s existence is identical to God’s essence (Oliver, 
2017: 45-6; see ST I, q. 4, a. 6). 
In contrast, creation exists contingently; its existence is distinct from its essence. This is what 
is established by the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo: rather than existing “of its own power or 
by its own right”, creation exists by virtue of “that which exists in and of itself, namely God”, 
in whose existence it “participates” (Oliver, 2017: 47; see Summa Contra Gentiles, I.22.9). 
This identifies a fundamental distinction between creation and God which mirrors that 
drawn by Francis: creation is not that which necessitates its own existence; the substance of 
creation is distinct from the divine substance. 
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Francis’ characterisation of this distinction as being one of “infinite distance” resonates with 
Thomas’ recognition of what Oliver describes as a “radical and irreducible asymmetry 
between God and creation”, which arises from this distinction (2017: 48). Creation is entirely 
dependent upon God for its existence, yet God is entirely independent of creation (2017: 
50). Moreover, the relation between God and creation is entirely unmediated: because God 
creates ex nihilo, there is no third term which might mediate this relation. This means that 
there is nothing that God and creation have “in common”, in the sense of a mediating term; 
their difference is “not a difference of degree, nor a difference of kind” (2017: 51; see ST I, 
q.13, a. 7). 
This raises a challenge when talking about the divine “being”. On the one hand, we speak of 
God as possessing “being” in a sense. On the other, because of this radical distinction, this 
sense, if proper to God, must be radically different to that which we use for creaturely 
“being”. Aquinas expresses this similarity across the difference in terms of analogical 
language. This kind of language stands in distinction to two other types of language use, the 
terms for which we encountered in our discussion in the last chapter: firstly, there is 
equivocal language. This kind of language can have different intensions, as with the word 
“pitcher” between “the pitcher of beer” and “the baseball pitcher”. Secondly, there is 
univocal language use. Univocal language has only one intension. For example, “John’s 
wisdom” and “Peter’s wisdom” both use the terms “wisdom” in the same way (Oliver, 2017: 
66). In contrast, analogical language intends resemblance across difference. For example, it 
means different things to describe a husband and a dog as “faithful” (that is, the word is not 
being used univocally), but equally, nor are we using it entirely equivocally (2017: 67).  
For Aquinas, a specific kind of analogy holds between God and creatures: one of 
“attribution”. In this analogy, the resemblance between analogates lies in their “common 
focus”. Aquinas gives the example of ‘health’: we can describe a person as “healthy”, but 
also a complexion or diet. When we describe a person as “healthy”, we are talking about 
their possessing ‘health’ in themselves. However, when we describe their complexion or diet 
as “healthy”, we are not talking about the ‘health’ of the complexion or the diet in 
themselves. Rather talking about the way these object signify (in the case of complexion), or 
cause (in the case of diet) the health of the person. To put it differently, health is ascribed 
“primarily” to the person, and “secondarily” to health and complexion “by virtue of their 
relation to that person” (Oliver, 2017: 68; see ST I, q.13 a.5). This kind of analogy holds with 
regards to the “being” of God and creatures insofar as the being of creatures is by 
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participation in that of God: to claim that creatures have “being” in this context is to illustrate 
their causal dependency on God’s being. The ‘common focus’ of “being” in this context is 
God’s being, while the fact that one is dependent upon the other is the distinction between 
the two uses (2017: 72).137 
Francis himself touches on analogical metaphysics in LS §80, invoking Thomas’ understanding 
of divine activity. In doing so, Francis tacitly invokes the analogical metaphysics undergirding 
it: for Thomas, this divine activity is intelligibly “activity” because it bears out a resemblance 
to human activity, but is also of an entirely different metaphysical order – as illustrated in his 
example of human and divine art.138 Similarly, we saw in our last chapter how Francis rejects 
equivocal and univocal ecclesiologies, instead opting for a metaxological model in which 
difference is preserved within an intelligible (if not necessarily intuitive) unity. We might 
understand this metaxological unity as one of analogical resemblance, wherein each element 
is ‘Church’, albeit in distinct ways. This analogical language equips Francis to negotiate the 
relationship between encountering creation and God: when we ‘encounter’ creation, we do 
so in an analogical way to that in which we ‘encounter’ God through it.139 
As an explanation, this still seems obscure; just what does it mean to analogically 
“encounter” a non-person as Other? One way in which we might understand this is in terms 
of resemblance. Francis reminds us that “[t]he world was created by three Persons acting as 
a single divine principle” (LS §238). Recognising this, he writes, “suggests that the Trinity has 
left its mark on all creation” (LS §239). He references Bonaventure in order to elaborate on 
this when he writes,  
 
137 Interpreters such as McInnerny (1996) and Davies (1998, 2012) dispute this metaphysical reading 
of the analogy of being. These interpretive debates lie beyond the scope of this thesis, and are 
somewhat extrinsic to our use of Aquinas. Nevertheless, Oliver cites De principiis naturae VI.33-34, 
and Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics IV.535 as sources in which Aquinas gives it this 
metaphysical sense (2017: 72, footnote 14). 
138 In a further similarity, Oliver notes that the lack of mediation which undergirds this distinction in 
Aquinas means that God is “infinitely close to creation” (2017: 51). Likewise, in this Thomistic passage, 
Francis describes God as “intimately present to each being”, even as the divine action does not 
impinge on creaturely autonomy (LS §80). 
139 In doing so, however, he preserves the analogical distinction between God and creation. This 
problematises panentheistic readings of LS such as Daniels (2015: 330). 
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The Franciscan saint teaches us that each creature bears in itself a specifically 
Trinitarian structure, so real that it could be readily contemplated if only the human 
gaze were not so partial, dark and fragile. In this way, he points out to us the challenge 
of trying to read reality in a Trinitarian key. 
(LS §239) 
This ‘Trinitarian key’ serves to undergird a metaphysics which makes sense of analogous 
encounter. Citing Aquinas, Francis writes that just as “[t]he divine Persons are subsistent 
relations”, so too “the world, created according to the divine model, is a web of 
relationships”. Hence, “[c]reatures tend towards God, and in turn it is proper to every living 
being to tend towards other things, so that throughout the universe we can find any number 
of constant and secretly interwoven relationships” (LS §240). 140  In short, just as God’s 
substance is characterised by relations between Persons, so too is creation constituted by 
relations; between beings within creation and God, and, most pertinently here, between 
beings and other beings. 
However, Francis is more specific than this, continuing to write that  
The human person grows more, matures more and is sanctified more to the extent 
that he or she enters into relationships, going out from themselves to live in 
communion... In this way, they make their own that trinitarian dynamism which God 
imprinted in them when they were created. Everything is interconnected, and this 
invites us to develop a spirituality of that global solidarity which flows from the 
mystery of the Trinity. 
(LS §240) 
In this passage, Francis portrays the expression of the life of the Trinity within creation as 
specifically interpersonal. These expressions are relationships of “communion”, and embody 
“solidarity”; and it is specifically as “person[s]” that humans find their fulfilment in these 
relationships. Perhaps then, we can read Francis as taking not just the relational aspect of 
the Trinity as the model for cosmic order, but this relational aspect as specifically between 
persons. 
 
140 Francis cites here ST I, q. 11, a. 3; q. 21, a. 1, ad 3; q. 47, a. 3. 
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We can also account for this interpersonality via Aquinas. 141  Despite the radical and 
unmediated distinction between God and creation, Aquinas does not think that the relation 
between the two is an inscrutable one. Rather, the act of creation arises from the divine 
nature, which is the perichoretic relation of love between the persons of the Trinity. 
Following from his Aristotelean and Neoplatonic influences, Aquinas holds that effects 
resemble their causes – hence creation, as an expression of this love, is itself a relation of 
love. As such, the difference between God and creation, as Oliver puts it, “is a participation 
in, or trace of, the eternal differences and relations of the Godhead” (see ST I, q. 45, a.7). 
Moreover, this resemblance extends to creatures themselves, who Aquinas sees as 
manifesting a trinitarian nature of their own: just as the Father creates through the Son, 
whom Aquinas identifies with the Father’s knowledge; and the Spirit, whom Aquinas 
identifies with the Father’s will, so to do creatures possess both knowledge and will (2017: 
52; see ST I, q. 45, a. 6). In short, Aquinas sees the Trinitarian origins of creation reflected in 
its structure not merely as a general relationality, but in the specific relations between 
creatures themselves.  
We might read LS §240 as invoking a similar idea to Aquinas: creation resembles the Trinity 
not merely in being relational. 142  Rather the relationships within creation analogously 
resemble the relations themselves within the Trinity. The relations within the Trinity are 
relationships between Persons. Consequently, the relationships within creation resemble 
 
141 As before, we will be taking our reading of Aquinas from Oliver (2017), who makes many of the 
connections which illuminate Francis.  
Note also that Bonaventure shows little concern for issues such as the analogy of divine and 
creaturely being, which preoccupies Aquinas in his discussion of divine and creaturely resemblance, 
as well as our discussion below. Nevertheless, at least as Reynolds reconstructs it from its implicit 
deployment in Bonaventure’s writings, he also deploys a non-univocal theory of this resemblance, 
which he similarly grounds in the Aristotelean principle of effects resembling their causes (Reynolds, 
2003: 231; 238). These are key themes of our following discussion, intimating the alternative 
possibility of a systematic reading of LS via Bonaventure.  
142  Showing the willingness to make this move, at least in parallel, Francis explicitly states that 
creatures themselves have a Trinitarian structure internal to themselves (LS §238-239). However, he 
reads this in light of Bonaventure’s schema rather than Aquinas’. Edwards summarises this reading: 
“Each creature in its very existence represents the Source of All as the cause of its being; in its identity, 
each represents the Word of God as its exemplar; in its goodness, each represents the Spirit, who 
brings it to its final fulfilment” (2017: 88). Note also how the highly abstract nature of these 
correspondences resists more substantive identifications, unlike Aquinas’ more concrete, and thus 
more determinate, psychological Trinitarianism. We will return to this in our discussion of Kilby’s 
(2000) critique of social Trinitarianism below. 
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these ‘inter-Personal’ relationships, specifically in manifesting a creaturely ‘inter-
personality’.143 A being-in-relation is thus always analogously a being-in-relation. 
This is entirely compatible with the description of human personhood as “unique” (LS §81). 
In this context, it can be read as a restatement of humanity’s privileged nature as imago dei, 
possessing a higher degree of resemblance to God with regards to divine Personhood 
compared to the rest of creation.144 Nevertheless, under this reading, it is also meaningful to 
talk about wider relationships within creation in analogously interpersonal terms: the 
linguistic analogy tracks a metaphysical analogy. 
This also makes sense of Francis’ talk of encounter specifically in metaphysical terms. For 
Buber, relation is ultimately a phenomenological category. In contrast, in LF, Francis writes 
of Abraham that “[i]n the voice which speaks to him, the patriarch recognizes a profound call 
which was always present at the core of his being” (LF §11). Although in our third chapter we 
approached relation in terms of subjectivity, we can now speak of it without bracketing 
metaphysical claims. Similarly, this also makes sense of Francis’ association of encounter, 
and the transcendence of the Other within it, with “reality” in his third principle in EG: If the 
transcendent Other is a category within the ontology of relation, read in this way it is also a 
metaphysical one, and talk about it is talk about something beyond the ideal. Relation is a 
metaphysical category, expressed in metaphysical resemblance in the being-in-relation of 
creation. 
In short, then, we can read the interpersonal language of LS in the following way: for Francis, 
God is relational. Therefore, Francis’ ontology is one of relation, in which the being of 
creatures is figured in terms of a being-in-relation. This can be understood as exhibiting 
degrees of analogical resemblance to the highest form of being-in-relation, possessed by 
humans, and exemplified in God, which is being-in-relation. To analogously encounter them 
 
143 This move involves a shift from divine “Person” to creaturely “person” that is admittedly dubious. 
We will address this below in our discussion of Kilby’s (2000) critique of social Trinitarianism. 
144 This perhaps also goes some way to answering Dombrowski’s charge of hypocrisy levelled at 
Francis’ willingness to subordinate individual animals to human use. Dombrowski perceptively notes 
that Francis’ critique of anthropocentrism is at the service of a wider “theocentrism” rather than a 
commitment to the moral status of individual animals, and argues that this fails to recognise the 
implications of that critique with regards to that moral status (2015: 32). However, the analogical 
resemblance between persons and non-person Others does not necessarily (although it may) include 
individual moral status, meaning that this status need not be assumed, regardless of whether we 
reject the anthropocentrism under which it has traditionally been discarded. This identification of 
theocentrism also corrects Rolston’s misreading of Francis as a “biocentric holist” (2015: 52). 
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is to relate to them on the basis of this resemblance, in such a way that they serve as relatants 
analogously to ‘the Other’ in encounter. 
1.3. HEARING CREATION 
So what does it mean to relate to beings on the basis of their resemblance to the 
divine Persons? If our relation to creation is analogous to our relationship to God, 
then it might resemble our relationship to God in the sense of the indeterminacy, 
inabsoluteness, and non-totality which it entails for knowledge. That is, our 
communion with creation may involve hearing, or at least something analogous to 
it. 
Francis presents some indication that he believes this to be the case in at least two 
places. Firstly, a recurring theme within LS is that everything is “connected” (LS §91; §72), 
“interconnected” (§70, 92, 138, 240), or “interrelated” (LS §120, 137, 138). In many cases, 
this refers to the need for “a vision capable of taking into account every aspect of the global 
crisis”, integrating all its various facets in an “integral ecology” (LS §137). For example, 
Francis writes: 
Time and space are not independent of one another, and not even atoms or subatomic 
particles can be considered in isolation. Just as the different aspects of the planet… 
are interrelated, so too living species are part of a network which we will never fully 
explore and understand. A good part of our genetic code is shared by many living 
beings. It follows that the fragmentation of knowledge and the isolation of bits of 
information can actually become a form of ignorance, unless they are integrated into 
a broader vision of reality. 
(LS §138) 
Prima facie, this passage just indicates that there are causal connections between various 
phenomena that are missed by a non-systemic analysis. However, in the context of his 
ontology of relation, it can also be read in terms of a meditation on the nature of being-in-
relation as disclosed to knowledge. For Francis, the being-in-relation of the Other possesses 
a qualitative transcendence over the determinations of sight: there are aspects of the Other 
which, although available to touch, are intrinsically irreducible to thematicity. In non-person 
creation, we may lose this qualitative transcendence: its being-in-relation is only its shadow, 
(at the risk of pushing a metaphor too far) lacking this additional ‘dimension’. However, it 
nevertheless manifests an analogous quantitative transcendence over specific knowledges 
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by virtue of the complexity of its being-in-relation, which is so vast as to never be fully 
explored or understood. To put it differently, the world resembles God in that it resists the 
construction of total knowledges; albeit for different reasons, this difference being an 
expression of the distinction between them.145 
Secondly, non-person creatures possess a transcendence over knowledge and the 
will, requiring of us a kind of ‘obedience’ to their nature.  This concern lies at the heart 
of Francis’ locating the “human origins” of the ecological crisis in the “technocratic paradigm” 
(LS §101). This paradigm equates increasing power over the world with increasing progress, 
without reference to issues of responsibility (LS §105). Francis critiques this paradigm as 
falsely “undifferentiated and one-dimensional”, exalting a “confrontational” schema 
involving “a subject who… progressively approaches and gains control over an external 
object”, which itself is rendered “formless, completely open to manipulation” (LS §106).  
Francis opposes this to an approach that recognises the “reality” of “the possibilities offered 
by the things themselves”, “receiving what nature itself [allows], as if from its own hand” (LS 
§106). In speaking of “reality”, Francis intimates a connection between his analysis, and his 
third principle in EG §231-233, which exhorts us to resist idealist reductions of realities that 
in fact transcend them. Read in these terms, the problem posed by the technocratic 
paradigm is that it reduces creation to a resource to be exploited by power. Hence he also 
describes this paradigm in terms of a “Promethean vision of mastery” (LS §116). In doing so, 
he invokes terminology reminiscent of the “self-absorbed, promethean neopelagianism” of 
EG §94, which we saw in chapter three is opposed to the recognition of the true 
transcendence of the Other over ideal formulations.  
This brings Francis’ analysis into contact with his ethic of ‘unselfing’: at the heart of the 
technocratic paradigm is the failure to recognise the transcendence of creation over the 
concepts of resource according to which we would master it. This is opposed to unselfing 
precisely because it refuses ‘obedience’ to this transcendence. 
 
145 It is thus significant that LS, in sketching a holistic picture of creation, “does not pretend to know it 
all” (Gold, 2017: 95), both in terms of its internal consistency, but also as embodying a 
characteristically reparative refusal of totality more generally. Keller commends this “mystical 
unknowing” as lending itself to more sensitive, cautious approaches to relationships with others, 
which in turn facilitates the formation of real relationships (2013: 179), thereby integrating our 
relationships with others into our relationship with creation as in LS §66. Poznański closes the 
hermeneutical circle, noting that it is only through true dialogue with others that theology can acquire 
the holistic, interdisciplinary knowledge that LS prescribes (2017: 298). 
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In summary, then, for Francis, the being of creatures is a being-in-relation. This derives from 
the nature of the Trinity, as a relationship between persons. The specifically interpersonal 
nature of Trinitarian relations bears out an analogical resemblance in creation, in which 
interpersonal relation or encounter is the prototypical form of relation. Non-personal 
relationships analogically resemble this interpersonal prototype. Consequently, they also 
analogically manifest the conditions of hearing which attend knowledge within an 
interpersonal relationship. 
1.4. TRINITARIAN APOPHATICISM 
Superficially, in drawing a correspondence between ontic relations and the immanent 
Trinity, LS appears to present a cosmic or metaphysical ‘social trinitarianism’, in which the 
Trinity serves as the paradigm for relations between (varying analogical degrees of) persons. 
It is important to recognise that this is a misreading, not in the least because of the problems 
that social Trinitarianism presents for our project. These problems are twofold.  
Firstly, there is the way social Trinitarianism draws an analogy between Trinitarian “Persons” 
and creaturely “persons”. Kilby notes that theologians who are sceptical of social 
Trinitarianism in general, argue that “Person” in the Trinitarian sense is a technical term that 
has very little shared meaning with “person” in the anthropological sense, instead serving to 
identify distinctions between relations of procession within the Godhead. In this context, 
critics such as Rahner and Barth argue that the conflation of the two concepts leads to the 
introduction of a tritheism into Trinitarian theology, wherein the hypostases of the divine 
substance become “three separate "I"s, three centres of consciousness, three distinct wills 
and so on” (2000: 434).  
Secondly, there are theologians who dispute the claim that the two terms are so radically 
different, and instead argue that they have sufficient common meaning for the analogy to 
be intelligible. However, they argue, our contemporary anthropological sense of “person” 
invokes certain ideas that must be resisted in a Trinitarian context. Moreover, they claim, 
these ideas are also inappropriate to anthropology, and so a recovery of this Trinitarian sense 
can serve as an anthropological corrective (2000: 434). Within this latter group, which 
includes theologians such as Moltmann and Gunton, there are those who also see the 
relations between Persons (specifically the way in which they manifest distinction in unity) 




Kilby argues that the approach of this latter group is often predicated on a troubling 
“projection”, in which the Trinity itself is reduced to a principle of affirmation for one’s own 
ideological commitments, which can then function as a determining idea of unity for wider 
social theory along those lines (2000: 442). The possibility of this projection is underpinned 
by the first issue of too close an identification between divine and human Persons/persons, 
turning the Trinity into a literal society which must be understood in terms of our own social 
commitments, as well as upon which our society should be modelled (2000: 441).  
Whether or not these critiques are apt of social Trinitarian theologies more widely lies 
outside the scope of this thesis, as does the historical aspect of the former critique. However, 
if apt of our reading of LS, the second critique does raise the concern that Francis, in 
appealing to the Trinity as the model of ontic relation, reifies and thus totalises a particular 
immanent idea of that relation (encounter). In doing so, he would seem to betray the 
reparative impulse towards non-totality. 
In response to the second critique, it is worth considering just what ‘encounter’ really 
constitutes. As we noted above, to encounter creatures is to relate to them in a way that is 
conditioned by hearing. As such, to describe a creature as Other is to describe it primarily 
negatively, indicating the limits of our sight before it. This raises the question of whether it 
even makes sense to talk about totalising encounter: substantively speaking, all this 
constitutes is the universal limitation of our claims to positive thematic knowledge. As such, 
Francis’ ontology of relation actually challenges the kinds of totalising, determining 
hermeneutics that Kilby finds at the heart of social Trinitarianism. Likewise, reading 
encounter into the Trinity merely encourages us to be more agnostic about its inner life: 
what it amounts to is a statement that the relations between its Persons cannot be 
exhaustively determined according to any immanent ideas. 
Indeed, this leaves us in a position much like the one Kilby herself advocates. Against social 
Trinitarianism (and similar approaches, such as psychological readings of the Trinity),146 Kilby 
champions a reading of the doctrine as a kind of “second order proposition, a rule, or perhaps 
set of rules” for talking about God, aimed less towards providing a substantive account of 
God’s nature, and more towards preventing us from lapsing into misunderstandings (2000: 
443). As with Francis, this hermeneutic moves us away from attempting to read the Trinity 
 
146  In our previous chapter, we noted that Francis does identify a more determinate Trinitarian 
structure to creatures (LS §238-9). However, this structure is too abstract to say anything more 
determinate than that creatures exist, have an identity, and are good – something which I doubt even 
Kilby would object to. 
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under any determining idea. The difference is that Kilby moves us on to an entirely different 
way of reading the doctrine, as opposed to Francis who merely tells us how not to read it. 
In short, despite superficial appearances, Francis is better described as presenting not a 
‘social Trinitarianism’, but a ‘Trinitarian apophaticism’. This also enables us to respond to the 
former critique. This critique objects to the inappropriate characterisation of the Persons of 
the Trinity, for example as centres of consciousness or will. However, if our language of 
encounter serves to indicate the negative limitation of sight, then our drawing an analogy 
between divine “Persons” and creaturely “persons” does not inappropriately ascribe such 
positive characteristics. Rather, it indicates that, in both cases, the kinds of relatant involved 
are such that the relationship between them escapes thematic determination. In other 
words, rather than anthropomorphising the Trinity, this analogy professes its transcendence; 
a transcendence that is resembled in humans, to be sure, but only insofar as humans possess 
characteristics that escape determination, rather than constituting determinations in 
themselves. 
Correspondingly, this apophaticism prevents the very dynamic upon which social 
Trinitarianism is founded – the drawing of correspondence between determinate aspects of 
the Trinity, and features of society; a dynamic which in itself can smuggle not just poor 
Trinitarian theology, but also troubling social theology. For example, Tonstad notes that 
certain Trinitarian social ontologies reproduce the procession of the Son from the Father, 
and Spirit from both, in terms of social inequality. Similarly to Kilby, Tonstad argues that this 
is enabled by the projection of worldly inequalities, such as gender relations, onto the Trinity 
itself – a projection which thus reifies social inequality within the Godhead, and also collapses 
the distinction between immanent and economic Trinities, from which these images of 
inequality are ostensibly drawn, in the process (2016: 10-11). 
Francis’ Trinitarian apophaticism draws an analogical correspondence between 
interpersonality and perichoresis. However, he does so in terms of a shared indeterminacy. 
This says nothing about the correspondence between determinate aspects of the immanent 
Trinity, such as the order of procession, and determinate ontic relations, such as social order. 
Consequently, neither can be used to understand the other, at least based on this alone. 
1.5. ANALOGY AND HIERARCHY 
Another potential concern may lie in our appeal to an analogical metaphysics. This concern 
is voiced by Surin, who notes that appeals to a via analogia intrinsically invoke a hierarchy 
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among beings, distinguishing between them in terms of gradations of analogical primacy in 
relation to the Godhead (Surin, 2005: 258). This is problematic for our project (and society in 
general!) insofar as, in reifying hierarchical ontic relations, these metaphysics become 
principles of hierarchical determination. 
One response would be to note that, for Francis, one’s position in this hierarchy is 
proportional to the resemblance between the relationships one is capable of occupying and 
that of encounter. This means that this hierarchy does not serve to distinguish between 
persons, who are all capable of this mode of relation. 
Another response turns on the recognition that, whereas the analogical metaphysics which 
trouble Surin produce an analogical structure between creatures, ordering them as objects 
within an analogical relational schema, Francis’ metaphysics does not accept an easy 
distinction between creatures and the relations between them. We see this in how Francis 
recognises the possibility of analogical ‘encounter’; ways of being-in-relation which resemble 
other ways of being-in-relation not just in terms of the beings involved simpliciter, but also 
of the relations between them. That is, his analogical metaphysics also structures relations 
between the relations themselves, as objects. 
This means that this hierarchy serves to distinguish between modes of relation. If it privileges 
certain objects over others, then it privileges certain modes of relation over other modes. 
These privileged modes are the ones closest to encounter. This privileging of encounter 
warns against the hierarchical subordination of beings in two ways. Firstly, on an epistemic 
level, encounter is characterised by indeterminacy. Consequently, privileging encounter as a 
mode of relation involves refusing to determine the other in ways that render encounter (or 
its closest possible approximation) impossible. This ought to at least give us pause when 
asserting hierarchies, which risk this determination in the course of their ordering. Secondly, 
on an ethical level, we saw previously that encounter requires an attitude of ‘unselfing’, 
which is exemplified in a tender love that moves us to “approach a person with immense 
respect and a certain dread of causing them harm or taking away their freedom” (AL §127). 
This raises caution about aspiring to inhabit relationships which might potentially constrain 
the legitimate exercise of this freedom, including dominating social hierarchies. 
2. A RELATIONAL METAPHYSICS 
So far, we have argued that Francis employs a relational ontology, in which being is being-in-
relation. He argues that this derives from the origins of creation in the Trinity. Insofar as the 
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relational life of the Trinity is a set of relations between persons, this leads him to claim that 
the primary analogue of being-in-relation in creation is interpersonal relation. We argued 
that this imparts the conditions of hearing, either literally or analogically, to our knowledge 
of creatures, insofar as this knowledge arises in the context of our relation to them. 
However, for Francis, the being-in-relation of creatures is also with God. This is evidenced by 
the way we can encounter God in creation; a transcendent or ‘metaphysical’ dimension of 
creaturely being-in-relation that impinges on our knowledge of those creatures in two ways: 
firstly, in our knowledge of those creatures themselves, which can only be known as being-
in-relation to God; secondly, in our ontic relation to those creatures, which has a 
metaphysical dimension in itself. The upshot of this is that our knowledge of creatures in 
their being-in-relation also involves knowledge of God as that with which they are in relation. 
This in turn means that our knowledge of creatures not only manifests hearing as the 
conditions of ontic knowledge, but also as the condition of our knowledge of God, in relation 
to which creatures are known. This next section will attend to this.  
2.1. CREATION AS SITE OF ENCOUNTER WITH GOD 
In our third chapter, we saw how Francis sees faith as arising from an economy of touch, 
wherein we mystically encounter God in God’s love, and ‘touch back’ in loving response. 
Following Oltvai (2018), we also saw how the loving gaze serves as a medium for this 
‘touching’. It is in these terms that Francis conceives of nature as a site of encounter with 
God. He writes that St. Francis also shows how gazing upon nature enables us to gaze upon 
God: 
What is more, Saint Francis… invites us to see nature as a magnificent book in which 
God speaks to us and grants us a glimpse of his infinite beauty and goodness… For this 
reason, Francis asked that part of the friary garden always be left untouched, so that 
wild flowers and herbs could grow there, and those who saw them could raise their 
minds to God, the Creator of such beauty. 
(LS §12) 
Francis’ loving gaze, before which each creature was “a sister united to him by bonds of 
affection” (LS §11), enables creation to become a site in which we can “glimpse” God in 
contemplation. In short, for Francis, the life and spirituality of St. Francis presents us with a 
vision of creation that is fundamentally interpersonal – not only ontically, in the sense that 
187 
 
it, and the beings within it, are to be gazed upon lovingly, like persons; but in that it mediates 
the person of God to us as the ‘object’ of our loving gaze. 
Francis revisits these images when he later writes that 
God has written a precious book, “whose letters are the multitude of created things 
present in the universe”… “From panoramic vistas to the tiniest living form, nature is 
a constant source of wonder and awe. It is also a continuing revelation of the divine”.. 
“To sense each creature singing the hymn of its existence is to live joyfully in God’s 
love and hope”… We can say that “alongside revelation properly so-called, contained 




…nature as a whole not only manifests God but is also a locus of his presence. The 
Spirit of life dwells in every living creature and calls us to enter into relationship with 
him. 
(LS §88) 
This sets out the second mode of encounter in Francis’ ontology. Not only do we encounter 
other creatures, but we encounter God in and through them. In continuity with the language 
of chapter four, we might say that they play a quasi-sacramental role. Indeed, Francis himself 
makes this comparison when he describes the sacraments as “a privileged way in which 
nature is taken up by God to become a means of mediating supernatural life”. In the 
sacraments, creatures such as “[w]ater, oil, fire, and colours are taken up in all their symbolic 
power”, mediating God to us in a unique way (LS §235). Nowhere is this more true than in 
the Eucharist, in which grace finds its “unsurpassable expression” through the giving of 
Christ’s incarnate body as food. In participating in this sacrifice, the whole of creation is 
“[j]oined to the incarnate Son”, who reaches our “intimate depths through a fragment of 
matter”. Thus the sacrament “joins heaven and earth”, its matter serving as the meeting 
point of all creation with its Creator (LS §236).147 
 
147 Yocum (2017) develops this in an ecological mystagogy that reads the elements in terms of their 
being part of the natural world. 
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This second mode of encounter shows that the being-in-relation of creatures is not 
exhausted by ontic relations. Rather, the being of creatures is also in-relation to God, to 
whom we can relate through them. Our encounter with God in creatures takes place in two 
contexts, both of which have implications for our ontic knowledge. Firstly, in the being-in-
relation of creation to God. When we know creation, we know it as being-in-relation to God. 
Thus knowledge of creation is inseparable from our knowledge of God, in relation to which 
its being is defined. Secondly, in the analogical resemblance between our being-in-relation 
to creation and our being-in-relation to God. Because of this resemblance, we cannot relate 
to creation without relating to God – which is to say, our knowing creation is at once also 
knowing God. We will explore this below. 
2.2. KNOWING CREATURES AS BEINGS-IN-RELATION-TO-GOD 
For Francis, the being-in-relation of creation is fundamentally a being-in-relation with God. 
This metaphysical relation is prior to, and determinative of ontic relations. This means that 
knowledge of God as in-relation-to-creatures is a condition for knowledge of the being-in-
relation of those creatures. 
Francis writes that faith reveals to us the origin of the relationships internal to creation in 
the relational context in which creation itself arises, thereby allowing us “to interpret the 
meaning and the mysterious beauty of what is unfolding”. Hence contemplating the 
relationships which make up creation as a whole leads to contemplation of the divine, by 
which those relationships are mediated: “[i]n this universe, shaped by open and 
intercommunicating systems, we can discern countless forms of relationship and 
participation. This leads us to think of the whole as open to God’s transcendence, within 
which it develops” (LS §79). This includes the redemptive work accomplished through matter 
in the incarnation and sacraments. Hence Francis writes: “For Christians, all the creatures of 
the material universe find their true meaning in the incarnate Word, for the Son of God has 
incorporated in his person part of the material world, planting in it a seed of definitive 
transformation” (LS §235). 
In this context, Francis understands our relationship with other beings in terms of a shared 
relationship with God. He quotes Psalm 148:3-5, which entreats other creatures to join 
humanity in its praise of God (LS §72). Similarly, Francis notes that an understanding of the 
world as creation involves recognising that “God’s love is the fundamental moving force in 
all created things”. In turn, this means recognising that “[e]very creature is thus the object 
of the Father’s tenderness, who gives it its place in the world” (LS §77). By highlighting the 
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tender nature of God’s love, Francis construes the relationship between God and creation in 
terms of encounter. He then continues to write that in recognising this, we therefore can 
“ascend from created things” to contemplation of God (LS §77). In other words, according to 
Francis, in recognising the place of creation within this relationship of encounter, and thus 
adopting these terms for creation itself, we are able to relate to God. 
Similarly, he writes that “called into being by one Father”, all creatures “are linked by unseen 
bonds and together form a kind of universal family, a sublime communion”. Because of these 
links, we must identify with the rest of creation, and feel its destruction as damage to 
ourselves (LS §89). Indeed, he writes, “when our hearts are authentically open to universal 
communion, this sense of fraternity excludes nothing and no one” (LS §92). In other words, 
our communion with creation is a function of our shared relationship with God as creator. 
He links this back to themes of fatherly love, noting that Jesus would invite his disciples “to 
recognize the paternal relationship God has with his all his creatures” and “that each one of 
them is important in God’s eyes” (see Luke 12:6; Matt. 6:26) (LS §96).  
Francis frames this in terms of the loving gaze, which we encountered in our third chapter, 
writing that “[t]he Lord was able to invite others to be attentive to the beauty that there is 
in the world because he himself was in constant touch with nature, lending it an attention 
full of fondness and wonder”, often stopping in his travels “to contemplate the beauty sown 
by his Father” (LS §97). Following Oltvai, we noted that, for Francis, we encounter grace 
through experiencing “being phenomenalized in a certain way” by the gaze of Christ as Other 
(Oltvai, 2018: 318). In this context, we might read Christ’s invitation in terms of an earlier 
comment about the eschatological destination of all creatures in God, and humanity’s 
responsibility in this process: “Human beings, endowed with intelligence and love, and drawn 
by the fullness of Christ, are called to lead all creatures back to their Creator” (LS §83). In 
making this link, Francis illustrates how Christ’s invitation to encounter creation is also an 
invitation to join with and participate in the action of God in this redemptive economy of 
grace. 
Francis likewise construes our own natures as a site of encounter with God, in the form of 
our co-operation with the divine work of creation. At the heart of this lies Francis 
understanding of the divine presence, which he construes in terms of a broadly Thomist 
account of divine activity. For Francis, divine activity does not compete with creaturely 
activity. Rather, it “ensures the subsistence and growth of each being” (LS §80) and 
“continues the work of creation” (ST  I, q. 104, a. 1, ad. 4; in LS §80). To illustrate this, he 
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draws from Thomas’ example of art: art as we produce it is the acting of creatures upon 
other, pre-existent creatures. In contrast, God’s art (which is to say, the world) is produced 
at the level of creation itself, such that the nature of what is created tends towards its 
fulfilment in God’s artistic design - “as if a shipbuilder were able to give timbers the 
wherewithal to move themselves to take the form of a ship” (In octo libros Physicorum 
Aristotelis exposito, Lib. II, lectio 14; in LS §80). This enables God to act upon creation and be 
“intimately present to each being” without “impinging on the autonomy of his creature” (LS 
§80). 
In this context, fulfilling our natures constitutes a co-operation with the divine activity that 
creates us to fulfil them. Francis expresses this when he employs this metaphysics to respond 
to the problem of evil, asserting that “many of the things we think of as evils, dangers or 
sources of suffering, are in reality part of the pains of childbirth which he uses to draw us 
into the act of cooperation with the creator” (LS §80). In other words, because God acts in 
the world in this way, fulfilling our natures is ultimately an act of co-operation with (which is 
to say, a response to) God – and knowing this can provide consoling knowledge about the 
meaning of otherwise troubling and inscrutable aspects of life. 
In short, for Francis, to know creatures is to know them as beings-in-relation-to-God. Thus 
our knowledge of creatures cannot be separated out from our knowledge of God, in relation 
to whom their being is defined. 
2.3. RELATING TO CREATURES AS RELATING TO GOD 
Secondly, as we saw above, Francis recognises that the relations between creatures can 
analogically resemble one another. In this vein, Francis states that our being-in-relation to 
other creatures can symbolise our own being-in-relation to God. This means that we can 
reflect on (and thus inhabit) our relation to God through relating to other creatures, in these 
ontic relations themselves. In turn, this means that our relation to God is a feature of certain 
ontic relations, in which this metaphysical relation takes place. In such cases, our relation to 
those creatures is inextricable from our relation to God. 
Francis writes: 
Saint John of the Cross taught that all the goodness present in the realities and 
experiences of this world “is present in God eminently and infinitely, or more 
properly, in each of these sublime realities is God”… the mystic experiences the 
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intimate connection between God and all beings, and thus feels that “all things are 
God”. 
(LS §234) 148 
In short, for St. John, God is present in creatures by virtue of their goodness, which 
participates in the divine goodness. In relating to them in their goodness, we thus relate to 
God in the divine Goodness. 
However, Francis nuances this when he continues to write: 
Standing awestruck before a mountain, he or she cannot separate this experience 
from God, and perceives that the interior awe being lived has to be entrusted to the 
Lord: “Mountains have heights and they are plentiful, vast, beautiful, graceful, bright 
and fragrant. These mountains are what my Beloved is to me.” 
(LS §234)149 
This quotation introduces a significant dimension to the above passage: the mountains and 
the valleys are not merely what God is in general; they are what God is “to me”. Read with 
this inflection, it is not merely the fact that both the valleys and God are pleasant that makes 
the valleys symbolise God: it is that they are both pleasant to me. To put it differently, 
whereas the first passage seems to focus on their common being in general (e.g. the valleys 
are good; God is good), the second passage locates the symbolic reference specifically in this 
being-to-me. In short, it inscribes St. John’s mystical insight into the relational ontology of 
LS: rather than being a property of discrete beings, this resemblance lies in creaturely being-
in-relation. Hence the majesty of the mountains before me is the majesty of God above me. 
In this context, our knowledge of creatures is knowledge of our relation to those creatures; 
and our knowledge of this relation evokes knowledge of our loving encounter with God. This 
transforms our knowledge of other creatures in relation into knowledge of God: the 
mountains are what God “is to me”. To know what the mountains are in this context is  also 




148 Francis here quotes St. John’s Cántico Espiritual, XIV, 5. 
149 Ibid., XIV, 6-7 
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2.4. METAPHYSICAL HEARING AND ONTIC KNOWLEDGE 
In short, for Francis, our knowledge of and relationship with creation is inextricable from our 
knowledge of and relationship with God. This inscribes the indeterminacy that attends our 
knowledge of and relationship with God into our knowledge of and relationship with 
creation. This is exemplified by Francis’ rejection of the category of “nature” as a substitute 
for “creation”. “Creation”, he writes, “can only be understood” in terms of its relationship to 
God, as “a gift from the outstretched hand of the Father of all”, and “a reality illuminated by 
the love which calls us together into universal communion”. In contrast, nature is a reduction 
of creation before the human intellect and will, which is “usually seen as a system which can 
be studied, understood, and controlled” (LS §76). In rejecting it for an explicit discourse of 
creation, Francis rejects this reduction. 
Francis is led from this to an injunction to respect the nature of creation. He enjoins us to 
recognise that “the earth is the Lord’s”, refuting all human claims to “absolute ownership” 
(LS §67). In this context, we must recognise that “[w]e are not God”. Rather, the earth “was 
here before us and it has been given to us”. This is the foundation of the charge to “till and 
keep” the earth in Genesis 2:15, which he reads as implying “the duty to protect the earth 
and to ensure its fruitfulness for coming generations” (LS §67). This means that we “must 
respect the laws of nature and the delicate equilibria existing between the creatures of this 
world”, which he also sees as undergirding the Bible’s concern for non-human creatures (LS 
§68). This is because “other living beings have a value of their own in God’s eyes” (LS §69); a 
value which gives them a “priority of being over being useful” (The German Bishop’s 
Conference, in LS (§69)). In short, our relation to God gives rise to an ethical impulse to 
recognise the analogous alterity of non-person creation, which is to say, our knowledge of 
the being-in-relation of creatures with us (as analogous ‘Others’) arises from our relationship 
with God.150 
3. CONCLUSION: INDETERMINACY AND RELATION 
In summary, LS outlines a cosmology of encounter, in the context of which our knowledge of 
creation is subject to the conditions of hearing, with all the indeterminacy, non-totality and 
 
150  This chimes with Christie’s reading Francis’ ecological conversion as one of metanoia, or 
repentance through the radical reorientation of the soul towards God (2017: 113). Imanaka (2018) 
relates this to the image of the gaze when she writes that LS invites us to engage in contemplation of 
the natural world; an activity that opens up the space for thought and imagination beyond the 
determinations of instrumental reason and instrumentalising power. In the language of chapter three, 
we might say that for Imanaka, this metanoia is thus a matter of re-learning to love. 
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inabsoluteness this entails. This is the case in two respects: firstly, Francis understands being 
as being-in-relation, wherein the being of creatures analogously resembles the being of the 
persons who encounter one another within the life of the Trinity. This means that even non-
person creatures must be approached as ‘analogous Others’, our relation to them 
manifesting analogous indeterminacy to that involved in the encounter with the Other 
proper. Secondly, our knowledge of creation is determined by our knowledge of God, which, 
as we saw in chapter three, is conditioned by hearing. This means that our knowledge of 
creation is likewise conditioned by indeterminacy, non-totality, and inabsoluteness. Because 
it extends to knowledge about creation in general, this indeterminacy impinges on the 
doctrine and dogma which seek to describe it. Thus it extends beyond the focus of credere 
in Deum of the last two chapters to issues of credere Deum. 
In many ways, this conclusion completes the main argument of this thesis: in establishing 
these conditions as features of all knowledge, Francis universalises the reparative 
hermeneutic underpinned by the epistemology of LF. 
However, this indeterminacy raises two further issues: firstly, of how we can both 
acknowledge it and hold to our doctrinal and dogmatic commitments. Secondly, of the 
breakdown of parameters for negotiating disagreement. This raises an affective issue, 
relating to fears of danger in unresolvable disagreement. We will look at how LS enables us 
to resolve this issue, arguing that it does so in two ways: by providing us with a more readily 
accepted reading of disagreement as variation in credere in Deum; and providing an 
eschatological narrative of disagreement that promises reconciliation, enabling us to 




VII. COMEDY AND CONSOLATION 
 
In our last chapter, we saw how the relational metaphysics of LS extends the conditions of 
hearing to our knowledge of the world in general. This chapter responds to concerns around 
this wide-ranging indeterminacy in knowledge. In section 1, we will show how Francis’ 
acceptance of indeterminacy in knowledge can be squared with doctrinal commitment, 
arguing that Francis can sustain first-order commitments by relocating indeterminacy to a 
second-order level. We will then move from this to respond to concerns relating to second-
order indeterminacy and threat – namely the fear that it leads to unresolvable disagreement 
in “epistemological crisis”, which in turn introduces degenerative pluralism into inquiry. 
These concerns motivate the paranoid project of Veritatis Splendor, and may likewise inhibit 
a reparative response to this wide-ranging indeterminacy in knowledge. We will make our 
response in two ways: firstly, in section 2, by arguing that Francis’ ‘ontology of relation, 
outlined in the previous chapter, enables us to narrate difference in credere Deum along the 
lines of the argument in chapter four. Because credere Deum is a function of credere in Deum, 
we can read difference in credere Deum as more readily acceptable difference in credere in 
Deum. Secondly, in section 3, we will argue that the eschatological vision of LS, when read in 
conjunction with Francis’ ‘four principles’ for overcoming social tensions in EG, equips us 
with a hopeful, comic narrative of reconciliation that enables us to view disagreement as 
non-threatening. We will begin by looking at the necessity of coping with anxiety for 
overcoming paranoia. We will then look to how the eschatological vision of LS is one of 
reconciliation. We will then look at how the Eucharistic theology of LS presents the Church 
with the promise of this reconciliation. We will argue that this establishes a comic narrative 
of conflict, which in turn provides the security needed to overcome anxiety around conflict, 
and thus the temptation to a paranoid hermeneutics of disagreement. Section 4 concludes 
the chapter with a reflection on theological style in the face of this confidence. 
1. INDETERMINACY, DOCTRINAL COMMITMENT, AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL CRISIS 
The wide-ranging indeterminacy argued for in the previous chapter raises an issue for 
theology. A simplistic rendering of this issue would be something like the following: if all our 
knowledge is indeterminate, how can we hold to our doctrinal and dogmatic commitments? 
In this vein, we noted in our fourth chapter that Francis is not indifferent to issues of either 
doctrine (particularly in the necessity of the articles of faith) or form. Consequently, the 
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indeterminacy in knowledge presented by his epistemology appears to also bear up a tension 
internal to the wider systematic sweep of his documents. 
A simple answer to this simplistic concern is by way of a distinction between first- and 
second-order indeterminacy. By first-order indeterminacy, I mean the indeterminacy internal 
to a theory, or the conclusion of an argument. First order indeterminacy says, “I don’t know” 
or “x or y or z”. Recognising this kind of indeterminacy would enable us to suspend judgment 
between differing theories, embracing them both as potential sources of truth prior to 
ultimately making a decision. In this regard, it is this kind of indeterminacy which threatens 
doctrinal commitments. 
However, this is not the only form of indeterminacy. Second-order indeterminacy is 
indeterminacy external to a theory, or concerning the premises rather than the conclusion 
of an argument. It says, “I know, but I could be wrong”, or “x, but then again maybe ¬x”. 
Second-order indeterminacy is the kind of indeterminacy that we find when we constantly 
ask “why”, repeatedly questioning our premises until we realise that there is always 
potentially a ‘step back’ that we can take – even if we can’t see it.  
Recognising this indeterminacy can open our imagination to possible alternative positions. 
However, it is arguably trivial in terms of our actual epistemic commitments: we cannot 
anticipate (i.e. know) ‘unknown unknowns’, meaning that we are always haunted by their 
possibility. 151  Given that this is ubiquitously the case, we must thus be able to hold 
theological positions, at least if we can hold beliefs at all. Recognising this kind of 
indeterminacy would thus enable us to remain open to alterity as possibly indicating truth, 
even against the best reasons to the contrary offered by our actual beliefs. In short, this kind 
of indeterminacy allows us to ‘think’ the possibility of learning from the other, even if we 
think they are wrong. In this way, Francis is able to both affirm the timeless necessity of the 
articles of the faith to the tradition (see LF §48), while also admitting the indeterminacy that 
comes with the transcendent orientation of the faith itself, which in turn (as we saw in 
chapters four and five) problematises our reading of the tradition – an indeterminacy, 
 
151 Note that accepting this argument strikes against paranoid appeals to absoluteness and totality. 
Moreover, it is a logical point that is, at least superficially, not tied in to any specific synthetic 
theological position. As a result, it is perhaps a reason for why Francis’ reparative approach may 
actually be better than its paranoid counterpart, rather than merely a possible alternative as we have 
been exploring it. However, this issue is secondary to the argument’s purpose here in accounting for 
how Francis can maintain his doctrinal commitments alongside his commitment to indeterminacy. 
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moreover, that is secured by those articles, which themselves resist determination in their 
assimilating function. 
However, while second-order indeterminacy may be compatible with doctrinal and dogmatic 
commitments, it also introduces a subtly related problem. This is the problem of 
“epistemological crisis”, or intractable conflict arising from methodological uncertainty, 
which VS seeks to solve by way of its paranoid hermeneutics. Unless we address this 
problem, Francis’ reparative alternative cannot present itself as workable. 
In our first chapter, we followed Odozor (1995: xiii) in noting how Veritatis Splendor responds 
to an “epistemological crisis”: in the years following the second Vatican Council, moral 
theologians, released from their neoscholastic fetters, began to go about their inquiry in a 
new diversity of ways that seemed (to some) to strain the boundaries of what was intelligibly 
‘Catholic’. In short, VS responds to the threat of alterity introduced to theology by these 
loosening methodological conditions. It does so by re-tightening them, consolidating the 
norms of inquiry which were being eroded. 
MacIntyre’s concept of an epistemological crisis is rooted in his idea of “rational enquiry as 
embodied in a tradition” (1988: 7). In short, for MacIntyre, rationality is a matter of 
navigating a tradition of inquiry: institutionalised methods which are embodied in the life of 
a community, and which produce a language that captures and enables discussion of the 
world as it manifests to human minds so that disagreements within the community can be 
mediated. In this context, an epistemological crisis represents a crisis of tradition in which a 
tradition constituted enquiry “ceases to make progress” according to its own standards, and 
is no longer able to mediate disagreements within its community (1988: 361-2).  
Epistemological crises, according to MacIntyre, are marked by the “dissolution of historically 
founded certainties”, and their solutions lie in “the invention or discovery of new concepts 
and the framing of some new type or types for theory which meet three exacting 
requirements”: firstly, they must “furnish a solution to the problems which had previously 
proved intractable in a systematic and coherent way”. Secondly, they must also be able to 
explain precisely what rendered the tradition inadequate in its previous formulation. Thirdly, 
these previous two tasks must be accomplished in a way that “exhibits some fundamental 
continuity of the new conceptual and theoretical structures with the shared beliefs in terms 
of which the tradition of enquiry had been defined up to this point”. However, the 
developments themselves will not be derivable from the elements of the previous tradition. 
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That is, “[i]maginative conceptual development will have to occur”, which will be justified 
precisely in the success of the innovations in achieving what was previously impossible 
(MacIntyre, 1988: 362). MacIntyre invokes the development of the doctrine of the Trinity, 
which was predicated on philosophical concepts issuing “from debates rationally unresolved 
up to that point”, and Aquinas’ synthesis of Augustinian and Aristotelean traditions as 
examples of these developments (MacIntyre, 1988: 362-3). 
In short, although a tradition crisis may manifest in first-order indeterminacy through 
preventing the resolution of specific questions, it is essentially an issue of second-order 
indeterminacy. A tradition crisis represents a breakdown of the norms of inquiry themselves, 
giving rise to disagreements which are intractable precisely because the norms of inquiry 
which would mediate those disagreements have failed. They thus necessitate a development 
of those norms in a way that goes beyond the bounds of what they initially determine. 
Following Odozor’s analysis, VS is thus ultimately concerned with eliminating this second-
order indeterminacy – an indeterminacy which it sees as introducing a threatening pluralism 
of thought which incorporates “certain interpretations of Christian morality which are not 
consistent with "sound teaching" (2 Tim 4:3)” (VS §32). Its response, as we saw in our first 
chapter, is to push a paranoid hermeneutics in which the old set of norms, and their 
determining power, are totalised and thus absolutized – in turn confirming the negation of 
rival norms as ‘unsound’. 
Odozor’s diagnosis of this threat as being one of epistemological crisis introduces an affective 
dimension to the phenomenon. What Veritatis Splendor exhibits is the potential anxiety-
inducing effects of second-order indeterminacy, and, correspondingly, a pastoral challenge 
involved in recognising it. In this context, in order to acknowledge second-order 
indeterminacy, and perhaps to enable a more reparative hermeneutics in general, we must 
be able to cope with or overcome the sense of peril which comes with it. 
Read in light of the cosmology of LS, Francis’ reparative alternative provides us with a two-
pronged response to this concern. Firstly, his cosmology of encounter makes issues of 
plurivocity in credere Deum issues of plurivocity in credere in Deum. This enables an openness 
to the possibility of plurivocity, following the argument of the last two chapters. However, 
mere openness to the possibility does not, on its own, enable us to recognise that possibility, 
insofar as it does not require us to accept indeterminacy in the face of potentially more 
compelling fears. This leads us to the second prong of our response: Francis’ cosmology is 
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bound up with an associated eschatology that promises reconciliation and fulfilment therein. 
This provides a narrative of hope which enables unresolved disagreement to be born 
painlessly, rather than feared as threatening. This undercuts the self-defensive impulse 
which can underpin paranoid hermeneutics, thereby enabling us to trust in the possibility of 
plurivocity. We will now turn to this in more detail. 
2. PRONG ONE: CREDERE DEUM AS CREDERE IN DEUM 
The first prong of our response employs the Marian priority of chapter four as the basis for 
a reading of disagreement in credere Deum. In chapter four, we argued that Francis sets out 
an ecclesiology in which the ‘Petrine’ institutional forms of the Church must follow the 
historical realities of the ‘Marian’ encounter that lies at the heart of faith. This enables 
plurivocity in the form of the Church, corresponding to the historical pluralism of its Marian 
dimension. We will argue below that LS shows how this narrative can be used to understand 
pluralism not merely of credere in Deum, but of credere Deum. We will argue, following the 
last chapter, that LS provides an understanding of credere Deum as inextricable from credere 
in Deum. We will then argue that LS gives examples of instances in which credere Deum is 
conditioned by credere in Deum. In doing so, it provides the basis for an account of variation 
in credere Deum as variation in credere in Deum, and thus its justification by the arguments 
of chapter four. 
In our fifth chapter, we saw how the Marian priority of chapter four is reflected in our 
understanding of ecclesial unity. This understanding must likewise follow the historical 
reality of that unity, which always has the capacity to unsettle it. In the previous chapter, we 
saw how this pattern is repeated with regards to knowledge of creation in general: it is only 
in light of our relation to God that we truly know creation. Consequently, this knowledge is 
relativized to that relation. 
This means that different relationships can potentially reveal different facets of the world: 
variation in the former can potentially lead to variation in the latter. We find this insight 
reflected in LS itself: in the last chapter, we saw how LS integrates our relation with God and 
our relation with creatures in such a way as to render the former the condition of all 
knowledge. This means that we cannot know the world except as in relation to God, as 
encountered by us.  
LS provides two substantive examples of what this means in practice. These can be found in 
its recognition of spirituality as the basis for theology, and in its contextual hermeneutic of 
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tradition. Together, they illustrate how credere Deum can arise from credere in Deum. 
Moreover, they do so in a way that shows how variation in the former can arise from 
variation in the latter. 
Firstly, Francis affords what might be described as a hermeneutical priority to spirituality in 
theology. Writing in chapter six, Francis offers “a few suggestions for an ecological 
spirituality” (LS §216): 
More than in ideas or concepts as such, I am interested in how such a spirituality can 
motivate us to a more passionate concern for the protection of our world. A 
commitment this lofty cannot be sustained by doctrine alone… without an “interior 
impulse which encourages, motivates, nourishes and gives meaning to our individual 
and communal activity”. 
(LS §216)152 
Here, Francis draws a familiar distinction between a holistic understanding of the spiritual 
life, and what GE would refer to as a ‘gnostic’ intellectualism (see GE §37). 
Admittedly, Christians have not always appropriated and developed the spiritual 
treasures bestowed by God upon the Church, where the life of the spirit is not 
dissociated from the body or from nature or from worldly realities, but lived in and 
with them, in communion with all that surrounds us. 
(LS §216) 
In making this distinction, Francis identifies his “spirituality” with a holistic, existentially 
engaged way of life. In short, his ecological spirituality is not merely a theory about the world, 
to be held in abstraction; it is a way of being in the world defined by “communion”. This 
spirituality invigorates the doctrine which exhorts us to protect the earth, providing the 
“interior impulse” that gives it force.153 In other words, Francis recognises here that the 
credere Deum that thematises our responsibilities towards the earth is only intelligible as 
authoritative and motivating (that is, as doctrine) in light of a particular permutation of 
credere in Deum.154 By extension, he offers a renewal of credere in Deum as the basis for one 
 
152 Francis here quotes EG §261. 
153 In this vein, Sedmak describes the purpose of the encyclical as a whole as meeting “the challenge 
to bridge the gap between convictions and commitments… and a consistent way of life” (2017: 943). 
154  In this vein, Miller describes Francis’ appeal to relation in communion as the basis for 
transformation in our moral understanding of the world in terms of a “serene gaze” (2017: 17). In 
chapter three, we saw how Francis conceives of seeing as a way of touching with love, and the primacy 
he affords to this love in knowledge. The resonances are obvious here. 
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of credere Deum – which is to say, variation of the former as the basis for variation in the 
latter. 
Secondly, Francis affords priority to experience. We see this in the repetition of the above 
pattern in the structure of the encyclical as a whole, which gives a hermeneutical priority to 
a broadly secular reading of the ecological crisis. This serves to provides a motivating 
experiential basis for engaging with the tradition later in the encyclical.  
Francis begins the encyclical by “briefly reviewing several aspects of the present ecological 
crisis… letting them touch us deeply and provide a concrete foundation for the ethical and 
spiritual itinerary that follows” (LS §15). From the outset, this establishes a contextual 
dimension to the encyclical’s theological contributions. More specifically, the document is 
contextual in the sense that it responds to a concrete need, which is expressed in more or 
less secular terms (see LS §17-61).155 This has the effect of drawing a distinction between the 
context from which the document begins its reflections, and the theology of the document. 
Francis then uses this as a pragmatic basis for reading the tradition, which he approaches for 
“some principles… which can render our commitment to the environment more coherent” 
(LS §15).  
It would be wrong to say that LS attempts to derive a religious ethic from a secular basis: 
firstly, the terms of its initial analysis are only more or less secular.156 Moreover, given that 
the encyclical is “addressed to all people of good will”, and argues that theology takes its 
place among various ‘branches’ of the sciences and ‘forms’ of wisdom (LF §62), this is 
perhaps best read in terms of a device for reaching out to an audience that extends beyond 
the Church. Nevertheless, the structure of the early encyclical has the effect of giving priority 
to a secular empirical analysis, which then shapes the following reading of tradition. This 
structure, when read in light of its implicit distinction between context and reflection,157 
 
155 The only explicit exceptions are throwaway lines in LS §33, 53, 58, 61. Potentially add to this 
instances where he obliquely invokes Catholic social teaching in LS §23, 25, 28, 48-52, 30, 43, 46, 58; 
as well as quotations from Church documents in LS §52 and §54, which nevertheless employ secular 
language. 
156 Feehan reverses this to say that Francis’ ecological spirituality offers us a religious way of pursuing 
a “secular agenda” that can be shared beyond the Church (2017: 80). 
157  In this vein, Annett reads LS as an instalment in a tradition of contextually-grounded social 
encyclicals (2017: 161). Likewise, Prabhu (2015: 81) compares the contextual methodology of LS to 
that of Liberation Theology, and Irwin compares it to Cardinal Cardijn’s “see, judge, act” process as 
used by Pope John XXIII in Mater et Magistra §236 (2016: 95). 
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gives a corresponding priority to context over reflection. In other words, what the encyclical 
teaches about God follows from the way in which we inhabit our context of ecological crisis.  
This contextual hermeneutic of tradition is also exemplified by Francis’ discussion of 
anthropocentrism. In this, he gives a covert nod to the development of the tradition, writing: 
“In our time, the Church does not simply state that other creatures are completely 
subordinated to the good of human beings” (LS §69; emphasis mine). We can read this 
acknowledgment as a rejoinder to White’s influential argument that medieval Christianity 
established a dualism of humanity and nature, under which nature was available to be 
exploited “in a mood of indifference to the feelings of natural objects” (1967: 156).158 By 
qualifying his reading of the tradition in this way, Francis indicates that the Church’s 
understanding of the nature of creation, and our responsibilities towards it, has developed 
from the medieval paradigm identified by White.159 Francis does this as part of an effort to 
“to show how faith convictions can offer Christians… ample motivation to care for nature 
and for the most vulnerable of their brothers and sisters” (LS §64), which in turn takes its 
place in the overarching project of the encyclical. Here, Francis thus explicitly reinterprets (in 
the sense of taking part in an ongoing re-interpretation of) the tradition in light of the context 
of the ecological crisis.160 
 
158 Prabhu (2013: 82) also makes this link. Miller notes that White endorses St. Francis of Assisi as a 
model for a less ecologically destructive Christianity, and that Francis’ attention to St. Francis can also 
be read in terms of this response (2017: 16), as does Erickson (2015: 89). Henning (2015: 44) reads 
Francis as part of a process of responding to White that began ambivalently with John Paul II; although 
Irwin stresses continuity between Francis and the three previous Popes (2016: 4-5), as do Pavić and 
Šundalić – who also identify the White link (2016: 329). 
159  McDonagh reads LS more generally as re-emphasising themes in the tradition that are more 
affirming of the body and creatures. He contrasts this with the Hellenic hierarchical dualism of spirit 
and body in early Christianity (c.f. Johnson (2015)), medieval association of the world with suffering 
and death after the Black Death, as well as the strongly anthropocentric soteriologies of early 
modernity (2017: 12-15). Thompson finds in LS a similar Thomist affirmation of nature (2016: 752), 
and Edwards reads Francis’ conception of nature as revelatory of the divine as “a return to a traditional 
view, associated with Bonaventure, among others” (2016a: 8). 
However, Edwards also reads Francis’ affirmation of the “intrinsic value” of nonhuman 
creatures with less of a hermeneutic of continuity, describing it as “a real development in church 
teaching” (2016a: 8). Ruether picks up on the soteriological contrast identified by Black, similarly 
describing Francis’ incorporation of all creation into his vision of salvation as a “notable development” 
(2015: 20). Feehan (2017: 57-8) likewise contrasts LS in this to the anthropocentrism of Augustine, 
Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, and their contemporary heirs. However, he also sees in LS’ concern for 
biodiversity parallels with an alternative sensibility in Aquinas (c.f. Summa Theologiae I, q. 47, a. 1.; 
Summa Contra Gentiles, II, XLV) (2017: 68-9). 
These developments are not uncontroversial. Van den Heuvel (2018) critiques Francis’ turn 
from anthropocentrism as theologically inadequate, also noting that anthropocentrism itself permits 
more nuance than the broad strokes in which Francis rejects it. 
160 Castillo claims that Francis’ theological attention to the human-earth relationship as a theological 
topic in its own right, rather than the background to other relationships, constitutes a novel 
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LS does not specifically identify this context as one of faith. However, it is an experiential, 
practical, and existential one, and therefore includes the pre-doctrinal spirituality articulated 
above: it is a context in which God is encountered and ‘believed in’. In short, it is a context 
which includes credere in Deum, and prioritising it means giving hermeneutical priority to 
credere in Deum over credere Deum. In this vein, the ecological crisis of today, and the 
credere in Deum which emerges within it, provides the basis for the development of (that is, 
variation in) credere Deum. 
In short, these examples show how plurivocity in credere Deum can be understood as arising 
from plurivocity in credere in Deum. The upshot of this is that our reflections about 
plurivocity in credere in Deum also apply to plurivocity in credere Deum. Different outlooks 
with regards to doctrinal issues can be read in terms of an expression of the plurivocal unity 
of faith, rather than a sign of deviation from that unity. This opens the possibility for this 
alterity to be read as an expression of variation in true faith, thereby equipping us to 
approach difference with a hopeful outlook. 
In the language of our fourth chapter, reading these differences as differences in form, rather 
than in terms of the discursive agreement and disagreement which arises from them equips 
us to approach variation in credere Deum along the same lines as variation in doctrinal form: 
differences in belief can potentially be read as differences in the form of belief, justified by 
their facilitation of encounter with God. In the language of our fifth chapter, we might say 
that the unity of beliefs which make up the proper doctrine of the Church is one that has the 
capacity to unsettle the ideas which seek to determine it. This is not exactly the same as 
saying that the unity of the truth, to which these beliefs tend, bears up a similar 
transcendence over our ideas of unity. However, if the unity of belief proper to the Church 
ultimate conforms to the unity of the truth (which is not a controversial idea), then 
presupposing this, any actual transcendence of the unity of that belief in this way indicates 
a corresponding transcendence in the unity of the truth. As a result, we can view difference 
 
development of the tradition in itself (2017: 98-100). In a similar vein, O’Halloran (2018) reads LS as 
developing through clarifying Vatican II’s ambiguously cosmic vision by specifically incorporating the 
whole of creation into the drama of redemption. A similar point is made by McDonagh (2017: 9-10) 
and Visick (2015: 411). More ambivalently, Thompson reads LS from the perspective of a more 
straightforward Thomism. In the course of this, he (dubiously) argues that Francis’ vision of creation 
resembling the Godhead constitutes a restatement of Aquinas’ claim that the lower orders of nature 
are untouched by sin and therefore not incorporated into this redemption, thereby mitigating this 
novelty somewhat (2016: 752), although he employs his reading to extend natural law theory to cover 
ecology in a different novel development. 
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in this context as an expression of legitimate variation of form within the Church, rather than 
a deviation either from the proper unity of the Church’s belief or the truth itself. 
3. PRONG TWO: HOPE IN RECONCILIATION 
There is, however, a further problem: merely recognising the possibility of this variation does 
not enable us to read any given instance of variation in these terms. Merely being able to 
recognise the possibility of a hopeful reading does not in itself enable the hope that would 
motivate this reading. 
LS also supplies a solution here. We will begin to explore this by looking more closely at the 
nature of the problem, returning to Sedgwick’s original Kleinian typology in order to 
understand it. We will then argue that LS invokes an eschatological vision of reconciliation in 
which disagreement can be viewed as non-threatening. Finally, we will explore how LS 
presents this in terms of a Eucharistic temporality, in which disagreement appears as comic. 
This in turn enables a security that provides the basis for a hopeful, rather than fearful, 
reading of disagreement. 
3.1. ANXIETY AND PARANOIA 
The response in VS to epistemological crisis reproduces an affective-epistemological dynamic 
which becomes associated with paranoid hermeneutics when we read Sedgwick’s typology 
with closer attention to its Kleinian roots. Sedgwick identifies paranoid hermeneutics with 
Klein’s paranoid-schizoid position. According to Klein, this position is a way of relating to 
objects which corresponds to a stage in childhood development. This stage is characterised 
by anxiety, which arises in response to self-destructive impulses or the “Death Instinct”. This 
anxiety is “felt as fear of annihilation (death)”. This fear becomes attached to an object, 
which leads to its being felt as “fear of an uncontrollable overpowering object”. This object 
is the mother, who, through a process of “splitting”, is reconstituted by the infant in terms 
of part-objects: a good, nurturing breast; and a bad, threatening breast towards which this 
fear is directed, and which correspondingly becomes the object of aggression (Klein, 1996: 
166). Hence the position manifests in a “terrible alertness to the dangers posed by the 
hateful and envious part-objects that one defensively projects into, carves out of, and ingests 
from the world around one”, which Sedgwick identifies as the dominant characteristic of her 
‘paranoid’ hermeneutics (Sedgwick, 2003: 128). We might elaborate on this to say a paranoid 
hermeneutic enacts an analogous process of splitting: as a theory of negative affect, it 
determines its objects so as to be threats; while its strong-theoretical aspects establishes the 
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connection between fear and objects as such, enabling the attachment of  the former to the 
latter. 
By contrast, reparative hermeneutics are associated with the depressive position (Sedgwick, 
2003: 128). This position, according to Klein, corresponds to the next stage of child 
development, in which the child integrates their image of the mother, recombining the part-
objects that were split in the prior stage. This leads to feelings of guilt, as the child comes to 
recognise that the aggression previously directed at the ‘bad’ part-objects was truly directed 
at the ‘good’ mother. This engenders a “drive to repair or protect the injured object” 
(Sedgwick, 2003: 172). In this regard, we might gloss the depressive position as embodying 
a shift from a paranoid-schizoid fear for the self, to a fear for the harmed object. 
We noted in our first chapter that our use of Sedgwick’s typology is primarily descriptive, 
rather than explanatory; we are not seeking to psychoanalyse ‘paranoid’ Catholic 
theologians! However, what attending to this psychoanalytic background does show is a 
deeper relationship between hermeneutical choice and affect than is captured in the claim 
that paranoid hermeneutics are theories of negative affect. Klein’s typology indicates that 
the link between anxiety and paranoid hermeneutics is not unilateral; it is not merely that 
paranoid hermeneutics identify threats. Rather, it is also the case that one potential 
motivating factor for adopting a paranoid hermeneutic is anxiety, or response to a perceived 
threat.  
This is reflected in Sedgwick’s description of paranoid hermeneutics as reflexive and mimetic: 
paranoia understands its objects by reproducing them, this understanding itself is only 
understood through the adoption of that paranoia (2003: 131). To put it another way, 
paranoid hermeneutics presuppose a prior defensive stance that validates paranoia’s theory 
of negative affect. This is confirmed in the case of VS, which offers a paranoid response to a 
perceived threat posed by dangerous alterity in moral theology.  
To put it more simply: paranoid hermeneutics are motivating to the extent that the subject 
already feels uneasy about their object, as we are more likely to opt for an account which 
assesses something as a threat if we are open to perceiving it as one. Correspondingly, if a 
reparative alternative is to be compelling, it needs to be accompanied by something which 
alleviates this anxiety. The second prong of our response addresses this concern, looking to 
Francis’ theology of the Eucharist as the basis for this consolation. In short, in LS, the 
Eucharist inserts us into an eschatological temporality which imbues conflict with the 
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promise of resolution. This enables us to take a stance towards it which is fundamentally 
comic, reading it in joy and hope rather than with self-protective fear. 
3.2. ESCHATOLOGY AND RECONCILIATION 
LS builds on its cosmology of encounter to present us with an eschatological vision that is 
fundamentally one of reconciliation.161  Firstly, Francis finds the origins of all creation in 
harmonious communion, writing that the narrative of creation in genesis establishes “that 
human life is grounded in three fundamental and closely intertwined relationships: with God, 
with our neighbour and with the earth itself”; a state recovered in part by St. Francis’ of 
Assisi’s communion with nature. However, this original “harmony between the Creator, 
humanity and creation” was “disrupted” by sin, becoming “conflictual” (LS §66). 
However, Francis is ultimately hopeful. He writes that “[t]he ultimate destiny of the universe 
is in the fullness of God… all creatures are moving forward with us and through us towards a 
common point of arrival, which is God, in that transcendent fullness where the risen Christ 
embraces and illumines all things” (LS §83).  
This passage highlights two important themes. Firstly, this reconciliation can be read in terms 
of relation, in the ‘embrace’ of communion with God. In this vein, the Trinitarian resemblance 
of creation means that it finds its fulfilment in communion with both other creatures and 
God:  
The human person grows more, matures more and is sanctified more to the extent 
that he or she enters into relationships, going out from themselves to live in 
communion with God, with others and with all creatures. In this way, they make their 
own that trinitarian dynamism which God imprinted in them when they were created. 
(LS §240) 
Secondly, in this communion, we are ‘reconciled’ in truth: the nature of creation will be 
‘illumined’. Hence Francis also writes: “At the end, we will find ourselves face to face with 
the infinite beauty of God… and be able to read… the mystery of the universe, which with us 
will share in unending plenitude” (LS §243). This makes sense in the context of Francis’ 
metaphysics of relation: insofar as our destiny in this relation involves communion with other 
creatures, our eschatological destiny is also one of encounter (analogous or otherwise) with 
other creatures. Because the being(-in-relation) of creatures arises from, and finds its 
 
161 This gives a double meaning to the phrase, “our common home”, which takes on eschatological 
resonances (Grey: 5). 
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fulfilment in, relation with God, their destination in relation with God represents the fullest 
realisation of their nature. Consequently, our encounter with creatures in our eschatological 
destination is an encounter with them in their fullest nature.162 
This eschatology of reconciliation allows us to read Francis’ four principles in EG in a cosmic 
register. EG presents them as “related to constant tensions present in every social reality”, 
and able therein to “guide the development of life in society and the building of a people 
where differences are harmonized within a shared pursuit” (EG §221). That is, they are 
fundamentally concerned with reconciliation. However, they are also eschatological: Francis’ 
first principle, “[t]ime is greater than space”, enjoins us to approach social tensions in light 
of the tension between the limited possibilities of the present, and the “fullness” of “the 
greater, brighter horizon of the utopian future as the final cause which draws us to itself” 
(EG §222). This enables us to give priority to “processes”, rather than succumbing to the 
impatient desire to have everything in the present (EG §223). This principle is thus predicated 
upon an eschatological statement about the promise of future fulfilment, which in turn 
enables us to accept the limitations of the present in hope. This can be read as undergirding 
the forward-looking aspects of his other three principles.163  
Francis’ second principle, “[u]nity prevails over conflict”, enjoins us to look for a resolution 
to conflict which “takes place on a higher plane and preserves what is valid and useful on 
both sides” (EG §228). In the context of conflict, it exhorts us to avoid negating any party by 
totalising another’s position in, or account of, that conflict (Verstraeten, 2016: 109). This is 
achieved within a patient logic of ‘time’: it is the product of “a way of making history”; an 
ongoing process in which “tensions and oppositions can achieve a diversified and life-giving 
unity”, rather than being negated by premature resolution (EG §228). Likewise, this principle 
relies on an explicitly eschatological vision, reminding us “that Christ has made all things one 
in himself”. It thus seeks “peace”, which is the “sign of this unity and reconciliation of all 
things in him” (EG §229). This vision directly speaks against the easy resolution of conflict in 
“a negotiated settlement”. Rather, it aims towards the fulfilment of all, and is motivated in 
 
162 This includes an ethical relation to creation. Hence we can follow Kauffman et al.’s description of 
the hope for an eco-friendly world as a hope for “transcendence” (2015: 231). 
163  In this vein, Lane argues that Francis’ relational ontology locates human development and 
fulfilment in dialogue with others (2017: 39-40). This establishes language as constitutive of our being 
(2017: 41-2); something which resonates with Francis’ analogy between the Church and speaking 
communities in LF (§38), which we saw in chapter four. 
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this by the “conviction that the unity brought by the Spirit can harmonize every diversity” 
(EG §230). 
Francis’ fourth principle gives another image of the unity sought by Francis’ second principle. 
This principle is “[t]he whole is greater than the part”, and it reminds us to balance both 
global and local perspectives, reducing neither to the other. Part of this involves recognising 
that, while “the whole is greater than the parts”, it is also “greater than the sum of its parts” 
(EG §235). This particularly applies to the Gospel, which addresses everyone (EG §237), and 
cannot be reduced to “limited and particular questions” on subject particular to only a few 
(EG §235). Francis illustrates this with the image of a polyhedron, which is composed from a 
unity of multiple facets, but cannot be reduced to them; and in which each local point is 
included in the peaceable, plural justice of ‘equidistance’ from the global centre (EG §236). 
Finally, Francis’ third principle is “[r]ealities are more important than ideas”. This principle 
exhorts us to reject the idealist schemas of “formal nominalism”, and instead seek 
“harmonious objectivity” (EG §232). This principle is eschatological in the sense that it 
requires us to attend to history: we must recognise and respect the role of the Church in 
salvation history, the historical specificities of its life, and to “put the word into practice” (EG 
§233). 
In short, these four principles illustrate a vision of promised social reconciliation, achieved 
through a historical process which must recognise, and which embraces everyone without 
negation through either exclusion or homogenisation. Francis’ eschatology of reconciliation 
in LS repeats this in a cosmic register: we find our fulfilment in communion with creation, in 
relation to God. This communion is one in which each creature is incorporated, and each 
nature is fully realised, correcting the divisive disruptions of sin. In doing so, LS confirms the 
hopeful social vision of EG: the cosmic reconciliation of creation in God incorporates the 
social reconciliation of differences.164  
 
164 In this vein, Vogel (2015) reads the vision of LS as directing us towards legal reforms that will enable 
better relation to one another and creation. Parker also reads it as directing us towards similar reforms 
within the Church, in pursuit of an “eco-ecclesiology” (2015: 318-321). Silecchia recognises this when 
he reads LS as calling for a “social love” (c.f. LS §231, 228) that expresses personal love for God in 
public life and institutions (2015: 397). 
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3.3. PROMISE AND EUCHARISTIC TEMPORALITY 
What is significant about this cosmic register is that LS explicitly treats it in light of themes of 
promise. Francis writes that the New Testament depicts the risen Christ as “present 
throughout creation by his universal Lordship” (LS §100). This 
leads us to direct our gaze to the end of time, when the Son will deliver all things to 
the Father, so that “God may be everything to every one” (1 Cor 15:28). Thus, the 
creatures of this world no longer appear to us under merely natural guise because the 
risen One is mysteriously holding them to himself and directing them towards fullness 
as their end. The very flowers of the field and the birds which his human eyes 
contemplated and admired are now imbued with his radiant presence.  
(LS §100) 
In short, this eschatological perspective renders creation a site of encounter with God, and 
specifically as the eschatological destination of creation. Here, the “fullness”, which Francis’ 
first principle in EG identifies as the “final cause”, is encountered anew in creation as the 
promise of its reconciliation in that fullness. 
For Francis, the Eucharist is the site of this encounter and the realisation of this communion 
par excellence. Francis writes that “[i]n the Eucharist, fullness is already achieved; it is the 
living centre of the universe, the overflowing core of love and of inexhaustible life. Joined to 
the incarnate Son, present in the Eucharist, the whole cosmos gives thanks to God… The 
world which came forth from God’s hands returns to him in blessed and undivided 
adoration” (LS §236).  
Pickstock reads the Eucharist in a similar way. In doing so, she identifies a process of 
repetition in which the present moment is constituted by different instantiations of a 
promised future in eternity. For Pickstock, this occurs in the Liturgy, which constitutes the 
Church that performs it within a Eucharistic temporality oriented towards the fulfilment 
prefigured in the sacrament. This process is mirrored in the Eucharistic theology of LS: for 
Francis, the Eucharist inserts the Church within a temporality in which the eschatological 
promise prefigured in the Eucharist governs its reading of time. This in turn provides the 
Church with a narrative for disagreement that is fundamentally comic, reading it in the 
context of eschatological fulfilment in communion.  
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Pickstock follows de Lubac’s165 well-known genealogy of the corpus mysticum in order to 
frame this. De Lubac traces an historical theological shift around the relationship between 
the historical, sacramental, and the ecclesial bodies of Christ. Originally, the sacramental and 
ecclesial bodies were associated in their conception as the enactment of an event originally 
occurring in the historical body of Christ, and continued in the reception of the sacramental 
body, which also caused the individual to be received into the ecclesial body. In this context, 
‘mystical’ applied equally to the sacramental body and the Church, insofar as they were both 
mutually constituted within the sacrament: the Church was unified through its reception of 
the Eucharist, and the Eucharist “signified the Church... as that in and by which it was 
received, and which attested to it through its essential manifestation of unity”. In this vein, 
it was precisely because the mystical body of the Church was considered a reality that the 
Eucharist was conceived as an effective sign rather than merely a symbol (Pickstock, 1998: 
159). 
However, in the late middle-ages, the historical and the sacramental bodies became more 
closely associated, and the ecclesial body relegated to an invisible extension. Pickstock 
understands this shift in terms of the loss of a temporal dimension to sacramental presence, 
and the adoption of a spatialising logic. To put it simply, this modern understanding 
emphasised the Eucharist’s bringing about a particular state of affairs in the present (the 
presence of the historical body in the specific location of the altar).  
In contrast, the pre-modern conception emphasised an economy in which the Eucharist 
communicates the divine within the present, thereby inserting the Church into an 
eschatological temporality defined by relation to the eternal reality of Christ’s saving action 
(Pickstock, 1998: 160). Pickstock describes this communication in terms of “non-identical 
repetition” of the mystical reality through the eucharistic sign (1998: 160). She draws this 
term from Kierkegaard, 166  whom she reads as drawing a contrast between Platonic 
recollection and Christian repetition. In this, recollection is portrayed as a backward-looking 
movement that seeks to recover a past that is understood as entirely separate from the 
moment of recollection. In contrast, for Kierkegaard, Christian repetition is a forward-looking 
movement in which the moment of repetition is a constitutive part of that which is repeated. 
Pickstock disagrees with Kierkegaard in terms of his reading of Plato, whom she reads as 
presenting a “doxological” philosophy of language that grounds meaning in a quasi-
 
165 C.f. de Lubac (2006) 
166 C.f. Kierkegaard (1983) 
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sacramental encounter with the divine (2008: xviii); a reading which seems to “close the gap” 
between Plato and Christianity opened by Kierkegaard (Pickstock, 1998: 269). Rather, she 
uses Kierkegaard’s distinction to understand the difference between pre-modern and 
modern understandings of sacramental signs. Hence, she notes, under modernity, the 
historical tradition of the Church that celebrates the Eucharist ceased to be understood as a 
matter of participating in an eschatology. Instead, it became conceived in terms of “a code 
or law” that preserved the essence of an historical presence, securing it in the present 
through recollection in its statutes (Pickstock, 1998: 160).167 Moreover, in representing the 
Church, the host on the altar made this presence visible - and this making-visible becoming 
the raison d’être of the Church, rather than the sacramental communication of the eternal 
in the liturgy. The Church thus became “the place where invisible authority is made legible 
(the read historical accounts) or manifested (the totalized visibility of the sacrament), or both 
together” (Pickstock, 1998: 161). 
In contrast, she writes, the pre-modern understanding “laid stress on the contemporary 
continuity between the act of receiving the eucharistic Body and being received by and as 
the ecclesial “body”” (Pickstock, 1998: 159). That is, it conceived of the Church as both the 
cause and effect of the Eucharist – to quote de Lubac, “the Church produces the Eucharist 
but the Eucharist also produces the Church” (1999: 133). This “opened the space of liturgy” 
to incorporate a temporal dimension spanning the sweep of history from “the apostolic 
historic origins to the present ecclesial moment, and ever onwards” (Pickstock, 1998: 159). 
Here, the Church becomes “the realization in time of a mystery”, constituted by the 
sacramental repetition of the eschaton in the different celebrations of the Eucharist (1998: 
160). 
The metaphysics of relation in LS recovers this pre-modern theology of the Eucharist as 
repetition. We have seen above how, for Francis, the Eucharist is the site of encounter with 
God as eschatological fullness. Because the nature of creation finds its fulfilment in this 
fullness, creation is encountered as fulfilled within this communion, thereby illuminating it. 
Moreover, insofar as Francis’ reading of Genesis situates the origins of creation in this same 
 
167 Pickstock argues for an understanding of language based upon the function of the signs in the 
Eucharist, which she describes as “doxological” (1998: xiii): for Pickstock, meaning is grounded in the 
activity of praise of the divine, which serves to communicate the divine to the speaker and hearer, 
rather than merely representing truth as the means of recollection. Likewise, in chapter four, we saw 
how Francis prioritises the role of doctrinal forms as a site of encounter with God, rather than as 
merely codifying precepts. This might be read as recognising the possibility of a doxological reading of 
language, which is similarly grounded in a sacramental economy within the Church that we explored 
as his ‘Marian priority’. 
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communion, which is repaired in the Eucharist, in presenting that destiny the Eucharist also 
presents the origin of creation as related to it. For Francis, the Eucharist thus also opens up 
a temporal dimension within the liturgy, inserting the Church into a unique temporality.  
As with Pickstock, this temporality is oriented around the origins of the Church. In LF §44 he 
writes that the Eucharist is “an encounter with Christ truly present in the supreme act of his 
love, the life-giving gift of himself”. Here, he thus portrays the Eucharist in terms of a 
communication of origins in the Passion. Hence the passage continues to discuss it in a way 
that almost completely reproduces Pickstock’s reading: 
In the Eucharist we find the intersection of faith’s two dimensions. On the one hand, 
there is the dimension of history: the Eucharist is an act of remembrance, a making 
present of the mystery in which the past, as an event of death and resurrection, 
demonstrates its ability to open up a future, to foreshadow ultimate fulfilment. 
We can read this as an extension of the Christology of LF, in which Christ is the “supreme 
manifestation” of God’s love (LF §15). This theme is transposed into a eucharistic register 
when Francis identifies this manifestation specifically with Christ’s sacrifice, writing that 
“[t]he clearest proof of the reliability of Christ’s love is to be found in his dying for our sake” 
(LF §16), and that “Christ’s death discloses the utter reliability of God’s love above all in the 
light of his resurrection” (LF §17). It is this identification of Eucharist as love which underpins 
the Eucharistic temporality of LF, insofar as it enables us to view the future in an 
eschatological context: in realising how God “is so close to us that he entered into human 
history”, we are able “to grasp reality’s deepest meaning and to see how much God loves 
this world and is constantly guiding it towards himself” (LF §18). 
For LF, the origins encountered in the Eucharist lie in Christ’s sacrifice. In contrast, LS 
develops this theme of divine ‘closeness’ in order to extend the sweep of Eucharistic 
temporality back to original creation, thereby translating it into a specifically cosmological 
register. Francis describes the communion of creation and God in the Eucharist in terms of 
closeness: in the Eucharist, God chooses to “reach our intimate depths”, such that he “comes 
not from above, but from within”. However, this closeness is cosmic: “[t]he Eucharist joins 
heaven and earth; it embraces and penetrates all creation” (LS §236); and participating in it 
is “an act of cosmic love” (LS §236) that is “celebrated on the altar of the world” (Ecclesia de 
Eucharistia §438; quoted in LS §236). In doing so, the love that provides the foundation of 
the Eucharistic temporality of LF, and which LF finds embodied in this closeness, becomes 
revealed not so much in Christ’s Passion and Resurrection themselves as in the communion 
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that they expressed and restored. This is not to say LS loses the Christocentrism of LF. It is 
“[j]oined to the incarnate Son, present in the Eucharist” that “the whole cosmos gives thanks 
to God” (LS §236). However, it becomes contextualised within a wider sweep of cosmic 
history. Christ as encountered in the Eucharist is the supreme, revelatory expression of divine 
love as realised in cosmic communion.168 
In short, in the Eucharist, we are not merely presented with Christ’s sacrifice. Rather, we are 
presented with the closeness expressed in the incarnation as realised on a cosmic scale, in 
the communion of all creation. In doing so, the Eucharist incorporates within itself the 
promise of reconciliation presented by EG when read through the cosmology of LS. This 
enables that promise to have a relativizing effect on historical conflict: within Eucharistic 
temporality, into which we are inserted by repetition in the Eucharist, historical conflict is 
always eschatologically directed towards a promised reconciliation. This relativization 
enables us to view that conflict as indicative of the promise, which is found in the creatures 
that it illuminates.  
This discovery of promise in conflict, imparts a certain narrative structure to conflict itself - 
and it is this narrative which serves to console anxiety in the face of conflict. In the next 
section, we will see how Eucharistic temporality is one in which conflict must be viewed in 
the context of a ‘contradiction’ with its eventual resolution, which can even occur through 
those conflicts, as the material of history. This means that those conflicts themselves become 
comic, but in a fundamentally hopeful way that incorporates a clear vision of this redemptive 
context; one in which even the most difficult tensions can find themselves, bizarrely, the 
vehicles of grace. Viewed in this way, conflict can cease to be threatening, becoming instead 
the object of a hope that finds salvation in the oddest places. 
3.4. COMEDY 
As with Pickstock’s theology of the Eucharist as repetition, Kierkegaard also provides our foil 
for understanding the narrative structure of Francis’ Eucharistic temporality, and its relation 
to our guiding concern around alterity and threat. This is the theory of comedy that he 
 
168 This contrast is perhaps also why LS emphasises the link between the Eucharist and the risen Christ, 
but has little to say about the Cross: although commentators such as Gruber (2017a) focus on the 
ecclesiological implications of the cosmic-ecological aspects of LS, Francis’ concern here is ultimately 
a cosmological one, in which the apostolic origins of the Church in specific historical events are 
relatively less significant than in the ecclesiologically-minded LF. Of course, the two readings of the 
Eucharist are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, LS might be read as deepening the ecclesiology of LF: 
whereas LF identifies the origins of the Church in the life of Christ, in LS, the Eucharist also reveals the 
Church’s cosmic origin in the act of creation itself. 
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presents under the pseudonym of Johannes Climacus, in his Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript.169 Reading eucharistic temporality in dialogue with Climacus brings the narrative 
structure found in Francis’ eschatology of reconciliation into contact with issues of 
affectivity, revealing how it enables us to approach the failure of reconciliation in the present 
in a joyful and hopeful way. 
At the heart of Climacus’ theory of comedy is an understanding of human life as 
characterised by a contradiction or “incongruity” (Lippitt, 2000: 10) between God and 
creation. This contradiction falls along lines of divine infinitude against created finitude, and 
divine absoluteness before which creation is relative.  
The distinction between comedy and tragedy in this context lies in the manner in which it 
bears this contradiction. Climacus writes: 
The comic apprehension evokes the contradiction or makes it manifest by having in 
mind the way out, which is why the contradiction is painless. The tragic apprehension 
sees the contradiction and despairs of a way out. 
(Kierkegaard, 1941: 463) 
To put it differently, the ridicule of the comic is a hopeful ridicule, which serves as the 
instance for transcendence of the situation in which the contradiction arises.170 In contrast, 
tragedy faces this contradiction in despair. 
This humour takes on two forms. The first is a mode of approaching suffering. This is 
predicated on the awareness that the contradiction entails the impossibility of attaining 
one’s ultimate happiness, and hence the inescapability of suffering (1941: 401). This renders 
any talk of the particular or relative sufferings arising from the frustration of worldly desire 
“superfluous”, insofar as their satisfaction will never alleviate the true, absolute suffering in 
life (Kierkegaard, 1846: 402). Likewise, it recognises the inadequacy of any particular act in 
achieving this happiness – for example, in kneeling to pray (Lippitt, 2000: 94). This superfluity 
 
169  The relationship between Kierkegaard’s various pseudonyms, as well as between them and 
Kierkegaard as an author, is complex (c.f. Golomb (1992)). We are using Climacus’ theory in an ad-hoc 
way here, without wider systematic relation to the authorial figure of Kierkegaard himself, or any of 
the other pseudonyms under which he writes. 
170 Climacus notes that the lower cannot make the higher ridiculous, although bringing something 
higher into relation with something lower “may make the relationship ridiculous”. Thus, he writes, “it 
is possible for a horse to be the occasion for a man showing himself in a ridiculous light, but the horse 
has no power to make him ridiculous” (Kierkegaard, 1941: 463). 
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and inadequacy expresses the ultimate incongruity of the contradiction between God and 
creation, and it is this incongruity which serves as the matter for humour. 
The second is specifically “religious humour”. This humour turns on what Climacus calls guilt 
consciousness. Guilt consciousness is a feature of pagan religion, and refers to the awareness 
that one’s very capacity to fail to meet the demand of the infinite renders one guilty, which 
in turn makes even redemption (as a change relative to this capacity) the condition of one’s 
guilt. Guilt-consciousness thus realises the absolute “totality of guilt”, as a quality of 
existence in general (Kierkegaard, 1941: 471). In revealing the essential nature of guilt to 
existence, guilt consciousness thus indicates the impossibility of relation to the infinite by 
anything other than the relation of consciousness of one’s guilt before it. This in turn means 
that the pagan is trapped: their only relation to the infinite is through their guilt, which is 
their inability to attain it. This means that both relating to and attaining the infinite become 
mutually exclusive, rendering its attainment impossible (1941: 472-3). 
Religious humour juxtaposes one’s guilt relative to specific acts and measures with one’s 
absolute or total guilt, against which it appears trivial. Climacus compares this to figures 
running around in panic on a sinking ship: “the contradiction is that in spite of all this 
movement they do not move away from the place where the destruction is” (Kierkegaard, 
1846: 493). 
Francis’ Eucharistic temporality is comic, albeit not in a way that completely reproduces 
these schemata. Firstly, the contradiction upon which its comedy turns is different to that 
figured by Climacus: for Climacus, recognition of the contradiction entails the realisation that 
God is not to be identified with any good in the external world. The infinite, in its distinction 
from the finite, is “abstract” and “aesthetically poverty-stricken”; unable to fulfil the kinds of 
desires elicited by worldly objects (Kierkegaard, 1941: 353). This in turn reduces relation to 
the infinite to something entirely inwards. Francis, by contrast, holds that we encounter both 
God and this reconciliation in the communion of the Eucharist.171 In other words, he does 
not recognise Kierkegaard’s distinction between God and the world; we encounter God in 
the world, in the Eucharist (and, as argued in chapter four, through other forms as well). 
 
171  Climacus here would criticise this claim as a ridiculous misdirected “absolute dedication to a 
relative telos” (Kierkegaard, 1941: 377-8). Milbank (1996) offers an alternative reading of Kierkegaard 
that both contests his restriction of religious pathos to interiority, and also his refusal of mediation. 
This reading lends itself to a more unproblematic reading of Francis via Kierkegaard. However, 
Milbank’s reading is not concerned with comedy. Given that we are not interested in redeeming 
Kierkegaard for Catholic theology so much as illustrating something about Francis to do with comedy, 
a more straightforward reading of the Postcript serves us better here. 
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What we have instead are the horizons of the third chapter, expressed in a practical as well 
as epistemological register: in the Eucharist, we do achieve actual, positive relation to the 
infinite and the reconciliation therein. The contradiction instead lies in our ability to achieve 
the fullness of this relation in our limitation, either by thematising it (as problematised in our 
third chapter), or by achieving reconciliation or mediation of difference (and thematising it, 
as problematised in our fifth chapter). 
This also means that the object of comedy in Eucharistic temporality is different. Climacus’ 
humour turns on the incongruity between finite or relative passion, and the absoluteness or 
inescapability of suffering before the infinite; or finite or relative guilt, and the total or 
absolute guilt before the infinite. In contrast, Francis’ eschatology establishes a contradiction 
between the “social tensions” of present limitation (which we have associated with alterity, 
disagreement, and the failure of mediation in epistemological crisis), and the future 
reconciliation encountered within the Eucharistic communion. In short, for Climacus, 
humour lies in the triviality of the finite in the face of the infinite. For Francis, however, 
humour lies in the importance of finite struggles in the face of ultimate consolation, and the 
contradiction therein with their difficulty; that we must persist in the absurdity of limitation 
today because it finds its fulfilment tomorrow.172 This ‘Eucharistic’ humour is essentially 
joyful, showing the way out of the contradiction not through negation of the finite, but in 
the promise of its fulfilment.173 For example, Francis encourages evangelizers to embrace 
“the smell of the sheep” (EG §24) and being “soiled by the mud of the street” (EG §45). These 
two images, which metaphorically express closeness to peoples’ lives and the difficulties 
involved in relating to Others respectively, portray a Church that is undignified: it has become 
smelly and dirty in the course of its work. However, he can deploy these images precisely 
because he is certain of a deeper dignity that remains is unshaken by these superficial 
embarassments. The contradiction that they express is not one in which the Church’s 
muckiness becomes trivial in light of its transcendent orientation. Rather, it attains a new 
level of importance and dignity, and this is what is funny.174 
 
172 This difference is important. Climacus notes that that if there is no contradiction if there is some 
“positive definition” that prevents the finite being negated (Kierkegaard, 1846: 493). Hence Francis’ 
comedy sustains contradiction by shifting its location 
173 In this vein, Irwin reads Francis’ Eucharistic theology as installing liturgical celebration at the heart 
of any process of theological reflection, reminding us both of the object of our hope, but also the 
reality of contemporary need for redemption (2016: 238-240). 
174 Contrast this with John Paul II’s request that journalists stop referring to the papal car as the 
“popemobile” because it was “undignified” (in Stone, 2008: Online). Here, John Paul accurately reads 




This hope, moreover, is a secure one. Climacus’ religious humour, and Francis’ Eucharistic 
humour, differ in that the former despairs of a way out of contradiction whereas the latter 
does not. For both, contradiction is ubiquitous to human life. However, Francis’ Eucharistic 
temporality transforms conflict from a threat to communion into its negative face, intelligible 
only as painful conflict because it appears against the backdrop of a promised reconciliation. 
As such, it redeems the tension of this contradiction, transforming it into a hopeful one that 
bears within itself the seeds of its own overcoming. Thus it provides security even in conflict.  
Climacus reflects on Paganism, which “has only human nature in general as its assumption” 
(Kierkegaard, 1846: 496). Paganism is ultimately tragic insofar as awareness of the distinction 
implies awareness of the ultimate inability of finite humanity to escape suffering and attain 
the infinite (Lippitt, 2000: 90).  
In contrast, Eucharistic temporality is comic precisely because the resolution of the 
contradiction is contained within itself: limitation stands in tension with fullness because 
there is fullness. It therefore provides us with security, and therein hope: the contradiction 
between the conflicts of the present and the communion of the future renders those 
conflicts themselves indicative not of the failure of reconciliation, but in fact its inevitability. 
The Eucharist presents us with the cosmic origins of all beings-in-relation within communion, 
as well as the promise of their cosmic reconciliation in that same communion. Similarly, in 
doing so, it illuminates those beings-in-relation such that they are known in light of that 
origin and promise. Consequently, their relations – including those relations that are 
conflictual – must be read as an expression of a creation that is fundamentally oriented 
towards reconciliation. That is, it is only because there is a promise of resolution that we feel 
the contradiction of conflict. As Francis puts it in EG §222, we “live poised between each 
individual moment and the greater, brighter horizon of the utopian future as the final cause 
which draws us to itself”. The tension of this ‘poise between’ is only such because there is 
the pole of fullness, which is a “horizon” precisely because it does lie beyond. Even in the 
agony of agonism, we encounter the consolation of communion. 
 
However, he responds to the contradiction as a threat to this dignity. In doing so, he loses touch with 
the transcendent orientation of the contradiction, in the process disguising it. The result is that the 
Church itself ceases to be read in light of this orientation, reversing the emphasis of the humour: 
rather than laughing at how the fulfilment of creation incorporates the popemobile, we now laugh at 
the ridiculousness of a call for dignity from the man who rides in it. 
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Moreover, Francis’ Eucharistic temporality provides a fundamentally hopeful outlook 
towards particular historical conflicts. We see this when we contrast Francis’ hope with the 
Christian hope offered by Climacus. 
For Climacus, whereas paganism mourns the inability of the finite to attain the infinite, 
Christianity finds a way beyond this: it recognises that even the contradiction between the 
finite and infinite, insofar as it is understood, belongs ultimately to the finite. In an extension 
of the movement of the religious in general, it thus surrenders understanding. Instead, it 
seizes on the “absurd”, in which the infinite, transcending the contradiction, delivers itself 
over to the finite. In the absurd, Climacus writes, “existence is paradoxically accentuated for 
the reason that the eternal itself came into the world at a moment of time” (Kierkegaard, 
1941: 505). That is, rather than negating the finite before the infinite, the contradiction 
instead enables the finite to provide a relationship with the eternal through itself: “the 
eternal is at a definite place” (1941: 506). 
Like Francis, then, Climacus’ Christianity ultimately finds a way beyond the despair of 
paganism. However, there is an important distinction between the two. Climacus’ Christian 
is characterised by sin consciousness, which is a development of guilt consciousness.  
Sin consciousness is consciousness of how the infinite relates the guilty finite to itself. This 
can only be attained by the finite subject via relation to the infinite in the finite (Kierkegaard, 
1941: 474). Climacus claims that the temporally-bound nature of the knowing subject means 
that the finite objects of knowledge do not possess being, as eternal essences. Rather, they 
are only becoming, possessing a temporally-bound, empirical existence (1941: 169). In this 
relation to the infinite, however, the finite itself attains the eternity in which the infinite 
views existence. In doing so, the finite attains an essence, and therein being. “In this way, 
Climacus writes, “this thing of becoming a Christian begins with the miracle of creation”. 
However, this is paradoxical in itself: “this occurs to one who already is created”. That is, one 
is already existent, and thus must become eternal (Kierkegaard, 1941: 510). In this sense, like 
Francis, Climacus also holds that one’s salvation is an expression of one’s being. However, 
for Climacus, this is paradoxically determined in the course of one’s existence, by divine 
intervention. That is, while salvation is an expression of one’s being, that being is in some 
sense extrinsic to oneself. To put it differently, the finite can only be saved by its 
supplementation with this extrinsic condition after the fact of its existence.  
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In the context of Francis’ identification of salvation with reconciliation, this would have a 
troubling implication: the extrinsic nature of the condition for salvation to creation renders 
the process of redemption itself something extrinsic to history, arriving from without at the 
apportioned time.  Correspondingly, there is nothing in the conflicts of the present that 
implies their resolution in the course of history. Instead, we must merely wait for the 
miraculous arrival of the eschaton for reconciliation. In contrast, Francis’ Eucharistic 
temporality reveals an orientation towards communion at the heart of creation. That is, all 
creation is intrinsically oriented towards this communion, in which the conflicts of the 
present will be resolved.175 As such, for Francis, all conflicts are intrinsically resolvable, and 
tend (as relations-in-being) towards this resolution in history in the course of its redemptive 
arc.176 
 
175 This is also why, contrary to readers such as Punch (2015), we do not read Francis as a process 
theologian: Punch reads Francis’ eschatological being-as-relation in terms of “belonging 
(relationality)” and “becoming (process)” (2015: 85). In contrast, eschatological fulfilment, for Francis, 
is the realisation of essence as being-in-relation, which is expressed in a less ‘fulfilled’ (agonic) way 
prior to grace. Stated in more explicitly non-process, Aristotelian terms, Francis holds that particular 
relations between beings are accidental expressions of a relational substance that possess the 
capacity to occupy a range of distinct relations, just as spatially extended substances can occupy 
distinct positions within that extension. In this context, the eschatological vision of reconciliation is 
not so much a development in being as such, but a change in accidental configuration as individual 
substances come to be expressed in different relations. In this vein, Thompson (2016: 746) reads the 
ontology of nature in LS as ultimately being one of “a divinely arranged, ordered complex of organic 
wholes” that provides the basis for a Thomist natural law ethics, albeit one that also speaks in terms 
of ecology; a “Green Thomism” similarly championed by Cuddeback (2016). Keller also notes that 
Francis invokes images of divine omnipotence to underpin his critique of reductive anthropocentrism, 
in contrast to the models of God normally associated with process theology (2015: 181-182). This 
implies a more classical metaphysics at the heart of Francis’ apophaticism. 
Nevertheless, there are thematic continuities between Francis as we read him and process 
theology, which indicate a possible rapprochement between the two. These include the emphasis on 
relation and temporality identified by Punch, but also a holistic vision of knowledge (Riffert, 2015: 
418-419); a scepticism of reduction and a view of “reciprocal relation” between systems and parts 
which requires an integral view of society and ecology (Bracken, 2015: 422-423), or anthropology 
more generally (Petrov, 2015: 427-428); and the endorsement of a holistic, relational hermeneutic 
predicated upon an ontology to match this (Teixeira, 2015: 435). In this vein, Shields notes that process 
philosophy is a wide-ranging field, and contrasts a narrow definition centring around pragmatist and 
Whiteheadian versions (which he admittedly identifies with process theology), with a “broad” 
definition which he explicitly identifies as encompassing Aristotelianism (2009: 128). This offers a 
bridge between ‘classical’ and ‘process’ theology. Finally, Francis’ refusal of totality, determination 
and absoluteness in his knowledge of creatures defies the kind of totalising approach we might 
associate with ‘classical’ Thomism, channelling a sensibility perhaps more readily found in process 
theologians (and which relatively conservative ‘Green Thomists’ might find troubling). 
176 The astute reader may recognise shades of de Lubac’s reading of Aquinas’ here. According to de 
Lubac, nature is characterised by an intrinsic openness to grace, which is fulfilled by divine action 
within history (c.f. Kerr, 2002: 134-148). Contrast this with Climacus, for whom the condition of the 
reception of the infinite/God must be provided by the infinite as something extrinsic to the 
finite/nature.  
Note that this contrast is less pronounced when we move from talk of fulfilment in grace to 
more general relationship to God. De Lubac himself recognises similarities on this point between 
219 
 
However, there is also a similarity between Climacus and Francis here. For Climacus, 
salvation arises from the absurd, in an utterly inscrutable, non-understandable contradiction 
to the determinations of our finite knowledge and power. This provides the basis for hope, 
in that these determinations would otherwise render salvation impossible.  
Likewise, in stressing the tension between limitation and fullness, and the horizons which 
emerge from it, Francis reminds us that the process of salvation likewise ultimately 
transcends our knowledge and control. In other words, the fulfilment of our nature is 
something that transcends our capacity to anticipate and determine it.177 This also means 
that progress, conceived as success achieved over time, must be “conceived in terms of grace 
and the free response to grace, not in terms of independent human achievement” (Grey: 6; 
see LS §78; 83; 100; 205; 221).  
This too provides the basis for a hope against apparent impossibility: even where our 
knowledge and actions fail, we can hope that intrinsic resolvability of conflict may still 
express itself. Francis illustrates this neatly when he quotes John Paul II to write that the 
tribulations of creation must be read in light of the fact that “God… can also bring good out 
of the evil we have done. “The Holy Spirit can be said to possess an infinite creativity, proper 
to the divine mind, which knows how to loosen the knots of human affairs, including the 
most complex and inscrutable” (LS §80). As for Climacus, precisely because salvation is 
indeterminate, hope can be sustained even in the failure of determination. We might even 
say that for both Francis and Climacus, hope arises from knowledge born of unselfing, which 
recognises the limitations of our knowledge and its capacity to determine the operation of 
grace – a theme that we will return to below. 
In summary, Francis’ Eucharistic temporality provides security in hope amidst conflict. It does 
so by revealing conflict as the negative face of future communion, always-already oriented 
towards its own resolution. Moreover, this security is not just a general, abstract security; 
 
Thomas (as he reads him) and Kierkegaard (which holds for Climacus) in that both invoke the idea of 
an absolute distinction between God and creation that gives rise to an ‘existential’ mode of relation 
between the individual and God, which cannot be reduced to pure theoretical or speculative knowing 
(Furnall, 2016: 126-134). Hence Francis also parallels this common element when he talks about 
human being-in-relation as presupposing encounter with God, and we extend this in our discussion of 
how conflict ‘presupposes’ communion. 
177 Francis expresses this when he refers to the natural world in communion with God as “sublime” 
(LS §234). He uses the term here in a non-technical sense, which captures the awe-inspiring 
transcendence of the world as site of encounter with God. However, it also captures the unsettling, 
and perhaps troubling aspects of creation which seem absurd or inscrutable to us in our finitude 
(Edwards, 2016b: 390-391). 
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rather, it is one that can be found in individual conflicts. This is because the process of 
reconciliation, for Francis, is fundamentally historical, occurring through the intrinsic 
resolvability of historical conflict as such. Moreover, the driving force of this resolution lies 
beyond the determinations of human thought and power. As such, this reconciliation can still 
occur even when we cannot anticipate it. 
This in turn enables us to accept disagreement as unthreatening: VS views conflict as an 
attack on foundations which are already ‘possessed’, and must be defended from 
degeneration. Eucharistic temporality, on the other hand, shows us that faith is not such a 
process of recollection, to be recovered from the past and preserved from degeneration in 
the future. Rather, it is a process of repetition that looks towards a foundation that lies 
before us, and which is to be hoped for and awaited in obedience to its transcendence over 
the limitations of the present. This foundation is communion, towards which the cosmos is 
continually journeying. In this context, conflict is not an attack on a recollected foundation, 
but is rather the working out of this future communion. Thus it presupposes the promise of 
this communion in its very being. This in turn provides the basis for a hope of universal 
reconciliation through this conflict, undermining all portrayals of conflict as a threat – even 
in the face of an indeterminacy that prevents our anticipating the nature of this 
reconciliation.178 
4. CONCLUSION: FEAR AND TRIUMPHALISM 
4.1. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we have addressed fears around the indeterminacy extended across all 
knowledge by the metaphysics of LS, as discussed in the previous chapter. Firstly, we argued 
that we could sustain doctrinal commitments in light of it by locating this indeterminacy on 
a second-order level. Secondly, we responded to concerns around epistemological crisis 
accompanying this. We argued that the metaphysics of LS enables us to conceive of 
multivocity in credere Deum in terms of multivocity in credere in Deum, thereby enabling a 
 
178 In this vein, Grey (6) describes time as portrayed by LS “as gift, not given”, evoking our relationship 
with God, and therefore rendered meaningful, in this hope. This enables us to embrace it and value it 
in the context of this relationship. Similarly, Scherz (2018) argues that the teleological orientation of 
eschatological time gives it qualitative value. This enables us to appreciate the present as valuable, 
despite its quantitative limitations, and therein attain satisfaction in one’s finitude. Hanby argues that 
the critique of the technological paradigm in LS implies that the intrinsic nature of creation is “in some 
sense normative” (2015: 746). This can be taken even further than Grey and Scherz: if the nature of 
creation is to be temporally bound, then respect and appreciation for this becomes an ethical impulse. 
Lasida demonstrates this by reading Francis’ four principles in light of the dialect of his first principle 
as a guide for economic activity (2017: 109-121). 
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reparative approach towards it as outlined in chapters four and five. We then showed how 
the Eucharistic theology of LS encourages us to view alterity and conflict not as a threat, but 
with hope. This consoles the fears that undergird the decision for paranoid hermeneutics, 
thereby enabling the adoption of a reparative alternative. 
We shall conclude this chapter by extending this to comment on what might be described as 
the ‘style’ of Catholic theology. We will argue that the comic narrative of Eucharistic 
temporality establishes a security that both enables and invites an ethic of unselfing. This in 
turn is realised in a correspondingly comic style, which delights and persists in the 
redemptive contradictions of present limitation. 
4.2. SECURITY AND UNSELFING 
In this chapter, we saw how Francis’ four principles in EG can be read in cosmic terms, rooted 
in a metaphysics of relation that finds its fulfilment in communion and reconciliation. Francis’ 
first principle, “Time is greater than space” (EG §222-225), outlines the necessity of an 
eschatological framework for approaching conflict. Reading it in this way shows us how this 
principle is allied to Francis’ third principle, “Realities are more important than ideas” (EG 
§231-233), which cautions against idealism and reduction. For Francis, what is real is that 
which is eschatological – which, as we have also seen, is that which is unsettling, 
indeterminate, and (perhaps most importantly) hopeful. This also enables a re-reading of his 
other two principles: “Unity prevails over conflict” (EG §226-230) because we have a common 
destination in communion with God and each other, which is also a common destination in 
the truth as revealed in the fulfilment of creation. Likewise, his instruction to reject false, 
totalising universalism in his fourth principle, “The whole is greater than the part” (EG §234-
237), can be read as a rejection of attempts to anticipate the form of this communion in a 
way that forgets the irreducible transcendence of that reality, lying beyond the limitations 
of our present in the eschatological future. Hence also, it becomes a critique of the projected 
unities and totalitarian hierarchies which troubled us in our last chapter; as well as Teilhard 
de Chardin’s eschatological monism,179 with which the vision of LS has been compared,180 
but which culminates in the erasure of certain pre-determined groups in a way that is 
evidenced starkly by his endorsement of eugenics (see Slattery, 2017: Online).181 
 
179 Francis cites de Chardin in LS §83, footnote 53. 
180 For example, Lane (2017: 39; 51); Slattery (2017: 71); O’Halloran (2018: 394); Hrynkow (2018); van 
den Heuvel (2018: 57-58) 
181  Haught (2019: Online) criticises Slattery’s reading of de Chardin as failing to recognise his 
acknowledgment of differentiation in unity. Read in this way, de Chardin is more like Francis as we 
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We can read this as illustrating the close relationship between the four principles of EG and 
Francis’ ethic of unselfing – a relationship that has implications for the ‘style’ of the Church. 
By locating the resolution of these tensions in the cosmic eschatological future, he reminds 
us that this resolution escapes us today not merely because of practical difficulties that could 
be overcome if only we tried harder, or were more forceful in advancing our positions, but 
because tensions and difficulties are a feature of the cosmos in our current stage in history. 
The recognition of indeterminacy, and the impossibility of totality or absoluteness, as cosmic 
principles shows how an ethic of unselfing is a necessary condition for truthful apprehension 
of the world in all its messiness and opacity. However, this recognition is not quite 
resignation. Rather, it is consoled by the security of knowing that creation, now in its 
awkward adolescence, will find its fulfilment in eschatological maturity. 
This combination of unselfing and security reflects the key distinction between Klein’s 
paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. The paranoid-schizoid subject attacks the Other 
in defence of the self. That is, they are moved by insecurity to assert itself over and against 
the Other, both in violent assault, but also in epistemic terms in the determination of that 
Other via a totalising, absolute hermeneutic. In contrast, the depressive subject no longer 
fears for the self in the face of the Other, and is enabled by this security to seek to recover 
the Other – a process which involves respecting their alterity.  
In short, it is precisely because we are secure that we can be less confident in ourselves, and 
acknowledge that the world escapes us without fear. Consequently, we might ask whether 
the supposedly confident style of some ‘triumphalist’ theologies, with their eagerness to 
master their objects and vanquish their opponents, fails to embody the true confidence that 
is proper to the Church. 
4.3. A COMIC STYLE 
Instead, the confidence offered by Francis’ eschatological vision enables a comic style. In this 
style, the Church can allow itself to become the object of humour, deriving joy and hope 
from its humiliation. 
Climacus argues that religion is unique in that it can never become comical in itself. This is 
because, in relating itself solely to the infinite, there can never be a contradiction between 
 
read him. In this vein also, Hrynkow sees in de Chardin the basis for a cosmic vision that is more 
integrative of diversity than that given in LS (2018: 615). However, Slattery (2019: Online) presents 
historical evidence in defence of his original reading. 
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the object of its passion and the infinite (Kierkegaard, 1846: 465).182 However, existence 
within Eucharistic temporality is distinct from Climacus’ religion, in that fullness is the 
intrinsic fulfilment of limitation. This means that the relation between fullness and limitation 
is not one of negation.183 As a result, existence within this temporality is very much one of 
contradiction, lying in the tension between the two – that is, it is comical.  
However, unlike for Climacus, where this humour ultimately turns on the negation of the 
relative before the absolute, for Francis, the contradiction of this humour turns on its 
fulfilment – which is to say, it is a hopeful one. This means that this contradiction can be born 
joyfully, as it does not threaten that dignity itself: the holiness of the Church lies in its silliness 
and pettiness as much as its grandeur.  
This in turn means that the Church can itself deploy self-mockery, and laugh with its critics. 
In doing so, it also gains a new language for joining them, enabling more honest, critical self-
evaluation:184 humour can strike propadeutically against otherwise discursively intractable 
convention (Lippitt, 2000: 22). In this vein, Francis’ images of the dirty, smelly Church remind 
us that the Church is capable of being dirty and smelly. Read symbolically, this reminder is 
also a reminder that the Church is capable of reaching out to the Other, and embracing 
difficulty and uncertainty – that is, of taking a more reparative stance. Conversely, a 
humbling joke can also help us shake our foolish confidence in limitation by revealing this 
limitation to us – the discomfort of which can be born in the security that, if we are saved at 
all, we will be saved as those who were foolish in that moment.185 
Another way of putting these points is in terms of persistence in the comic perspective. When 
we ‘give priority to space’, and attempt to resolve the contradiction of the present, we 
condemn ourselves to tragedy: because of the actual limitation of the present, this tension 
will reassert itself - which we will experience painfully.186 In contrast, Eucharistic temporality 
figures fullness as promise; something that can only be achieved through limitation, and in 
 
182 Including when the infinite is in the finite, by virtue of the absurd. 
183 Not even an absurd negation that preserves and elevates it. 
184 This is not to say that all failings are comical, in the same way that not everything will have a place 
in the Kingdom. The relevant distinction here lies precisely in whether a failing can be found funny: 
for example, the terrible church choir is hilarious. However, there is nothing to laugh about in child 
abuse. 
185 Note the resonances here with Francis’ endorsement of the “law of gradualness” (AL §295), and 
statement that the Eucharist is “not a prize for the perfect but a powerful medicine and nourishment 
for the weak” (EG §47). It is precisely because of this confidence that we must recognise the limitations 
of the present. 
186 I am indebted to Marcus Pound for this insight. 
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relation to which that limitation is defined, but which does not negate that limitation itself. 
It therefore both dignifies limitation, and thus also the contradiction that defines it. This in 
turn enables us to refuse any premature resolution, but rather to take pleasure, and thus 
persist, in it.  
We might understand this as something like N’yong-O’s concept of recursion, which we saw 
in our first chapter: this is a reading practice in which the negative-affective hermeneutical 
circle of paranoia serves as the basis for a positive-affective reparative project, which 
emerges from the reading activity itself, and yet thereby preserves it (2010: 249). The 
significant aspect of this is the link between frustration and pleasure, wherein the constant 
repetition of frustration becomes a source of fulfilment - for example, in a community built 
upon the basis of shared complaint. Likewise, Eucharistic temporality invites us to 
acknowledge the contradiction of the Church in limitation as inescapable in the present, 
frustrating the desire for fullness. In a quasi-recursive movement, we can take pleasure in 
this frustration, as in doing so we glimpse the fullness by which limitation is defined and 
affirmed.  
Nevertheless, this orientation towards fullness remains comic: in affirming limitation, this 
view of future reconciliation returns us to limitation and the contradiction itself. 
Consequently, acknowledging fullness leads us back to acknowledging limitation and the 
contradiction between the two poles of Francis’ dialectic. Eucharistic temporality is comic 
because it shows us the way out of the contradiction in fullness – but it remains comic 
because, in doing so, it returns us to the contradiction.187 
We find all of this embodied in the meditation on the “Marian “style” to the Church’s work 
of evangelization” that concludes EG (§288). Francis writes that Christ’s promise of 
redemption is delivered “with a power that fills us with confidence and unshakeable hope”. 
We are shown how to navigate this confidence by Mary, with whom “we advance confidently 
towards the fulfilment of this promise”. However, in a return to the contradiction, Mary’s 
example is not a triumphalist, aggressive one. Yet, as a return, this in itself comes out of this 
confidence and strength: “Whenever we look to Mary… we see that humility and tenderness 
are not virtues of the weak but of the strong who need not treat others poorly in order to 
 
187 Milbank (1996: 312-313) makes a parallel argument relating to the relationship between worldly 
ethical commitments and the infinite commitment of faith in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, 
wherein Abraham’s sacrifice of the former in service of the latter is made in the hope of its return in 
the latter.  
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feel important themselves”. Thus, in a joyfully comic turn, Francis concludes by heightening 
the contradiction with the invocation: “to her we pray…”  
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VIII. CONCLUSION: A POSTMODERN HERMENEUTIC OF CATHOLIC 
UNCERTAINTY 
 
In this brief conclusion, we will consolidate the argument of the previous chapters. In section 
one, we will begin by reviewing the argument that we have followed throughout this thesis. 
We will then look briefly at the limits of what we have (hopefully) achieved. In section two, 
we will move from this to discuss a key feature of Francis’ theology, as we have read it – 
namely the way in which he articulates the essential Christian ambivalence towards the 
world. We will begin by looking to how Francis mediates the twin poles of what Komonchak 
(1994) calls “Augustinian” pessimism and “Thomist” hope, situating him in relation to these 
two broad sensibilities within the post-Vatican II theological landscape. We will argue that 
he recovers themes of what Stump (2010) calls “Franciscan knowledge” in order to do so. 
We will then look to how this mediation enables the pursuit of new possibilities through self-
overcoming. We will do this by placing Francis in dialogue with ‘theologies of failure’, 
wherein we embrace negativity and abandon our convictions, specifically Rose’s (2019) 
“theology according to drive”, and Tonstad’s (2016) critique of futurity in ecclesiology. 
Finally, we will conclude by reflecting on how Francis’ ambivalence enables us to achieve a 
reparative stance, moving from a paranoid resignation to threat, and instead achieving an 
eschatologically hopeful resignation in the face of our own limitations. 
1. A HERMENEUTIC OF CATHOLIC UNCERTAINTY 
1.1. REVIEW 
This thesis began by identifying a paranoid hermeneutic present in the contemporary 
Catholic theological tradition. Drawing from Sedgwick, it argued that theology in this mode 
was characterised by three key epistemic features: determination, totality, and absoluteness, 
which it deploys in response to, and in construction of, the perceived threat of uncertainty. 
It looked to Veritatis Splendor, as well as the dubia put to Amoris Laetitia, as examples of this 
hermeneutic at work. It employed a ‘reader-centered’ reading of Francis’ papal documents 
in order to articulate an alternative to this hermeneutic, reading those documents 
systematically in order to construct a theology that directs us towards a reparative 
hermeneutic. This new hermeneutic would embrace uncertainty in hope, admitting 
epistemic indeterminacy, non-totality, and inabsoluteness, in contrast to the above. 
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In chapter three, we then saw how Lumen Fidei articulates a model of faith knowledge that 
serves as the basis for a theology that can embrace uncertainty in knowledge. Faith 
knowledge, in the encyclical, arises from an encounter with God as Other, manifesting first 
in the unthematic knowledge of touch, which is then thematised in sight. The priority of 
touch over sight, along with the historical nature of faith knowledge, means that sight is 
characterised by two horizons, which Lumen Fidei expresses as hearing: a qualitative horizon, 
representing the qualitative transcendence of touch over sight; and a quantitative horizon, 
representing the gradual process of growth in sight over time. Because of these horizons, 
our thematic faith knowledge can never claim to totality, instead always admitting 
indeterminacy and the possiblity of revision or inabsoluteness. We also argued that this 
model of faith-knowledge requires an obediential ethics of ‘unselfing’, in which the knower 
refuses to assert themselves over and against divine transcendence in alterity by rejecting 
the conditions of hearing. 
In our fourth chapter, we focused on issues of credere in Deum, arguing that Lumen Fidei’s 
founding of faith in encounter establishes an ecclesiological ‘Marian priority’, in which the 
juridical aspects of the Church follow from a fundamentally mystical dimension in faith. This 
in turn relativises them to this encounter. We read Evangellii Gaudium and Magnum 
Principium to argue that this enables a plurivocal model of ecclesial unity in credere in Deum, 
in which the unity of the Church admits historical variations in form corresponding to 
historical differences in encounter. This historical variation renders that formal unity an 
indeterminate one, which by implication defies the totalisation of any one form. Finally, we 
argued that the possibility for historical variation in encounter enables a positive-affective 
approach to variation in form, which can be read as signifying an achievement of faith across 
difference – even where that variation is negative. The upshot of this is uncertainty with 
regards to the forms that can be embraced within the total life of the Church. 
Our fifth chapter read the ecclesiology of chapter four through the epistemology of chapter 
three. We argued that Francis’ ecclesial ‘Marian priority’ establishes a metaxological model 
of ecclesial unity, in which the unity of the Church is a transcendent reality that transcends, 
and in doing so incorporates within itself, ideal unity and difference. This imparts a non-
totality, indeterminacy, inabsoluteness to our ideas of ecclesial unity that corresponds to the 
conditions of hearing in our thematic knowledge of God. This indicates an intrinsic 
epistemological basis to the uncertainty of chapter four. 
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Finally, our sixth chapter extended the epistemology of chapter three to credere Deum. It 
argued that Laudato Si’ establishes a cosmology of encounter that establishes credere in 
Deum as the foundation for all other knowledge. This means that credere Deum admits all 
the non-totality, inabsoluteness, and indeterminacy of the credere in Deum. This affirmed 
the scope of that epistemology, and the horizons of hearing as encompassing all theological 
knowledge. That is, the epistemological conditions of uncertainty identified in chapter three 
are all pervasive. We then looked to how the encyclical’s cosmology establishes a 
‘Eucharistic’ temporality that establishes a background of cosmic hope for reconciliation that 
enables us to face up to these horizons without fear. The result is a theology that enables us 
to embrace uncertainty, rather than trying to eradicate it through the imposition of 
determining, totalising, and absolutizing hermeneutics. 
It is from this theme of uncertainty that the title of this thesis gets its name. Francis’ 
hermeneutic is one of “Catholic uncertainty” in two senses. Firstly, as the uncertainty of 
Catholics: Francis provides theological resources which Catholics can deploy to guide them 
in uncertainty. Secondly of a specifically ‘Catholic uncertainty’: Francis’ reparative 
hermeneutics embraces uncertainty, enabling us to abide in it in a specifically Catholic way. 
It is “postmodern” in a sense that we will explore in section two. 
1.2. THE LIMITS OF OUR THESIS 
It is worth stopping to reflect on what this thesis does not try to achieve. Firstly, we are not 
trying to push Francis’ reparative hermeneutics as the only possible hermeneutics for 
Catholicism. Sedgwick’s typology draws from Klein’s concept of psychological positions. She 
looks to Klein here precisely because she seeks to overcome the idea that paranoid 
hermeneutics are inevitable or necessary in critical theory: just as for Klein we can move 
between the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions, so to does Sedgwick argue that we 
can move between paranoid and reparative reading practices. The same holds for 
Catholicism – indeed, by virtue of its very presence, there is a role for a paranoid tradition in 
Catholic theology. What Sedgwick seeks to do is articulate the possibility of a reparative 
alternative. Our thesis argues that Francis shows us this possibility for Catholicism, without 
turning it into another inevitability.  
Likewise, our critiques of paranoid theology are all rooted within the methodological 
assumptions of Francis’ reparative approach – they show how the paranoid tradition might 




Similarly, as we have stressed multiple times throughout this thesis, Francis’ more reparative 
approach is not the same as an indifferent one. It opens up our imagination to find hope 
where otherwise we may find none. However, this does not mean that we must conclude 
that there is hope in all things, let alone that everything is mostly hopeful. Some things, such 
as fascism, have already been shown to be evils, and it seems unlikely that there is some yet-
uncovered hope to be found in it. Likewise, not everything will ultimately provide hope when 
read carefully. Hence Tonstad (2017: 11-12) notes that sometimes paranoid reading 
practices are just more truthful to the situation, and it would be wrong to discard our 
resources for dealing with these cases just because they are not universally appropriate.  
In all cases, the possibility of hope is subject to the nature of the potential source, and our 
capacity to read hopefully is therefore conditional to truth. In this context, what is significant 
about Francis’ hermeneutic is that it discourages us from taking the idea that our thought 
has exhausted the truth already as a general assumption. Moreover, if there is hope to be 
found, then a hermeneutic which makes us more sensitive to the presence of this hope will 
be a more truthful one. On this point, Francis’ eschatology and metaphysics gives us a good 
reason to assume that this hope is present in most cases, against jaded dismissals of hopeful 
attitudes as naïve or Polyanna-ish. 
We also should distinguish between hermeneutics and wider issues of practice. For example, 
just because a given idea might be a source of hope doesn’t mean that it has to be 
implemented, or even given an audience in any given context. A hopeful hermeneutical 
stance towards a thing is different from an ethical imperative towards it, and likewise should 
not be conflated with any specific ethical imperative, excepting those involved in maintaining 
that stance in the first place (such as the obediential one towards unselfing). The possibility 
of hope does perhaps indicate the prudence of allowing some universally accessible ‘spaces 
of uncertainty’ in which the Other can be encountered, regardless of our presuppositions 
about them. However, the practical issue of identifying or constructing spaces appropriate 
for this is a complex one, and lies beyond the scope of this thesis. 
2. FRANCIS AND THE RENEGOTIATION OF AMBIVALENCE 
2.1. FRANCIS BETWEEN AUGUSTINE AND AQUINAS 
For reasons identified in chapter two, our thesis has not worked to situate Francis in the prior 
Catholic tradition. This is not to say that we have read Francis as entirely divorced from this 
tradition: chapter six forefronts Thomist themes in LS, and chapter seven connects Francis 
with de Lubac. Nevertheless, this kind of reflection would be fruitful insofar as it would 
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establish more points of contact with wider thought that speaks out of that tradition. 
Additionally, we connected Francis with Buber (chapter three) and Kierkegaard (also in 
chapter seven). A helpful avenue for further study might be to look into these connections 
in more detail, integrating Francis into (or distinguishing him from) the wider systematic-
theological landscape. 
However, this is very much a task for the future. For one thing, our reading of Francis has 
been structured around explaining his hermeneutics of uncertainty, rather than his 
treatment of the key philosophical and theological issues around which these various 
systematic theologies are normally organised, or dialogue with those theologies themselves. 
Consequently, more work would need to be done in fleshing out the dispersed and 
contextual connections made in this thesis before we can do this. Likewise, part of this might 
involve trying to reorder our reading of Francis so as to build from this metaphysics in order 
to integrate the other themes in a way more redolent of the “exitus/reditus” structure 
associated with classic systematic theology genre conventions (Odozor, 1995: 9). Without 
undertaking these kinds of tasks, it is difficult to consider Francis as a voice in a tradition 
conceived as an orientation around certain key texts and thinkers. Sadly this lies beyond the 
scope of what is possible in this thesis, and it would also, therefore, be premature to try and 
comment on these considerations in any detail. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of general points which can be made here; points which 
turn less on a detailed comparison with specific figures, and more on the presence of certain 
broad themes within Catholic theology in relation to which Francis, at least as we read him, 
takes a significant stance. These themes, concurrent with our concerns in reading Francis, 
are about where we locate our hope. 
Tracy writes that the theologian must walk “the line between loyalty and idolatry” (1981: 
47), recognising their ambivalent vocation to both love the world as God loves it, but also to 
recognise its sinfulness and contingency (1981: 48). Two divergent approaches to this 
ambivalence can be found in Komonchak’s heuristic typology of the prevailing trends in 
Catholic theology around the Second Vatican Council, which contrasts broadly “Augustinian” 
with broadly “Thomist” approaches. According to Komonchak, the Augustinian approach 
presupposes “a sharp and unmediated distinction between sin and grace, natural reason and 
faith”. This is expressed in a hermeneutical priority of “religious categories” over ‘natural’ or 
secular ones. For the Augustinian, the world is to be mastered by a knowledge brought to 
bear analytically upon it; a divine determining principle held over and against a sinful, 
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determined world. In contrast, the Thomist approach “effects a theoretical differentiation of 
the natural, not in order to deny that the drama of sin and grace is the only real drama of 
human history but in order to promote a more accurate understanding of it”. In short, for 
the Thomist, the world is a site for the ‘working out’ of grace. As this site, it becomes a source 
of both hope and insight, both read by, but also possessing the power to reciprocally 
determine, the knowledge of the tradition which approaches it (1994: 87). 
From our framing above, we can see that the Thomist approach is relatively more reparative 
than the Augustinian. In this vein, champions of the Augustinian approach reproduced the 
self-confirming paranoid dynamic of threat construction and negation in their critiques of 
the Thomist approach, which they argued lacked a sufficiently strong sense of sin and its 
privation of the natural (construction), resulting in an unacceptable subordination of 
theology to an impoverished natural reason (negation) (Komonchak, 1994: 88). 
Francis, as we have read him, broadly represents the Thomist approach: in this thesis, we 
have seen how Francis envisions history as the site of grace, requiring us to look for the action 
of God around us. In one sense, he seems to even speak against the Augustinian pessimism 
about the world, enjoining us even to suspend our suspicion in the name of a hope that grace 
can be found in the most surprising of places. 
What is significant about Francis, however, is that he also channels an Augustinian sensibility. 
The possibility of this hope is expressed in an ethic of unselfing, which refuses to assert the 
self as knower over and against an indeterminate eschatology. In this context, we, with our 
pretensions to certainty and mastery, are the world. Hence the working of grace in history is 
to an extent over and against us in our self-aggrandizing efforts to achieve totality, and 
thereby determine what properly transcends us; it is for this reason that it is fundamentally 
unsettling, even as it brings our fulfilment. Of course, this opposition is not complete: our 
lives, as part of that history, are sites for providence, and we can participate in the divine 
action therein. Even so, the driver of this action lies beyond our power – indeed, as we saw 
in chapter seven, this is the key to hope even in the direst of circumstances. When we 
participate in grace, it is never from a position of mastery. Just as the Augustinian approach 
teaches that only the supernatural can truly read nature, for Francis, grace always ultimately 
masters us. 
Perhaps Francis’ greatest insight is that this inversion of Augustinian suspicion is enabled 
precisely because of a more Thomist hope in historical grace. As we have seen, Francis can 
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embrace the uncertainty that comes with this suspicion not just because he holds on to the 
promise of fulfilment, but because he recognises this fulfilment as lying in the uncertain 
elements of history. We encounter grace in the moments where it most escapes us. Francis 
is enabled in this through his deployment of a third broad theme: what Stump refers to as 
“Franciscan knowledge”.  
In chapter three, we looked at length at how Francis employs broadly Buberian concepts of 
alterity in order to underpin his epistemology; something which we returned to in chapter 
six, where we saw how this epistemology, when united to a Thomist metaphysics of analogy, 
forms the basis for a Trinitarian apophaticism that extends its indeterminacy to all 
knowledge. We might be slightly concerned here that, in doing so, Francis airlifts in ‘secular 
philosophy’, without care for its wider systematic relation to what is less problematically 
considered ‘the Tradition’. 
In chapter two, we looked at arguments which cut against this kind of concern.  Firstly, 
Francis’ theology enables receptivity to alterity, and any rejection of the Buberian elements 
of his thought on the basis of a professed alterity needs to contend with this if it is not going 
to fall into a kind of question-begging. Secondly, we are reading Papal documents; texts 
which are at least nominally part of the Tradition by virtue of their identity. In this context, 
the inclusion of Buberian concepts in LF problematises quick claims that they are 
‘untraditional’. Thirdly, the example of Aquinas’ engagement with Aristotelianism shows that 
there is precedent within the tradition for integration from the secular; indeed as the history 
of Thomism shows, if this integration is successful then the previously ‘secular’ can become 
as ‘traditional’ as Aristotelianism is now. This being the case, then the integration of secular 
concepts is not enough to render a theology ‘untheological’ or ‘untraditional’; rather, it is 
this integration itself which must be assessed.  
One way of understanding Francis’ integration of Buber is as the recovery or ressourcement 
of a pre-existing theme within the Tradition, albeit in contemporary(ish) terms. This theme 
is what Stump refers to as “Franciscan knowledge”. 
Stump develops her account of Franciscan knowledge by contrasting the epistemic 
approaches involved in stereotypically Dominican and Franciscan religious life. She notes 
that Dominican mission (broadly speaking) is undertaken through disputing philosophical 
and theological postulates, taken in abstraction from the particular individuals who profess 
them. In this context, epistemic priority is given to discursive reasoning, which approaches 
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the world in light of these postulates (2010: 45-6). In contrast, Franciscan spirituality (broadly 
speaking) is construed first and foremost as an interpersonal response to a personal address 
by Christ, which is made through a personal, imitative relationship with St. Francis himself. 
This gives rise to a distinct epistemic approach, which affords priority to “knowledge of 
persons conveyed by second-person experiences of persons” (2010: 61).  
Stump sees this second-personal mode of knowledge as an example of a broader type, albeit 
one that is difficult to define more precisely. She opts to contrast it with “knowledge that”, 
in which knowledge is construed as propositional attitudes (“I know that [proposition P] is 
true”) (2010: 51). For Stump, Franciscan knowledge is a kind of knowledge that does not 
reduce to propositional attitudes – this being why it cannot be defined in terms of those 
attitudes (2010: 51-2). The parallels here with Buberian relation, which Francis reproduces 
in his metaphor of touch, are clear. 
Franciscan knowledge provides the bridge between Thomist historicity and Augustinian 
suspicion. As the object of unthematic knowledge, the Other (both divine and creaturely) 
possesses a transcendence that resists determination within thematicity, and which thereby 
unsettles claims to thematic totality. This requires the Augustinian suspicion of the self as 
knower, which refuses to falsely determine the Other in defiance of their transcendence. This 
also has a Thomist aspect, in the sense that the Other is encountered in history, which thus 
becomes the site of transcendence and redemption. Correspondingly, however, history is 
only a site of redemption by virtue of a transcendence that is inseparable from alterity, 
turning us in hope away from our own capacities and towards grace in a characteristically 
Augustinian way. 
In short, for Francis, Franciscan knowledge shows us how to hope in history, but in a way 
that refuses to locate that hope in immanence. Moreover, united to his Thomist metaphysics 
of analogy, it becomes a way in which history can participate in transcendence specifically 
by sharing in its indeterminacy. As we saw in our discussion of Francis’ Trinitarian 
apophaticism in chapter seven, this means that it does so specifically in a way that resists the 
determination both of history and of that transcendence. Rather, it is precisely this 





2.2. A THEOLOGY OF FAILURE 
This ordering of Augustinian suspicion to Thomist hope is perhaps most significant in that it 
enables us to deploy negativity in a self-critical move, opening up not merely new 
possibilities, but new possibilities in spite of ourselves. As Rose puts it, it enables us to read 
Christianity “according to the logic of drive rather than desire” (2019: 13). This means shifting 
the emphasis from the active pursuit of fullness and possession (the movement of Freudian 
“desire”), the dark side of which includes the urge to violently assert oneself over the Other 
in the course of this possession, in favour of finding satisfaction in our unfulfillment (the 
movement of the Freudian “death drive”). 
Rose resources Žižek’s ontology as the basis for a theology according drive. The result is a 
conception of the Church as constituted by and realised in a process of change arising from 
a purely immanent negativity. From this, she offers a model of faith as fidelity to the ongoing 
material project and community of the Church, which emerges from this immanent process. 
This enables her to reject models of faith as faithfulness to an ideal reality (of dogma, or the 
ideological figure of the Church). This in turn enables two things: firstly, the recognition of 
the Church’s historical violence, which is occluded in order to sustain idealised models of the 
Church, but which is entirely compatible with the Church’s identity when considered as an 
historical community. Secondly, this historical identity possesses an indeterminacy and 
fluidity of identity that enables faithful reform away from Christianity’s violent historical 
elements; a process which she describes as a kind of redemptive ‘failure’ or ‘betrayal’ of 
those elements, and for which Žižek’s ontology provides additional support in its rooting of 
identity in this very failure or inconsistency. This opens up the possibility for a theological 
imagination that escapes the pre-determinations of its own troubling history. 
We find similar themes in Francis’ writings. Firstly, our reading of Francis is similarly 
historicist. As we saw in chapters four and five, our ideas of what forms can intelligibly be 
called ‘Church’ must be qualified by the mutable historical realities of its communion. This 
means that the Church must be identified with the forms in which (for better or for worse) 
we encounter God as an historical community. Moreover, in placing the formal unity of the 
Church at the service of a fundamentally historical phenomenon of encounter, Francis thus 
likewise enables a fluid understanding of what it is to be Church.  
Secondly, for Francis, this process is similarly reflexive. This possibility emerges when we look 
to Rose’s critique of the deconstructive, Derridean turn in theology, represented by thinkers 
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such as Caputo and Keller, which bears out superficial similarities, but also a crucial 
difference to Francis’ approach. 
The deconstructive turn reorients theology around the question of economy “away from the 
relationship of God to the world and toward the relationship of the individual to the world” 
(Rose, 2019: 43), redeploying themes of apophaticism in order to talk about the disjunction 
between the economy of language and the world in which we as speaking, spoken subjects 
find ourselves. In this, Derrida seeks the fulfilment of desire as the rupture of economy, 
rather than its completion in the attainment of a divine One (2019: 37). Rose argues that 
Derrida, rather than breaking from the Christian tradition in this movement, instead 
radicalises its apophatic heritage by broadening the scope of transcendence to encompass 
not just the divine (and the divine elements within the world), but the world in general in 
relation to human life and language (2019: 43).  
Rose critiques the deconstructive theological tradition based on its emphasis on 
apophaticism at the expense of decision-making, which must ultimately rule for or against a 
position; something that Caputo and Keller reject as allying religion to the positive force of 
violence (2019: 46-47). Rose argues that while this apophatic approach seeks a way out from 
the totalised regime of contemporary capitalism, in failing to posit an alternative it adopts a 
utopian stance that ineffectively seeks a ‘third way’ between capitalism and socialism. In an 
ecclesiological context, she argues that this similarly lacks the resources to challenge the 
historical relations of domination enshrined in the traditions of orthodox Christian thought 
and practice. Instead, deconstructive Christianity reaches out in an anodyne universalism 
that embraces the Other without offering a real challenge to the basis of their exclusion; a 
basis which may also be the foundation for, and thus repeated in that universal gesture itself 
(2019: 53-54). 
The distinction between Francis and Caputo or Keller here is that Francis’ theology is 
concerned with the relation between God and the world, rather than the Derridean focus on 
the subject and the world. This concern for divine economy (unsurprisingly) places Francis 
less problematically within the traditional parameters of Christian theology. Admittedly, 
Francis prioritises Franciscan knowledge in his ontology of relation in such a way as to 
necessitate apophaticism about what might otherwise be considered immanent realities – a 
move that is superficially quite Derridean. Nevertheless, as we also noted earlier, this 
expanded apophaticism is integrated into a broadly Thomist metaphysics in such a way as to 
recover it for the tradition.  
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Francis’ papal texts are not a manifesto for ecclesial revolution. However, his concern with 
divine economy enables us to imagine radical change in a way that bears out similarities with 
Rose’s own solution to the inability of deconstructive theology to do so. Rose’s solution is to 
situate the Church’s identity in contradiction, enabling the reflexive dialectical movement 
away from its constitution as empire. In a move that is both similar, and yet fundamentally 
at odds with, Rose, Francis uses his concern for divine economy in order to similarly embrace 
immanent negativity as the basis for reform. 
In our fourth chapter, we saw how the transcendence of the reality of the Church, towards 
which its worldly forms must be oriented, holds within itself the possibility of both inclusive 
and exclusive historical formal variation. Likewise, we saw in the previous chapter how this 
is reproduced in terms of knowledge: firstly, tensions between beliefs can be narrated as 
tensions in form, and thus negotiated in terms of variation in form. Secondly, the eschaton 
promises a reconciliation in truth that cannot be determined by the totalisation of any one 
position within present conflict. In short, for Francis, a diachronic metaphysical contradiction 
governs the resolution of synchronic ontic tensions in both ecclesial and an epistemic 
registers. Finally, we saw how this is embodied in a distinctively Eucharistic humour, which 
redeems the contradiction between immanent conflict and transcendent reconciliation. This 
in turn encourages us to persist in this tension, inhabiting immanent conflict because of our 
transcendent orientation. 
In short, Francis’ concern for divine economy leads him to embrace immanent negativity. 
This establishes a similar continuity-in-difference to that sought by Rose, wherein it becomes 
possible to say that the Church could be most faithful to its identity in change: in an ecclesial 
register, synchronic formal or ontic variation can enable greater diachronic fidelity to 
mystical identity. Likewise, in an epistemic register, synchronic change in belief can enable 
greater diachronic fidelity to final truth. 
Moreover, in the previous chapter, we saw how this indeterminacy plays out on the second-
order level, addressing the premises for first order positions. To put it differently, the 
contradiction between historical form and transcendent telos exists at a higher order than 
the relations and tensions within that historical form. Consequently, its resolution is 
determinative of those relations, rather than determined by them. This means that our 
progress towards this telos can resolve historical tensions so as to integrate or overturn any 
given historical form, including the ones in which we encounter that contradiction 
themselves. As for Rose, this thus enables the criticism of the universal gesture upon which 
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the Church seeks to include alterity. Thus Francis enables that gesture to undo its own basis 
and reveal the need for a reconstruction of Christian universalism beyond the logic of empire. 
In doing so, he thus also escapes the perils of an imperialist universalism represented by 
Milbank and Pickstock, whom we have otherwise cited receptively in chapters six and seven. 
Following Rubenstein (2010), Rose critiques the hierarchical, politically conservative 
Neoplatonist reaction against Derrida, which she associates with ‘Radical Orthodox’ thinkers 
such as both Milbank and Pickstock. This reaction seeks the fulfilment of desire in a 
transcendence that analogically mediates difference; a mediation that amounts to a 
conforming (and inevitably violent) integration into the established order,188 which thereby 
becomes identified with that transcendence. As such, she critiques this approach as failing 
to recognise the challenge that transcendence presents, which is precisely that it escapes 
our understanding and attempts at certitude (2019: 43).  
Although the Thomist sensibility embodied in Francis’ metaphysics grounds fulfilment in a 
mediating transcendence, Francis’ inwards-directed Augustinian suspicion puts into question 
any anticipation of this mediation. Hence, although he deploys what we have explicitly 
framed as Milbankian themes in order to recover a fulfilling transcendence, he nevertheless 
does so in a way that undermines its conservative elements: as we saw above, this 
transcendence is always an unsettling one, showing us new possibilities beyond our 
expectations, rather than confirming and conforming the world to them. 
Another way of putting it is that Francis, rather than pushing a determinate utopian vision to 
either confirm or deny the status quo, encourages us to be patient and open-minded (in EG, 
fullness is a utopian horizon and not a state), but specifically in a sense of sustaining an 
expansive imagination that could nevertheless frame the possibility of revolution.  
This deferral positions any ‘revolutionary’ reading of Francis nearer more uncertain radicals 
such as Mary C. Grey. Grey similarly embraces negativity (specifically, alienation within the 
Church) as an opportunity for redemptive transformation (specifically, ecclesial reordering 
against kyriarchy) (1997: 3). However, she holds that a truly universal ecclesiology can only 
emerge through this redemptive revolution (1997: 19-31), rejecting determinate 
programmes of reform in favour of bottom-up transformation, “sparked off” by, but not 
reducing to, community praxis, instead being rooted in a relatively indeterminate process of 
 
188 On this point, Rose also identifies Milbank’s appeal to metaxological paradox with the same ‘third 
way’ sought by deconstructive theology, reconciling tensions within capitalism instead of resolving 
them in revolutionary dialectic (2019: 49). 
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interpersonal relation across diverse lines of social exclusion (1997: 123). Notably absent 
from this is a Marxist class analysis that might homogenise Grey’s conception of excluded 
groups or commit her to an overarching programme (including the methodological primacy 
of praxis). This commitment to non-totalising subsidiarity is mirrored in Francis’ Marian 
basismo, as seen in chapter four, which prioritises a similarly indeterminate process of local 
historical relation. 
Nevertheless, the self-directed Augustinian suspicion of Francis’ ethic of unselfing thus opens 
up the possibility for a self-overcoming abandonment of the evils in which we participate. In 
rejecting the totalisation of our ideas, we can embrace immanent negativity: we too can ‘fail’ 
them, ‘betraying’ them in a redemptive movement of negation that performs this rejection. 
This also protects against a further risk, exemplified in what Edelman calls the figure of “the 
Child”. According to Edelman, “the Child” embodies an unquestionable universal futurity 
thereby presenting a total, untransgressable boundary for political discourse. The result is a 
strongly determined politics, which can only reproduce the order represented by that 
boundary, and which in turn is consequently absolutised (2004: 2). While this absolutisation 
through totalisation and determination is problematic in itself for our reparative project, the 
true danger exemplified by “the Child” lies in the way this determining futurity asserts itself 
as a social telos; a universal freedom towards which all particular freedoms are ordered, and 
in the name of which the freedoms of particular historical individuals can thus be denied 
(2002: 11). 
Specifically in the case of Edelman’s “the Child”, this order is heteronormativity, as embodied 
in an idealised picture of the nuclear family (2004: 2). We might also find resonances here 
with Francis’ critique of the “economy of exclusion”, in which society is so ordered towards 
continued economic growth that the unproductive are discarded; where “it is not a news 
item when an elderly homeless person dies of exposure, but it is news when the stock market 
loses two points” (EG §53). 
Coming closer to the focus of our project, Tonstad illustrates how this futurity is reproduced 
in ecclesiologies that permit the suffering of particular historical individuals and groups in 
the name of fidelity to a universal ‘continuity’ of tradition. Tonstad connects these 
ecclesiologies to a particular kind of Trinitarian logic, in which the Church is conceived as 
analogous to the Son, proceeding from its origins in the Father through a process of 
continuous Fatherly generation in the teachings of a continuous (male) hierarchy, and 
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inhabited through continued fidelity to that process and its identity markers. In this context, 
the suffering of individuals who are excluded and condemned by the Church is accepted in 
the name of this reproductive continuity of tradition (2016: 264-268).  
Embracing negativity protects from this kind of annihilating futurity. Edelman’s response to 
the figure of “the Child” is to reject reproductive social imaginaries, thereby embracing the 
negativity of drive as a counter-principle to its desirous logic (2004: 9-10). Tonstad makes a 
similar move, re-imagining the identity of the Church around resurrection conceived as a 
negativity that “interrupts” reproductive continuity (2016: 269). Likewise, Francis’ embrace 
of immanent negativity prevents us from totalising any element of the present, thereby 
preventing its projection into the future as an absolute horizon that determines thought. 
Hence although Francis identifies continuity of tradition with the constant assimilation of 
experience by the articles of faith (LF §48), as we saw in chapters five and seven, this process 
of assimilation is one of continuous contradiction, wherein the transcendent reality 
reflexively expressed in those articles unsettles rather than reinforces our determinations. 
Moreover, while this negativity does ultimately hold the promise of its own transcendence, 
it does so in a way that forbids the negation of particulars in the name of this transcendence. 
Rather, to attain the eschaton and thereby overcome this negativity, we must consider the 
particulars in which negativity presents itself as potential sites of grace, however 
unexpected. Significantly, Francis locates this redemptive negativity in the encounter with 
the Other, forcefully reminding us that we must specifically attend to concrete, historical 
people as the condition of our fulfilment. By extension, any futurity that annihilates them 
can only be a false one. 
This does not mean a total abandonment of ideas of orthodoxy as continuity. We noted in 
the previous chapter that we can sustain both doctrinal commitments and a recognition of 
indeterminacy. Likewise, recognising that futurity may consist in the surrendering of our 
ideas of continuity does not mean that it will, or that we cannot maintain those ideas of 
continuity in the present, at least while they remain intact. However, this does mean that 
these ideas cannot be totalised or absolutised. In turn, this means that the act of negating 
the particular in favour of their universal vision is risky and uncertain, and only to be 
undertaken in the knowledge that it may actually represent the abandonment of fidelity to 
the Church’s truth.  
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2.3. RESIGNATION, REDEMPTION, AND REPARATIVITY 
This embrace of an authentically redemptive negativity in self-overcoming, is possibly the 
most significant aspect of Francis’ theology. Firstly, we might say that Francis redeems 
metaphysics for postmodernity, finding a way of Thomist transcendence that integrates the 
negativity of Franciscan knowledge in order to avoid the dangerous positivity of totalisation. 
However, he also redeems postmodern negativity for theology, renarrating and thereby 
embracing it as the outworking of an unselfing Augustinian suspicion that presupposes divine 
economy. In this way, we might say that his reparative theology is already engaged with 
alterity, looking outwards to a secular world in an authentically dialogical gesture that both 
receives from, and offers to the Other. 
Secondly, and even more importantly, this imparts a message about the nature of hope and 
resignation. To an extent, following Rose and Edelman, Francis’ Augustinian embrace of 
negativity also constitutes a theology according to drive. Nowhere is this more clearly 
evidenced than his Eucharistic humour, with its recursive satisfaction in frustration. Yet the 
Eucharistic temporality which enables this humour reminds us that this negativity is 
nevertheless a hopeful one, to be persisted in as the site of a grace that escapes anticipation. 
Likewise, Augustinian suspicion is reconciled with Thomist reparativity by Franciscan 
knowledge because the indeterminacy of the Other is the outworking of transcendence. 
Thus, for Francis, drive is sanctified because desire finds its fulfilment in its recursive 
satisfaction.  
In this, Francis powerfully renarrates not just what it means to hope for fulfilment, but also 
to be resigned to failure. For Francis, Christian resignation is a recognition of our own 
weakness that arises from a trust in God’s transcendence over us. Thus it is in this resignation 
that we can find the greatest expression of our hope. In doing so, Francis represents the 
“achievement” of a reparative position. For Klein, reparativity is achieved through the 
overcoming of paranoia, learning to see the world unfearfully. Likewise, Sedgwick, in making 
reference to Klein’s concept of the positions, seeks to show critical theory the way out from 
its hermetic circle of suspicion and despair, towards hope and joy. Similarly to Sedgwick, 
Francis shows us a way beyond fear; a way to recover a view of the world that is conditioned 
by an unshakeable hope in providence.  
In light of this, Francis might perhaps be called a great theologian. This now (hopefully) 
established, we might also look to a more common, often dismissive, characterisation. 
Francis not only represents this achievement, but shows us the way towards it. This lies in a 
241 
 
rearticulated ambivalence, in which the suspicion that circulates within the deep Augustinian 
veins of our post-Conciliar Church is not merely overcome, but is redeemed in orientation 
towards a fundamentally hopeful vision. Francis enables us to shift our resignation: rather 
than being resigned to fear and threat, we are instead empowered to distrust in our own 
capacities, opening the space for the surprising joy of an unpredictable redemption. And, in 





Abram, Anna. 2017. ‘Pastoral discernment, imagination and ekphrases in Pope Francis’ 
apostolic exhortation Amoris Laetitia’, in Studia Teologiczno-Historyczne Śląska 
Opolskiego 37.1: 141-162 
Alberigo, Giuseppe. 1985/1987. ‘The Christian Situation After Vatican II’, in The Reception 
of Vatican II, Giuseppe Alberigo, Jean-Pierre Jossua and Joseph A. Komonchak 
(eds.), Matthew J. O’Connell (trans.) (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of 
America Press) pp. 1-24 
Annett, Anthony. 2017. ‘The economic vision of Pope Francis’, in The Theological and 
Ecological Vision of Laudato Si’: Everything is Connected, Vincent J. Miller (ed.) 
(London: Bloomsbury) pp. 160-174 
Augustine of Hippo. 2002. The Confessions of St. Augustine, E. B. Pewsie (trans.) 
(www.gutenberg.org) <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3296/3296-h/3296-h.htm> 
[Accessed 09/11/17]  
Barret, Melanie Susan. 2018. ‘Doctrine and Praxis in Pope Francis’s Approach to 
Evangelization’, in Pope Francis and the Event of Encounter, John C. Cavadini and 
Donald Wallenfang (eds.) (Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick Publications) pp. 113-128 
Baudrillard, Jean. 1994. Simulation and Simulacra, Sheila Faria Glaser (trans.) (Ann Arbor, 
MI: University of Michigan Press) 
—— 2001. ‘Fatal Strategies’, Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings, Mark Poster (ed.) 
(Cambridge: Polity Press) pp. 188-209 
Beattie, Tina. 2006. New Catholic Feminism: Theology and Theory (London: Routledge) 
Beck, A.T. 1976. Cognitive Therapy and Emotional Disorders (New York, NY: New American 
Library) 
Pope Benedict XVI. 2005. Address of His Holiness Benedict XVI to the Roman Curia Offering 
Them His Christmas Greetings (online: w2.vatican.va) 
<http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-
xvi/en/speeches/2005/december/documents/hf_ben_xvi_spe_20051222_roman-
curia.html> [Accessed 17/11/17] 
243 
 
—— 2007. Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Sacramentum Caritatis (Online: 
w2.vatican.va) <http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-
xvi/en/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_ben-xvi_exh_20070222_sacramentum-
caritatis.html> [Accessed 29/03/17] 
—— 2009. Encyclical Letter, Caritas in Veritate (Online: w2.vatican.va) 
<http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate.html > [Accessed 29/03/17] 
Pope Benedict XVI with Peter Seewald. 2016. Last Testament: In his own words, Jacob 
Phillips (trans.) (London: Bloomsbury) 
Bergoglio, Jorge Mario and Abraham Skorka. 2013. On Heaven and Earth: Pope Francis on 
Faith, Family, and the Church in the Twenty-first Century, Diego F. Rosemberg (ed.), 
Alejandro Bermudez and Howard Goodman (trans.) (London: Bloomsbury) 
Berryman, Phillip. 2016. ‘The Argentine and Latin American Background of Pope Francis’, 
in American Catholic Studies 127.2: 55-70.  
Bevans, Stephen. 2015a. ‘Evangellii Gaudium and Prophetic Dialogue’, in Australasian e-
Journal of Theology 22.1: 11-18 
<https://staff.acu.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/746316/evangelii_gaudium
_and_prophetic_dialogue_bevans_apr15_vol22.1.pdf> [Accessed 02/08/19] 
—— 2015b. ‘Life, Joy, and Love: Together towards Life in Dialogue with Evangelii Gaudium 
and The Cape Town Commitment’, in International Review of Mission 104.2: 193-
202. 
Bevans, Stephen. 2016. ‘Together towards life and the Evangelii Gaudium: Life and joy in 
dialogue’, in Ecumenical missiology: Changing landscapes and new conceptions of 
mission, Regnum Edinburgh Centenary Series 35: 461-472. 
Biviano, Erin Lothes. 2017. ‘Working together to address the climate crisis’, in The 
Theological and Ecological Vision of Laudato Si’: Everything is Connected, Vincent J. 
Miller (ed.) (London: Bloomsbury) pp. 235-252 
Boersma, Hans. 2009. Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
244 
 
Boff, Leonardo. 1982. ‘Theological Characteristics of a Grassroots Church’. The Challenge of 
Basic Christian Communities: Papers from the International Ecumenical Congress of 
Theology, February 20-March 2, 1980, São Paulo , Brazil, Sergio Torres and John 
Eagleson (eds.), John Drury (trans.) (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books) pp. 124-144 
Borghesi, Massimo. 2018. The Mind of Pope Francis: Jorge Bergoglio’s Intellectual Journey, 
Barry Hudock (trans.) (Collegeville, Minnesota: Liturgical Press Academic) 
Bouquillon, Thomas J. 1999. ‘Moral Theology at the End of the Nineteenth Century’, in The 
Historical Development of Fundamental Moral Theology in the United States, 
Charles E. Curran & Richard A. McCormick (eds.) (Mahwah, New Jersey: Paulist 
Press) pp. 91-114 
Bruneau, Thomas C. 1980. ‘Basic Christian Communities in Latin America: Their Nature and 
Significance (Especially in Brazil)’, Churches and Politics in Latin America, Daniel H. 
Levine (ed.) (London: Sage Publications, Inc.) pp. 225-237 
Buber, Martin. 2013. I and Thou, Ronald Gregor Smith (trans.) (London: Bloomsbury) 
Burke, Raymond. 2016. ‘Amoris Laetitia’ and the Constant Teaching and Practice of the 
Church (Online: www.ncregister.com) <http://www.ncregister.com/daily-
news/amoris-laetitia-and-the-constant-teaching-and-practice-of-the-church> 
[Accessed 29/03/17] 
Butler, Judith. 2006. Gender Trouble (2nd Ed.) (Oxford: Routledge)  
—— 2011. Bodies that Matter (Oxford: Routledge) 
Buttiglione, Rocco. 2016. The joy of love and the consternation of theologians (Online: 
www.osservatoreromano.va) <http://www.osservatoreromano.va/en/news/joy-
love-and-consternation-theologians> [Accessed 28/06/19] 
Byrne, Brendan. 2016. ‘A Pauline Complement to Laudato Si’’, in Theological Studies 77.2: 
308-327. 




Cartagenas, Aloysius Lopez. 2010. ‘The Social Teachings of the Church in Light of Paul 
Ricoeur’s Interpretation Theory: Implications for a Critical Reading of a ‘Tradition’’, 
in The Heythrop Journal 51: 636-657 
Carter, David. 2014. ‘Evangelii Gaudium. Testimony of a simple believer, teaching of a great 
church leader’, in One in Christ 48.1: 54-68 
Carvalhaes, Claudio. 2018. ‘Which Liberation Theology? Pope Francis and the choice of 
theologies for his papacy’, in Pope Francis in Postcolonial Reality: Complexities, 
Ambiguities, and Paradoxes, Nicolas Panotto (ed.) (No location given: Borderless 
Press) pp. 19-38 
Cassin, Ray. 2005. ‘Karol Wotyla (Pope John Paul II) 18 May 1920-2 April 2005’, in Sophia 
44.1: 1-3 
Castillo, Daniel. 2017. ‘“To praise, reverence, and serve”: The theological anthropology of 
Pope Francis’, in The Theological and Ecological Vision of Laudato Si’: Everything is 
Connected, Vincent J. Miller (ed.) (London: Bloomsbury) pp. 95-108 
Ceballos, Gerardo. 2016. ‘IV. Pope Francis’ Encyclical Letter Laudato Si’, in Global 
Environmental Risks, and the Future of Humanity’, in The Quarterly Review of 
Biology 91.3: 285-295. 
Chaput, Archbishop Charles. 2017. ‘Pastoral Guidelines for Implementing: Amoris Laetitia’, 
in Nova et vetera 15.1: 1-7. 
Charlier, Louis. 1938. Essai sur le problème théologique (Thuilles: Ramgal) 
Chenu, Marie-Dominique. 1937. Une école de théologie: Le Saulchoir (Kain-Lez-Tournai: Le 
Saulchoir) 
Choi, Kwang Sun. 2015. ‘Ecological Themes in Evangelii Gaudium, Together towards Life, 
and The Cape Town Commitment for Fraternity with God's Creation’, in 
International Review of Mission 104.2: 278-291. 
Choi, Young Back. 2017. ‘On Evangelii Gaudium: An Asia/Pacific Perspective’, in Journal of 
Vincentian Social Action 2.2: 8. 
246 
 
Christie, Douglas E. 2017. ‘Becoming painfully aware: Spirituality and solidarity in Laudato 
Si’, in The Theological and Ecological Vision of Laudato Si’: Everything is Connected, 
Vincent J. Miller (ed.) (London: Bloomsbury) pp. 109-126 
Clarkson, Lindsay L. 2017. ‘Engaging with Climate Change: Psychoanalytic and 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Laudato Si’: On Care for Our Common Home’, in 
Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 65.3: 537-553. 
Clifford, Anne. 2017. ‘Pope Francis'" Laudato Si'" On Care for our Common Home: An 
Ecofeminist Response’, in Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of 
America 72: 32-46 
Coccopalmerio, Francesco. 2017. Il Capitolo Ottavo della Esortazione Apostolica Post 
Sinodale Amoris Laetitia: Accompagnare, discernere e integrare la fraglita (Vatican 
City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana) 
Condon, Ed. 2017. What no-one’s noticed about the new liturgy rules (Online: 
www.catholicherald.co.uk) 
<http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/commentandblogs/2017/09/12/what-no-ones-
noticed-about-the-new-liturgy-rules/> [Accessed 11/10/17] 
Congar, Yves. 1938a. ‘The Reasons for the Unbelief of Our Time: A Theological Conclusion’ 
(Part I), Integration Aug. 1938: 13-21 
—— 1938b. ‘The Reasons for the Unbelief of Our Time: A Theological Conclusion’ (Part II), 
Integration Dec. 1938: 10-26 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. 1989. Doctrinal Commentary on the Concluding 
Formula of the Professio Fidei (Online: www.ewtn.com) 
<https://www.ewtn.com/library/CURIA/CDFADTU.HTM> [Accessed 11/10/17] 
—— 1990. Instruction, Donum Veritatis, on the Ecclesial Vocation of the Theologian 
(Online: www.vatican.va) 
<http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfa
ith_doc_1900524_theologian-vation_en.html> [Accessed 12/02/19] 
—— 2018. Letter Placuit Deo (Online: www.vatican.va) 
<http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfa
ith_doc_20180222_placuit-deo_en.html> [Accessed 21/05/19] 
247 
 
Connolly, Noel. 2015. ‘Ad gentes to Evangelii Gaudium: Mission’s move to the centre’, in 
The Australasian Catholic Record 92.4: 387-402 
Considine, Kevin Patrick. 2015. ‘The Han of the Sinned-Against: A Global Sensus Fidei in the 
Pope Francis Era’, in New Theology Review 27.2: 38-46. 
Cooper, Thia. 2018. ‘Pope Francis: Church, State, Economics and Sex’, in Pope Francis in 
Postcolonial Reality: Complexities, Ambiguities, and Paradoxes, Nicolas Panotto 
(ed.) (No location given: Borderless Press) pp. 55-76 
Cooreman-Guittin, Talitha. 2016. ‘Amoris Laetitia Through the Lens of Disability’, in Journal 
of Disability & Religion 20.3: 213-217. 
Cremers, Martijn. 2016. ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in Light of Laudato Si’, in Journal of 
Corporate Citizenship 64: 62-78. 
Crocitti, John J. 2002. ‘The Internal Organization of the Jesuit Missions among the Guarani’, 
in International Social Science Review 77.1/2: 3-15 
Crosby, John F. 2016. Crime, Punishment, and Amoris Laetitia (Online: 
www.firstthings.com) 
<https://www.firstthings.com/blogs/firstthoughts/2016/09/crime-punishment-
and-amoris-laetitia> [Accessed 28/06/19] 
Cuddeback, John. 2016. ‘Reflections of a Green Thomist on Pope Francis's Laudato Si'‘, in 
Nova et vetera 14.3: 735-744. 
Curran, Charles E. 1992. The Living Tradition of Catholic Moral Theology (London: University 
of Notre Dame Press) 
—— 2002. Catholic Social Teaching 1981-Present: A Historical, Theological, and Ethical 
Analysis (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press) 
Curran, Sheila. 2013. ‘Signs of the Times: Pope Francis Puts Latin America on the Ecclesial 
Map’, in New Theology Review 26.1: 84-86. 
Daniels, Chris. 2015. ‘Indigenous Wisdom and Pope Francis’ Encyclical Letter’, in For Our 
Common Home: Process-Relational Responses to Laudato Si’’, Jonn B. Cobb Jr. and 
Ignaio Castuera (eds.) (Anoka, Minnesota: Process Century Press) pp. 325-332 
248 
 
Davies, Brian. 1998. ‘Aquinas on What God is Not’, in Revue Internationale de Philosophie 
54.204 (2): 207-225 
—— 2012. ‘The Limits of Language and the Notion of Analogy’, in The Oxford Handbook of 
Aquinas, Brian Davies (ed.) (Oxford: Blackwell) 
De Lubac, Henri. 1999. The Splendour of the Church (2nd ed.) Michael Mason (trans.) (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press) 
—— 2006. Corpus Mysticum: the Eucharist and the Church in the Middle Ages Gemma 
Simmonds, Richard Price and Christopher Stephens (trans.) (London: SCM Press) 
Deck, Allan Figueroa. 2016. Francis, Bishop of Rome: The Gospel for the Third Millennium 
(New York: Paulist Press) 
Desmond, William. 2005. ‘Neither Servility nor Sovereignty: Between Metaphysics and 
Politics’, in Theology and the Political: the New Debate. Creston Davis, John 
Milbank and Slavoj Žižek (eds.) (Durham, NC: Duke University Press) pp. 153-182 
Dettloff, Dean. 2017. ‘Catholic Air Conditioning: Laudato Si’ and the Overcoming of 
Phenomenology’, in The Heythrop Journal 58.6: 931-941. 
Dombrowski, Daniel A. 2015. ‘A Liberal, Catholic Response’, in For Our Common Home: 
Process-Relational Responses to Laudato Si’’, Jonn B. Cobb Jr. and Ignaio Castuera 
(eds.) (Anoka, Minnesota: Process Century Press) pp. 30-34 
Eccheverria, Eduardo J. 2015. Pope Francis: the Legacy of Vatican II (Hobe Sound, Florida: 
Lectio Publishing) 
Edelman, Lee. 2004. No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (London: Duke University 
Press) 
Edwards, Denis. 2016a. ‘Earth as God’s Creation: The Theology of the Natural World in 
Pope Francis’ Laudato Si’’, in Phronema 31.2: 1-16 
—— 2016b. ‘“Sublime Communion”: The Theology of the Natural World in Laudato Si’’, in 
Theological Studies 77.2: 377-391 
—— 2017. ‘Everything is interconnected': The trinity and the natural World in Laudato Si’, 
in The Australasian Catholic Record 94.1: 81-92 
249 
 
Ehrman, Terrence. 2018. ‘Serene Attentiveness to the Creator and Creation’, in Pope 
Francis and the Event of Encounter, John C. Cavadini and Donald Wallenfang (eds) 
(Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick Publications) pp. 93-109 
Erickson, Jacob J. 2015. ‘Falling in Love with the Earth: Francis’ Faithful Ecology’, in For Our 
Common Home: Process-Relational Responses to Laudato Si’’, Jonn B. Cobb Jr. and 
Ignaio Castuera (eds.) (Anoka, Minnesota: Process Century Press) pp. 87-91 
Faggioli, Massimo. 2015. Pope Francis: Tradition in Transition (New York: Paulist Press) 
—— 2016a. ‘Ecumenism in Evangellii gaudium and in the context of Francis’ pontificate’, in 
Perspectiva Teológica 48.1: 17-35 
—— 2016b. Relearning critical obedience and faithful dissent (Online: www.ucanews.com) 
<https://www.ucanews.com/news/relearning-critical-obedience-and-faithful-
dissent/77083> [Accessed 04/09/18] 




Feehan, John. 2017. ‘Creation as Incarnation: Reflections on Biodiversity in Laudato Si’’, in 
Laudato Si’: An Irish Response, Sean McDonach (ed.) (Dublin: Veritas Publications) 
pp. 55-82 
Fernández, Victor Manuel in Conversation with Paolo Rodari. 2016. The Francis Project: 
Where He Wants to Take the Church (New York/Mahwah NJ: Paulist Press) 
Flipper, Joseph S. 2018. ‘The Time of Encounter in the Political Theology of Pope Francis’, in 
Pope Francis and the Event of Encounter, John C. Cavadini and Donald Wallenfang 
(eds.) (Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick Publications) pp. 201-226 
Foucault, Michel. 1977. ‘What is an Author?’, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: 
Selected Essays and Interviews, Donald F. Bouchard (ed.), Donald F. Bouchard and 
Sherry Simon (trans.) (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press) pp. 113-138 






—— 2013b. Encyclical Letter, Lumen Fidei (Online: w2.vatican.va) 
<http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-
francesco_20130629_enciclica-lumen-fidei.html> [Accessed: 27/04/17] 
—— 2013c. Litterae Encyclicae, Lumen Fidei (Online: w2.vatican.va) 
<http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/la/encyclicals/documents/papa-
francesco_20130629_enciclica-lumen-fidei.html> [Accessed: 09/03/20] 
—— 2014. The Church of Mercy, Giuliano Vigini (ed.) (London: Darton, Longman and Todd) 
—— 2015a. Encyclical Letter, Laudato Si’: On Care for our Common Home (online: 
w2.vatican.va) 
<http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-
francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.html> [Accessed 29/03/17] 
—— 2015b. Misericordiae Vultus: Bull of Indiction of the Extraordinary Year of Mercy 
(online: w2.vatican.va) 
<https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_letters/documents/papa-
francesco_bolla_20150411_misericordiae-vultus.html> [Accessed 29/03/17] 
—— 2015c. Morning Homilies: In the Chapel of St. Martha’s Guesthouse, March 22 - July 
26, 2013, Dinah Livingstone (trans.) (New York: Orbis Books) 
—— 2015d. The Gospel of New Life: Following Christ, Together, on the Path to Holiness, 
Giuliano Vigini (ed.) (London: Darton, Longman and Todd) 
—— 2015e. Video Message to Participants in an International Theological Congress held at 
the Pontifical Catholic University of Argentina (1-3 September 2015) (Online: 
w2.vatican.va) <http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/messages/pont-
messages/2015/documents/papa-francesco_20150903_videomessaggio-teologia-
buenos-aires.html> [Accessed 15/02/19] 







—— 2016b. Apostolic Letter, Misericordia et Misera (Online: w2.vatican.va) 
<http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_letters/documents/papa-
francesco-lettera-ap_20161120_misericordia-et-misera.html> [Accessed 17/11/18] 
—— 2016c. Morning Homilies II: In the Chapel of St. Martha’s Guesthouse, September 2, 
2013 – January 31, 2014, Dinah Livingstone (trans.) (New York: Orbis Books) 
—— 2016d. Morning Homilies III: In the Chapel of St. Martha’s Guesthouse, Dinah 
Livingstone (trans.) (New York: Orbis Books) 
—— 2016e. Morning Homilies IV: In the Chapel of St. Martha’s Guesthouse, July 7 – 
November 27, 2014 Dinah Livingstone (trans.) (New York: Orbis Books) 
—— 2016f. The Joy of Discipleship: Reflections from Pope Francis on Walking with Christ. 
James P. Campbell (ed.) (Chicago: Loyola Press) 
—— 2016g. The Name of God is Mercy: a Conversation with Andrea Tornielli, Oonagh 
Stransky (trans.) (London: Bluebird) 
—— 2017. Apostolic Letter Motu Proprio “Magnum Principium” Quibis nonnulla in can. 838 
Codis Iuris Cannonici immutantur (Online: press.vatican.va) 
<https://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2017/09/09/
170909a.html> [Accessed 27/06/17] 
—— 2018a. Apostolic Exhortation, Gaudete et Exsultate, of the Holy Father Francis on the 




—— 2018b. Morning Homilies V: In the Chapel of St. Martha’s Guesthouse, December 2, 
2014 – March 26, 2015, Dinah Livingstone (trans.) (New York: Orbis Books) 
Fuchs, Josef. 1970. Human Values and Christian Morality (London: Gill and Macmillan) 




Gaillardetz, Richard. 2015. An Unfinished Council: Vatican II, Pope Francis, and the Renewal 
of Catholicism (Collegeville, Minnesota: Liturgical Press) 
Gaudelli, William. 2017. ‘People, Pope and Planet: A hermeneutic and spectacle analysis of 
Laudato Si’ for Global Citizenship Educators’, in Journal of International Social 
Studies 7.1: 70-91. 
German Bishops’ Conference. 2017. ,,Die Freude der Liebe, die in den Familien gelebt wird, 
ist auch der Freude der Kirche”: Einladung zu einer erneuerten Ehe- und 
Familienpastoral im Licht von Amoris Laetitia (Online: www.dbk.de) 
<http://www.dbk.de/fileadmin/redaktion/diverse_downloads/presse_2017/2017-
015a-Wortlaut-Wort-der-Bischoefe-Amoris-laetitia.pdf> [Accessed 29/03/17] 
Gibson, David. 2016. While Francis frustrates foes with silence, Fr. Antonio Spadaro nails 
them with tweets (Online: www.ncronline.org) 
<https://www.ncronline.org/news/people/while-francis-frustrates-foes-silence-fr-
antonio-spadaro-nails-them-tweets> [Accessed 01/08/19] 
Gilchrist, Brian. 2017. ‘Papal Media Ecology: Laudato Si'as a Medium of Technocratic 
Resistance’, in Journal of Communication & Religion 40.1: 56-75 
Gold, Lorna. 2017. ‘The Disruptive Power of Laduato Si’ – A ‘Dangerous Book’’, in Laudato 
Si’: An Irish Response, Sean McDonach (ed.) (Dublin: Veritas Publications) pp. 91-
104 
Goleń, Jacek. 2018. ‘The Renewal of Pastoral Care of the Family in the Light of the Apostolic 
Exhortation Amoris Laetitia’, in Roczniki Teologiczne 64.6: 95-113. 
Golomb, Jacob. 1992. ‘Kierkegaard’s Ironic Ladder to Authentic Faith’, in International 
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 33.2: 65-81 
Granados, José. 2017. ‘From Flesh to Flesh: on the Sacramental Meaning of Tradition’, in 
Communio: International Catholic Review 44.4: 643-666 
Grey, Carmody. Understanding and Implementing Laudato Si’: Time and Measures of 
Success (Unpublished report for CAFOD) 




Gruber, Judith. 2017a. ‘Ec (o) clesiology: Ecology as Ecclesiology in Laudato Si’’, in 
Theological Studies 78.4: 807-824. 
—— 2017b. ‘“The Lord, your God is in your Midst” (EG 4): Evangelii Gaudium – Francis’ Call 
for a Kenotic Theology’, in Pope Francis and the Future of Catholicism: Evangelii 
Gaudium and the Papal Agenda, G. Mannion (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press) pp. 55-74 
Guitton, Jean. 1967. Dialogues avec Paul VI (Fayard: Paris) 
Gutierrez, Gustavo. 1979. ‘Liberation Praxis and the Christian Faith’, in Frontiers of 
Theology in Latin America, Rosino Gebellini (ed.), John Drury (trans.) (London: SCM 
Press Ltd) pp. 1-33 
Haldane, John. 1999. ‘Thomism and the Future of Catholic Philosophy’, in New Blackfriars, 
Vol. 80, No. 938: 158-169 
Hanby, Michael. 2015. ‘The Gospel of Creation and the Technocratic Paradigm: Reflections 
on a Central Teaching of Laudato Si’, in Communio 42: 724-47. 
Hauerwas, Stanley. 1996. ‘Murdochian Muddles: Can We Get Through Them if God Does 
Not Exist?’, in Iris Murdoch and the Search for Human Goodness, Maria Antonaccio 
and William Schweiker (eds.) (London: Chicago University Press) pp. 190-208 
Haught, John F. 2019. Trashing Teilhard: How Not to Read a Great Religious Thinker 
(Online: www.commonwealmagazine.org) 
<https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/trashing-teilhard> [Accessed 22/05/19] 
Hebblethwaite, Peter. 1980. The New Inquisition? Schillebeeckx and Küng (London: Fount 
Paperbacks) 
Henning, Brian. 2015. ‘Stewardship and the Roots of the Ecological Crisis’, in For Our 
Common Home: Process-Relational Responses to Laudato Si’’, Jonn B. Cobb Jr. and 
Ignaio Castuera (eds.) (Anoka, Minnesota: Process Century Press) pp. 41-51 
Hinze, Bradford E. 2017. Listening to the Spirit: Francis’ Distinctive Vision of the Church 
(online: www.thetablet.co.uk) 
<http://www.thetablet.co.uk/features/2/10071/listening-to-the-spirit-francis-
distinctive-vision-of-the-church>> [Accessed 12/10/17] 
254 
 
Hirsch, E. D. 1967. Validity in Interpretation (New Haven: Yale University Press) 
Hitchens, Dan. 2016. The Sacraments Don’t Need Fixing (Online: www.firstthings.com) 
<https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2016/08/the-sacraments-dont-
need-fixing [Accesssed 28/06/19] 
Hoose, Bernard. 1987. Proportionalism: the American Debate and its European Roots 
(Georgetown University Press) 
Hrynkow, Christopher W. 2016. ‘A True Ecological Approach Always Becomes a Social 
Approach’: A Green Theo‐Ecoethical Lens, Pope Francis’ Teaching, and Integral 
Social Justice’, in The Heythrop Journal (Online) doi: 10.1111/heyj.12350 
—— 2018. ‘Pope Francis and Respect for Diversity: A Mapping Employing a Green Theo‐
Ecoethical Lens’, in New Blackfriars 99: 601-621. 
Hunt, Mary E. 2018. ‘Postcolonial Catholics: a U.S. Feminist Perspective’, in Pope Francis in 
Postcolonial Reality: Complexities, Ambiguities, and Paradoxes, Nicolas Panotto 
(ed.) (No location given: Borderless Press) pp. 87-98 
Iheanacho, Ngozi N. 2016. ‘The Place of Women in Laudato Si: the Nigerian Reflection’, in 
Journal of Gender and Power 22.1: 29-46 
Imanaka, J. 2018. ‘Laudato Si’, Technologies of Power and Environmental Injustice: Toward 
an Eco-Politics Guided by Contemplation’, in Journal of Agricultural and 
Environmental Ethics 31.6: 677-701. 
Insole, Christopher J. 2006. ‘“Beyond glass doors… the sun no longer shining”: English 
Platonism and the problem of self-love in the literary and philosophical works of 
Iris Murdoch’, in Modern Theology 22.1: 111-144 
Ivereigh, Austen. 2014. The Great Reformer: Francis and the Making of a Radical Pope 
(London: Allen & Unwin) 
Jamieson, Kathleen M. Hall. 1973. ‘Generic Constraints and the Rhetorical Situation’, in 
Philosophy & Rhetoric 6.3: 162-170 





consortio.html> [Accessed 25/10/18] 
—— 1983. Veritatis Splendor (Online: w2.vatican.va) <http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-
paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_veritatis-splendor.html> 
[Accessed 29/03/17] 
—— 1984. Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation, Reconciliatio et Paenitentia (Online: 
w2.vatican.va) <http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-
ii/en/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_02121984_reconciliatio-et-
paenitentia.html> [Accessed: 29/03/17] 
—— 1986. Dominum et Vivificantem: On the Holy Spirit in the Life of the Church and the 
World (Online: vatican.va) <http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-
ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_18051986_dominum-et-
vivificantem.html> [Accessed 27/02/20] 
—— 1988. Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation, Christefideles Laici of His Holiness, John Paul 
II on the Vocation and Mission of the Lay Faithful in the Church and in the World 
(Online: w2.vatican.va) <http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-
ii/en/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_30121988_christifideles-
laici.html> [Accessed 17/08/18] 
—— 1991. Centisimus Annus (Online: w2.vatican.va) <http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-
paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_01051991_centesimus-annus.html> 
[Accessed: 17/11/17] 
—— 1995. Ut Unum Sint: On commitment to Ecumenism (Online: w2.vatican.va) 
<http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-
ii_enc_25051995_ut-unum-sint.html> [Accessed 12/02/19] 
—— 1998a. Apostolic letter, Dies Domini, of the Holy Father, John Paul II, to the Bishops, 






—— 1998b. Encyclical Letter, Fides et Ratio (Online: w2.vatican.va) 
<http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-
ii_enc_14091998_fides-et-ratio.html> [Accessed 29/08/18] 
—— 2003. Encyclical Letter, Ecclesia de Eucharistia (Online: w2.vatican.va) 
<http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-
ii_enc_20030417_eccl-de-euch.html> [Accessed 20/08/19] 
Pope John XXIII. 1961. Mater et Magistra: Encyclical of Pope John XXIII on Christianity and 
Social Progress (Online: w2.vatican.va) <http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-
xxiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_15051961_mater.html> [Accessed 
23/05/19] 
—— 1962. Gaudet Mater Ecclesia, (Online: w2.vatican.va) 
<https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-xxiii/it/speeches/1962/documents/hf_j-
xxiii_spe_19621011_opening-council.html> [Accessed 12/02/19] 
Johnson, Elizabeth A. 2015. ‘Is God’s Charity Broad Enough for Bears?’, in The Irish 
Theological Quarterly 80.4: 283-293 
Kasper, Walter. 2015. Pope Francis’ Revolution of Tenderness and Love (New York: Paulist 
Press) 
Kauffman, Stuart; Devins, Caryn; Koppl, Roger; and Felin, Teppo. 2015. ‘Searching for 
Transcendence at the Hinge of History in the Context of Laudato Si’’, in For Our 
Common Home: Process-Relational Responses to Laudato Si’’, Jonn B. Cobb Jr. and 
Ignaio Castuera (eds.) (Anoka, Minnesota: Process Century Press) pp. 229-238 
Keenan, John F. 2010. A History of Catholic Moral Theology in the Twentieth Century: From 
Confessing Sins to Liberating Consciences (London: Bloomsbury) 
—— 2017. ‘Receiving Amoris Laetitia’, in Theological Studies 78.1: 193-212 
Keller, Catherine. 2015. ‘Encycling: One Feminist Theological Response’, in For Our Common 
Home: Process-Relational Responses to Laudato Si’’, Jonn B. Cobb Jr. and Ignaio 
Castuera (eds.) (Anoka, Minnesota: Process Century Press) pp. 175-186 
Kerlin, Michael. 2007. ‘Reginald Garrigou-Legrange: Defending the Faith from Pascendi 
Dominici Gregis to Humani Generis’, in U.S. Catholic Historian 25.1: 97-113 
257 
 
Kerr, Fergus. 2002. After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism (Oxford: Blackwell) 
Kessler, Edward. 2018. ‘“The Church Also Is Enriched When She Receives the Values of 
Judaism”: Shared Faith Responses to Pope Francis and Interreligious Dialogue”, 
Pope Francis and Interreligious Dialogue: Religious Thinkers Engage with Recent 
Papal Initiatives, Harold Kasimow and Alan Race (eds.) (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan) 
pp. 85-100 
Kierkegaard, Søren. 1941. Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical 
Fragments, David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (trans.) (London: Oxford 
University Press) 
—— 1980. The Sickness Unto Death: A Christian Psychological exposition for Upbuilding and 
Awakening, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (eds. and trans.) (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press) 
—— 1983. Repetition: an Essay in Experimenting Psychology, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. 
Hong (trans.) (New Jersey: Princeton University Press) 
Kilby, Karen. 2000. ‘Perichoresis and Projection: Problems with Social Doctrines of the 
Trinity’, in New Blackfriars 81.956: 432-445 
Klein, Melanie. 2003. ‘Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms’, in Journal of American 
Psychotherapy Practice and Research 5.2: 164-179 
Knasas, John F. X. 2000. ‘“Fides et Ratio” and the 20th Century Thomist Revival’, in New 
Blackfriars Vol. 81.955: 400-408 
Knoetze, Hannes. 2015. ‘Together Towards Life and Evangelii Gaudium: Implications for 
African Child Theology Today’, in Missionalia 43.2: 218-231 
Komonchak, Joseph A. 1994. ‘Vatican II and the encounter between Catholicism and 
Liberalism’, in Catholicism and Liberalism: Contributions to American Policy, R. 
Bruce Douglass and David Hollenbach (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press) pp. 76-99 
—— 1998. ‘Thomism and the Second Vatican Council’, in Continuity and Plurality in Catholic 
Theology: Essays in Honor of Gerald A. McCool, S.J., (Ed.) Anthony J. Cernera 
(Fairfield, CT: Sacred Heart University Press) 53-73 
258 
 
Kotsko, Adam. 2009. ‘“That They Might Have Ontology”: Radical Orthodoxy and the New 
Debate’, in Political Theology, 10.1: 114-124 
Laghi, Pio. 1996. ‘The Impact of Veritatis Splendor on Catholic Education at the University 
and Secondary Levels’, in The Thomist: a Speculative Quarterly Review Vol. 60.1: 1-
18 
Lamb, Christopher. 2017. ‘Enemies Within’, in The Tablet 271.9182: 6 
Lane, Dermot A. 2017. ‘Anthropological and Theological Reflections on Laudato Si’’, in 
Laudato Si’: An Irish Response, Sean McDonach (ed.) (Dublin: Veritas Publications) 
pp. 31-54 
Langan, John. 1989. ‘Catholic Moral Rationalism and the Philosophical Basis of Moral 
Theology’, in Theological Studies 50: 25-43 
Lash, Nicholas. 1994. ‘Crisis and Tradition in Veritatis Splendor’, in Studies in Christian Ethics 
7.2: 22-28 
Lasida, Elena. 2017. ‘Laudato Si’: a New Conception of Progress’, in Catholic Theology and 
Thought 78: 90-125 
Lehmann, David. 1996. Struggle for the Spirit: Religious Transformation and Popular Culture 
in Brazil and Latin America (Cambridge: Polity Press) 
Lemna, Keith Edward. 2014. ‘Pope Francis' Strong Thought’, in Theological 
Librarianship 7.2: 45-53 
Pope Leo XIII. 1879. Aeterni patris: Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII on the Restoration of Christian 
Philosophy (Online: w2.vatican.va) <http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-
xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_04081879_aeterni-patris.html> 
[Accessed: 13/08/18] 
Lewis, Charlton T.; and Charles Short. 1879. A Latin Dictionary. Founded on Andrews' 
edition of Freund's Latin dictionary. revised, enlarged, and in great part rewritten 
by. Charlton T. Lewis, Ph.D. and. Charles Short (Online: www.perseus.tufts.edu) 
<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0059:entry
=conscribo> [Accessed 09/11/18] 
Leys, Ruth. 2011. ‘The Turn to Affect: A Critique’, in Critical Inquiry Vol. 37, No. 3: 434-472 
259 
 
Lippit, John. 2000. Humour and Irony in Kierkegaard’s Thought (Basingstoke and London: 
Macmillan Press, Ltd.) 
López, Ángel Pérez. 2016. ‘Conjugal charity and the pastoral care of the conjugal bond in 
Amoris Laetitia’, in Scripta Fulgentina: revista de teología y humanidades 26.51: 83-
119. 
Luciani, Rafael. 2017. Pope Francis and the Theology of the People, Philip Berryman (trans.) 
(Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books) 
Lunney, Daniel T. 2016. ‘Reflections on Mercy: Pope Francis and Joseph Cardinal 
Bernardin’, in Theophilus: The Student Journal of Catholic Theological Union 3.1: 53-
56. 
Lynch, Paul. 2017. ‘On Care for our Common Discourse: Pope Francis’s Nonmodern 
Epideictic’, in Rhetoric Society Quarterly 47.5: 463-482 
MacDonald, Scott. 1993. ‘Theory of Knowledge’, The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, 
Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press) pp. 160-195 
MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1988. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Gerald Duckworth 
& Co. Ltd.) 
Magesa, Laurenti. 2017. ‘Africa and an Economy of Universal Human Solidarity: In the 
Footsteps of Pope Francis’ Evangelii Gaudium’, in Journal of Vincentian Social 
Action 2.2: 6. 
McCormick, Richard A. 1994. Corrective Vision: Explorations in Moral Theology (Kansas City, 
MO: Sheed & Ward) 
McDonagh, Sean. 2017. ‘Introduction: Laudato Si’: A Prophetic Challenge for the Twenty-
First Century’, in Laudato Si’: An Irish Response, Sean McDonach (ed.) (Dublin: 
Veritas Publications) pp. 7-30 
McElroy, Robert W. 2016. Embracing the Joy of Love: A Pastoral Message to the People of 
the Diocese of San Diego (Online: www.sdcatholic.org) 
<http://www.sdcatholic.org/Portals/0/Bishop/Documents/Embracing_the_Joy_of_
Love.pdf?ver=2016-05-09-151145-653> [Accessed 29/03/17] 
260 
 
McGill, Alan. 2017. ‘What Does Pope Francis Mean by his References to the Devil as a 
Being? An Intratextual, Cultural‐Linguistic Perspective’, in The Heythrop Journal 
(Online) doi: 10.1111/heyj.12481> [Accessed 06/02/19] 
McInnerny, Ralph. 1996. Aquinas and Analogy (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of 
America Press) 
Mercier, Charles. 2016. What does Pope Francis’ motto really mean? (Online: 
www.catholicnewsagency.com) 
<https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/column/what-does-pope-francis-motto-
really-mean-3469> [Accessed 25/10/18] 
Messinger, Dean. 2017. ‘Beauty, Nature, and Laudato Si: Locating John Ruskin's Naturalism 
within the Framework of Theological Aesthetics’, in Say Something Theological: The 
Student Journal of Theological Studies 1.1: 4. 
Mesters, Carlos. ‘The Use of the Bible in the Christian Communities of the Common 
People’, in The Challenge of Basic Christian Communities: Papers from the 
International Ecumenical Congress of Theology, February 20-March 2, 1980, São 
Paulo, Brazil, Sergio Torres and John Eagleson (eds.), John Drury (trans.) 
(Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books) pp. 197-210 
Michaluk, Kamil. 2017. ‘Individual, societal and global consequences of technology 
development in the perspective of the encyclical Laudato Si' of the Pope Francis’, in 
World Scientific News 72: 376-386. 
Milbank, John. 1996. ‘The Sublime in Kierkegaard’, in The Heythrop Journal 37: 298-321 
—— 2006. Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (2nd ed.) (Oxford: Blackwell) 
—— 2009. ‘The Double Glory, or Paradox Versus Dialectics: On Not Quite Agreeing with 
Slavoj Žižek’, in The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectics? Slavoj Žižek and 
John Milbank; Creston Davis (ed.) (Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press) pp. 110-
233 
Miller, Vincent. 2017. ‘Integral Ecology: Francis’s spiritual and moral vision of 
interconnectedness’, in The Theological and Ecological Vision of Laudato Si’: 
Everything is Connected, Vincent J. Miller (ed.) (London: Bloomsbury) pp. 11-28 
261 
 
Moccia, Salvatore. 2017. ‘Evangelii Gaudium: A European Perspective’, in Journal of 
Vincentian Social Action 2.2: 7. 
Mudge, Lewis S. 1996. ‘Veritatis Splendor and Today’s Ecumenical Conversation’, in The 
Ecumenical Review Vol. 48, No. 2: 158-163 
Mudge, Peter. 2018. ‘'No borders and no limits': Pope Francis on crossing frontiers and 
encountering Christ through the 'other'‘, in The Australasian Catholic Record 95.3: 
339-351 
Murdoch, Iris. 1973. The Black Prince (London: Penguin Books) 
—— 1992. Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (London: Chatto & Windus) 
—— 1997a. ‘On ‘God’ and ‘Good’’, in Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy 
and Literature, Peter Conradi (ed.) (London: Penguin Books) pp. 337-362 
—— 1997b. ‘The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts’, in Existentialists and Mystics: 
Writings on Philosophy and Literature, Peter Conradi (ed.) (London: Penguin Books) 
pp. 363-387 
Murray, Paul D. 2006. ‘On Valuing Truth in Practice: Rome’s Postmodern Challenge’, in 
International Journal of Systematic Theology 8.2: 163-183 
Nyong’o, Tavia. 2010. ‘Trapped in the Closet with Eve’, in Criticism 52.2: 243-251 
O’Collins, Gerald. 2016. ‘The Joy of Love (Amoris Laetitia): The Papal Exhortation in Its 
Context’, in Theological Studies 77.4: 905-921. 
O’Halloran, Nathan W. 2018. ‘Each Creature, Resplendently Transfigured”: Development of 
Teaching in Laudato Si’, in Theological Studies 79.2: 376-398. 
O’Malley, John W. 2008. ‘Vatican II: Did Anything Happen?’, in Vatican II: Did Anything 
Happen? John W. O’Malley, Joseph A. Komonchak, Steven Schloesser, and Neil J. 
Ormerod; David G. Schultenover (ed.) (London: Continuum) 
Odozor, Paulinus Ikechukwu. 1995. Richard A. McCormick and the Renewal of Moral 
Theology (London: University of Notre Dame Press). 
—— 2003. Moral Theology in an Age of Renewal: A Study of the Catholic Tradition since 
Vatican II (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press) 
262 
 
Oliver, Simon. 2017. Creation: a Guide for the Perplexed (London: Bloomsbury) 
Oltvai, Kristóf. 2018. ‘Bergoglio Among the Phenomenologists: Encounter, Otherness, and 
Church in Evangelii Gaudium and Amoris Laetitia’, in Open Theology 4: 316-324 
Panotto, Nicolás. 2018a. ‘Introduction’, in Pope Francis in Postcolonial Reality: Complexities, 
Ambiguities, and Paradoxes, Nicolas Panotto (ed.) (No location given: Borderless 
Press) pp. xxi-xxvi 
—— 2018b. ‘The Complexity of Religious Identifications: Meanings and paradoxes in the 
relationships between beliefs, experiences and the polity in the new Pope Francis 
age’, in Pope Francis in Postcolonial Reality: Complexities, Ambiguities, and 
Paradoxes, Nicolas Panotto (ed.) (No location given: Borderless Press) pp. 119-133 
Parker, Rebecca Ann. 2015. ‘Foundations for an Eco-Ecclesiology’, in For Our Common 
Home: Process-Relational Responses to Laudato Si’’, Jonn B. Cobb Jr. and Ignaio 
Castuera (eds.) (Anoka, Minnesota: Process Century Press) pp. 312-322 
Pope Paul VI. 1963. Consititution on the Sacred Liturgy, Sacrosanctum Concilium (Online: 
www.vatican.va) 
<http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_const_19631204_sacrosanctum-concilium_en.html> [Accessed 11/10/17] 
—— 1964a. Decree on Ecumenism, Unitatis redintegratio (Online: www.vatican.va) 
<http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_decree_19641121_unitatis-redintegratio_en.html> [Accessed 12/02/19] 
—— 1964b. Dogmatic Constitution of the Church, Lumen Gentium (online: www.vatican.va) 
<http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_const_19641121_lumen-gentium_en.html> [Accessed: 17/04/17] 
—— 1965a. Declaration on Religious Freedom, Dignitatis Humanae, on the Right of the 
Person and of Communities to Social and Civil Freedom in Matters Religious (Online: 
www.vatican.va) 
<http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html> [Accessed 11/10/17] 





ii_const_19651118_dei-verbum_en.html> [Accessed 12/02/19]  
—— 1965c. Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes 
(online: www.vatican.va) 
<http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html> [Accessed: 06/04/16] 
Pavić, Željko, and Antun Šundalić. 2016. ‘Environmentalism and development in Catholic 
Social Teaching: A case of the encyclical Laudato Si’’, in Ekonomski vjesnik: Review 
of Contemporary Entrepreneurship, Business, and Economic Issues 29.2: 323-334. 
Pentin, Edward. 2016a. ‘Cardinal Burke on Amoris Laetitia Dubia: ‘Tremendous Division 
Warrants Action’ (Online: www.ncregister.com) <http://www.ncregister.com/daily-
news/cardinal-burke-on-amoris-laetitia-dubia-tremendous-division-warrants-
action>> [Accessed 08/11/17] 




—— 2018. Pope Allegedly Says Hell Doesn’t Exist in Latest Scalfari ‘Interview’ (Online: 
www.ncregister.com) <http://www.ncregister.com/blog/edward-pentin/pope-
allegedly-says-hell-doesnt-exist-in-latest-scalfari-interview> [Accessed 08/11/17] 
Peppard, Christiana Z. 2016. ‘Hydrology, Theology, and Laudato Si’’, in Theological 
Studies 77.2: 416-435. 
Perelman, C.H. and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca. 1969. The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on 
Argumentation, John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (trans.) (London: University of 
Notre Dame Press) 
Petrov, Vesselin. 2015. ‘An Appeal to Build up an Ecological Civilisation’, in For Our Common 
Home: Process-Relational Responses to Laudato Si’’, Jonn B. Cobb Jr. and Ignaio 
Castuera (eds.) (Anoka, Minnesota: Process Century Press) pp. 425-430 








Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace. 2004. Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the 
Church (Online: vatican.va) 
<http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc
_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html> [Accessed 24/08/19] 
Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts. 2000. Declaration: Concerning the Admission to Holy 
Communion  of Faithful Who Are Divorced and Remarried (Online: v2.vatican.va) 
<http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/intrptxt/documents/rc_p
c_intrptxt_doc_20000706_declaration_en.html> [Accessed 29/03/17] 
Porras, Ileana M. 2015. ‘Laudato Si’, Pope Francis’ Call to Ecological Conversion: 
Responding to the Cry of the Earth and the Poor—Towards an Integral Ecology’, in 
AJIL Unbound 109: 136-141. 
Porter, Janet. 1995. ‘Moral Reasoning, Authority, and Community in “Veritatis Splendor”‘, 
in The Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics Vol. 15: 201-219 
Pottmeyer, Herman J. 1987. ‘A New Phase in the Reception of Vatican II: Twenty Years of 
Interpretation of the Council’, in The Reception of Vatican II, ‘(Eds.)’ Giuseppe 
Alberigo, Jean-Pierre Jossua and Joseph A. Komonchak ‘(trans.)’ Matthew J. 
O’Connell (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press) pp. 27-43 
Pound, Marcus. 2007. Theology, Psychoanalysis and Trauma (London: SCM Press) 
Poznański, J. 2017. ‘Pope Francis’ Encyclical Laudato Si’: Ecological Concerns and a Shift of 
Theological Approach to the Problems of Humanity and the Earth’, in Issues in 
Science and Theology: Are We Special? Issues in Science and Religion: Publications 
of the European Society for the Study of Science and Theology, vol 4., M. Fuller, D. 
Evers, A. Runehov, and KW. Sæther (eds.) (Cham: Springer) 
Prabhu, Joseph. 2013. ‘The Game Changer in the Vatican’, in For Our Common Home: 
Process-Relational Responses to Laudato Si’’, Jonn B. Cobb Jr. and Ignaio Castuera 
(eds.) (Anoka, Minnesota: Process Century Press) pp. 77-86 
265 
 
Pramuk, Christopher. 2018. ‘Contemplation and the Suffering Earth: Thomas Merton, Pope 
Francis, and the Next Generation’, in Open Theology 4.1: 212-227. 
Punch, Michael. 2017. ‘Laudato Si’: Mining the Meanings for the City’, in Laudato Si’: An 
Irish Response, Sean McDonach (ed.) (Dublin: Veritas Publications) pp. 83-90 
Ratzinger, Joseph. 1993. Christ, Faith and the Challenge of Cultures (Online: 
www.vatican.va) 
<http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/incontri/rc_con_cfaith
_19930303_hong-kong-ratzinger_en.html> [Accessed 15/02/19] 
Reginald, A. L. V. A. 2017. ‘Contemporary Christian Family Life in the Light of the Teachings 
of Amoris Laetitia’, in Journal of the Nanzan Academic Society Humanities and 
Natural Sciences 13: 211-227. 
Reimer, Marga and Eliot Michaelson. 2017. ‘Reference’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (Ed.) (Online: plato.stanford.edu) 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/reference/> [Accessed 
19/11/17] 
Reynolds, Philip L. 2003. ‘Bonaventure’s theory of resemblance’, in Traditio 58: 219-255 
Ricoeur, Paul. 1981. Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press) 
Riffert, Franz. 2015. ‘Local Change Agents and General Perspective’, in For Our Common 
Home: Process-Relational Responses to Laudato Si’’, Jonn B. Cobb Jr. and Ignaio 
Castuera (eds.) (Anoka, Minnesota: Process Century Press) pp. 416-420 
Roberts, Stephen B. 2018. ‘Is the Pope Catholic? A Question of Identity in Pope Francis’s 
Practical Theology of Interreligious Dialogue’, Pope Francis and Interreligious 
Dialogue: Religious Thinkers Engage with Recent Papal Initiatives, Harold Kasimow 
and Alan Race (eds.) (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan) pp. 129-144 
Robin Ryan, C. P. 2015. ‘Ecclesiological Themes in the Teaching of Pope Francis’, in New 
Theology Review 27.2: 81-89. 





francis-crafts-a-new-genre-of-papal-language.cfm> [Accessed: 29/03/17] 
Roche, Joseph L. 1965. ‘The Aggiornamento in Catholic Philosophy’, in Philippine Studies, 
Vol. 13 No. 2: 232-257  
Rolston, Holmes III. 2015. For Our Common Home: Process-Relational Responses to Laudato 
Si’’, Jonn B. Cobb Jr. and Ignaio Castuera (eds.) (Anoka, Minnesota: Process Century 
Press) pp. 52-57 
Rose, Marika. 2019. A Theology of Failure: Žižek Against Christian Innocence (New York: 
Fordham University Press) 
Rourke, Thomas R. 2016a. ‘Pope Francis: The Historical-Theological Roots and Development 
of His Social Thought’, in Journal of Catholic Social Thought 13.2: 285-309. 
—— 2016b. The Roots of Pope Francis’s Social and Political Thought: From Argentina to the 
Vatican (London: Rowman and Littlefield) 
Routhier, Giles. 2017. ‘Vatican II: Relevance and Future’, in Theological Studies 74: 537-554 
Rubenstein, Mary-Jane. 2005. ‘The Unbearable Withness of Being: On the Essentialist Blind 
Spot of Anti-ontotheology’, in Theology and the Political: the New Debate. Creston 
Davis, John Milbank and Slavoj Žižek (eds.) (Durham, NC: Duke University Press) pp. 
340-349 
—— 2010. Thinking Otherwise (Online: tif.ssrc.org) 
<https://tif.ssrc.org/2010/12/03/thinking-otherwise/> [Accessed 16/07/19] 
Ruether, Rosemary Radford. 2015. ‘Pope Francis’ Encyclical on Care for Creation’, in For Our 
Common Home: Process-Relational Responses to Laudato Si’’, Jonn B. Cobb Jr. and 
Ignaio Castuera (eds.) (Anoka, Minnesota: Process Century Press) pp. 16-20 
Ryan, Tom. 2017. ‘‘Weakness, and wounded and troubled love’ in Amoris Laetitia: Pope 
Francis as Pastor’, in The Australasian Catholic Record 94.2: 131-147 
Sachs, Wolfgang. 2017. ‘The Sustainable Development Goals and Laudato Si’: varieties of 
Post-Development?’, in Third World Quarterly 38.12: 2573-2587. 
Sadowski, Ryszard F. 2016. ‘The Concept of Integral Ecology in the Encyclical Laudato Si’’, in 
Divyadaan Journal of Philosophy and Education 27.1: 21-44 
267 
 
Salzman, Todd. 2004. ‘Signs of the Times: Ethical Method, Noninfallible Magisterial 
Teaching, and the Formation of Conscience: Two Divergent Models.’ New Theology 
Review 17.4: 76-79 
San Martín, Inés. 2017. Pope okays Argentine doc on Communion for divorced and 
remarried (Online: www.cruxnow.com) <https://cruxnow.com/global-
church/2016/09/12/pope-okays-argentine-doc-communion-divorced-remarried/> 
[Accessed 29/03/17] 
Scalfari, Di Eugenio. 2018. Il Papa: “È un onore essere chiamato rivoluzionario” (Online: 
rep.repubblica.it) 
<https://rep.repubblica.it/pwa/intervista/2018/03/28/news/il_papa_e_un_onore_
essere_chiamato_rivoluzionario_-192473492/> [Accessed 01/08/19] 
Scannone, Juan Carlos. 1979. ‘Theology, Popular Culture, and Discernment’, in Frontiers of 
Theology in Latin America, Rosino Gibellini (ed.) (London: SCM Press) pp. 213-139 
—— 2016. ‘Pope Francis and the Theology of the People’, in Theological Studies 77.1: 118-
135. 
Scherz, Paul. 2018. ‘Living Indefinitely and Living Fully: Laudato Si’ and the Value of the 
Present in Christian, Stoic, and Transhumanist Temporalities’, in Theological 
Studies 79.2: 356-375. 
Schloesser, Steven. 2006. ‘Against Forgetting: Memory, History, and Vatican II’, in 
Theological Studies 67: 275-319 
Sedgwick, Eve Kosovsky. 2003. Touching, Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press) 
Sedmak, Clemens. 2017. ‘Traditional Concerns, New Language? Reflections on Laudato Si’, 
in The Heythrop Journal 58.6: 942-952. 
Seifert, Josef. 2016 ‘Amoris Laetitia: Joy, Sadness and Hopes’, in AEMAET 5.2: 160-249. 
Shields, George W. 2009. ‘“Quo Vadis”? On Current Prospects for Process Philosophy and 
Theology’, in American Journal of Philosophy and Theology, 30.2: 125-152 
Silecchia, Lucia A. 2016. ‘“Social Love” as a Vision for Environmental Law: Laudato Si’ and 





Siniscalchi, Glenn B. 2018. ‘Pope Francis and Christian Credibility’, in Pope Francis and the 
Event of Encounter, John C. Cavadini and Donald Wallenfang (eds.) (Eugene, 
Oregon: Pickwick Publications) pp. 129-145 
Sistach, Lluís Martínez. 2017. Come Applicare l’<<Amoris Laetitia>> (Vatican City: Librere 
Editrice Vaticana) 
Skorka, Abraham. 2018. ‘Foreword: Who is Jorge Bergoglio?’, in Pope Francis and 
Interreligious Dialogue: Religious Thinkers Engage with Recent Papal Initiatives, 
Harold Kasimow and Alan Race (eds.) (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan) pp. vii-xii 
Slattery, John P. 2017. ‘Dangerous Tendencies of Cosmic Theology: The Untold Legacy of 
Teilhard de Chardin’, in Philosophy and Theology 29.1: 69-82 
—— 2019. Teilhard and Eugenics: A Response to John Haught (Online: 
www.commonwealmagazine.org) 
<https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/teilhard-eugenics> [Accessed 22/05/19] 
Spadaro, Antonio. 2013. Interview with Pope Francis (online: w2.vatican.va) 
<https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2013/september/docume
nts/papa-francesco_20130921_intervista-spadaro.html> [Accessed 01/08/19] 
Spinoza, Baruch. 2003. The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Gemoetrico Demonstrata), R. H. M. Elwes 
(trans.) (Online: www.gutenberg.org) 
<https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3800/3800-h/3800-h.htm> [Accessed 09/11/17] 
Stollenwerk, Daniel J. 2015. ‘A new synthesis of faith and reason: Ecumenism in light of 
Lumen Fidei’, in The Australasian Catholic Record 92.1: 53-66 
Stone, Daniel. 2008. A Peek Inside the Popemobile (Online: www.newsweek.com) 
<https://www.newsweek.com/peek-inside-popemobile-86377> [Accessed 
16/05/19] 
Stump, Eleonore. 2010. Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
269 
 
Surin, Kenneth. 2005. ‘Rewriting the Ontological Script of Liberation: On the Question of 
Finding a New Kind of Political Subject’, in Theology and the Political: the New 
Debate. Creston Davis, John Milbank and Slavoj Žižek (eds.) (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press) pp. 240-266 
Teixeira, Maria-Teresa. 2015. ‘Ecological Conversion: the Plea for Sister Earth’, in For Our 
Common Home: Process-Relational Responses to Laudato Si’’, Jonn B. Cobb Jr. and 
Ignaio Castuera (eds.) (Anoka, Minnesota: Process Century Press) pp. 431-437 
The Archdiocese of Malta and the Diocese of Gozo. 2017. Criteria for the Application of 




The Holy See. 1983. Code of Canon Law (Online: w2.vatican.va) 
<http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG1104/_INDEX.HTM> [Accessed: 29/03/17] 
Thompson, Christopher J. 2016. ‘Laudato Si’ and the Rise of Green Thomism’, in Nova et 
vetera 14.3: 745-756. 
Todd, Mary Madeline. 2018. ‘Embodied Mercy: The Centrality of the Incarnation in the 
Thought of Pope Francis’, in Pope Francis and the Event of Encounter, John C. 
Cavadini and Donald Wallenfang (eds.) (Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick Publications) pp. 
17-37 
Toldy, Teresa. 2017. ‘Someone is Missing in the Common House: The Empty Place of 
Women in the Encyclical Letter Laudato Si'‘, in Journal of the European Society of 
Women in Theological Research 25: 167-189. 
Tonstad, Lin. 2016. God and Difference: The Trinity, Sexuality, and the Transformation of 
Finitude (London: Routledge) 
—— Linn Marie. 2017. ‘Ambivalent Loves: Christian Theologies, Queer Theologies’, in 
Literature & Theology 31.4: 472-489 
Torevell, David. 2018. ‘Angels in America–a theological reading in conjunction with Pope 
Francis’ Apostolic Exhortation on The Call to Holiness in Today's World, Gaudete et 
270 
 
Exsultate (Rejoice and Be Glad), and key Catholic writings on Homosexuality’, in 
New Blackfriars 100: 434-451 
Tracy, David. 1981. The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of 
Pluralism (New York: Herder & Herder) 
Tran, Anh Q. 2018. ‘A Church of Mercy and Hope: Pope Francis and the New 
Evangelization’, in Pope Francis and the Event of Encounter, John C. Cavadini and 
Donald Wallenfang (eds.) (Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick Publications) pp. 1-16 
Turkson, Cardinal Peter. 2015. How are We to Live in Our Common Home? Reflections on 
Laudato Si, Pope Francis' Encyclical on Ecology (Online: kb.osu.edu) 
<https://kb.osu.edu/handle/1811/77974> [Accessed 19/10/18] 
Urick, Michael J., William J. Hisker, and Jeffrey L. Godwin. 2017. ‘Management Response to 
Laudato Si: An Operational Excellence Perspective’, in Journal of Biblical Integration 
in Business 20.2: 20-29 
Vallini, Agosto. 2016. “La letizia dell’amore: il cammino delle famiglia a Roma” (Online: 
www.romasette.it) <http://www.romasette.it/wp-
content/uploads/Relazione2016ConvegnoDiocesano.pdf> [Accessed 29/03/17] 
van den Heuvel, Steven C. 2018. ‘The Theocentric Position of Laudato Si’: a Critical 
Discussion’, in Philosophia Reformata 83: 51-67 
Verstraeten, Johan. 2016. ‘Entering Fully into the Fabric of Society: Pope Francis and the 
Future of Social Discernment’, in Concilium 52.1: 104-112 
Vogel, Howard J. 2015. ‘Laudato Si’, the Idea of Property, and the Rule of Law’, in For Our 
Common Home: Process-Relational Responses to Laudato Si’’, Jonn B. Cobb Jr. and 
Ignaio Castuera (eds.) (Anoka, Minnesota: Process Century Press) pp. 289-297 
von Balthasar, Hans Urs. 1969. The Moment of Christian Witness, Richard Beckley (trans.) 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press) 
—— 1986. The Office of Peter and the Structure of the Church, Andrée Emery (trans.) (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press)  
271 
 
Wahlberg, Mats. 2017. The Two Faces of Amoris Laetitia (Online: www.firstthings.com) 
<https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2017/04/the-two-faces-of-amoris-
laetitia> [Accessed 19/10/18] 
Wallenfang, Donald. 2018. ‘Pope Francis and His Phenomenology of Encounter’, in Pope 
Francis and the Event of Encounter, John C. Cavadini and Donald Wallenfang (eds.) 
(Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick Publications) pp. 57-71 
Weil, Simone. 2002. Gravity and Grace, Emma Crawford and Mario von der Ruhr (trans.) 
(London: Routledge) 
Whelan, Gerard. 2015. ‘Evangelii Gaudium as "Contextual Theology": Helping the Church 
“Mount to the Level of its Times"‘, in Australian e-Journal of Theology 22.1: 1-10 
<https://staff.acu.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/746315/evangelii_gaudium
_as_contextual_theology_whelan_apr15_vol22.1.pdf> [Accessed 02/08/19] 
White, Lynn Jr. 1967. ‘The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis’, in Science 155.3767: 
1203-1207 
Wildes, Kevim Wm. 1994. ‘In the Light of the Splendor: Veritatis Splendor and Moral 
Theology’, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 4.1: 13-25 
World Synod of Catholic Bishops. 1971. Justice in the World (Online: www1.villanova.edu) 
<https://www1.villanova.edu/content/dam/villanova/mission/JusticeIntheWorld19
71.pdf> [Accessed 11/10/17] 
Worthen, Jeremy. 2016. ‘What’s New About Renewal in Evangelii Gaudium?’, in 
Ecclesiology 12.1: 73-90 
Yaghjian, Lucretia B. 2015. Writing Theology Well: A Rhetoric for Theological and Biblical 
Writers (2nd Edition) (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark) 
Yocum, Sandra. 2017. ‘Liturgy: the exaltation of creation’, in The Theological and Ecological 
Vision of Laudato Si’: Everything is Connected, Vincent J. Miller (ed.) (London: 
Bloomsbury) pp. 127-144 
Young-Somers, Debbie. 2018. ‘On Donkey Drivers, Interreligious Dialogue, and Shared 
Tasks: A Jewish Response to Pope Francis on Interreligious Relations and 
Collaboration’, in Pope Francis and Interreligious Dialogue: Religious Thinkers 
272 
 
Engage with Recent Papal Initiatives, Harold Kasimow and Alan Race (eds.) (Cham: 
Palgrave Macmillan) pp. 101-128 
Zhang, Xue Jiao. 2016. ‘How St. Francis Influenced Pope Francis’ Laudato Si’, in 
CrossCurrents 66.1: 42-56 
